

EAST ASIA: HISTORY, POLITICS, SOCIOLOGY, CULTURE

edited by
EDWARD BEAUCHAMP
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII

A GARLAND SERIES

THE ORIGINS OF THE
BILATERAL OKINAWA
PROBLEM

OKINAWA IN POSTWAR U.S.-JAPAN
RELATIONS, 1945-1952

ROBERT D. ELDRIDGE

GARLAND PUBLISHING, INC.
A MEMBER OF THE TAYLOR & FRANCIS GROUP
NEW YORK & LONDON/2001

Published in 2001 by
Garland Publishing, Inc.
A member of the Taylor & Francis Group
29 West 35th Street
New York, NY 10001

Copyright © 2001 by Robert D. Eldridge

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

*Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available
from the Library of Congress.*

ISBN 0-8153-3948-8

Printed on acid-free, 250 year-life paper
Manufactured in the United States of America

This book is dedicated to the memories of my father, Donald P. Eldridge (1924-1986), a participant himself in the Battle of Okinawa, and my brother; Thomas M. Eldridge (1951-1998), two men of two generations who taught me to love history—my father without his being aware of it and my brother without his being able to see the labor of this love of history through to its completion.

History is understood and written on two levels—factual and interpretive. As time passes, the ability of the scholar to better understand a certain period, issue, or a policy-maker's decision and action is often made possible through the opening of archival materials or the publication of memoirs. At the same time, however, as these same years and decades pass, the participants of events at the time likewise get older, become forgetful, or may have already passed away. When doing my doctoral dissertation, "Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952: The Origins of the Eilateral Okinawa Problem," the author was fortunately blessed by the best of both worlds. The passage of time has allowed most or sometimes all of the necessary documents and related materials to become available while still being not so long ago that the participants available for interviews no longer remember important details and impressions. While completing my book, however, two retired U.S. Foreign Service Officers who were especially generous with their time, recollections, and comments with me, as the reader will see, passed away to the deep regret of their families, friends, former colleagues, and especially to me, who looked forward to visiting with them upon the completion of this work and sharing it with the both of them.

*I would like to include a "Special Dedication"
to their memories here.*

*Ambassador Marshall Green (1916-1998)
Richard B. Finn (1917-1998)*

Table of Contents

Abbreviations Used in Main Text

List of Figures

Acknowledgments

Preface

Chapter 1

Introduction

Chapter 2

The Strategic Debate Over Okinawa, 1942-1946:

America's Search for National Security

Chapter 3

The State Department and Postwar Planning for

Okinawa, 1942-1946: Realizing the Principle of "No Territorial

Aggrandizement"

Chapter 4

The SWNCC Debate over Okinawa, 1945-1947:

An Unresolved and Unresolvable Question of Trusteeship

Chapter 5

The Japanese Government's Plainning for a Peace Treaty and

its Views Regarding Okinawa's Territorial Status, 1945-1948

Chapter 6

Forging a Domestic Policy Consensus for Okinawa:

The PPS and the Formation of NSC 13, 1947-1949

Chapter 7

The Treaty of Peace with Japan and Article 3: U.S. Strategic Requirements, Japanese Territorial Desires, and the Problem of International Recognition, 1949-1951

Chapter 8

Conclusion: The Limits of Article 3, Ratification and the Elusive Search for a "Practicable Arrangement "

Appendix

Selected Bibliography

Abbreviations Used in Main Text

<i>ACJ</i>	Allied Council of Japan
<i>ACPWFP</i>	Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy
ACPFR	Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations
CA	Division of Chinese Affairs
CAC	Country and Area Committees
<i>CIA</i>	Central Intelligence Agency
<i>CinCFE</i>	Commander-in-Chief, Far East Cominand
<i>CinCPAC</i>	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
<i>CinCPACFLT</i>	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
CAD	Civil Affairs Division
CG	Consul General
DA	Division of Dependent Areas
ES	Division of Economic Studies; Subcommittee on Economic Problems
FE	Office (Bureau) of Far Eastern Affairs
FEC	Far Eastern Commission
FECOM	Far East Cominand
FY	Fiscal Year
<i>GHQ/SCAP</i>	General Headquarters, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
GS	Government Section
IDACFE	Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East
<i>ISO</i>	Division of International Security and Organizations
<i>JA</i>	Division of Japanese Affairs
<i>JCS</i>	Joint Chiefs of Staff
<i>JIC</i>	Joint Intelligence Committee
<i>JIS</i>	Joint Intelligence Staff

<i>JLC</i>	Joint Logistics Committee
<i>JLPC</i>	Joint Logistics Plans Committee
<i>JLPG</i>	Joint Logistics Plans Group
<i>JPS</i>	Joint Staff Planners
<i>JSPC</i>	Joint Strategic Plans Committee
<i>JSPG</i>	Joint Strategic Plans Group
<i>JSSC</i>	Joint Strategic Survey Command
<i>JWPC</i>	Joint War Plans Committee
<i>LA</i>	Division of Legal Affairs; Division of Liberated Areas
<i>MG</i>	Military Government
<i>MGS</i>	Military Government Section
<i>NA</i>	Division of Northeast Asian Affairs
<i>NME</i>	National Military Establishment
<i>NSC</i>	National Security Council
<i>OEA</i>	Office of Economic Affairs
<i>OPD</i>	Operations and Planning Division
<i>OPSA</i>	Office of Special Political Affairs
<i>OSS</i>	Office of Strategic Services
<i>PHILRYCOM</i>	Philippines-Ryukyus Command
<i>POLAD</i>	Political Adviser
<i>PPS</i>	Policy Planning Staff
<i>PS</i>	Division of Political Studies; Subcommittee on Political Problems
<i>PWC</i>	Post-War Programs Committee
<i>RYCOM</i>	Ryukyus Command
<i>SANACC</i>	State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee
<i>SP</i>	Division of Southwest Pacific Affairs
<i>SR</i>	Division of Special Research
<i>SWNCC</i>	State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
<i>TS</i>	Division of Territorial Studies; Subcommittee on Territorial Problems
<i>UK</i>	United Kingdom
<i>UN</i>	United Nations
<i>UNA</i>	Office of United Nations Affairs
<i>US</i>	United States
<i>USA</i>	United States of America; United States Army
<i>USAF</i>	United States Air Force
<i>USMC</i>	United States Marine Corps
<i>USN</i>	United States Navy
<i>USSR</i>	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

List of Figures

Map 1-1	Nansei Islands
Map 2-1	Territorial Provisions of the Peace Treaty and Okinawa/Iwo Jima's Geostrategic Position
Table 2-1	Definitions and Locations of Base Areas
Figure 3-1	Evolution of Okinawa Policy in the State Department
Map 4-1	The Disposition of the Nansei Islands in JCS 161911
Figure 4-1	Early Important Papers Presented by the JCS and State Department to SWNCC Relating to Trusteeships and the Disposition of Okinawa, 1946
Figure 5-1	Explanatory Documents on the Ryukyu and Nansei Islands Prepared by the Japanese Foreign Ministry
Map 6-1	Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands in PPS/10/1
Table 6-1	Formation of NSC 13 (With Particular Reference to Okinawa)
Table 6-2	Visits to Okinawa by Foreign Service Officers, State Department Officials, and Senior Military Personnel, 1945-1950
Figure 7-1	Article 3 as a Product of Compromise: The Numerous Pressures John Foster Dulles Faced in Negotiating the Territorial Provisions of the Nansei (Ryukyu) Islands

Acknowledgments

Osewn ni narimashita is a Japanese phrase which means to be indebted to someone. It is a phrase that quickly became necessary for me to learn upon coming to Japan in 1990. It is also one of my most favorite expressions in the Japanese language because it reflects the fact that I, during the course of my life, and particularly during my almost ten years in Japan, have truly been indebted to many people. Here I would like to acknowledge them and their assistance.

First, my loving gratitude goes to my wife, Emiko Doi Eldridge, who has been by my side throughout the Master's and Doctoral programs. Emiko gave me strength when I was out of it, confidence when I did not believe in myself, and love when I needed it. This study of U.S.-Japan relations, which began as my Ph.D. dissertation, is as much hers as it is mine. One week after I received my Doctorate, our daughter, Ami Mary Eldridge, was born—another "joint effort" so to speak. While preparing the dissertation for publication, Ami has been a great source of joy, fun, and love for which I am so grateful. I look forward to the day when we can read this book together.

Second, my eternal gratitude goes to my mother, Mary M. Eldridge, and to my deceased father, Donald P. Eldridge. I thank them for giving me their all-out love, support, and encouragement over the years.

Third, my deep and respectful gratitude goes to Dr. Iokibe Makoto, my mentor, advisor, teacher, dear friend, and now, Ami's godfather. Without his trust and belief in me, this study and my five years at Kobe University, first in the Master's program and then in the Ph.D. program, would not have been possible. I have been very, very fortunate to have had a *sensei* and dissertation advisor like him.

Fourthly, I would like to express my special thanks to the several individuals who took and continue to take the time to share with me their comments, impressions, and recollections of the events in which they

participated described in this dissertation. These kind and generous people include: George F. Kennan, the late Marshall Green, the late Richard B. Finn, Robert A. Fearey, Olcott H. Deming, the late John S. Service, Niles W. Bond, Edward O. Freimuth, and numerous others.

Fifthly, I would like to acknowledge the scholars and researchers that have gone before me who have made this task of writing history both more enjoyable and a great learning experience. In particular, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Iokibe, Gabe Masaaki, Watanabe Akio, Kono Yasuko, Miyazato Seigen, Igarashi Takeshi, Kitaoka Shinichi, Hata Ikuhiko, Sakamoto Kazuya, Murata Koji, Sugita Yoneyuki, and others who have come before me in the study of postwar Japan and U.S.-Japan relations.

There are also many other people to whom I have been indebted. I wish to express my deep appreciation to my sister, Patricia, and brothers (Thomas, Michael, and John) and their families in the United States, and my "second family" here in Japan—my in-laws, Ryosuke and Fukiko Doi, Akiko, Hiroyuki, and Yoshiko; the people of my "second hometown," Naka-cho, Japan, particularly my guarantor Ikeda Yutaka sensei and his charming wife who have given me their friendship since I first came to Japan; my senpai, dokyusei, and kohai from Kobe University for their friendship, guidance, and support—Cheikh Sarr Gueye, Hattori Ryuji, Minohara Toshihiro, Takahara Shusuke, the late Kudo Jun (who tragically died along with 38 others from Kobe University in the 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake at the start of what promised for him to be a truly brilliant career as a scholar of Western Political History), Hattori Satoshi, Murai Ryota, Kusunoki Ayako, Murakami Tomoaki, Mary Alice Pickert, David Wolff; my friends in Okinawa, Gil and Betty Hoffman, Kakazu Noriaki, formerly of the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly, Miki Ken and his colleagues at the Ryukyu *Shimpo*, and Christopher Ames, formerly of the Public Affairs Office of Kadena Air Force Base, who have provided much help, warmth, and friendship during my many visits to Okinawa; Nakamoto Kazuhiro (and his lovely family), Yamahata Haruna, and friends in Washington, D.C. who made my stays there and work at the National Archives in College Park a pleasure (not to mention lending me valuable assistance in acquiring materials for my research); my cousin and friend Jimmie Foster, who came to my rescue many times after frantic messages for help with documents in Washington; Kumagai Toshiki and his colleagues at the U.S. Consulate in Osaka who befriended me in my early days here at Kobe University and included me in the many functions of the U.S. Information Agency at the consulate; Muroi Norio at the Pacific Stars and Stripes office in Tokyo who kindly worked with me in searching his office's vast clippings library and who quite often sent me by mail and fax materials for which I was looking; Hitoshi Yuichiro at the National Diet Library; Dennis Bilger at the Harry S. Truman Library; David J. Haight at

the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library; Ben Primer of the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton; Thomas E. Camden of the George C. Marshall Foundation Research Library; James W. Zobel of the MacArthur Memorial Research Library; Carol A. Leadenham of the Hoover Institution Archives at Stanford University; the dedicated staff at the National Archives in College Park; and numerous others who have been so kind and helpful along the way.

Last, but not least, as the expression goes, I would like to express my deep gratitude to the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (Nihon *Gakujutsu* Shinkokni), for which I was a special research fellow from 1997-1999, and the Matsushita International Foundation (Matsushita Kokusai Zaidnn), whose grant allowed me to gather much of the materials I have cited from such places as Okinawa, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C. Without the financial and institutional support of these two organizations, the research for this study would definitely have not been possible. Likewise, the Suntory Foundation (*Suntory* Bunka Znidan), which has sponsored me as a Fellow following the completion of my Doctorate, deserves my deep appreciation for their support and encouragement.

To all of the above, I express once again my deepest gratitude and hope that I may continue to be deserving of their support, friendship, and love. Mnkoto ni osewn ni nrimnshitn. Kongo *tomo, dozo yoroshiku onegai shi-masu.*

Preface

This study, "The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem: Okinawa in Postwar U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1952," began out of a hnnsei, or self-criticism if you will, during the completion of my master's thesis on postwar Japanese prime minister Yoshida Shigeru and his foreign policy. As the final touches of that thesis were being added, the tragic abduction and rape of a 12-year-old Okinawan schoolgirl (on September 4, 1995) occurred, touching off the present stage of the "Okinawa Problem." I realized then that I had written little about Okinawa, or for that matter the "Okinawa Problem," in the thesis. For my doctoral dissertation I decided therefore that I would explore a different angle of postwar Japanese history and U.S.-Japan relations by looking at the "Okinawa Problem" head-on, so to speak.

When starting the initial research in late 1995 and early 1996, I found myself immersed in learning about both the present-day economic and socio-political problems Okinawa was facing relating to the still-large presence of U.S. military bases, as well as the early political and cultural history of the Ryukyu Kingdom (*Ryukyu Okoku*) and its relations with both Japan and China approaching the status of being under the "dual sovereignty" of both neighbors. In the latter context, I found George H. Kerr's classic book, *Okinawa: The History of an Island People*, immensely valuable and fascinating reading.' I, in fact, re-read his book on the 48-hour ferry ride down the Ryukyu Island chain to Okinawa, when I visited there for the first time in the summer of 1996.

I also became drawn into learning more about the Battle of Okinawa in 1945, which as a child I remember hearing about from my father who was a 20-year-old participant in the battle. While there, I undertook visits to local historical battle sites and the recently constructed Heiwn no *Ishiji* (Cornerstone of Peace) park near where the "last stand" took place in the southern part of the main island of Okinawa. Anyone who visits Okinawa

can not leave there without be overwhelmed by the suffering the civilians in Okinawa endured during the three months necessary for U.S. troops to take the islands and Japanese forces (as part of their efforts to delay a final attack on Japan) to surrender—a battle in which more non-combatants died than the forces of both the U.S. military and Japanese Imperial Army combined. The experiences of that battle understandably resulted in the anti-war psychological and sociological make-up of the people themselves. That this theme is not addressed more in this study itself by no means is meant to suggest or imply that the author was unaware of this history or that those feelings did not exist in the postwar years covered.

Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.'s *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945–1950*, published by the U.S. Army's Center of Military History, gave me a greater understanding of these immediate postwar years in Okinawa (admittedly from the U.S. military perspective), as well as the planning that went into military government and the difficulties encountered during the early stages of the administration of the islands due in large part to the destruction caused by the war and subsequent typhoons, poor funding and supplies, and lack of over-all guiding policy.' A second trip to Okinawa as a Special Visiting Fellow at Ryukyu University in the early part of 1997 thanks to Professor Gabe Masaaki gave me the opportunity to build upon my knowledge of those years by working with him and other Okinawan scholars and local historians. It also allowed me to benefit from regular use of the nearby collections at the Local Materials Reading Room (*Kyodo Shiryo Shitsu*) of the Ryukyu University Library, as well as the collections at the Okinawa Prefectural Archives (Okinnwnken Kobunshokan), the Naha City Historical Materials Center (Nahashi *Shiryo* Senta), and the Okinawa Prefectural Library (Okinnwn Kenritsu Toshokan).

It was in the middle of this journey into Ryukyuan history, prewar history, battle history, occupation history, and postwar history that I realized that there were too many topics and general materials regarding Okinawa to cover in one dissertation (or probably in one lifetime for that matter). Dr. Iokibe Makoto, my dissertation advisor at Kobe University, set me back on course again after a frantic call to him one evening early into my second stay in Okinawa. After telling him of my dilemma, he simply asked me (rhetorically I imagine) if I wanted to be "a scholar of Okinawa" or "a scholar of U.S.-Japan relations," adding that while learning as much as I could about Okinawa was indeed vital to understanding the history of the so-called "Okinawa problem," the basic framework of the dissertation was a bilateral political and diplomatic history—in other words, our field of study. With that truly "eye-opening" comment—the kind of obvious yet enlightening advice that every Ph.D. student receives (or should receive if necessary) during his or her period of study—I was able to refocus. I

decided to reexamine the previous research, concentrating on the political-military-diplomatic relationship in the context of postwar Okinawa.

I quickly discovered however that with the exception of four Japanese works, two of which were first published in English and serve as the "Bible" for non-Japanese readers interested in postwar Okinawa, there was little systematic study of the political and diplomatic history relating to the "Okinawa Problem." Of these four studies, Miyazato Seigen's *Amerika no Taigai Seisaku Kettei Kntei* (The Process of American Foreign Policy-Making), and Kono Yasuko's *Okinnwa Henknn o Meguru Seiji to Gaiko Nichibei Kankeishi no Bunmyaku* (The Politics and Diplomacy of the Reversion of Okinawa in the Context of the History of U.S.-Japan Relations) are, as discussed more fully in the Introduction chapter, really the only ones that give the reader more than a general account of the diplomatic history involved, particularly for the years from 1945 to 1952.' Indeed, it was Dr. Kono herself who also recognized that the early postwar period was not yet fully understood and thus strongly encouraged me to focus on the 1945 to 1952 period.

With this recommendation, which happened to correspond with my advisor's own strong prompting and encouragement to focus on a more specific and manageable topic and period, I decided to undertake an in-depth examination of what I have called "The Origins of the Bilateral Okinawa Problem," as the first part of what is meant to be a larger, three-volume study of the so-called "Okinawa Problem" in the postwar U.S.-Japan relationship from 1945 until the present day.' The reader of this study should thus bear in mind that rather than discuss in generalities the entire dynamic and complicated "Okinawa Problem," a problem that remains with us today in the context of bilateral and international political and security relations, as well as the complex social and administrative relationship between Tokyo and Okinawa, or discuss the larger Cold War history (which I feared would prevent an *in-depth* look at Okinawa policy), the purpose here is to examine in historical detail the underlying conflict between political considerations and military requirements regarding Okinawa in the 1945-1952 period as well as to explore how this conflict "spilled over" into the bilateral relationship with Japan by looking at Japanese planning for the Peace Treaty and their views on the territorial provisions of the future peace treaty for Okinawa usually primary materials, many of which have never been used or introduced before. I arrived at several new conclusions and interpretations regarding decision-making on both sides of the Pacific that I hope the reader will consider, evaluate, and perhaps appreciate.

This study makes extensive use of primary materials in both Japanese and English, such as declassified and newly discovered government documents, diaries, and memoirs (both published and unpublished), and personal papers (both open and closed collections) from numerous archives in

Okinawa and Tokyo, Japan, and the United States, including the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Military History Institute (U.S. Army War College), Nimitz Library (U.S. Naval Academy), Hoover Institution Archives (Stanford University), Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library (Princeton University), Oral History Research Office (Columbia University), George C. Marshall Library (Virginia Military Institute), and other locations, as well as interviews and correspondence with numerous participants of events at the time. It is hoped therefore that the extensive introduction that follows of factual information not known or fully examined until now will also allow for a more solid interpretation of the period covered here in this historical study.

Considering the fact that the "Okinawa Problem" is so politically and socially complicated and dynamic, as well as U.S. (and Japanese) strategic interests in the region continuing to be so committed, it is safe to assume that the problem, as both a bilateral one and a domestic one for the Japanese government and the people of Okinawa, will not quickly or easily go away.⁶ The need, therefore, for a new understanding of the historic aspects of the relationship is essential for students of U.S.-Japan relations and policy-makers alike in both countries. I believe this study will add to that understanding. I hope also that it will serve as a new starting point for those interested in pursuing further studies of Japanese Foreign Policy, American Foreign Policy, U.S.-Japan Relations, and Okinawan history.

Robert D. Eldridge
Rokko-dai Campus, Kobe University
December 1998
Naha, Okinawa
September 2000

NOTES

1. George H. Kerr, *Okinawa: The History of an Island People* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, Co., 1958).
2. Arnold G. Fisch, Jr., *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1988).
3. The two English language studies are Milzio Higa, *Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa* (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1963) and Alzio Watanabe, *The Okinawa Problem: A Chapter in Japan-US. Relations* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1970). Higa's well-organized study gives an overview of what he calls the "the political status of Olzinawa" and loolz at the development of political parties in Olzinawa. He next examines the attitudes of these political parties on questions such as the reversion issue, the U.S. base problem, and self-government and analyzes party politics in Olzinawa. Watanabe's study on the other hand loolz at the problem from a Japanese domestic political per-


spective. He gives careful treatment to the history of the Okinawa problem through the late 1960s, the roles of Japanese governmental departments in the making of policy, as well as the influence of political parties, individuals and organizations active in the Okinawa issue, the press, framing it all in the context of an intra-alliance conflict—the alliance being the one formed in 1951–1952 with the signing and ratification of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

4. Miyazato Seigen, *Amerika no Taigai Seisaku Kettei Katei* (Tokyo: Sanichi Shoho, 1981) and Kono Yasuko, *Okinawa Henkan o Meguru Seiji to Gaiko Nichibei Kankeishi no Bunmyaku* (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1994).

5. I would like to express here my gratitude to former Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard L. Arinitage who suggested the inclusion of the word "bilateral" in the dissertation title to prevent confusion with the fact that other aspects of the problem, including specifically the sometimes difficult domestic, cultural, social, and psychological relationship between Okinawa and Japan, also exist. Author's interview with Richard L. Arinitage, Arlington, Virginia, June 23, 1998.

6. Symbolic of the difficult nature of the problem—the balancing of strategic requirements with political and social concerns—residents in Okinawa Prefecture have in recent years sought to challenge the authority of the central government as to whether the United States should be allowed to maintain its large, and many understandably say unfair, military presence in Okinawa. Two examples of this movement are the 1996 prefectural referendum and the 1997 plebiscite in Nago City against construction of a heliport off the eastern coast of Nago. For discussions on these two issues, see Robert D. Eldridge, "The 1996 Okinawa Referendum on U.S. Ease Reductions: One Question, Several Answers," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 37, No. 10 (October 1997), 879-904; and Robert D. Eldridge, "Okinawa and the Nago Heliport Problem in the U.S.-Japan Relationship," *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2000), 137-156.

Map 1-1



Source: Adapted and translated from materials provided by Okinawa Prefectural Government by the author with the assistance of Emiko D. Eldridge, November 1998

Introduction

I. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

The tragic abduction and rape of an Okinawan schoolgirl by three American servicemen in September 1995 touched off the present stage of the so-called "Okinawa problem," shaking the bilateral relationship and bringing national and international attention to the situation in Okinawa in which local residents have been increasingly frustrated with the problems related to the presence of U.S. bases and the seeming indifference of the central government to their problems. Until that tragic incident occurred, however, it would not be an exaggeration to say that many people in Japan and the United States had long forgotten about Okinawa. As a result, having not heard about Okinawa or the problems there for so long, many wondered why American forces are still there, or perhaps why the United States ever chose to station forces in Okinawa in the first place.

In fact, the United States has maintained a large military presence there since the Battle of Okinawa began in late March 1945. After the occupation/administration period ended in 1972, the United States continued this presence through the application of the 1960 U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the related Status of Forces Agreement, and the so-called "5115 Memo," made public in 1997, with its secret provisions. This presence, the base-related accidents, crimes, pollution, forced land-leasing, and the resentment caused by these issues (and the appearance of indifference by the central government), are what is known as the "Okinawa Problem," or more accurately, the "Bilateral Okinawa Problem."

The purpose of this study is to attempt to answer the above questions by examining the beginning of the bilateral Okinawa problem—the 1951 Peace Treaty with Japan, whose Article 3, while recognizing Japan's "residual sovereignty" over the Nansei (Ryukyu) Islands (including Okinawa) and Nanpo Islands (including Ogasawara and Iwo Jima), allowed the

United States to hold not only base rights, but the powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction as well.¹ This study shows how Article 3 with its purposely vague wording was the product of a compromise that the architect of the peace treaty, John Foster Dulles was forced to build. This compromise was made in order to allow Japan to retain sovereignty over Okinawa, as desired by Japan (and supported by the State Department) and prevent it from being separated permanently from main islands, which is what the U.S. military, led by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was demanding. The clash over military requirements and political considerations, and the resulting impact it had on U.S.-Japan relations as seen in the disappointment felt by the Okinawan and Japanese people at the time of the peace treaty, are what the author considers the "origins" of the bilateral Okinawa problem. It is the examination of this clash of political and military interests over Okinawa that is the primary focus of this study.

This study's second main purpose is to examine, again in as great as detail as possible, how this political and military clash affected the U.S.-Japan relationship, recovering from the disruption caused by the war, by looking at the Japanese government's planning for a peace treaty, its views on Okinawa's territorial status, its strong desire to see the islands returned, and its numerous attempts to express those views to the United States and the Allies, based on the extensive use of Japanese (and U.S.) primary documents, diaries, and other accounts from that period. While the Japanese government eventually accepted the terms of Article 3, this study, using new Japanese documents, disproves the general image that the Japanese government was indifferent to Okinawa's fate at the time of the treaty, and while recognizing U.S. strategic requirements, repeatedly tried to secure Okinawa's "return."

II. OVERVIEW OF PREVIOUS RESEARCH AND CHAPTER CONTENTS

In approaching this study of the "Okinawa Problem" in postwar U.S.-Japan relations for the period of 1945 to 1952, the author was surprised, as mentioned in the Preface, at how little systematic research actually existed on this topic, or indeed on the entire postwar period up until the present day. While various articles have been written about different aspects of Okinawa history or politics, they were unfortunately random, repetitive, and not undertaken in any systematic manner. Likewise, around the time of Okinawa's reversion to Japan in the 1972, several dissertations appeared on the reversion policy-making process. However for the most part, these dissertations were written it seems more for their attempts to apply or test a political science model than to illuminate at any great length the political and diplomatic history of the "Okinawa Problem" itself. As a result, the same historical "facts" (often incorrect) are often repeated and the surface seems only scratched. Indeed, with the exception of the two

studies mentioned earlier by Miyazato and Kono, few studies of postwar U.S.-Japan-Okinawa relations go into the historic detail necessary to get an accurate picture of this time period.

However, unfortunately, both Miyazato and Kono themselves in the end do not go far enough or into enough detail in examining the policy-making dynamics over Okinawa between the military and the State Department. As a result, there is a tendency in their works to make factual mistakes and misinterpret events, thereby leaving many questions unanswered. Likewise, these studies have not made use of the wealth of declassified documents, diaries, memoirs, and other historical materials that have become available in recent years, and thus, while admirable works, do not completely present the full picture.

In Miyazato's case, due perhaps to his ambitious task of comparing the making of American foreign policy for both Vietnam and Okinawa, he seems to have had to limit his path-breaking discussion to "case studies" on the U.S. side of the debate and more specifically, to the documents themselves, rather than making use of the wealth of personal accounts from participants of the time which would add better insight to events and policy-making. Also he does not seem to take Japanese planning and views into any consideration and thus presents a very limited picture of this critical time period. On the other hand, Kono was more aware of the need to look at the Japanese side in her overall excellent and informative treatment of postwar relationship up until the reversion of Okinawa in 1972. Unfortunately for some reason, however, Kono too pays no attention to the Japanese side of the debate until the time of the peace treaty, thus effectively shedding no light on the critical planning stages, and makes little use of the related diaries, memoirs, and other accounts that would have benefited her work. Likewise, her discussion of the 1945-1952 period, while not shallow, provides less detail than one might hope for, particularly on the U.S. side.

Both studies nevertheless proved to be invaluable for giving the author direction in this area. However, because of the lack of detailed, comprehensive, and systematic research on this period, as described above, it became necessary in writing this study to discuss more completely the political and diplomatic history of this period, specifically the origins of the bilateral problem. Employing numerous documents and materials from both sides of the Pacific that have become available over the passage of time, including of course declassified memorandum, several diaries, and other personal accounts, may have allowed the author to do so, as shown in the chapters that follow.

The study is divided into eight, essentially chronological chapters, including this introductory chapter (Chapter One), following movements in Washington, Tokyo, and to a smaller extent Okinawa to examine how the "high policy," rather than occupation policy per se, was being made for

Okinawa. The chapters become progressively longer in length. This is for two reasons. One reflects the simple fact that there was "more happening" later on in relation to the subject matter, such as the aborted peace treaty conference in 1947, the increase in the number of agencies, divisions, and people involved in reexamining Japan policy and the making of NSC 13 in 1948 and 1949, as well as the preparations for the Peace Treaty with Japan in 1950 and 1951. The second reason, more importantly, is because despite the fact there was more happening, particularly around the time of the Treaty of Peace with Japan in 1951, little research on the subject actually exists and hence a great need arises to carefully document and record it. Throughout each of the chapters, numerous maps, charts, tables, and figures are also provided to highlight or illuminate a certain point or policy decision.

The demands of the JCS to be allowed free use of Okinawa by having exclusive and absolute control of the islands, which can be traced directly to the lessons that the military learned from World War II, form the first part of the debate as found in Chapter Two, and are expressed later in other parts of this study, such as in Chapters Four, Six, Seven, and Eight. The United States, as we see in Chapter Two, was found to be unprepared militarily and other powers, like Japan, threatened America's inadequately defended Pacific possessions and military installations with the result being a devastating attack on Pearl Harbor. The desire of the JCS and the civilian secretaries of the War and Navy Departments to have absolute control over the Pacific became stronger as the war continued and more lives were lost capturing islands in preparation for the final attack on Japan. These lessons were reflected in the planning for postwar bases overseas. Okinawa as a potential base of operations and as a postwar base surfaced late in this planning, but once Okinawa appeared, the view of it as "the Keystone of the Pacific" stayed for good. As the Cold War emerged and a hot war broke out nearby on the Korean peninsula, the JCS' demands, supported, if not led, by General Douglas MacArthur in Tokyo, to retain absolute control of Okinawa became more uncompromising than ever—even at the risk of endangering post-treaty relations with Japan. The demands of the military, particularly the JCS, for control over Okinawa form one side of the debate discussed below.

The State Department, specifically the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, on the other hand, was extremely sensitive to the political and diplomatic implications of U.S. retention of the islands, particularly wishing to avoid violating the principal of "no territorial aggrandizement" as found in the 1941 Atlantic Charter announced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt. As is seen in Chapter Three, as early as 1942, when the State Department first began its systematic studies for the postwar, discussions on Okinawa's status were held. Later, in 1943, the first State Department paper on the Ryukyu Islands emerged recommending that the islands be demilitarized

and returned to Japan. After that the State Department continued to argue for the retention of the islands by Japan, as reflected in its planning and policy papers. These conclusions would clash with the demands of the military, which continued to call for either outright annexation or strategic trusteeship both of which the State Department opposed. By 1947, with the Cold War clearly emerging, the State Department came to better recognize the strategic requirements of the military and suggested a base-leasing agreement. This however was vetoed by the military as being "inadequate." Eventually a temporary compromise, recognizing the strategic needs and long-term desire of the United States to retain some form of control over the islands, but delaying final decision on the international status of the islands, was worked out which became National Security Council memorandum NSC 13/3 in 1949. However, officials in the State Department were unhappy with the military's uncompromising stance and would continue in the months and years ahead to search for a way to allow Okinawa to be retained by Japan in fact as well as just name. The State Department's views form the other side of the debate in this study, as seen particularly in Chapters Three, Four, Six, Seven, and Eight.

This study's second important focus is to examine, as looked at in great detail in Chapters Five and Seven, and to a lesser extent in Chapter Eight, how this political and military clash affected the U.S.-Japan relationship, recovering from the disruption caused by the war, by looking at the Japanese government's planning for a peace treaty, its views on Okinawa's territorial status, its strong desire to see the islands returned, and its attempts to express those views to the United States and Allies, based on numerous primary documents, diaries, and other accounts from that period. While the Japanese government eventually accepted the terms of Article 3, this study disproves the general image that the Japanese government was indifferent to Okinawa's fate at the time of the treaty. Indeed, the author argues that its efforts were critical and should be evaluated favorably.

In fact the Japanese Foreign Ministry began preparing at an early stage for the future peace treaty, giving particular attention to the problems of its territories such as Okinawa.² The Foreign Ministry, the author discovered, as early as 1947 even prepared a memorandum which while recognizing the strategic interests of the Allied Powers in Okinawa, sought to make an arrangement with the Allies by allowing them to maintain bases there but keeping sovereignty and administrative rights with the Japanese government. Eventually in late 1947, after the start of the Cold War and the failed attempt at holding a peace conference for Japan in August, it was the Emperor (who in the author's opinion sought to prevent the loss of sovereignty over Okinawa) that relayed this message, or at least one similar to it.³ The United States and Allies in 1947 were not in any case ready to receive the views of the Japanese government at this point. The Japanese

government continued to view with concern the potential loss of sovereignty over Okinawa. During Dulles' trip to Japan in January-February 1951, Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru and his Foreign Ministry officials relayed those concerns and desires on numerous occasions, through the sympathetic State Department representative in Tokyo (who also acted as MacArthur's political adviser), William J. Sebald. The author made great use of Sebald's diary, interviews, as well as Japanese documents (including the Doba Hajime Papers) never before cited to illuminate an unknown side of the creation of the "residual sovereignty" formula.

The author, in his conclusions, evaluates the work that went into Article 3 favorably in the sense that while Article 3, allowing U.S. retention of administrative rights over Okinawa, became the beginning of the bilateral Okinawa problem, it was probably the best possible solution that could be reached at the time (due to the uncompromising stance of the JCS). That is to say, it prevented the worst case scenario from the Japanese, Okinawan (and State Department) perspective—Okinawa's permanent separation from Japan. Had that happened, U.S.-Japan relations would likely have been greatly affected if not permanently damaged. Indeed, new evidence the author introduces here suggests that Dulles and the State Department sought to create a window of opportunity in order to possibly secure the return of the islands to Japan. However, in the end, Okinawa was in actuality separated from the administrative functions of Japan to the disappointment of the Okinawans and Japanese and, while not the focus of this study, it was only a matter of time before the untenable situation created under Article 3 would have to be changed.

In the above ways, the following chapters illuminate the origins of the bilateral Okinawa problem, offering several new interpretations and conclusions along the way. It is hoped that this new evaluation of this period will contribute to a more accurate, solid, and perhaps balanced understanding of this truly complicated history.

NOTES

1. Unless specifically so written in a cited document, the author will use Okinawa, the Ryukyu Shoto (or Islands), and the Nansei Shoto interchangeably. Technically speaking, as seen in [Map 2-1](#), the Nansei Islands represent the entire island chain south of the main island of Kyushu in western Japan, of which the Ryukyu Islands are a part. The Ryukyu Islands are those south of 27° North Latitude (with Amami Gunto being those north of that parallel). Okinawa is the name of the largest island in the Ryukyus and as a result the word "Okinawa" is often used to designate all of the islands.

2. Several studies have been done to date which have examined, to varying degrees, attempts by the Japanese government to influence, or at a minimum, to put forth its views and desires to the United States and other Allied countries. Most of those studies were however written before Japanese diplomatic documents and

memoirs of participants at the time became available and thus contain some factual and interpretive errors. Likewise, those studies have tended to focus primarily on the post-treaty security debate and have largely left out discussion on the views of the Japanese government regarding other issues. Particularly this is true concerning the territorial status of Okinawa, an important strategic location, and the government's territorial desires in a future peace treaty settlement. In chronological order these published studies include: Martin E. Weinstein, *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969); Nishimura Kumao, *San Furanshisztko Heiwa Joyaku* (The San Francisco Peace Treaty), Vol. 27, in the series edited by Kajima Heiwa Kenkyujo, ed., *Nihon Gaikoshi* (Japanese Diplomatic History), (Tokyo:Kajima Kenkyujo Shuppankai, 1971), 10 (Nishimura was a participant in events of this time as a member of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, and then as that bureau's director from December 1947 until May 1952. His study is the main historical text on Japan's preparations for the peace treaty.); Nishimura Kumao, "Senryo Zenki no Tainichi Kowa Mondai — Muttsu no Dentatsu (The Problem of the Peace Treaty With Japan—Six Attempts at Communication)," *Fainanszt* (Finance), Vol. 10, No.11 (February 1975), 77; Michael M. Yoshitsu, *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983); Reinhard Drifte, *The Security Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-1952* (East Sussex: Saltire Press, 1983), Marie D. Strazer, "Japanese Efforts to Influence a Peace Settlement, 1945-1951," in Thomas H. Eurkman, ed., *The Occztpation of Japan: The International Context* (Norfolk, VA: MacArthur Memorial Foundation, 1984), 195-211; Watanabe Akio, "Kowa Joyaku to Nihon no Sentaku (The Peace Treaty and Japan's Choices)," in Watanabe Akio and Miyazato Seigen, ed., *San Fztranshisuko Kowa* (The San Francisco Peace Treaty), (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986), 17-54; and Miura Yoichi, *Yoshida Shigeru to San Furanshisztko Kowa Joyaku* (Yoshida Shigeru and the San Francisco Peace Treaty), (Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1996), 71-93. Other studies give shorter attention to these events, but notably John Welfield, *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy* (London: The Athlone Press, 1988), 41-45, includes material obtained from extensive interviews. Indeed, with the exception of Nishimura, Drifte, and Watanabe, the other earlier studies have relied to a large extent on interviews with participants at the time, particularly Nishimura Kumao and Suzuki Tadakatsu, who was Director of the Central Liaison Office in Yokohama. Historical research has been facilitated to some degree however through documentation with the Seventh Opening on September 19, 1982 of some materials from that time period at the Diplomatic Record Office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo. Also the publication of the Diary of Ashida Hitoshi has added to the volume of historic materials from this period. See Ashida Hitoshi (ed. by Shindo Eiichi and Shimokohe Motoharu), *Ashida Hitoshi Nikki* (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1986).

3. This message and incident have also been called, in addition to "The Tenno Message", "The Okinawa Message" and "The Terasaki Message." Shindo

Eiichi, then an Assistant Professor of International Politics at Tsukuba University, first discovered the document and named it the "Tenno Message" in his article "Bunkatsu Sareta Ryodo—Okinawa, Chishima, Soshite Anpo (Separated Territories—Okinawa, Chishima and the Security Treaty)," in *Sekai* (The World), a monthly opinion journal generally recognized as progressive in orientation and argument, in April 1979 (No. 401), 31-51). Later that year in the October issue (No. 407) of *Sekai*, Shindo published "'Tenno Messeeji' no Sairon—Sengo Gaiko Shiryo no Yomikata ('The Tenno Message' Revisited—Ways to Read Postwar Diplomatic Materials)," 104-113. His discovery of the document subsequently touched off a political storm in Tokyo through April and May of 1979 over the Emperor's "interference" in postwar governmental affairs and "sacrificing of Okinawa." The "Tenno Message" has since been discussed briefly and inconclusively in some academic writings in Japan. See for example, Miyazato, *op. cit.*, 217-218; Hata Ikuhiko, *Hirohito Tenno Itsutsu no Ketsudan* (The Five Decisions of Emperor Hirohito), (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1984), which was later revised and published as *Showa Tenno Itsutsu no Ketsudan* (The Five Decisions of the Showa Emperor), (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha, 1994); Miura, *op. cit.*, 94-103; and Toyoshita Narahiko, *Anpo Joyaku no Seiritsu—Yoshida Gaiko to Tenno Gaiko* (The Formation of the Security Treaty—Yoshida's Diplomacy and the Emperor's Diplomacy), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1996). The document itself recording the conversation between the adviser to the Emperor and the Acting Political Adviser in Tokyo, William J. Sebald, can be found in the United States National Archives, College Park, Maryland. See "United States Political Adviser for Japan to Secretary of State on the Subject of the Emperor of Japan's Opinion Concerning the Future of the Ryukyu Islands (September 22, 1947), Despatch No. 1293, With Attached Memorandum for MacArthur (September 20, 1947)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (890.0146/9-2247), Record Group (hereafter RG) 59, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives. While the veracity of the message (and meeting) has never seriously been in doubt with the discovery of the above document, the background behind it, its meaning, and whether or not it was truly Emperor Hirohito's "opinion" were in fact questioned. Suggesting answers to these questions however is now, to some extent, possible with the posthumous publication in 1991 of two diaries of Adviser to Emperor Hirohito, Terasaki Hidenari and Grand Chamberlain Irie Tsukemasa. Both diaries, speaking from two different time periods, confirm that the message came from the Emperor. Moreover, the former diary answers to some extent the question of the background of the meeting and message, while the latter clarifies to some extent its meaning. See Terasaki Hidenari and Mariko Terasaki Miller, eds., *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku: Terasaki Hidenari Goyogakari Nikki* (Personal Account of the Showa Emperor: The Diary of the Terasaki Hidenari, Adviser to the Emperor), (Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha, 1991) and Irie Tametoshi, ed., *Irie Tsukemasa Nikki* (The Diary of Irie Tsukemasa), (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1991).

The Strategic Debate Over Okinawa, 1942-1946: America's Search for National Security

I. INTRODUCTION

One of the many lessons learned in the aftermath of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941 was that the United States was no longer invulnerable. For almost two centuries before the day U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared "a date that would live in infamy," America enjoyed its political and physical "splendid isolation" thanks in no small part to the two large bodies of water separating the Western Hemisphere from the continents of Europe and Asia. With advances in modern technology, particularly the aircraft carrier perfected by the Imperial Japanese Navy, long-range bombers, and long-range missiles (and much later inter-continental missiles), that isolation ended dramatically. Not only were American shorelines exposed, but indeed any place inland would also become a potential site for attack.

In the interwar years (1919-1941), the United States had not only renounced its rights to strengthen its bases west of Pearl Harbor, it had also allowed a foreign power like its Pacific rival Japan to occupy and fortify islands near America's vital interests, such as the Philippines, and already isolated bases, like Guam, Wake, and Midway.¹ At the same time, the United States permitted weaker foreign powers like France and Great Britain to possess their own Mandated Islands in the Pacific that they could not, in the end, adequately defend. The result was that when hostilities broke out, the Japanese military was able to quickly take control over the Pacific at a minimum cost. For America a bloody island-hopping campaign to retake the Pacific ensued in which approximately 107,000 U.S. servicemen died over the course of the war. The mistake of losing control of areas vital to America's defense could not be repeated, military and government leaders pleaded during and after the war.

General Douglas MacArthur, Commander of U.S. Forces in the Far East, and later Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) in Japan, for


example, declared on numerous occasions that the East Coast of Asia, not simply the West Coast of the continental United States or even Hawaii, had to be considered America's first line of defense. Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Commanding General of U.S. Forces in Europe, also called for the creation of "a cushion of distance" for the United States in the Pacific and other areas.' Likewise, civilian leaders in Washington, like Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal were also very active in this debate. They all argued that in planning for the postwar, the military and other agencies in the government should keep the costly lessons of the interwar and wartime periods in mind.

With this understanding, military planners began to undertake studies on its postwar shape and the future position of its postwar bases in the Pacific and around the world. Of these bases, Okinawa would come to play a very important, if not crucial, role in America's strategic presence in the postwar Pacific (as shown in [map 2-1](#)), although this realization did not come until later in the war. Having been heavily fortified and garrisoned by the Japanese in 1944-1945, Okinawa's potential for interfering with the Allied invasion of Japan was recognized by all.³ Indeed, it would become necessary to use Okinawa, 375 miles from the southernmost of the four home islands, Kyushu, and 460 miles from the large Japanese naval base at Sasebo, in preparing for the first stage of the invasion of Japan scheduled for September 1945 (Operation OLYMPIC), in what became known as Operation ICEBERG.

Following the early surrender of Japan in August 1945, Okinawa was first seen as a base necessary to monitor or control Japan, the enemy whose future make-up and disposition, after the initiation of the U.S.-led "demilitarization and democratization" reforms in the occupation period (1945-1952), was still uncertain. As the Cold War dawned, the international security concept known as the "Four Policemen," as originally (and perhaps prematurely) envisioned by President Roosevelt, was found to be no longer possible. Regionally, in the Pacific, it became essential to deny the Okinawan islands and bases to other actual or potential military powers. As the region became more unstable and tense with the overthrow of the Chinese Nationalist Kuomintang regime on the mainland, it became necessary for the United States to maintain its presence in Okinawa as a deterrent, as well as a potential forward base against the Soviet Union (and Communist China) were war to break out. When war did break out on the Korean peninsula (540 miles away), recognition of Okinawa's vital role, particularly as a base for Air Force operations, was reinforced and military activities there dramatically expanded.' Even today, in the year 2000, with a peace treaty yet to be signed between South and North Korea, not to mention continuing tensions in the Taiwan Straits, the overwhelming strategic importance of Okinawa is recognized by nearly all regional defense experts and military officials.

Map 2-1

Territorial Provisions of the Peace Treaty and Okinawa/Iwo Jima's Geostrategic Position



Source: NSC Planning Board, "The Japanese Treaty Islands June 15, 1953," Box 29a Policy Planning Staff Papers, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, Maryland.

In the early planning and subsequent initial implementation years, 1942-1946, covered in this chapter, however, Okinawa was not viewed as anywhere near that significant because of the many uncertainties as to how World War II would end and what the postwar would bring. This latter question, whether the postwar era would be one of international cooperation or one of traditional power politics, was in fact one that was always in the mind of Roosevelt, who would remain in office until his death in April 1945.

In prosecuting the war and overall planning, Roosevelt, as Commander-in-Chief, preferred to work directly with the uniformed chiefs of the military, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (itself created as a counterpart to the British Chiefs of Staff Committee), rather than with or through the civilian heads of the War and Navy Departments.⁵ As is well-known, he also chose not to involve Secretary of State Cordell Hull, despite the latter's long service (1933-1944) as the Cabinet member responsible for implementing foreign policy, in most of the important military planning and crucial conferences of the Allied leaders, not to mention day-to-day operations. (This lack of consultation and the seeming failure to include State Department input in strategic planning—designs and concepts that would inherently effect the postwar political and diplomatic environment—would become most visible, and one of the reasons, the author suggests, in the later failure of the State Department and the military, particularly the JCS, to agree early on a clear and final policy for Okinawa.) Because of the primary role of the JCS concerning base planning, this chapter will focus initially (and then later) on the planning and discussions within the JCS and its related staffs and committees regarding larger and general postwar security requirements and arrangements.⁶ After briefly looking at the views of the military regarding the relationship between Okinawa and Japan proper, this chapter will look at the emerging official consensus in Washington at the time concerning the strategic importance of the islands in the Pacific. Next, the chapter will look at the differences that arose over the dilemma that emerged—the necessity for the United States to acquire these strategically important islands for its national security, and that of the region, while still seeking international cooperation. Put simply, the debate revolved around the desire of the military and their civilian heads to annex these islands outright, while the State Department sought to avoid international criticism for what would be seen as "expansionism" or "territorial aggrandizement" by promoting its idea for trusteeship for the region. Okinawa would not figure prominently in the debates at first, but with the end of the Battle of Okinawa in late June 1945 and the end of the Pacific War as a whole in mid-August, estimates of Okinawa's strategic importance rose, as mentioned above. The last part of this chapter thus will focus on the increased Okinawa's importance in the strategic planning of the JCS through 1946.

II. THE JCS 183 SERIES, 1942-1943

Six months after the Japanese Navy's defeat in the Battle of Midway and one month after the Battle of Guadalcanal, President Roosevelt in late December 1942 requested his Chief of Staff, Admiral William D. Leahy, to have the JCS undertake studies on the possible locations for air facilities for an International Police Force in the Pacific and around the world as part of his plan for international security cooperation among the major powers.' The President, according to a memorandum for Leahy,

stated that we must keep in mind the peace negotiations and that he visualizes some sort of international police force will come out of the war. Pursuing this thought further, the President stated that he wished you to have a study made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the end that when the peace negotiations are upon us we will be decided in our own minds where it is desired that "International Police Force" air facilities be located throughout this world; *this plan to be without regard to current sovereignty*.⁸ (Italics by author.)

With Roosevelt's request to Admiral Leahy, the series numbered JCS 183 ("Air Routes Across the Pacific and Air Facilities for International Police Force") was begun.' Indeed, as Michael S. Sherry notes, not only was the study begun, but Roosevelt's directive was "broadened...over the protests of Admiral Leahy and certain JCS staff officers" by the planners.'" This attempt at "broadening" was seen first as the result of the Army Air Force's conviction that "strategic air power would decide future conflicts" and its attempt to integrate its postwar base plans with those requested by the President." It also seems to have been the result of the Navy's desire to have its future base needs considered as well." In any case, bases necessary first for national defense, and second for the much vaguer "international police force," took priority in the military's planning."

Upon receipt of Roosevelt's directive, the JCS immediately referred the study to its own planning group, the Joint Staff Planners (JPS), which met on two occasions in January 1943.¹⁴ At the latter meeting on January 25, the Joint US Strategic Committee (JUSSC), the JPS subcommittee designated for the task, stated that it found it difficult to determine the location of facilities without knowing the conditions of the postwar world." These conditions, or assumptions, were given consideration in March by the JCS' long-range planners, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (JSSC), in the study JSSC 9/1 ("Air Routes Across the Pacific and Air Facilities for International Police Force: Post-war Military Problems—With Particular Relation to Air Bases").¹⁶ While the entire study can not be discussed here, the strategic assumptions that went into the planning and the U.S. military requirements in the Pacific after the defeat of Japan will be introduced below.

The JSSC study began by explaining rather prophetically that the "transition from a war never equalled in history to an era of peace never before attained is the major 'postwar problem'." Thus the study argued it was important that in postwar planning, military considerations should be integrated with political and economic considerations and likewise, within the military establishment itself, that postwar planning should be an integrated endeavor rather than being conducted separately by each of the services." In light of this uncertainty over the future, the JSSC admitted that it would be difficult to make accurate predictions. Thus the study would have to be made based on certain assumptions, including the victory of the Allied Powers and the continuation of their solidarity. Moreover, the JSSC assumed that the Axis Powers would be defeated in succession, with the smaller European Axis countries and Germany being conquered first and then Japan. Following the defeat of the Axis Powers in Europe, the JSSC predicted three periods to follow: 1) enforced peace (occupation) in Europe with war continuing in the Pacific; 2) the fall of Japan and a world-wide enforced peace working through the preliminary stages of an international machinery (encompassing moral force, economic force, and military force); 3) a peace maintained through the establishment of a world-wise international machinery and international goodwill, which would see the reintegration of the enemy states back into the international community as peaceful nations."

Concerning the first stage in relation to the Far East, the JSSC stated that the United States and Great Britain would still be at war against Japan. As a result, the study suggested that any preliminary basis for postwar planning should be built upon the assumptions that in the last phase of the war the Allies would have: 1) captured and occupied island bases across the Central Pacific (including likely Okinawa) to the Philippines and Japan; 2) strengthened their lines of communication to Southwest Pacific; 3) eliminated Japan from all her previously conquered territory, including China; 4) established air bases on the northeast coast of China; 5) assembled overwhelming military forces in the Far East. Japan's defeat would call for an immediate occupation and disarmament. The United States therefore, the study emphasized, would need to be prepared to assume, with or without the other Allies, the "responsibility for handling the problem of a defeated Japan." The time following Japan's defeat, the second period of the postwar as described in the JSSC study, was described as "critical...in the history of international efforts to establish lasting peace." As with Europe, the occupation of Japan would involve occupation, disarmament, and enforcement, with some reconstruction and relief. However, the JSSC noted that the occupation of Japan would necessarily be different due to the fact that Japan was a "widespread island empire." As a result, the Navy's role would be that much greater. Moreover, the JSSC did not place high hopes

on China's assistance due to the possibility of a weak central government. The degree of Soviet cooperation was "less certain."

As the international machinery came into being to enforce the peace, the JSSC envisioned the four powers assuming responsibility for certain areas, or zones, worldwide. The United States would be primarily responsible for the Western Hemisphere. Great Britain and Russia would take care of Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. America, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China would handle the Far East. The study urged that "U.S. military commitments should be limited in so far as possible to the American Zone and the Far East Zone." At the same time, while an international cooperation was desired, the JSSC cautioned that if a "workable international organization can not be established or...such an organization, once established...break(s) down again due to subsequent divergence of national policies," then,

Consideration of our own national defense and the security of the Western Hemisphere and of our position in the Far East must, therefore, dominate our military policy during and after the war. Adequate bases, owned or controlled by the United States, are essential to properly implement this policy and their acquisition and development must be considered as among our primary war aims. *Fortunately such war aims in no way conflict with the idea of ultimate collective security.* (Italics by author).

This last sentence, which suggests that other countries would see its strategic interests as the same as those of the United States, seems to have been too optimistic an assumption on the part of the military.

In undertaking military commitments, particularly in relation to the Far East, the JSSC argued that it was necessary to ensure that none of the Japanese Mandates or other islands that come under American control while defeating Japan are returned to Japan or given to any other aggressor nation. It was also vital, the study argued, for national defense (and U.S. commercial airline purposes, as well as for possible use by any international military force) that America "select, equip, and fortify a line of U.S. naval and air bases west from Hawaii to and including the Philippines, and Bonins. In general," the JSSC study continued, "all other islands as far west as the Philippines, south of latitude 30° and north of the equator, should be neutralized or under U.S. control. Air and naval bases should be maintained in Northeast China, or Korea, at least until Japan is accepted as a peaceful nation."²⁰ In other words, the JSSC argued, or at a minimum implied, the Ryukyu Islands and most of the Nansei Island chain should be neutralized or put under U.S. control. How neutralization was to be accomplished or what form of control this would take was not made clear. Likewise, a concrete list of the locations of the bases that were needed around the world was not provided. As a result, when the revised version of the JSSC study (now labeled JCS 183/5) was submitted to the JCS for

discussion at their 71st meeting on March 30, Leahy suggested that two lists, one of sites necessary for air bases for national defense and one for air bases for an international police force, be developed into a short paper."

The JSSC study submitted two weeks later on April 10 and given the designation JCS 183/6 (subtitled "Air Bases Required for use of an International Military Force in the Post-war Era") was also based on the assumption that "for a considerable period after the war" enforcing the peace would have to be entrusted to the United States, Great Britain, China, and the Soviet Union. Likewise, after that period, "some form of international machinery...includ[ing] an International Military Force" would be established to protect the world as a whole as well as their national interests. To be of military value, such a force would require "a balanced force of naval, ground, and air components, with adequate bases therefor, the report argued."²² The lists described in JCS 183/6 "should be accepted with considerable reserve," the JSSC cautioned, due to a number of unpredictable factors, such as the progress of the war, the time needed to establish an international military force, and the number and geographic location of participating countries. However, concerning bases in "oceanic areas," the JSSC felt ready to go ahead with a tentative list. These air bases, the study explained, were primarily to "permit the rapid transfer of elements of (an international military) force to areas of possible employment and to aid in the supply and reinforcement of such concentrations." Concerning the Pacific, or more specifically, along the "Central Pacific Route," the study designated the Hawaiian Islands, Wake, Marcus, Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands, Palau Islands, Marianas Islands, Bonin Islands, Philippines, Formosa, and Korea as areas where bases should be maintained.

Concerning the relation of these bases to American national defense needs, the study stated that while the establishment of bases world-wide for an effective international military force would inherently contribute to U.S. security, certain sites listed above were "of such obvious importance from the viewpoint of our national defense and the maintenance of United States interests that it is of the greatest importance that they should be controlled and maintained directly by" America. These facilities would be made available for use by the international military force if necessary. These areas "essential to our national defense or for the protection of United States interests" included were the Galapagos Islands and Clipperton Island (along the South Pacific Routes), the Hawaiian Islands, Wake Island, Marcus, Marshall Islands, Caroline Islands, Palau Islands, Bonin Islands, Philippines, and the Marianas Islands. The study noted that it would be necessary to establish sovereignty or long term rights for the maintenance of U.S. base establishments in the areas where the United States did not presently have either. Interestingly for our study, the Ryukyu Islands were

not listed or designated in any way here, despite reference to them in the JSSC 9/1 study.

While the JCS, at their 74th meeting on April 13, likewise did not refer to the Ryukyu Islands directly, they did enter into a long debate over the list as drafted by the JSSC. General Henry H. Arnold, Commander of the Army Air Forces, and Lieutenant General Albert C. Wedemeyer showed their concern that some bases were left out of the lists without explanation as to their omissions. In the same meeting, Major General Joseph T. McNarney observed that President Roosevelt would not be happy with a list that did not consider the mainland, or continental, areas. As a result, Admiral Leahy proposed that the study go back for JSSC review with the completed list being submitted in letter form from the JCS to the President.²³

Before the JSSC could complete their study however, they were directed by Major General John R. Deane to discontinue their work to pursue: 1) a related study on general postwar U.S. military air base requirements; and 2) an answer to a specific question from the president on U.S. military base requirements in the West African Area.²⁴ Although the series JCS 183 ended here in name, its revised contents actually became the basis of the next important study, JCS 570, which would come to have a major impact on Okinawa policy within the U.S. government.

III. THE JCS 570 SERIES, PART 1: 1943-1945— GENERAL U.S. STRATEGIC STUDIES

The first study in the series JCS 570 was completed on November 6, 1943 and included two maps, one illustrating the bases to be used in the war against Japan and the other illustrating the bases to be maintained by the four main powers." The periods referred to here are of course the same periods (two of the three) described in JCS 183—that is, the first period being one of enforced peace in Europe and prosecution of the war in the Pacific, a second, worldwide peace enforced by the four powers until some form of international machinery could be established, and the third period being that of a peace maintained by an international organization for collective security.²⁶ Noticeably, the military requirements for air bases in the third period, well ahead in the future, were not covered here because, according to the JCS, these requirements "must evolve from the experience obtained during the second period and in light of international developments." The JCS added that they believed, however, "that the system of military air bases as proposed for the second period will provide a sound basis upon which to design the system for the third period."

Shortly before this study was given to the President, the JCS met on November 15 for their 123rd meeting. In general JCS 570 was well received by the JCS, as Leahy noted. However, General Arnold, of the Army Air Forces, felt that it was necessary for the State Department and

other government agencies to begin thinking about the subject of postwar military bases or "we might find ourselves unprepared to meet the issue when it arose." General Arnold therefore suggested that an amendment to JCS 570 be made which requested the President to direct the State Department "to take appropriate action to obtain air bases and rights to the operation of military aircraft in and over foreign territory" as outlined in the maps because "we feel that the acquisition of air bases is a matter of the very greatest importance in the future security of the United States and to the retention of our rights in the post-war world...The acquisition of the desired rights should be pursued as a matter of high priority, at the earliest times and to the maximum extent deemed practicable."²⁸ The memorandum was redrafted in this way and given to Roosevelt later that same day, who examined it on November 19 in time for his upcoming trip to Teheran for his conference with Soviet leader Marshal Iosif V. Stalin and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill. For the most part Roosevelt was pleased with the JCS study, but he did direct the JCS to expand the area of U.S. control in the South Pacific, which the JSSC undertook.²⁹

Subsequently on January 7, 1944 President Roosevelt directed Secretary of State Hull to initiate negotiations to secure permanent or long-term use of bases and facilities (as requested in the forwarded JCS study) with the governments concerned and to "collaborate fully" with the War and Navy Departments." Roosevelt's letter, based on an earlier draft by the JCS, stated that "the order of priority, the timing, and the plan of negotiation will be determined by the State Department in each instance. The War and Navy Departments...will indicate the relative importance of the air bases and facilities, and will prescribe the maxima to be desired and the minima which will be acceptable in each instance." The minimum acceptable, Roosevelt explained in his letter, would be for the United States "in certain instances...to have the right to operate from the base and to install facilities essential to that operation and to defense." The maximum, or "optimum arrangements," desired were for the United States

in certain instances...to own or become long-term lessee of an air base and facilities with the right:

1. To import, free of duty, material, equipment and supplies requisite to the improvement, maintenance, operation and defense of a military air base;
2. To operate military aircraft into and from the base and over surrounding territory without restriction;
3. To install and operate such radio, weather, communication and other facilities as are required for the operation of the airbase, aircraft and navigation aids;
4. To maintain such personnel as may be requisite for the operation and defense of the base, facilities and rights.

The letter noted that "between these two extremes, the solution applicable in each locality will be governed by the importance of our particular need and a realistic approach to what we can expect to obtain from the sovereign power concerned." Roosevelt's comments here likely related to the difficulties he was having with the governments of Britain, France, Australia, and other countries with territories in the Pacific region over the military use of their island possessions.

At the end of January 1944, the JCS was designated as the coordinating agency with regard to military guidance for the State Department. Under the JCS, the JSSC continued to study the broader aspects of postwar military bases while the Joint Staff Planners and the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) would study and examine the locations of individual bases and sites.³¹ These studies by the JCS and its various staffs continued well into 1945. However the rapid changes brought about by the approaching end of the war in Europe, followed by the concentration of forces in the Pacific for the final battle with Japan, necessitated a new look at the postwar bases.

It was because of this new strategic environment that General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff for the Army, requested the JCS in May 1945 to reexamine the strategic needs for postwar bases. Exactly one month prior to that, as the Battle of Okinawa began, Admiral Ernest J. King on April 1, 1945 requested that the Nansei Shoto should be considered "as being areas wherein the United States should have 'exclusive military rights, except as modified by agreement'."³² This was the first time that Okinawa was directly named, although as seen earlier, the JSSC study of March 15 (1943) did indirectly include the southern Nansei Islands in its calls for neutralization or placement under U.S. control for all islands between the equator and 30 degrees North latitude.

The new study begun in May at Marshall's request became JCS 570140 and would take almost five months to complete due to the rivalry over the roles of the military services in the postwar period and the related competition for decreased budget allocations. Part of the debate revolved around the strategic location of the bases in regard to Europe and the question of whether the United States would continue to play a military and political role in European affairs. In the Pacific, however, it was now generally understood and recognized throughout the military that Okinawa was strategically important, and was vital in prosecution of the war against Japan and monitoring of it, protection of American security interests, and overall future stability in the region. Although it was a belated recognition, it became a commonly held view, a tenet almost, of U.S. security policy by 1945. An examination of how this recognition came about among officials within the U.S. government and in each of the services follows, but before that, it is necessary to briefly look at how the U.S. military viewed Okinawa in terms of its political and sociological relations with Japan

proper—views that seemed to suggest that the Okinawans would welcome separation from Japan.

IV. "RECIPROCAL SEPARATENESS" BETWEEN OKINAWA AND JAPAN: THE OSS STUDY

In early 1944, as part of the planning for military occupation and civil affairs, the military, specifically the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A) of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, had begun considering in detail the issue of the Okinawa islands in a series of socio-political and economic studies.³³ The first of these studies appeared in March 1944 and was a seven-page summary statement of a larger historical study on the people of Okinawa, their characteristics and history, and their differences from Japanese.³⁴ The second report of this series was also finished in March, and as the title suggests, dealt with the racial origins of the Okinawan people, including photographs of Okinawan men and women. Also included were several pages devoted to an analysis of family and personal names of Okinawans and Japanese, with a ten-page list of family and personal names written in Chinese characters." The third report in this series, entitled "Okinawan Studies 3 The Okinawas (sic) of the Loo Choo Islands A Japanese Minority Group," was finished on June 1, 1944 and combines and builds upon the findings of the earlier reports.³⁶ All of these reports were based on a combination of sources, many of which were quite old, but most of which took the attitude that the Okinawans were different from the Japanese. Included among them were Commodore Matthew C. Perry's account from 1852 to 1854 and several Japanese sources (looking down on the Okinawans as 2nd class citizens) which are believed to have colored the viewpoints of the researchers. One source used in their report was a book written more than 35 years before by an American, H.B. Schwartz, who had lived in both Kagoshima and Okinawa for several years and was critical of the policy of assimilation and forcing Okinawa to become a Japanese prefecture.'. These researchers and their assistants conducted extensive studies of Okinawan populations in South America, Hawaii, and islands in the Pacific, finding that Okinawan and Japanese communities did not interact and generally disliked one another. In general their conclusions were that "Okinawans were not Japanese" in contrast to the general understanding of the State Department, which as we will see in the next chapter, included many of the top Japan and East Asia scholars in the United States. Since it is the most comprehensive of the three, the third report will be briefly looked at here.

The 110-page "Okinawas of the Loo Choo Islands" is divided into three parts. Part I (58 pages) describes Okinawan history, origins, characteristics and disposition of the people, language, dress and decoration, economics, sociology, government, religion, history, and its "foreign relations" with

Japan and China. Part II (13 pages) examines the Okinawans in Hawaii and pays particular attention to the "reciprocal separateness" of the mainland Japanese and Okinawans there and other places where Okinawans and mainland Japanese were found. Finally, Part III (29 pages) argues this point of separateness and "mutual antipathy" between the Japanese and the Okinawans stating that:

in addition to the general dislike of anything Japanese by some of the islanders there is a resentment, a feeling stronger than dislike, often encountered in Okinawa itself...The whole political situation does not seem to have helped to bring harmony into the situation. The natives are, to a great extent, completely under the vassalage of Japan. The governor is always an outsider, a *Naichijin* [mainland Japanese], and his power of veto over the Prefectural Assembly is absolute. The Courts are run by the central government...The islands have always been exploited economically since the Satsuma times [roughly 1609-1871]. Even today most of the traders are Japanese with no interest in the country other than to make money and...have helped to keep alive the animosity of the natives toward this continued intrusion, forming a legitimate cause for complaint."

This report summarizes the basic argument of the OSS researchers that the "Okinawas (sic) are not Japanese either in their own islands or in their new homelands, and the idea of separateness on the part of these southern islanders is increasing," and suggests that this 'cleavage' can be utilized by the United States forces against Japan by stating: "Psychological Warfare in its various aspects might well be brought to bear upon the cleavage outlined here between the two Japanese groups, each with its own physical type, its own history, its own dynasties, mores and attitudes. The Okinawan himself might well prove useful in this movement as our agent in the prosecution of the war." The report concluded with the following passage citing what the occupation authorities may expect in the occupation of the Ryukyu Islands.

To the Civil Affairs Command of the Navy in their work of rehabilitation a knowledge of the two groups of Japanese might prove of benefit in the administration of that part of the population covered by this report [the Okinawans]. Different attitudes and reactions could well be expected and knowledge of the Okinawan history might be used among the more intelligent members of the population to gain their confidence and respect. Cooperation greater than that of the *Naichijin* [mainland Japanese] might well be looked for. Their abilities along certain lines might also be utilized so that these people could play an important role and one quite different from that of the Japanese proper in any plans for reconstruction.

A second important series of studies on Okinawa done by the military appeared in late 1944 as the decision was made to invade Okinawa.

However, the study had actually been started earlier by a team of anthropologists at Yale University comprised of Professors George P. Murdock, Clellan S. Ford, and John W. M. Whiting, who had been a part of Yale University's Cross Cultural Survey from July 1937 to December 1941.³⁹ This group of three scholars was eventually invited by the Navy Department to continue its work at the Columbia School for Military Government and Administration in 1943.⁴⁰ This team and their assistants produced eight "Civil Affairs Handbooks," one of which, "Civil Affairs Handbook, Ryukyu (Loochoo) Islands (OPNAV 13-31)," was ready for distribution on November 15, 1944 by the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. These eight works became the main source material for civil affairs planning for the Japanese or Japanese-held islands."

The handbook for the Ryukyus spanned 334 pages and presented in detail all aspects of Okinawan society, including the use of 22 maps and 52 charts, and covered not only historical, social, economic, and anthropological aspects but also examined food and diets, welfare, finance, labor movement, emigration, and many more concerns.⁴² The fact that more than 95% of the documentation came from Japanese sources written during the latter part of the 1930s, a time when the Japanese particularly tended to look down at the Okinawans as "second class citizens," may have acted to shade the perspectives of the researchers that the islands were "more primitive and undesirable and the society less developed than [they] actually [were]" reflecting "the traditional Japanese bias that the islanders were backward rustics."⁴³ In any case, this handbook was subsequently distributed in book form and is believed by some scholars, including Ota Masahide, to have had a great effect on occupation policies and implementation.⁴⁴ It is also safe to assume that these reports were read by, and had an effect on, not only the local commanders in the field, but also on military officials, like MacArthur, higher up in Hawaii, the Pacific, and Washington, who took into consideration consciously or unconsciously these socio-anthropological perspectives on the "separateness" of Okinawans from mainland Japanese when deciding Okinawa's status.

In early 1945, before a decision could be made regarding Okinawa (indeed the Battle of Okinawa was just beginning), the problem of securing strategic bases arose among policy-makers in Washington. Although a consensus had been emerging that bases would be necessary, the twin and inter-related problems of international cooperation as a whole, and specifically with the Soviet Union, came to the forefront. It is to the search for a consensus within the U.S. government that we turn next.

V. MILITARY CONSENSUS ON POSTWAR BASES AND OKINAWA: THE VIEWS OF THE SERVICES

Converse has written that unlike other areas of the prosecution of the war and postwar planning, planning for the location of postwar bases, despite

its slow start, was conducted with relatively less difficulty due to a high degree of interservice coordination." He gives three reasons for this. First of all, as Commander-in-Chief, Roosevelt directed the JCS, where the services were to work together, to develop the plans for the bases. Secondly, once the locations of the bases were designated, the State Department would become responsible for negotiations with foreign governments to secure base rights. As a result, the military as a whole would need to produce coordinated requirements to the State Department. (Although Converse misses this point, with the involvement of the State Department, the military would also need to unite together to prevent attempts by State, concerned with the potential political and diplomatic effects, to limit base requirements and base rights in foreign countries.) Finally, Converse, borrowing from the study, *Preparing for the Next War*, notes that in many cases, despite their service differences or rivalries, "military leaders found they had the same goals and worked together to secure them. They shared a similar past and believed they faced a common future of international uncertainty, explosive technology, and public neglect."⁴⁶ This section attempts to shed light on these views in relation to Okinawa, on which an interservice agreement or consensus was reached early, but not without difficulty.

The Navy

In early June 1945, Navy Department officials briefed President Harry S. Truman (who replaced Roosevelt upon the latter's death) and his new (Acting) Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, on the Navy's postwar base requirements." These requirements had been compiled that May in the Navy's study entitled "Basic Post War Plan No. 1." Begun in the Fall of 1944, this study picked up steam in March 1945 after meetings between Admirals King and Nimitz followed by one between King and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal.⁴⁸ The study placed heavy emphasis on the Pacific (53 sites out of a total worldwide of 75) and sought to cover as wide an area as possible in the Pacific. Importantly, along with the Philippines, Guam-Saipan in the Marianas, the Bonin-Volcano Islands, all traditionally eyed by the military, the Ryukyu Islands were also shown to be desired as a regular operating base. On April 1, the same day that the invasion of the main island of Okinawa began (the neighboring Kerama Islands were invaded on March 26), Admiral King requested to the JCS that Okinawa should be considered as part of the Blue Area (required for direct defense of United States, leased areas, and possessions) and not the Black Area (required by United States as one of Great Powers enforcing peace, pending a worldwide organization) of JCS 57012."

The desire of the Navy to use the Ryukyu Islands as a regular base was confirmed shortly after Truman's June briefing when the naval aide to the President asked Admiral Richard S. Edwards, who was supervising the

postwar planning for the Navy, his ideas on Pacific bases as well as on the Japanese Mandates. Edwards responded that he believed that the Yellow Sea approaches to the Pacific would be very important because of the geo-political rivalries in the area. A strong Pacific line of bases would allow the United States to "be in position either to take a hand in Asiatic affairs or, alternatively if so desired, to stand between the Japan-Asia trouble zone and the Pacific." The lessons of the war were particularly clear to the Navy—the United States would need to have absolute control of the area—making it an "American lake," in the words of some participants and observers at the time."

The Army

Shortly after Truman's briefing in June by the Navy, Truman requested his old friend and military aide, Colonel Harry H. Vaughan, to get the views of the Army regarding "exclusive military rights the U.S. should require in the Ryukyus, the Bonin-Volcano and Marcus Islands, and any other Pacific islands exclusive of the Japanese Mandates." The Army's response, personally checked and edited by Army Chief of Staff General Marshall, agreed with the Navy's estimate of the geo-political importance of the Far East and the need to possess a Pacific line of defense. The retention or acquisition of rights "in areas around the perimeter of the Pacific," Marshall's response stated, would allow the United States "to control the approaches thereto and to prevent surprise attacks on vital strategic areas." In addition, secondary bases in adjacent areas, necessary "as outposts to our main bases and as flank guards to our strategic lines of communication across the Central Pacific," would create an "interlocking system of bases...[to] not only secure our position in the Pacific but...enable the U.S. to project its military power into any troubled area and should discourage aggression by other powers and therefore contribute materially to maintenance of world peace." Likely symbolic of the fact that inter-service rivalry did continue to exist (the Air Force was still a part of the Army), but also representative of a practical understanding of the importance of air power, the Army's response stressed that the "primary reliance" should be on a combination of "air power complemented by naval surface power."⁵²

To Marshall and the Army, an American presence in Okinawa represented a way to promote security, and thus stability, in the region, an argument still used and convincing in the year 2000 as well. Accordingly, Marshall's memorandum stated (with great foresight) "The mere possession by the United States of positions within range of troubled areas should be a useful influence for peace and stability. Among the areas for potential trouble after the war is that bordering the Yellow Sea. A base in the Ryukyus, therefore, is particularly desirable, with the remainder of those islands demilitarized and in friendly hands." Farther south, U.S. bases in

Okinawa would also play an important role in the Western Pacific, particularly with the status of then-Formosa unclear:

The security of the Philippines from the North can best be assured by a base in Formosa, which is a strategic location controlling the central coast of Asia. By the Cairo Declaration, Formosa is to be restored to China. A demilitarized Formosa in friendly hands, augmented by our bases in the Ryukyus, should give north flank protection to the Philippines. We must recognize that at this time the future of Formosa is still uncertain and that final determination of our course of action must await development of events. If China cannot hold and demilitarize this highly strategic island, or if any nation seems likely to acquire rights in the island, we should take steps to acquire the predominant and, if possible, exclusive military rights in the area."

Marshall and the Army would continue to hold these views, as would the Air Force, which became independent in 1947 and would push for a large presence in Okinawa.

The Army Air Forces

The Army Air Forces completed their own study on July 11, 1945 shortly after Truman finished being briefed on the Navy and Army ideas and four days after he left for the Potsdam Conference. The AAF's study, entitled, "U.S. Requirements for Post War Military Air Bases and Rights in Foreign Territory," was conducted by its Ad Hoc Study Group (comprised primarily of members of the Air Staff's Postwar Division and the Air Transport Command's planning unit)." The plan was an ambitious one, encompassing 125 sites around the world (not including 25 sites in U.S. territories or possessions and those where arrangements had already been made). Since the United States did not plan for bases on the European continent, bases in the Pacific would play that much more of an important role in defense and projecting American power. (The study also called for the acquisition of bases and base rights in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia). In its report, the AAF therefore sought to gain exclusive U.S. base rights on Okinawa and Formosa, which would mean bases on the edge of the western Pacific defense perimeter. At this point, the report did not specify who the defense perimeter would be directed against, although an August 1945 AAF intelligence report considered the Soviet Union as "the only power which is conceivably capable of threatening our security."⁵⁵ In short, the report was a re-emphasis of the strong belief of the Air Force that air power was the strategic force to be relied upon in the postwar.

Of the services, the Army Air Force and the Navy would become the most vocal regarding the necessity of holding on to the Ryukyu Islands (although the Navy later lost some interest in Okinawa due to the frequent occurrence of typhoons, and the later availability of bases on the main

islands of Japan at Sasebo and Yokosuka).⁵⁶ For the Air Force, in fact, the air bases it gained, particularly Kadena Air Base, would become the largest U.S. Air Base in the Far East.

Toward an Official Consensus

The services continued with their studies of postwar needs and base locations while Truman was attending the Potsdam Conference (July 17 to August 2), where Point 8 of the Potsdam Declaration, agreed to by the U.S., the United Kingdom, and China (and later by the Soviet Union), reaffirmed the terms of the Cairo Declaration (discussed in the next chapter). "When Truman returned in early August, the military services attempted to convince him of their strategic requirements regarding Okinawa and the Pacific. In particular they stressed the need to make a firmer statement than the one given by Stettinius at the opening of the United Nations Conference in June regarding bases around the world and specifically in the Pacific. Truman made such a policy clear in a radio speech on August 10, stating:

Though the United States wants no territory or profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of world peace. Bases which our military experts deem to be essential for our protection, we will acquire. We will acquire them by arrangements consistent with the United Nations Charter.⁵⁸

Two months later at the Navy Day celebration in New York on October 27, Truman expanded on that announcement by stating that

the foreign policy of the United States is based firmly on fundamental principles of righteousness and justice. In carrying out those principles we shall firmly adhere to what we believe to be right; and we shall not give our approval to any compromises with evil. But we know that we cannot attain perfection overnight. We shall not let our search for perfection obstruct our steady progress toward international cooperation. We must be prepared to fulfill our responsibilities as best we can, within the framework of our fundamental principles, even though we have to operate in an imperfect world."

Truman then went on to state that while the United States did not seek any territory, it would exercise its "right to establish bases for [its] protection."⁶⁰ America would only go so far in international cooperation as long as its own national security was not endangered or compromised. But it would in any case go ahead with fortifying strategic islands in the Pacific, where the defeat of Japan some weeks before had created a power vacuum.

Perhaps emboldened by Truman's public support, the Navy took the lead in speaking out on the postwar need for an extensive network of bases." Immediately after the signing of the surrender on board the *U.S.S.*

Missouri in Tokyo Bay in early September, Assistant Secretary of the Navy H. Struve Hensel stated at a press conference in Washington, D.C. what the Navy regarded as the "absolute minimum" number of bases required in the Pacific." These bases were "those [that the United States] should intend to maintain and which are susceptible to defense," and included: 1) Kodiak, 2) Adak, 3) Hawaii, 4) Balboa, Canal Zone Panama, 5) Guam-Saipan-Tinian (considered as one base), 6) Iwo Jima, 7) Okinawa, 8) Manus, and 9) the Philippines.⁶³ Reflecting the lessons of the last war and the fears of a possible new one, Hensel also stated that the Navy would recommend more bases to be kept, not because they were considered "as essential to the Navy's needs, but primarily to prevent them from being used by any other nation."

Early the following week on September 10, Secretary Forrestal sent President Truman a memorandum explaining the military view on postwar bases and recommended how to proceed. In it, Forrestal stated that

the problem of military bases in the Pacific was a matter of life or death to both of the services and one that has continually been studied by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Military security and administration of the bases can only be truly accomplished by the mutual help of the Army, Navy, and Air Force and by the system of unified bases. The question as to what type of governing agency will be set up for bases in the Marianas, Okinawa, and other Pacific Islands that our national security planning finds necessary is very important to the combined bases of the three services, not only to the Navy, but to the other agencies as well. It should be recommended to the heads of the State Department, the Army, and the Navy that the question as to what type of government will be set up be studied and recommendations made.⁶⁴

Truman ratified this document the following day, September 11 and on September 19, the Assistant Secretary of War McCloy (who was very committed to air power), requested the Far Eastern Subcommittee of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee to begin studies of the organization of the governments on the Pacific Islands." However, during the following week on September 24, Forrestal and McCloy agreed that before meeting with the State Department representatives to SWNCC, they would seek to coordinate military views between their two departments, as well as agreed to abide by the decisions reached by the JCS concerning the number of bases, their location and form, and the agency responsible for them. With that agreement, the initial proposal to SWNCC was withdrawn and the two military services agreed to have the Joint Staff Planners take up the study of the questions raised by Forrestal on Okinawa and the status of the islands in the Western Pacific.⁶⁶

VI. THE JCS 570 SERIES, PART 2: 1945-1947 — OKINAWA'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE

Before looking at the JPS examination, it is necessary to take a quick look at the prioritization given to postwar bases by military planners. As shown below in [Table 2-1](#), there were four categories of bases ranging from absolutely vital to fairly important or necessary in range.

Categories of Bases

The first of these postwar bases was called "Primary Base Areas," strategically located, comprising the foundation of a base system essential to the security of the United States, its possessions in the Western Hemisphere, and the Philippines and for protection of military operations. The Primary Base Areas included the Aleutian Islands, Panama Canal Zone, Hawaii, Mariana Islands, Philippines, the Ryukyus, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Newfoundland, Iceland, and the Azores.

The second listing in the priority of postwar bases was the "Secondary Base Areas," which were considered essential for the protection of and/or access to primary bases, and for the projection of military operations. These base areas included Midway Island, Minami, the Bonin Islands, Truk Island, as well as 12 other locations in the Pacific, and in the Atlantic, Cuba (Guantanamo), Bermuda, as well as eight other areas.

The third category of postwar bases was designated "Subsidiary Base Areas." These bases were required for increasing the flexibility of the system of primary and secondary bases and included Formosa, the Canary Islands, Palau, and 11 other sites.

Finally, the last category in the plans for postwar bases was called "Minor Base Areas." These were base sites at which transit privileges and varying military rights are required, if not already obtained, in order to increase the flexibility of the base system (included New Caledonia, Dakar, Curacao, Guadalcanal Island, and other areas). "Subsequent strategic planning by the U.S. military would be based to a certain extent on the table below.

At the time Forrestal and McCloy sought to coordinate their views before meeting with the State Department representatives of SWNCC, Okinawa, along with the Bonin Islands and the former Japanese Mandated Islands (with the exception of the Marianas), was being considered by military planners as a "secondary base," as seen in JCS 570134 (September 27, 1945).⁶⁸ On October 10, however, continuing their discussions on JCS 570134, the Joint Chiefs of Staff took up the question of postwar bases again, deciding whether to add or subtract sites from the final list of necessary bases. There, Major General Arnold, Commander of the Army Air Forces, proposed that Okinawa, along with Greenland and Iceland, should be moved from the list of secondary bases to that of primary bases, argu-

ing that America must be prepared to respond to any potential enemy within twenty four hours and that Okinawa and the other bases would serve as forward bases to give the United States early warning and allow the United States to intercept any offensive moves.⁶⁹ Accepting Arnold's argument, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved JCS 570137 on October 10 (1945).

The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Icing, cautioned in a subsequent memorandum however that it was necessary "in setting up a base system for the defense of the United States and the Western Hemisphere, a balance must be struck between the security afforded thereby and the aggressive threat to other powers implicit in the degree of activation and use of certain forward base areas in time of peace."⁷⁰ However, representative of the importance that all branches of the military assigned to Okinawa, King noted in the same memo that he agreed to "the inclusion of the Ryukyus in the primary base area category."⁷¹ King indeed went so far as to state at a September 19 meeting of the House Naval Affairs Committee that with regard to the island bases in the Pacific that he preferred sovereignty over them to trusteeships.⁷²

It should be noted however that not everyone in the Navy was in agreement with these ideas. Several weeks before King's comments, Admiral Raymond A. Spruance expressed at a press conference he gave to American and foreign correspondents in Manila in late August (1945) that he was strongly against fortifying Okinawa." Spruance stated that occupying bases on or near the coast of Asia would offend Russia and China just as "it would be a sore point with us if a foreign power held a string of islands blocking our coasts." While Okinawa was strategically extremely valuable, Spruance stated, it was also "potentially explosive internationally" and thus "diplomats would have to determine its ultimate disposition."⁷⁴ Although Spruance's point was extremely insightful and was also shared by some in the State Department, his opinions, according to Spruance's biographer, "shocked the Navy Department."⁷⁵ His concerns did not, as we will see, take the wind out of the Navy's sails however.

In any case, the above studies concerning the number, location, and composition of postwar bases was completed on October 25, 1945, and endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as JCS 570140 "Over-All Examination of U.S. Requirements for Military Bases and Rights."⁷⁶ With this endorsement, the JCS requested (through SWNCC) that State seek the necessary international arrangements through its diplomatic channels, noting that "the comprehensive base system which will result from obtaining the desired rights is not only an inescapable requirement for United States security in the event of a failure of the United Nations Organization to preserve world peace, but that the provision of this system will contribute materially to the effectiveness of that organization in maintaining peace throughout the world."⁷⁷ Based on the JCS 570137 document of two weeks before,

military planners in JCS 570140 confirmed that the Ryukyu Islands were to be considered as primary base areas and that the United States should have exclusive rights to the islands. Likewise, the report also stated that "All Japanese Mandated Islands and Central Pacific Islands detached from Japan, including the Bonins and Ryukyus, will be brought under exclusive United States strategic control."⁷⁸ The military's desire for long-term retention of Okinawa was concretely decided at this point.⁷⁹

Table 2-1
Definitions and Locations of Base Areas (JCS 570/40)

Type of Area	Definition	Locations
Primary Base Areas	Strategically located, comprising the foundation of a base system essential to the security of the United States, its possessions, the Western Hemisphere, and the Philippines and for the projection of military operations.	Panama Canal Zone, Hawaiian Islands, Marianas Islands, Philippine Islands, Ryukyu Islands Southwestern Alaska-Aleutian Area, Newfoundland, Iceland Puerto-Rico Virgin Islands, Azores
Secondary Base Areas	Essential for the protection of and/or for access to primary bases, and for the projection of military operations	Fairbanks-Nome-Central and Western Alaska. Midway Island, Johnston Island, Wake Island, Marcus Island, Bonin-Volcano Islands,Truk Island, Kwajalein island, Marus , American Samoa, Galapagos Islands, Canton Island, Bermuda, Greenland, Cape Verde Islands, Ascension Island , Guantanamo (Cuba), Trndad, Airfields in Republic of Panama , Natal-Recife Area (Brazil)
Subsidiary Base Areas	Required for increasing the flexibility of the system of primary and secondary baser	Annette (Alaska), Yakutat (Alaska), Yap-Ulithi, Eniwetok, Tarawa, Majuro, Palmyra, Palau, Formosa, Funa Futi, Talara (Peru) , Canary Islands, Georgetown (British Gurana), Belem (Brazil) , St.Thomas, Antigua, St.Lucia, Bahamas
Minor Base Areas	And base sites at which transit privileges and varying military rights are required, if not already obtained, in order to insure availability as required further to increase flexibility of the base system	Morotai, Biak , Guadalcanal-Tulagi , Espiritu Santo, Noumea (New Caledonia), Viti Levu, Edomonton-Whitehorse Route to Alaska, Ft. Chimo-Frobisher Bay Route to Greenland, Salinas (Ecuador), Batista Field (Cuba), St.Julian-Lafe (Cuba), Curacao, Christmas Island Bora Bora Island, Clipperton Islands, Upolu, British Samoa, Jamaica, Surinam, Casablanca (Port Lyautey), Dakar, Monrovia, Goose Bay (Labrador)

The Question of Trusteeship for Okinawa

What form this strategic control would take was not defined in JCS 570140. It would be left undefined for three months until, on January 17, 1946, the JCS, responding to a request the day before by Byrnes, directed the JSSC to restudy the question of strategic control over Okinawa with reference to Article 82 of the United Nations Charter." The JSSC in their review promptly pointed out the problems it had with an amendment to JCS 570134 introduced by Admiral Leahy on October 8, 1945 of paragraph 9a, which originally read "All Japanese Mandated Islands and Central Pacific islands detached from Japan, including the Bonins and the Ryukyus, will be brought under exclusive United States strategic control, preferably through the assumption of full sovereignty, otherwise through trusteeship agreements designating these islands as strategic areas."" The latter phrase "preferably through the assumption of full sovereignty, oth-

erwise through trusteeship agreements designating these islands as strategic areas" had been removed by Leahy in JCS 570136 on October 8.⁸² The JSSC's concerns were noted and its recommendations accepted as JCS 570/48.⁸³ Four days later, the JCS submitted these recommendations to SWNCC and requested that its views be presented to the Secretary of State. This JCS study, numbered JCS 570150 ("Strategic Control by the United States of Certain Pacific Areas") recommended that the United States assume full sovereignty over the Caroline, Marianas, Marshall, and Palau Islands and seek a "trusteeship arrangement designating...as strategic areas" the Nansei and Nanpo Islands. For Marcus Island, the JCS did not anticipate any problems, as the JCS assumed there would be no questions concerning Pacific Islands which were under U.S. control at the time of the outbreak of WWII.⁸⁴ In making these recommendations, the JCS seems to have relied on a despatch from the Military Staff Committee of the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations, then meeting at the General Assembly gathering in London." In it, Admiral Richard K. Turner is quoted as stating that while he recommended that the question of a trusteeship for the Japanese Mandates, the Volcano and Bonin Islands, and the Ryukyus could be deferred until after ratification of a Japanese peace treaty, he also considered that "U.S. interests [we]re fully safeguarded by Chapters 12 and 13 of [U.N.] Charter provided continued care is exercised that the U.S. retain sole control by trusteeship accordance Article 82 or through other means over all territory now under our control having a direct or indirect strategic military value for present or future military position of the U.S."⁸⁶

Concerns over the ability of UN trusteeship for Okinawa to guarantee U.S. security requirements were to emerge increasingly over the next several years however, as is covered in later chapters, as the debate between the proponents of national security and those of international cooperation continued. In the meantime, JCS 570 went on to be revised in different places." However, the discussion of Okinawa in JCS 570140 remained as it was—recognized as strategically important but the type of control to be had over the islands and their future political and international status still undecided." "Okinawa" (as well as the Bonin Islands) being a political decision, as much as, if not more than, a military decision, would complicate the ability of the military to acquire the Nansei and Bonin islands for its strategic interests. It is to the political and diplomatic side of the debate, more specifically the postwar planning in the State Department, that we turn next to see how it and its planners and policy-makers viewed Okinawa and what recommendations they developed.

NOTES

1. The renunciation of base strengthening on the part of the United States (west of Pearl Harbor) and Great Britain (east of Singapore) was done at the 1921-1922 Washington Naval Arms Limitation Conference in order to make the 5:5:3

ratio in tonnage of battleships and aircraft carriers between the America, Great Britain, and Japan more acceptable and "face-saving" for the Japanese delegation.

2 Quoted in Hal Marc Friedman, "Creating an American Lake: The United States, Imperialism, Strategic Security, and the Pacific Basin, 1945-1947," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1995), 49.

3. On this point, see Roy E. Appelman, James M. Burns, Russell A. Gugeler, and John Stevens. *Okinawa: The Last Battle* (Washington, D.C.: United States Army, Center of Military History, 1991), 1-7; Robert Leckie, *Okinawa: The Last Battle of World War II* (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), 5; Ronald H. Spector, *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan* (NY: Vintage Books, 1985), 532-543; Samuel Eliot Morrison, *The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War* (New York: Galahad Books, 1963), 513-557.

4. During the Korean War, bases in strategically located Okinawa played a vital role. For example, two days after the start of the conflict on June 27, 1950, the 19th Bombardment Group was sent to Kadena Air Base in central Okinawa from Andersen Air Force Base in Guam, 1300 miles southeast. On June 29, when all of the B-29s had been relocated, air operations over Korea were commenced. In August, the 307th Bomb Group, assigned to the Strategic Air Command, moved from MacDill Field in Florida to Kadena. See *Kadena Air Base, 1945-1995: Fifty Years of Heritage* (Kadena, Okinawa: Office of History, 18th Wing, Kadena Air Base, 1995), 8-9. One journalistic account of Okinawa described its strategic importance in the following way:

[Okinawa's] greater value becomes apparent if you draw a semicircle on the map of Asia, with a radius of 2,300 miles from Okinawa's airfields. The entire area can be bombed by a B-29 carrying an A-bomb from Okinawa. The arc takes in all of southeast Asia, China, Manchuria and Soviet Siberia from Lake Baikal to the southern tip of Kamchatka. From nowhere else in the Pacific can these bombers cover so much troubled territory. From bases in Japan they can fly deeper into Siberia, but they cannot reach southeast Asia; from the Philippines they are closer to southeast Asia, but cannot get to Siberia. Flying time from Okinawa to North Korea's Yalu River boundary and back is less than eight hours, and since the third day of the Korean war, Okinawa-based B-29s have dumped 100,000 tons of bombs on the enemy. Heavy bombers such as the B-36 could start from the continental United States, Hawaii, or Guam, refuel at Okinawa and shuttle-run clear across Eurasia to land at an air base in North Africa.

See Peter Kalischer, "Our Gibraltar in the Pacific," *Collier's*, October 11, 1952, 22.

5. On the history of the JCS see James F. Schnabel, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume I, 1945-1947* (Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1979) and Lawrence J. Korb, *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1976). On the civilian side, the War Department was led by

Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson from January 1940 to September 1945, after being called by Roosevelt back into government from retirement in anticipation of U.S. involvement in what was promising to become a world-wide war. Stimson retired from government service for a second time in September 1945 after victory was achieved, to be replaced by Under Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson (who headed the War Department until reorganization of the defense establishment in July 1947). Frank Knox led the Department of the Navy from June 1940 until his death in April 1944 when Under Secretary James V. Forrestal assumed the position of Secretary. Forrestal led the Navy until reorganization of the military in 1947, at which time he became the first Secretary of Defense (until March 1949).

6. For the organizational composition of the JCS, see Historical Office, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1989* (Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989), 7-9.

7. Elliott Vanveltner Converse III, "United States Plans for a Postwar Overseas Military Base System, 1942-1948" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Princeton University, 1984), 10; William Roger Louis, *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 259; Lester J. Foltos, "The New Pacific Earrier: America's Search for Security in the Pacific, 1945-1947," *Diplomatic History*, No. 13 (Summer 1989), 318. Foltos' article is an abridged version of his "The Bulwark of Freedom: American Security Policy for East Asia, 1945-1952" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1980). On Leahy and the JCS, see William D. Leahy, *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on his Notes and Diaries Made at the Time* (New York: Whittlesey House, 1950), 95-107.

8. "Captain John L. McCrea, Naval Aide to the President, to Admiral William D. Leahy: December 28, 1942," JCS 183, Section 1, file CCS 360 (12-9-42), Combined Chiefs of Staff Decimal Files, 1942-1945, RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Modern Military Branch, National Archives. The phrase italicized by the author seems to contradict Roosevelt's policy of not seeking any territory as a result of war, the so called "no territorial aggrandizement" principles in the Atlantic Charter (discussed in the next chapter). Roosevelt was both a Wilsonian and a realist so he was most likely thinking of national security when he made the suggestion to the JCS. He may have sought to use the concept of international bases for an international police force in order to not expose his policy to domestic and international criticism. In any case, he certainly did not want to unnecessarily confine or limit the military in its planning early planning.

9. For a discussion (in Japanese) on the JCS 183 series in relation to Okinawa, see Gabe Masaaki, "Eei Togo Sanbo Honbu ni Okeru Okinawa Hoyu no Kento/Kettei Katei, The Process of Deciding on the Retention of Okinawa within the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1943-1946," *Hogaku Kenkyu* (Legal Studies, published by Keio University), Vol. 69, No. 7 (July 1996), 83-87.

10. Michael S. Sherry, *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), 42.

11. *Ibid.*, 41. Converse notes that it was Assistant Secretary of State Adolf A. Eerle and Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert A. Loret, both strong and long-time believers in the importance of aviation on American security and commercial interests, who also took a big interest in the planning for postwar air bases. See Converse, *op. cit.*, 13-15.

12. Perry McCoy Smith, *The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), 45.

13. Mark A. Stoler, "From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D. Embick, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and the Military View of American National Policy During the Second World War," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 6 (Summer 1982), 310. Stoler described the attention given by the JSC to bases for an international police force as no more than "lip service."

14. For the responsibilities of the JPS, see Historical Office, *op. cit.*, 3-6.

15. Converse, *op. cit.*, 11-12.

16. "JSSC 911, Air Routes Across the Pacific and Air Facilities for International Police Force: Post-war Military Problems—With Particular Relation to Air Bases (March 15, 1943)," JSSC 911, Section 1, file CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1942-1945, RG 218. For discussion on the JSSC (established on November 7, 1942) see Historical Division, *op. cit.*, 5.

17. "Enclosure'A'—Appendix'A' to JSSC 911 (March 15, 1943)," Section 1, file CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1942-1945, RG 218.

18. "JSSC 9/1, Air Routes."

19. "Enclosure'A'—Appendix'A'."

20. "JSSC 911, Air Routes." At Admiral King's request, Secretary of the Navy Knox at this time directed the Navy's General Board to begin studies of its own on postwar bases and an international police force. The General Board came up with similar conclusions in regard to the areas and islands around Japan. In a March 27 memorandum to Knox entitled "Postwar Sovereignty Over Certain Islands of the North Pacific," the General Board recommended that the United States acquire the Marshall, Caroline, and Marianas groups, Marcus Island and the Volcano and Bonin groups. The report denied that these transfers would constitute "territorial aggrandizement" because the Japanese had used them offensively, as "unsinkable aircraft carriers." Taking the islands out of Japan's hands, the report argued, would be a part of Japan's disarmament. Quoted in Converse, *op. cit.*, 23-24. Converse notes that what made these studies by the General Board special was that President Roosevelt, former Assistant Secretary of the Navy (1917-1921) himself, actually saw them and read them "with interest." However, Roosevelt replied that "the sweeping changes in sovereignty recommended by the Board may not be attainable, and, from an economic point of view, all of the acquisitions recommended may not be desirable."

21. "Memorandum for the Secretary, Joint Strategic Survey Committee (March 31, 1943)," Section 1, file CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1942-1945, RG 218.

22. "JCS 18316, Air Routes Across the Pacific and Air Facilities for International Police Force: Air Bases Required for use of an International Military

Force (April 10, 1943)," Section 2, file CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1942-1945, RG 218.

23. "Memorandum for the Secretaries, Joint Strategic Survey Committee on Air Routes Across the Pacific and Air Facilities for International Police Force (April 14, 1943)," *Ibid*.

24. "Memo for Record (September 7, 1943)," *Ibid*.; "Enclosure 'A' to JCS 570, U.S. Requirements for Post-War Air Bases (November 6, 1943)," *Ibid*. Other reasons played a role in ending the study at this time. Since mid-1943, Roosevelt, who had taken a personal interest in the military, particularly Navy, planning for the postwar bases, was unhappy with their early conclusions. As a result, he asked Rear Admiral Richard E. Byrd to investigate islands and bases that would be indispensable for U.S. strategic security and commercial development in the South Pacific. The 14-member Eyrd Special Mission left in September and returned in November after visiting 130 islands. For a discussion on this mission, see Louis, *op. cit.*, 269-271.

25. "JCS 570, U.S. Requirements for Post-War Air Eases (November 6, 1943)," Section 2, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1942-1945, RG 218.

26. "Appendix 'A,' Memorandum for the President," *Ibid*.

27. "Minutes of JCS 123d meeting (11-15-43)," *Ibid*.

28. "Enclosure to JCS 57011, U.S. Requirements for Post-War Air Bases (November 15, 1943)," *Ibid*.

29. "Memorandum for the JCS from the White House (November 23, 1943)," *Ibid*.; "JCS 57012, U.S. Requirements for Post-War Air Eases (January 10, 1944)," *Ibid*.

30. "President Roosevelt to Secretary of State Cordell Hull (January 7, 1944)," *Ibid*.

31. "Memorandum for the Secretary, Joint Staff Planners from the Joint Strategic Survey Committee on U.S. Requirements for Air Eases (January 29, 1944)," *Ibid*.; "JWPC 185/D, U.S. Requirements for Post-War Military Bases (February 3, 1944)," *Ibid*.

32. "Memorandum for the Joint Chiefs of Staff on U.S. Requirements for Post-war Eases from Admiral Ernest J. King (April 1, 1945)," Section 6, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1942-1945, RG 218.

33. Most of these studies have been gathered, translated, and published during 1995 and 1996 by the Okinawa Prefectural Board of Education (Okinawaken Kyoiku Iinkai) and are available at the recently constructed Okinawa Prefectural Archives.

34. Office of Strategic Services, "Okinawan Studies No. 1 The Okinawas: A Japanese Minority Group," Honolulu, Hawaii, March 16, 1944. In 1944 it, and the other studies cited below, were published as part of "Research and Analysis Branch #1567."

35. Office of Strategic Services, "Okinawan Studies No. 2 The Okinawas Their Distinguishing Characteristics," Honolulu, Hawaii, March 27, 1944.

36. Research and Analysis Branch, Office of Strategic Services, "Okinawan Studies No. 3 The Okinawas of the Loo Choo Islands A Japanese Minority

Group," Honolulu, Hawaii, June 1, 1944. It was published as part of R&A #1567 in 1944 as is described above. One scholar found that this report was "very helpful and widely used in the actual administration of the islands" by those who participated in the military government. See Ota Masahide, "The U.S. Occupation of Okinawa and Postwar Reforms in Japan Proper," in Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 286. Ota, in another study on this same topic, believes that the U.S. forces and civil affairs officers from the early stages to the middle stages of the occupation relied primarily on this document prepared by the OSS. See Ota Masahide, "Senryoka no Okinawa (Okinawa Under Occupation)," in *Iwanami Koza Nihonshi 23 Gendai 2* (Iwanami Lectures on Japanese History Vol. 23, Modern History 2), (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977), 297.

37. Ota, "Senryoka no Okinawa," 298.

38. "Okinawa Studies No. 3," 76.

39. Fisch, *op. cit.*, 176.

40. The official name of the school was the "U.S. Naval Reserve Midshipmen's School, New York, New York." In June 1942, the Navy decided to contract with Columbia University for instructors on military government and for facilities, following an approach to the assistant to Navy Secretary Knox by faculty members of Columbia who had formed the Emergency Training Program in International Administration. The school began operations in the summer of 1942. See *Ibid.*, 12-13.

41. *Ibid.*, 14.

42. Ota, "Senryoka no Okinawa," 297.

43. Fisch, *op. cit.*, 14.

44. Ota, "Senryoka no Okinawa," 297

45. Conrrese, *op. cit.*, 9.

46. *Ibid.* Also see Sherry, *op. cit.*, 26.

47. Byrnes officially replaced Stettinius on July 3, 1945, at which time Stettinius became the U.S. representative to the United Nations.

48. Quoted in Conrrese, *op. cit.*, 94.

49. On the strategic importance of the different color-coded areas, see Gabe, *op. cit.*, 88.

50. "Memorandum from R.S. Edwards to the Naval Aide to the President (June 12, 1945), FF1/A14-7, Serial 00512, file COMINCH Top Secret 1945, AF-2," COMINCH Records, Navy Operational Archives, Washington, D.C. Cited in Conrrese, *op. cit.*, 146-147.

51. See for example, Eleanor Lattimore, "Pacific Ocean or American Lake?" *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (November 7, 1945), 313-316. Historians later explored this theme as well. See John W. Dower, "Occupied Japan and the American Lake, 1945-1950," in Edward Friedman and Mark Selden, ed., *America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on American-East Asian Relations* (New York: Random House, 1969), 146-206.

52. "Colonel Harry Vaughan Memorandum for the Chief of Staff (June 16, 1945)," file OPD 336TS, Case 126, Box 143, Operations and Plans Division

Decimal File, 1945, RG 165; "Memorandum for the Military Aide to the President on Pacific Eases (July 3, 1945)," *Ibid.*

53. "Memorandum for the Military Aide to the President on Pacific Bases (July 3, 1945)."

54. Discussed in Converse, *op. cit.*, 136-137.

55. *Ibid.*, 143-144.

56. The Navy had operational responsibility for the Nansei islands from April 1, 1945 until June 30, 1946, when it relinquished control on behalf of the Army. Roger Dingman examines the Navy's decreasing interest in Okinawa and focus on the importance of Yokosuka ("Yokosuka waxed as Okinawa waned"). See Roger Dingman, "The U.S. Navy and the Cold War: The Cold War," in Craig L. Symonds, *New Aspects of Naval History* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981), 291-312.

57. The Potsdam Declaration Defining the Terms for Japanese Surrender reaffirmed the earlier Cairo Proclamation (see Chapter Three) with regard to the territories of Japan: "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine."

58. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Harry S. Truman, 1945* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal Register, 1961), 203. An earlier draft of this speech, stated in place of the reference to the United Nations that "We do not propose to give up what we have gained at such cost—so long as we need it for our own safety." Likely that was changed by Byrnes out of diplomatic considerations. Moreover the earlier draft focussed entirely on the Pacific—"and incidentally let no one worry about whether the United States is going to get all the bases it needs in the Pacific for our complete protection." The final version makes no reference to any specific area, thereby suggesting a shift from the Pacific area to include Europe and other parts of the globe. See "Presidential Speeches: Drafts file," Speech Folder, Box 32, President's Secretary's File, Papers of Harry S. Truman, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (hereafter Truman Library), Independence, Missouri.

59. Truman, *op. cit.*, 537.

60. Quoted in Council on Foreign Relations (John C. Campbell, ed.), *The United States in World Affairs, 1945-1947* (New York: Harper and Erothers, 1947), 81.

61. Miyazato, *op. cit.*, 196.

62. John M. Maki, "US Strategic Area or UN Trusteeship," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 16, No. 15 (August 13, 1947), 177. Also see Lattimore, *op. cit.*, 313.

63. Maki, *op. cit.*, 177.

64. Quoted in Miyazato, *op. cit.*, 196. The recommendation has been retranslated back into English from the Japanese translation provided in Miyazato, as Miyazato's source cited in his footnote was untraceable.

65. *Ibid.* In the meantime on September 18, Forrestal, according to Miyazato, sent Truman another memorandum suggesting the administration of the Ryukyu Islands should be placed under the control of another agency. Truman did not

immediately accept this recommendation however and decided to wait until it could be discussed further in the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee.

66 *Ibid.*, 197. Forrestal did write a letter to the Secretary of State on October 4 (1945) explaining the Navy's concerns with postwar bases. In it, he listed the "Ryukyus" (along with Marcus Island, the Bonin-Volcano Group, as well as the Marshall, Caroline, and Mariana Islands) as areas in which exclusive rights were desired. See "Forrestal to the Secretary of State (October 4, 1945), Enclosure to SWNCC 38/20," Section 9, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1942-1945, RG 218.

67 Miyazato, *op. cit.*, 196-197; Gabe, *Nichibei Kankei no Naka no Okinawa* (Okinawa in the Middle of Japan-U.S. Relations), (Tokyo: Sanichi Shoho, 1996), 35-36; Frederick L. Shiels, *America, Okinawa, and Japan: Case Studies for Foreign Policy Theory* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), 59-60; Kono, *op. cit.*, 9.

68. Gabe, *Nichibei Kankei*, 37. As Gabe notes (p. 34), the JWPC study on bases (JWPC 36115) conducted on September 4, after being amended and approved by the JSC as JWPC 361/6 on September 27 (and becoming JCS 570134 at that time), was the first time that the development of bases in Okinawa was approved by the JCS. JCS 570/34 likewise represented the first time that a trusteeship arrangement was discussed in a study appearing for circulation. However, as will be introduced below, Admiral Leahy was to strike out this phrase in a subsequent revision.

69. *Ibid.*, 37; Miyazato, *op. cit.*, 197.

70. "JCS 570139, Over-All Examination of U.S. Requirements for Military Eases and Rights (October 19, 1945)," Section 9, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1942-1945, RG 218.

71. *Ibid.* Converse writes that King was "not at all bothered by Russian reaction to a strong U.S. base on Okinawa." See Converse, *op. cit.*, 166. Instead, Converse cites the views of two other military officials who feared placing bases too close to Russia and China, Brigadier General George A. Lincoln of the Operations and Plans Division felt that bases in the Far East would "in the coining years...he considered, with some justification, by Russia and China, as a threat to them rather than as a reasonable element in the U.S. security system." Spruance, as noted, also felt the same as Lincoln. Also see *Ibid.*, 165.

72. See Lattimore, *op. cit.*, 313.

73. Thomas B. Buell, *The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), 371-372.

74. *Ibid.*, 372. While the Navy Department was very critical of his views, the *Washington Post* praised Spruance in an editorial: "Admiral Raymond A. Spruance's words of seasoned wisdom about United States postwar naval policy sweep in as a refreshing breeze from the Far Pacific. They are all the more arresting because of the contrast with the imperialistic jargon so often heard by Admiral [William F.] Halsey and other fire-eaters among our naval commanders. We had been looking earnestly for evidence of statesmanship in the Navy. This particular example of it is especially heartening because it coincides with the start of the colossal assignment of demilitarizing Japan and preparing the way for lasting peace in

the Far East." This editorial is in contrast with the one that appeared after comments by King and Forrestal at the House Naval Affairs Committee meeting in September. The *Washington Post* editorialized then that "It is for the Administration and Congress, not the armed services, to insist that statesmanship go hand in hand with strategy in this matter of the distribution of strategic points." Quoted in Lattimore, *op. cit.*, 316.

75. Buell, *op. cit.*, 371.

76. "JCS 570140 Over-All Examination of U.S. Requirements for Military Eases and Rights (October 25, 1945)," Section 9, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1942-1945, RG 218.

77. *Ibid.* The second problem taken up by Forrestal earlier, that of the responsibility for administration, ran into problems not only between military authorities, but with the Department of the Interior over jurisdiction. See JCS 1524 series, cited in Miyazato, *op. cit.*, 197. Concerning intradepartmental decisions, see the conclusions of the JPS in JPS 76611 (November 3, 1945), in *Ibid.*

78. "JCS 570140." When JCS 570140 was approved on October 25, it was done so with amendments introduced by Admiral Leahy concerning Okinawa.

79. Gabe, "Bei Togo Sanbo Honbu," 98.

80. "Cable from Military Staff Representatives to JCS (January 16, 1946)," Section 13, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1946-1947, RG 218; "JCS 570148, Trusteeships for Japanese Mandated Islands (January 17, 1946)," *Ibid.*

81. "JCS 570134."

82. "JCS 570136, Over-All Examination of U.S. Requirements for Military Eases and Rights (October 8, 1945)," *Ibid.* Army Chief of Staff Marshall noted here that in JCS 570134, there was "a danger that the strategic study, which reaches conclusions as to the classifications of base sites and rights in accordance with their strategic importance, may be misinterpreted. As I understand the study, it does not propose to give guidance concerning the extent of development to be undertaken at various sites or the extent of our participation during normal peacetime periods."

83. "JCS 570148." JCS 570148 is insightful because it shows the hesitation the JSSC and thus the JCS showed toward trusteeships. The JSSC, in this memorandum "recognized...U.S. support of the trusteeship principle," but called into question the ability to apply trusteeships to "areas vital" to both U.S. security and that of U.S. forces acting on behalf of the United Nations. Thus, the memorandum stated that "While the United States has for years maintained an anti-imperialistic position, the acquisition of territories of no commercial value, but on the other hand essential for security, is not believed a substantial departure from this position."

84. "JCS 570150, Strategic Control by the United States of Certain Pacific Areas (January 21, 1946)," Section 13, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1946-1947, RG 218. This memorandum became SWNCC 24911 the next day, January 22, 1946. In JCS 570150, the Nansei Islands are considered "to include all the islands in the chain between Kyushu south of 31° North Latitude and Formosa, the Sento Shosho, Okino Daito Shima (Rasa Is.) and Daito Shima (Borodino Is.)." A look at the map reveals that this definition included literally every island south of Kyushu.

85. The General Assembly met from January 10 to February 14, 1946 with the establishment of the trusteeship system as one of its top subjects for consideration. See Elizabeth H. Armstrong and William I. Cargo, "The Inauguration of the Trusteeship System of the United Nations," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 15, No. 403 (March 23, 1947), 511-552.

86. "Despatch No. 162212 from COMNAVEU to SECNAV (January 17, 1946), Enclosure to SM-4752, Memorandum from A.J. McFarland to Admiral Leahy; General Eisenhower, and General Arnold on Trusteeships for Japanese Mandated Islands (January 18, 1946),"Section 13, CCS 360 (12-9-42),JCS 1946-1947, RG 218.

87. The last revision of the JCS 570 series began in February 1947. Labeled JCS 570/83 (completed in September 1947), this study's design incorporated the reductions in military appropriations that were brought about in the aftermath of the war. Reflecting this reality, the number of the base requirements dropped dramatically from the last major revision of JCS 570, that of JCS 570140. In fact, where as JCS 570140 had requested 90 bases or areas, JCS 570/83 nearly halved that to 53. As Converse observes, it was not only the reduced budget that affected the drafting of this report however, but the "military's awareness" of the difficulty the State Department was having in acquiring base rights in foreign countries. For that reason, greater coordination with the State Department was deemed necessary, early on. See Converse, *op. cit.*, 222.

88. "JCS 570/83, Over-All Examination of U.S. Base Requirements for Military Bases and Base Rights: Report by the Joint Staff Planners (August 12, 1947),"Section 30, CCS 360 (12-9-42),JCS 1946-1947, RG 218. JCS 570183 was submitted to SWNCC on September 6, 1947.

The State Department and Postwar Planning for Okinawa, 1942-1946: Realizing the Principle of "No Territorial Aggrandizement"

I. INTRODUCTION

For the military, as seen in the previous chapter, reflections on the state of unpreparedness at the outbreak of World War II was the overwhelming lesson learned, as the phrase "No More Pearl Harbors " would symbolize. For the State Department, on the other hand, it was the failure of the world powers to have kept the peace in the first place that likely was the overwhelming lesson learned. The strict, vengeful peace treaty toward Germany worked out at the end of World War I, aided by the effects of a crushing world-wide depression and the rush to protectionism, made it all but inevitable for a country under a demagogue and dictator like Adolf Hitler to attempt to undo the disarmament and territorial clauses of the treaty arrangements, by force if necessary. Weak international cooperation and machinery, such as the League of Nations, further allowed this to become reality in the 1930s. The United States, in its extreme post-World War I isolationist mood, lulled by the "outlawing of war," coupled with the despair of the Great Depression, did not help matters. When officials in the State Department began to undertake studies of the postwar peace before and during World War II, it was clear that a repetition of the mistakes of World War I and the interwar period would have to be avoided if another world war was to be prevented.

One of the cornerstones for the future, long-lasting peace in the postwar world was laid when President Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill met in the North Atlantic off the Newfoundland Coast in August 1941. Indeed the authoritative work on the treaty of peace with Japan by Frederick S. Dunn calls this meeting and the subsequent declaration as being "by far the most important statement of postwar objectives. "¹ The United States, it should be pointed out, was not yet at war with Germany or Japan. However, it identified its interests very strongly with the United Kingdom in the struggle against the Nazi German menace,

the dictatorial nature and military policies of which the declaration called "dangers to world civilization. " At the same time, Roosevelt correctly showed no sympathy for Britain's desire to maintain its overseas empire.' To Roosevelt, the colonial issue was one of the biggest problems the world faced—indeed many Americans believed strongly that colonialism had been one of the major causes of wars and would probably continue to be the cause of wars if a stop were not put to the practice.

The eight-point "Atlantic Charter" was the result of Roosevelt's desire to re-order the postwar world, what he and the obstinate but respected statesman Churchill would call the "common principles of their respective countries on which they base their hopes for a better world."³ The first three well known points of this joint declaration, cited below, are of special interest to this chapter:

First, [the U.S. and the U.K.] seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other;
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned;
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.⁴

Although Roosevelt had not always been an anti-imperialist (indeed one of his early heroes was his older cousin Theodore Roosevelt), by the late 1920s his anti-colonialism views had begun to take shape.' In an article he contributed to *Foreign Affairs* in 1928 as the Democratic Party's leading spokesman in a "debate " on U.S. foreign policy, Roosevelt argued that "The time has come when we must accept not only certain facts but many new principles of a higher law, a new and better standard in international relations. We are exceedingly jealous of our own sovereignty and it is only right that we should respect a similar feeling among other nations."⁶ Roosevelt's desire for a long-lasting, peaceful world in the postwar period, as reflected in the Atlantic Charter, would serve as a guide for the U.S. government as a whole, and particularly the State Department. Indeed realizing the principle of "no territorial aggrandizement" became one of the fundamental goals of State in its planning. This was particularly true as well in the case of Okinawa, historically a part of Japan. The planning of the State Department with regard to the question of Okinawa's territorial status and explaining how these political and diplomatic considerations of State clashed with the strategic views of the military (as looked at earlier) is the subject of this chapter.

II. THE WARTIME STATE DEPARTMENT AND EARLY POSTWAR PLANNING, 1942-1943

In the 1930s, several individuals, in and out of government, recognized that the clouds of war in Europe threatened to bring about a world conflict. They also recognized that there was a need for the United States to be prepared for the future peace settlement, to play the leading role in bringing it about, and further, to play an active role in keeping that peace. Immediately after the invasion of Poland by Germany on September 1, 1939, the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), led by its Executive Director, Walter H. Mallory, and Hamilton F. Armstrong, a former executive director and then-editor of the council's publication, *Foreign Affairs*, visited State and met with Assistant Secretary for Administration George S. Messersmith to offer the services of the Council in formulating policy for the postwar.⁹ This suggestion was approved by Secretary of State Cordell Hull and Under Secretary Sumner Welles and on September 16, Hull appointed Dr. Leo Pasvolsky, a Russian-born economist with strong connections to the Brookings Institution and CFR, as his Special Assistant primarily responsible for the problems of the peace.¹⁰

By mid-December, 1939, Pasvolsky had a memorandum drafted that called for a new division to be created within the State Department to study "the Problems of Peace and Reconstruction," focusing on the analysis of territorial, economic, military, and political issues, with research to be done by other groups and divisions.¹¹ At the end of the month on December 27, Hull called together Welles, Pasvolsky, Messersmith, China specialist Stanley K. Hornbeck, who acted as Hull's political adviser, Herbert Feis, an economic adviser to the State Department from 1941-1944, Assistant Secretaries Adolf A. Berle, Jr., and Henry F. Grady, Counselor R. Walton Moore, Legal Adviser Green H. Hackworth, and Chief of the European Division, Jay P. Moffat to discuss Pasvolsky's proposal.¹² The officials in attendance determined the committee should work through the three subcommittees which, as seen in Chart 3-1 below, would consider political problems (including the organization of the peace), problems relating to the reduction and limitation of armaments, and economic problems.¹³ Early the following month on January 8, 1940, this committee, with its three subcommittees, was finally and officially given a name—the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations. Welles was accordingly designated as its chairman. Because the committee lacked personnel for full-time research and analysis, was comprised of busy officials, met infrequently and without an agenda, and as a whole was overwhelmed by the events of the day as the world drifted into war, as well as simply being an advisory organ for the Secretary of State (as opposed to the government as a whole or President), the committee was inherently limited in the work it was able to do and thus was ineffective.¹⁴

This situation necessarily changed as the United States itself was dragged into war with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and President Roosevelt's speech to Congress the following day, December 8, 1941. Exactly three weeks after the attack, Roosevelt "heartily approve[d]" the establishment of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy." This new committee, which began its activities on February 12, 1942 would take the place of the former, and this time, serve as an advising committee for the President and the entire government, comprising members from the State Department, the CFR, and other parts of government and non-governmental organizations.¹⁴

The number of subcommittees under the "Second Advisory Committee" expanded to four, including a Territorial Subcommittee (TS), in addition to the earlier Political Subcommittee (PS), Economic Subcommittee (ES), and a renamed Security Subcommittee (SS). "While it was predominantly in the Territorial Subcommittee that the issue of the territorial disposition of the Ryukyu Islands was taken up, the Political and Security subcommittees also devoted several meetings to the problem of Okinawa's territorial disposition as well considering the political and security implications that a final decision would have. Indeed, organizers of the Advisory Committee had originally planned to have one single group consider both political and territorial problems "because of the interwoven character of such problems; " however it later was decided that two separate committees would be formed with overlapping membership.¹⁶

Dr. Isaiah Bowman, a member of the CFR and the President of Johns Hopkins University from 1935 to 1948, chaired the Territorial Subcommittee. The subcommittee was originally comprised of Armstrong, Berle, Feis, John A. MacMurray, Special Assistant to the Secretary, Anne O'Hare McCormick, a member of the editorial staff of the New York Times, Pasvolsky, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State who was also, as was noted, Chief of the Division of Special Research, and Harley A. Notter, a career diplomat who temporarily served as research secretary (until he was replaced by Philip E. Mosely, who later supervised the territorial studies in the Division of Special Research). All of the original members of the Territorial Subcommittee were also members of the Subcommittee on Political Problems. As a result, as Notter relates, the relationship of the two committees was extremely close. Membership expanded and different area specialists were invited to participate as their areas were being considered or discussed. The territorial subcommittee held a total of 59 meetings from its formation in March 1942 to its termination (for reorganizing purposes) in December 1943. These meetings alternated between regular ones and special or technical sessions devoted to research preparation. As introduced below, the Division of Special Research was primarily responsible for conducting the studies used in the

Territorial Subcommittee's meetings, not to mention that of the other subcommittees' meetings.

The Territorial Subcommittee, according to Notter, defined "territorial" in two ways." First, it looked at "territorial" as "land with people on it." As such, "Boundaries could not therefore be ignored. They still meant what they always had, only to a lesser degree. Aviation and other modern developments of a military and economic nature had modified the significance but not entirely removed either the security or the economic implications of boundaries. These boundaries afforded, in particular, a reduced but still strategically vital period of military warning." Secondly, to the Territorial Subcommittee, "territorial" meant both the historical and current economic, social, and political situation in a given country, as well as the area or region in which it was located. As Notter recorded, "in this regard (the deliberations of the subcommittee) focused upon the requisite conditions for peace and stability both within and among countries."

Territorial discussions would obviously necessitate political and military considerations, particularly for the former Japanese Pacific Mandates and somewhat less so for Okinawa, having formally been a part of Japanese territory since 1879 (and informally since the invasion and subjugation of it by Shimazu Iehisa, the Lord of Satsuma, in western Japan in 1609). For that reason, before we examine the discussions of the Territorial Subcommittee regarding Okinawa and the important role of the Division of Special Research in preparing studies for discussion, a look at the considerations of both the Political and Security subcommittees is necessary.

The Political Subcommittee's Discussions

The first discussions on the future status of Okinawa within the Political Subcommittee began half a year after its February 1942 start on August 1, when it met to discuss the general aspects of the Far Eastern problem. Thinking it wise to examine the territorial aspects of the problem before considering the political aspects, the committee, led by Under Secretary of State Welles, undertook an exhaustive discussion of Japan's modern history of territorial acquisitions." The Political Subcommittee's basic premises, as suggested by Welles, were: 1) that, in a peace settlement for the Far East, Japan would lose the territories it "obtained through its aggressive action," hence returning to "its original position;" and 2) that through "such an arrangement...our own security would probably be advanced...(and) this would also probably further the security of other nations." Concerning Okinawa, or the Luchu Islands as they were called by the State Department officials at the time, some qualifying differences of opinion emerged." In his introductory remarks to the committee, Welles gave the members an oral presentation on the territories acquired by Japan (and their corresponding dates) and had stated that "in 1874, Japan had taken the Luchu Islands." Unfortunately what he meant by "taken" is not perfectly clear."

When asked for his comments later in the meeting, Bowman, chair of the Territorial Subcommittee, stated that he believed an analysis of Japan's pre-war expansion was needed because he had reservations or doubts as to whether the Kurile Islands in the far north and "Luchu Islands" should be considered as having been acquired by expansion. Welles noted these comments and subsequently admitted that "he shared th[ose] reservations."²¹ Maxwell M. Hamilton, a China hand, was also in agreement. Hamilton's reasoning was based on a comparison of the discussions of territorial settlements in Europe with those for the Far East. In the discussions of the former case, Hamilton pointed out, a general view existed in which there would be no return to the pre-war boundaries except in "exceptional" situations. However, in the Far East, he argued, no one had tried to stop Japan and as a result, "we were dealing with a country with a long record of aggression (unchecked by other countries), and we should, therefore, apply a different yardstick." In response to a question by Hamilton Fish Armstrong about what territories other than Korea and Formosa would be taken away from Japan, Hamilton suggested that a date prior to the European settlements of 1918–1919 should be taken as a reference point. The reference point, or "yardstick," suggested by Welles was the end of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895. Welles told his fellow committee members, "If we took [what happened before the Sino-Japanese War] as th[is] line, Japan would retain those territories which it had possessed at that time (unless the Army and Navy told us that on grounds of security it should be otherwise decided)...We would then have the point of view that the Luchu, Kurile, and Bonin Islands would be retained by Japan unless there were considerations of a security nature against this course. " Welles decided to refer this question to the Security Subcommittee and the meeting continued, with discussions turning to Korea, China, and other territorial questions.

The Security Subcommittee's Discussions

Three weeks after the above Political Subcommittee meeting, the Security Subcommittee, led by Norman H. Davis, a former chief delegate to the disarmament conferences in London and Geneva, took up its discussions on the security considerations of the possible retention of Okinawa by Japan, as requested by the Political Subcommittee. The meeting was also tasked with discussion of the future disposition of the Mandated Islands in view of U.S. strategic needs.²² In these discussions, one quickly comes to understand that retention by Japan of the Ryukyu Islands was to be in many ways contingent on the future security in the region and the disposition of the Mandated Islands.

Davis began the meeting by commenting on what he saw as the general principles of a future peace settlement. Davis stated that he felt that the Mandated Islands would have to be taken away from Japan and placed

under an international agency that would allow the United States to administer the islands as a trustee. The American public, he noted, would not "at the end of this war, support any settlement which would leave the islands in the hands of any power which might thereby be in position to threaten our future security." However, he continued, "for political reasons it would not be desirable for the United States to annex these islands in any direct form, no matter how desirable for strategic reasons such a step might be. This being true, the alternative arrangement of international control and American trusteeship seem[s] a desirable solution of this somewhat difficult problem."

Major General George V. Strong, a representative of the War Department fluent in Japanese who joined the Advisory Committee in late April 1942 as an advisor on international security, next discussed the security problems in the Pacific.²³ Strong argued that following the war, the United States would need to safeguard its oceanic communication routes. For this reason, "certain bases w[ould] be important as police outposts." As a result, any settlement would have to "deprive Japan of any and all means through which our continental security and the security of these police outposts would be endangered...The peace settlement must be based primarily upon the repression of potential Japanese aggression." In order to accomplish this, Strong suggested "a ring of 'police posts'" be constructed with the ending of Japanese control in Southern Sakhalin, Korea, Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Bonin and Marianas Islands.

Davis expressed his agreement and said that by limiting the amount of land acquired for strategic bases and refusing to take any additional territory, "the charge of imperialism could scarcely be made against us." It was "most important," Davis stressed, "in view of the comments made in the Atlantic Charter, for the United States to avoid taking any steps which would expose us to the charge of territorial aggrandizement." General Strong agreed with Davis' concerns. He replied that "from the standpoint of security we would not need any territory in addition to those base areas which would be important for the maintenance of our additional obligations as we might assume in the peace settlement." However, the military would later through the years, as discussed in later chapters, demand ever larger areas despite the State Department's attempts to satisfy the strategic requirements in the smallest amount of land area possible. In this light, General Strong argued later in the meeting that the Ryukyu Islands would be of "no great importance strategically to the United States or the United Nations if an adequate base were developed at some point on the island of Taiwan. However, Japan should be deprived of the Bonin and Marianas Islands because of their proximity to Guam." The military lessons of the early stages of the Pacific War, in which Guam, surrounded entirely by the Japanese Mandates, was taken by the Japanese immediately after the start of hostilities, were clear, at least in the case of the Central/Western Pacific.

Debate did arise over the necessity of limiting Japanese sovereignty. In contrast to Strong's more comprehensive approach, several members of the committee (including Davis) felt that Japan's territorial sovereignty did not have to be limited to such an extent. Specifically, concerning the last point about the Bonins, the members felt that destruction of fortifications, demilitarization, and the prevention of Japanese rearmament were adequate safeguards and that there would be little advantage gain by removing the islands from Japanese sovereignty. Indeed, the minutes of the meeting note that they felt that it was important to "disarm Japan rather than (carry out) the separation of outlying island areas from Japanese rule."

From these early discussions, it is obvious that Okinawa's status would be determined by the larger regional security requirements of the United States and the United Nations-Allied Powers. These security requirements were based on the future potential threat that Japan posed to United States and regional security. At this point, however, Okinawa itself was not viewed as playing a major role in the security dynamics of the region and hence it was believed that its retention by Japan would present no major problem as long as other bases in the immediate area were developed. Since discussion arose on the key base areas essential to U.S. security in the Pacific, the subcommittee decided to ask the newly formed Joint Chiefs of Staff to examine the problem at an early date.²⁴ The study, it was suggested, would then be used as part of the subcommittee's report to the Political Subcommittee. The response received from Admiral William D. Leahy, Chairman of the JCS, was read at the September 18 (1942) meeting of the Security Subcommittee. Admiral Leahy's letter to Davis (dated September 15) reads:

It is imperative that Japan be prevented from controlling the sea and air routes across the Pacific and the western Pacific and conversely; that these routes be controlled by the United Nations. *This indicates the necessity of depriving Japan of all islands south of latitude 30°O, with the possible exception of the Nansei (Ryu Kyu) Islands. This includes the Marshall, Caroline, Pelew, Bonin and Mariana Islands, and Formosa. The desirability of depriving Japan of the Nansei Islands south of latitude 30° north may be indicated after further study.*

The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the United States should not commit herself as to the ultimate disposition of any territory suitable for air and/or naval bases of which Japan may be deprived until the strategic situation likely to exist after the war has been determined." (Italics by author.)

As we saw in the last chapter, the JCS' evaluation of Okinawa would rise dramatically toward the end of the war.

The subcommittee next set about drafting the following conclusions regarding Japan's territorial disposition:

- 1) Japan should be prevented from controlling or endangering sea and air routes across the Pacific and in the western Pacific; these routes should be in the hands of the United Nations.
- 2) To this end, Japan should be deprived of control over all insular possessions south of 30° North latitude. This will include Formosa and the Marshall, Caroline, Pelew, Bonin and Mariana Groups. The Nansei (Luchu) islands may possibly be left in Japanese hands, but this problem will require further study before a final answer can be given.
- 3) The United States should not commit itself as to the ultimate disposition of any territory suitable for air or naval bases until the relevant strategic considerations have been carefully examined by the Army and Navy.:"

The latter part of the second point, the recommendation that more study would be needed before any determination that the Nansei Islands could be left in Japanese hands, is interesting here, and reflects both the JCS recommendations on this matter and the State Department's recognition of the military's dominant role in security considerations. These conclusions were subsequently given over to the Political Subcommittee on September 22 for its reference. The Political Subcommittee on October 1 tentatively concluded after deliberation that strategically important areas should be placed under international control.²⁷

The Division of Special Research and Early Territorial Considerations

In the meantime, it became clear that the working knowledge of the various committees was limited, as was the time they could devote to detailed studies and analyses of the issues. This was particularly true regarding problems on the Far East, an area of the world that had received little academic attention in the United States up until the verge of war. As a result, the Division of Special Research, established on February 3, 1941 and headed by Dr. Leo Pasvolksy, was expanded in the summer of 1942.

It was Pasvolksy who had first recognized and voiced the need for organized research by requesting in November 1940 the creation of such a division.²⁸ The resulting Division of Special Research was thus charged at the time of its creation with "the conduct of special studies in the foreign relations field...(and) the analysis and appraisal of developments and conditions arising out of present day disturbed international relations.""

Originally planned to comprise a staff of only eight Foreign Service officers, economists, and political scientists, with the outbreak of war and the increased demand for its studies, it began its 1942 summertime expansion with the introduction of 29 more Foreign Service officers, political scientists, historians, economists, and international lawyers. Notter recorded the importance of the increase in non-governmental personnel in this expansion process in the following way: "The staff...was built with the fixed aim of obtaining, so far as compatible with the high qualifications set for all personnel, persons from every section of the country. This had the objective of providing automatically in the staff a working knowledge of the points of view in the major sections of the country on or affecting international issues." As the division expanded, it further became necessary to subdivide it into two branches or sections—political and economic. The political branch, headed by Notter, was itself further divided into three sub-areas of study: International Organizations and Arrangements, Security and Armaments and Law, and Territorial Problems, with the last area under Mosely's direction.

Although the various European units and Near Eastern units were created early on due to their importance in the "Europe-first" war strategy as well as because of the expected political and territorial difficulties following the liberation of areas in and around Europe, very little thought had apparently gone into planning for the postwar Pacific." As a result, the Far Eastern unit of this Territorial Problems group was not established until later in the year in September.³²

By the end of December 1942 (which coincided with the termination of the Division of Special Research for reorganizational purposes), the Far Eastern Unit had six members. It was headed by Dr. George H. Blakeslee from Clark University, an authority on the history and international relations of the Far East who had been assigned to the Division of Special Research on August 23, 1942 and later became Chairman of the Far Eastern Commission in 1946. Under him initially were Cabot Coville, a career diplomat with extensive pre-war experience in Japan and Asia and relative fluency in Japanese, Robert A. Fearey, who had served as personal secretary to U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Joseph C. Grew, in 1941 (until 1942), Japan expert Hugh Borton, an associate professor of Japanese history at Columbia University, the latter two joining the Far Eastern Unit in early and late October respectively. Later, John W. Masland, Jr., an associate professor of political science and international relations at Stanford University, Clarence J. Spiker, a career diplomat with long experience in Asia, and Amry Vandenbosch, an East Asian affairs specialist at Kentucky University, were to join the unit.³³

Borton spoke highly of Blakeslee, his senior by more than thirty years, in his memoirs: "Our Far Eastern Group...was particularly fortunate in having Dr. Blakeslee as its head. His personal integrity and method of oper-

ation added greatly to the success of our unit in winning acceptance of many of its papers, which eventually became the basis of American policy.'" Borton attributed this bureaucratic success to Blakeslee's efforts to keep important members of the State Department informed, such as China-hand and then-Special Advisor on Far Eastern problems to the Secretary Hornbeck, a strong critic of Japan, and Joseph W. Ballantine, the senior Japan specialist in the Division of Far Eastern Affairs (later made Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs in December 1944). Likewise Blakeslee, Borton noted, regularly called meetings to decide priorities and drafting procedures because it was Blakeslee's contention that "the best way to get one's ideas accepted by others was to present them in writing before anyone else presented theirs." ; " A simple approach, and probably very true. Another important aspect of the Far Eastern group's success was probably based on Blakeslee's approach toward his staff. Although Blakeslee was a "specialist on Far Eastern international relations," Blakeslee had not lived in Japan long nor had any deep knowledge of the language; as a result, Borton proudly noted, "he often yielded to my view concerning specific Japanese problems."³⁶ Blakeslee likely did the same with others regarding their own areas of particular expertise.

With the expansion and reorganization of the Division of Special Research in the summer of 1942 and its widening responsibilities and specializations, the need became apparent that the political and economic branches would each have to have their own divisional status. Moreover, as Notter noted in his analysis of the State Department's work, with the rapid progress of the war, it became apparent that "the line between current and postwar policy was thus already beginning to merge." In the beginning of 1943, this reorganization was accomplished by Departmental Order 1124 which created on January 14, in place of the Division of Special Research, the Division of Political Studies (PS) and a corresponding Division of Economic Studies (ES). Both of these divisions would continue to function under the supervision of Pasvolsky while the Far Eastern unit, in the words of Borton, "survived the departmental reorganization and our responsibilities were broadened."''

III. T-343, THE MASLAND PAPER: THE BEGINNING OF AN ORGANIZED STATE DEPARTMENT POSITION REGARDING OKINAWA, 1943

The Far Eastern unit itself did not first address the territorial issue of Okinawa until mid-April, 1943. Until then, the Territorial Subcommittee, one of the four subcommittees to which it was responsible for research, was involved in European problems and thus was not able to address Pacific issues. That grace period, which Borton described as "particularly fortunate, " was not long lasting. It did however allow the Far Eastern group to prepare papers on "topics of our own choosing."³⁹

As that "grace period" was ending, an early version of a paper on Okinawa was prepared, as noted above, on April 13, 1943. It was subsequently rewritten and updated for the Territorial Subcommittee on July 2. Although simply titled "T-343, Liuchiu Islands (Ryukyu)," it has since unofficially been given the name the "Masland Paper."⁴⁰ This eight-page paper, as its number and title designates, was one in a series of territorial studies done by Masland and his colleagues.⁴¹ Each of these papers usually began with a description of the island(s) or area and a socio-anthropological sketch of the inhabitants. It then looked at the history of Japan's acquisition of, or relations with, the area, the political administration of the area, the local economy, and U.S. security considerations, finally, exploring solutions for territorial disposition of the areas. T-343 on the Ryukyu Islands was likewise based on this drafting outline.

The "Masland Paper" on Okinawa begins by explaining the consideration that "postwar territorial adjustments in the Far East will involve the question of the possible detachment of the Ryukyu Islands from the Japanese Empire. The inhabitants are closely related to the Japanese, and the islands are of some strategic and commercial value. "Following this introduction, the paper described the inhabitants as "hav[ing] a complex racial background and [being] somewhat different from the Japanese." Due to these different characteristics and the existence of an aboriginal culture, "the Japanese government has endeavored to assimilate the Liuchiu people. Through education, conscription, and a closely supervised system of local government, the population undoubtedly has come to consider itself an integral part of the Japanese Empire." Concerning the security considerations for the islands, Masland explained that "the location of the Liuchiu Islands athwart the approaches to the China coast and parallel to the great circle trade route gives them considerable strategic importance." However, echoing the earlier Security Subcommittee report, Masland added that "the strategic significance of the islands would largely disappear if Japan [lost] Formosa at the close of the war."

Turning his attention to the future disposition of the islands, Masland suggested three solutions. The first one considered the transfer of the Ryukyu Islands to China. Masland noted that the Chinese Foreign Minister, Dr. T. V. Soong had, in a November 1942 press conference (see below), expressed his country's desire to have the islands transferred to China. However, Masland describes historical claims to the islands as "tenuous [having been] allowed to pass to Japan by default. The population is largely Japanized, and the islands are culturally, administratively and economically closely attached to Japan proper." Moreover, he notes that while "in view of the reported antagonism of the local people toward Japanese rule, engendered by discrimination in favor of Japanese from the main islands in appointments to administrative posts, there might be some local

support for detachment from the Japanese Empire...this would not necessarily result in local approval of transfer to Chinese rule."

The second option, "International Administration, "considered by Masland was to detach the Liuchiu Islands from Japan, placing them under a form of "international jurisdiction" such as a "North Pacific Council or some other international organization." Masland's concept for international administration is not called here a trusteeship per se, but does seem to be an arrangement for international control whose principal purpose would be to prevent Japan from using the islands for military purposes, as it had done with the Pacific Mandates it came to be responsible for following World War I. Thus, Masland suggests, "administration by the international agency might be limited to supervision and investigation, while normal administration might be carried out by Japanese personnel. Provisions might be made for the continuation of Japanese commercial enterprise." It is unfortunately not entirely clear whether this option, in Masland's mind, meant that there would be a loss of Japanese sovereignty over the islands with their subsequently being placed under international jurisdiction. In any case, it probably was a flexible enough arrangement to allow Japanese participation.

Finally, Masland's paper suggests as a third solution to the disposition of the islands the "conditional retention by Japan." Retention of the islands where they "would presumably cease to constitute a threat to the security of other nations" would be conditioned on 1) the disarmament of Japan; 2) the detachment of Korea, Formosa, and the Mandated Islands from Japanese control; and 3) provisions for the dismantling of all military, naval, and air installations on the islands as well as for the establishment of a system of periodic inspections of the islands by an international agency to prevent their use for military purposes.

Eventually, this last choice would come to be adopted by the Territorial Subcommittee and later by the State Department as a whole, serving as the basis for State's policy on Okinawa for several years afterwards, as shown in [Figure 3-1](#) below. However, a definite conclusion would be hard to reach within the U.S. government as a whole, due to different priorities and agenda. Within the Territorial Subcommittee of the State Department, this paper would remain the only study on Okinawa until the sudden announcement of the Cairo Declaration on November 27, 1943 forced a reevaluation of territorial matters within the U.S. government and among the Allies.

Figure 3-1

Evolution of Okinawa Policy Within the State Department, 1943-1948

				April-May 1948
				Cargo Paper <i>(Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands Memo)</i>
				1. Ordinary Trusteeship south of 29° with U.S. administering authority
				2. Leased base arrangements with Japan
				3. Facilities for U.S. in the Ryukyus as part of a long-term Four-Power security guarantee of Japan
				November 1946-February 1948
				Fearey Paper <i>(Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands Memo)</i>
				1. Demilitarize and Return to Japan
				2. If (1) not possible, lease bases
				3. If (2) not possible, place Okinawa under Ordinary Trustee-ship
				December 1945—March 1946
				Emerson Paper <i>(PR-35, Ryukyu Islands [Liuchiu])</i>
				1. If base needed, place under smallest possible strategic trusteeship.
				2. (continued) Northern (above 28°40') should be returned to Japan, and remaining areas placed under ordinary trusteeship
				3. Recognize as one of Minor Islands to be returned to Japan.
				4. If Okinawans do not wish to return to Japan, set up International Commission.
				5. If China Objects to Trusteeship, Seek to Convince China
				6. Handle Territorial Disposition without Prejudice to International Bases
				October-December 1944
				Borton Paper <i>(CAC-307)</i>
				1. Return to China
				2. Set Up International commission if Chinn Demands return.
				3. Establish international Bases Without prejudice to Changes in Sovereignty
				July 2, 1943
				Masland Paper <i>(T'343, Liuchiu Islands)</i>
				1. Return To China
				2. Place Under International Organization
				3. Demilitarize and Return to Japan

IV. PLANNERS CAUGHT UNAWARES: THE CAIRO DECLARATION'S "TERRITORIES TAKEN BY GREED OR VIOLENCE" PHRASE

In late November 1943, President Roosevelt, Prime Minister Churchill, and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, along with their immediate advisors, met in Cairo, Egypt to discuss the progress of the war against Japan and to announce their agreements on the territorial disposition of Japan. Despite the very political and diplomatically explosive nature of discussions on the disposition of enemy territories, Roosevelt excluded members of State, including his Secretary of State, with the exception of the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, W. Averell Harriman. This in fact was representative of the President's style of excluding the State Department in such meetings during the war. Roosevelt thus, by not having anyone from the Far Eastern group with him at the time, was not able to make use of expert advice on the Far East." Indeed, the evidence suggests that he did

not even seek to acquire or use the documents that had been prepared in the Territorial Subcommittee, and thus great misunderstandings emerged (as they would at the Yalta Conference as well).⁴⁴

It is not possible here to discuss in detail the entire conference, but one episode in particular directly concerned Okinawa is related below. During a private dinner with the Chiangs on the evening of November 23, Roosevelt asked Chiang China's intentions regarding the Ryukyu Islands." According to the memorandum written by the Chinese side (Roosevelt's special assistant, Harry Hopkins, was present but did not take notes), "The President...referred to the question of the Ryukyu Islands and enquired more than once whether China would want the Ryukyus." To this, Chiang reportedly replied that "China would be agreeable to joint occupation of the Ryukyus by China and the United States and, eventually, joint administration by the two countries under the trusteeship of an international organization."⁴⁶ The Chinese summary of the conversation suggests that Roosevelt, by asking more than once about the Ryukyu Islands, was quite willing to agree to China's taking, in effect, unilateral control over the islands. Why Roosevelt made Chiang this offer, despite himself having announced the principles of the Atlantic Charter of not taking the spoils of war, is an interesting question. It does in any case reveal his unilateral, top-down style of decision-making by not consulting with nor relying on the State Department's territorial studies—with near unpredictable results.

One explanation of Roosevelt's approach to Chiang regarding the disposition of the Ryukyu Islands seems to be that Roosevelt may have actually believed China wanted them." Indeed, as the summary shows, their conversation was conducted in the context of the "restoration of territories." Roosevelt, the evidence suggests, was aware of China's various claims to the Ryukyus, mostly seen in editorials in the nationalistic press, but also seen in comments by Foreign Minister Soong, the older brother of Chiang's wife, all of which, while inconsistent in nature, had been reported by U.S. embassy officials in China, and had received coverage in the international and U.S. press. The comments in question appear in both 1942 and 1943 and are both editorial and official in nature. The first noted comment appeared in the April 6, 1942 edition of *Ta Kung Pao*. It argued that the "Liuchiu Islands" should be detached from Japan in the peace settlement.⁴⁸ Again in January 1943, the *Ta Kung Pao* published a special article entitled "How to Liquidate Japan" by Shao Yu-lin, a former student from Kyushu University in Japan who was then the Director of the Information Department of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who called for the islands' return. While Shao, who was also a member of Chiang's Household Secretariat, was described by Ambassador Gauss as being "strongly nationalistic in his views," Gauss acknowledged at the same time that Shao's views concerning Japan were "believed to be generally representative of Chinese official and private opinion." Regarding China's post-

war aims, Shao called for the "restoration of Formosa, the Ryu Kyu Islands and the Four Northeastern Provinces."⁴⁹ Prior to this, Soong, at his first official press conference as Foreign Minister on November 3, 1942, publicly called for the recovery of the Ryukyus (as well as Manchuria and Formosa). "So we see that it was not only vocal semi-official newspapers but government spokesmen that expressed the desire to see the Ryukyu islands "restored" to China." It was with this belief, perhaps, that Roosevelt asked Chiang about the Liuchiu Islands. Had Roosevelt actually bothered to read the State Department memorandums on Okinawa's territorial status, he would have known that Chinese control was not considered a viable option for the disposition of the Ryukyus.

Roosevelt may have had other reasons for asking Chiang as well. Roosevelt's approach suggests his method of dealing sternly and strictly with enemy states—as the call for "unconditional surrender" would suggest—while at the same time raising the status of the Allied countries, particularly China." He may have been trying to strengthen China's confidence by showing Chiang that he considered China to be one of the Four Great Powers, one of the "Four Policemen" that Roosevelt was hoping would guarantee the security in the postwar world. Indeed their very meeting was representative of this belief. In that sense, Roosevelt, never a fan of Japan, may have been hoping for Chiang's help in limiting Japan's regional power and territorial size and hoped that the transfer of the Ryukyus to Chinese control would contribute to that goal. Roosevelt likely as well was seeking to punish Japan, mistakenly believing that the Ryukyu Islands were taken or stolen by Japan, and thus felt that stripping the islands from Japan would be justified and not subject to his own Atlantic Charter. The final version of the Cairo Declaration, issued on November 27 by the three leaders, strongly suggests this latter possibility. It reads:

The Three Great Allies are fighting this war to restrain and punish the aggression of Japan. They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion. It is their purpose that Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all territories, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

Ironically, Roosevelt's intentions in the Cairo meeting and this Cairo Declaration were unknown by those primarily responsible for planning (and implementing this new policy) in the State Department.

The Division of Political Studies, under Bowman's direction, decided at its December 3 meeting to discuss the territorial provisions vis-à-vis Japan, as found in the Cairo Declaration. Hence, the minutes of the meeting were titled the "Post-War Territorial Settlement with Japan."⁵⁴ Blakeslee, as the expert on the Far East, was asked to give his interpretations of the declaration. It is Blakeslee's views on Okinawa in particular that interest us here.

Blakeslee began by stating "his belief that...the Liuchius ([as well as] the Kurile Islands, the Bonin and Volcano Islands, ...and Marcus Island) in all probability did not fall within the meaning" of the phrase found in the Cairo Declaration, "Japan will be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed." After discussing each of the other territories, Blakeslee took up the question of Okinawa, explaining that Japan "had been interested" in the islands "for many centuries." The monarchy in the Liuchiu Islands, Blakeslee continued, had paid tribute both to China and Japan, eventually being "conquered" by the Japanese feudal domain of Satsuma. Without explaining what happened in the meantime (specifically, 250 years of the continuation of this curious period of "dual subordination"), Blakeslee pointed out that the islands were later annexed in 1879 after the "murder of some shipwrecked Japanese sailors on Formosa, and in 1881, China recognized this annexation. "Blakeslee concluded by stating that "While there [was] some slight violence in Formosa in connection with the annexation of the Liuchius, it did not appear to be of the type which fell within the meaning of the phrase in question in the Cairo Declaration."

The discussion continued in the meeting for some time with different dates and interpretations being thrown around. Stanley Hornbeck asked if there were any limits at all involved. John V. A. MacMurray recalled that the Security Subcommittee had in fact in 1942 recommended the taking of territories south of the 30th parallel. Borton, however, pointed out that upon further consideration, it was decided to exclude the Liuchius." As this and other exchanges continued, a frustrated Blakeslee reminded the members of the meeting that "the point under discussion was what territories had been included within the meaning of the specific phrase in question, and that in the opinion of himself and his colleagues, neither the year 1895 nor the geographical limit of the 30^o parallel or of any other parallel could be regarded as conclusive for our policy with regard to the disposition of Japanese territories." This frustration over the inconclusive meaning of the phrase was obvious when the chairman of the meeting stated that the "communique as a whole left a great deal to be desired." Bowman asked Hornbeck how the declaration had been prepared to which Hornbeck stated that "judging from internal evidence, it appeared to have been drafted in some haste, either by the principals concerned or by their secretariat," and added that in his opinion, "it would be a mistake to attach too much importance to the exact phraseology of the document."⁵⁶ However, that is exactly what was not possible. Being a public (and presidential)

statement of Allied war aims against Japan, planners and policy-makers on both sides would have to take into account what was said. References to the phrase, "territories taken by greed or violence," in the Cairo Declaration would continue up until the peace treaty, although it was hard to argue that much was true in the case of Okinawa.

V. FROM PREPARATION TO POLICY DRAFTING: THE CREATION OF THE POST-WAR PROGRAMS COMMITTEE, 1944

The progress of the war in favor of the Allies in North Africa, Southern and Eastern Europe, and the Pacific made it necessary to move from simple preparation to actual and concrete planning and drafting of policy recommendations. Recognizing this need, Secretary Hull decided in early July 1943 that preparation for postwar planning should end and that now, as he told members of the Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, "it [wa]s imperative that the results of our discussions to date be brought together in the form of documents which can serve as a basis of a more specific consideration of policies and proposals."⁵⁷ As a result, the Advisory Committee was dissolved in September and in its place came the formation of the Post-War Programs Committee (PWC) in February 1944.

The PWC was to meet 66 times during 1944 until the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) came into being at the end of the year. Chaired by Hull, the PWC was comprised of all of the high officials in the State Department. In addition to Secretary Hull, members included Under Secretary Stettinius (who had replaced Sumner Welles on October 4, 1943 and as we saw in the last chapter, while inexperienced in foreign affairs, was a strong believer in the need for an international organization for world peace in the postwar), and Assistant Secretaries Berle, Acheson, and Brekinridge Long, as well as several special assistants such as Pasvolsky, Bowman, and Davis. Representative of the high ranking of the committee, and the advanced stage in postwar policy planning, once the PWC approved a recommendation, it became State Department policy, needing only Presidential approval to become official U.S. policy for that area." Beneath the PWC were what historian Iokibe calls its "backbone"—the Country and Area Committees (CAC), which had begun to come into being one after the other in the summer and fall of 1943 in anticipation of the new stage of policy drafting.⁵⁹ Likewise, it was at this time in October 1943 that the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East (IDACFE) was created with Blakeslee as its chairman and Borton acting as secretary." The other members of IDACFE eventually included Ballantine and Alger Hiss from the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Vandenbosch and Fearey (as well as Blakeslee and Borton) from the Division of Territorial Studies (TS), Abbot L. Moffat, from the Liberated Areas Division (LA), Clyde Eagleton, Donald C. Blaisdell, and Quincy Wright from the Division of International Security and Organization (ISO), Erle R. Dickover, Frank S. Williams, and

Beppo R. Johanson from the Division of Japanese Affairs (JA), John Carter Vincent and Oliver E. Clubb from the Division of Chinese Affairs (CA), as well as several others including Carl F. Remer, who came over from the Research and Analysis Branch of the Office of Strategic Services and Japan-hand Eugene Dooman, who was Counsellor of Embassy from 1937 to 1941 under Grew, and had been designated a member of the committee by the ambassador.⁶¹ The IDACFE thus was composed of the several sections. For obvious reasons, the Japan specialists on this committee, Borton, Ballantine, Dooman, under the direction of Blakeslee, exercised a great influence over the Japan debate within the IDACFE. However, because Far Eastern experts were "sometimes more sympathetic to the Japanese," according to one historian, "IDACFE documents did not always coincide with the harsher sentiments regarding Japan then prevailing in Washington."⁶² Although this comment was made in the context of the degree of reform necessary vis-à-vis Japan and the position of the Emperor, it could very easily apply to the debate regarding Okinawa, as seen in the last chapter.

The IDACFE first took up its study of Okinawa in October 1944, one year after its formation. This was the second territorial study to be done regarding the Far East, the first having been conducted ten days before on the subject of military government for Formosa. The rapidness with which the Okinawa study was undertaken probably had to do with the fact that progress in the battle against Japan made it likely that either Okinawa, or neighboring Formosa to the south, would be used as a stepping stone to launch an invasion of Japan and thus would soon come under occupation. Hence its future territorial disposition would need to be considered immediately. Indeed, just after the Formosa paper was prepared and before the one on Okinawa was completed, the JCS issued its October 3 directive to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz ordering the conquest and acquisition of "one or more positions in the Ryukyus, target date 1 March 1945." (Eventually the invasion was delayed several weeks because of problems encountered in eliminating Japanese resistance in the Philippines.)

Titled, "Japan: Territorial Problems: Liuchiu (Ryukyu Islands)," the IDACFE paper, as well its subsequent revisions, called for the retention of the islands by Japan, with the provisions that the islands would not be fortified and that inspections could be conducted at any time." Although Borton had prepared the paper in the Division of Territorial Studies, the discussion in it was based, to a very large extent, on the earlier Masland Paper, as seen in [Figure 3-1](#).⁶⁴ The first version of papers were prepared, according to Ballantine, by individuals and copies of the completed drafts were then distributed to other participants at or before a round-table meeting. This first draft would be given the name "Preliminary" and then would be discussed by other members of the committee. Eventually a final version

would emerge. Ballantine, in his unpublished memoirs, writes "I do not recall a single instance when a first draft passed unscathed through the round table gauntlet; occasionally a paper had to be redrafted again and again before it could satisfy valid objections."⁶⁵ Borton's paper on Okinawa (later added to by Rupert Emerson) would be a case in point, emerging some 18 months later, both due to the relative low priority territorial matters were to receive vis-a-vis, for example the status of the Emperor, as well as due to the complexity of the problem of the disposition of Okinawa.

The first draft of Borton's three-page paper introduces the basic geographical, historical, and cultural background concerning the Ryukyu Islands, which here were defined as the Amami, Okinawa, Sakishima, and Daito Islands, and their relations with Japan. In dealing with the disposition of the Ryukyus, which he points out were not mentioned specifically in the Cairo Declaration, Borton approaches the issue by first discounting China's claims to the islands and its ability to control them, and next by stressing Japan's inherent rights to the islands.

On the first issue, Borton explains why the Ryukyus should not be turned over to Chinese control, writing, "The transfer of the Liuchiu Islands to China would be based on tenuous historic claims and would necessitate the development by China of a navy or naval air force if it were to bear the responsibility for their future protection. Furthermore, the Liuchiu Islands would be an economic liability to China and the three-quarter million Japanese subjects living there might present a real minority problem." Borton then stresses why Japan should be allowed to retain control of them:

As both Formosa and the Mandated Islands are to be taken away from Japan, the [Liuchiu] Islands will have only limited strategic importance. If Japan is disarmed and an effective method of inspection and control of Japanese armaments is developed, the possession of the Liuchiu Islands by Japan would appear to constitute no threat to the security of the North Pacific. Furthermore, Japan has strong claim to the Liuchius on the grounds of historical possession, nationality and propinquity.

Like the Masland Paper, Borton's paper recommends that the Ryukyus should be retained by Japan, with the provision for complete disarmament and for inspection of the islands at any time to prevent rearmament.

Borton explained at the October 10 Inter-Divisional Area Committee of the Far East meeting that the main problem of the islands' disposition "centered around whether the probable Chinese demands for acquisition of the [them] should be supported or whether they should remain with Japan."⁶⁶ Borton himself, he acknowledged, felt that the "Japanization [of the islands] was fairly complete and that there was little similarity between the Liuchiuans and the Chinese. " In response to this, someone (unidentified in the minutes) suggested that a plebiscite could be held to determine the feel-

ings of the inhabitants on this question, or that, once the occupation began, a commission could decide the ultimate disposition." Likewise, it was also suggested that in the absence of a strong desire on the part of the Okinawans to be transferred to Chinese control, Japan should be allowed to retain the islands. At this point, it was decided that further consideration was needed and the meeting adjourned.

The IDACFE next took up the discussion two days later on October 12. In addition to suggesting some minor changes, the committee decided to revise the recommendations in Borton's October 7 draft paper to read:

1) It is recommended that no transfer of sovereignty take place for the Liuchiu Islands (the Amami, Oltinawa, Sakishima and Daito Islands) unless the Chinese press their claims for the Liuchiu Islands or unless there should be a general manifestation on the part of the people of the islands themselves for a change of status. In either case it might be proposed that the question of the future sovereignty of the Liuchiu Islands be resolved by the findings of a commission or by other means to determine the will of the people.

2) The final arrangement for the disposal of the Liuchiu Islands should not be prejudicial to the establishment of an international base or bases in the islands by an international organization, if the international organization desires such bases.⁶⁸

Borton subsequently included these recommendations in the next draft of his paper.⁶⁹

A committee meeting was held two weeks later on October 26 and "centered," according to the minutes, "on the problem of the future status" of the islands." The discussion itself focussed primarily on three areas. The first one, relatively easy in seeking agreement, concerned the wording of the earlier second recommendation which was changed to add "the establishment under the authority of the International Organization of a base or bases in the Islands." The second area of discussion concerned the seeking of agreement on the geographical definition of the Ryukyus, or more specifically, on the question of how to consider the islands—separately or as a group. The committee voted eight to five, over the objections of the Japan Affairs Division representatives (Dickover and Williams), in favor of considering the Ryukyus as a group and thus not subject to separate disposition.⁷¹ The third issue discussed concerned the earlier recommendation to send a commission of inquiry to the Liuchius and proved to be the most difficult to reach agreement on. The committee, "after considerable discussion," voted nine to three against sending a commission to the Ryukyus, although the reasons for this decision were not made clear in the minutes. At the same time, the committee voted unanimously that if a commission were to be sent to the Ryukyus, that it be "international in character."

However, in any case, the committee could not come to agreement on the wording of this recommendation and Borton was asked to submit a new draft for consideration by the committee.

In the meantime, before Borton's new draft was completed, the committee met again on November 20 and decided that the initial part of the paper entitled "Basic Factors," which includes a discussion on the geographical, cultural, and historic factors relating to the islands, should be reworked." The committee also felt that in light of this request for revision, the section on recommendations might also have to be revised.

Borton had the revisions ready on December 4. The new draft paper, "CAC-307 Preliminary b," having incorporated the above requests and expanded the discussions on Chinese-Japanese relations with Okinawa and the recommendations, was now, approaching six pages, twice the length of the original one." Moreover, a new section was added on the "strategic value" of the islands. Importantly, the high "strategic value" was found to be not inconsistent with conditional retention by Japan:

The location of the Liuchius athwart the approaches to the China coast and parallel to the great circle trade route gives them considerable importance. They contain various protected anchorages, suitable for seaplane and small vessels such as the port of Naha, the capital city, and several secondary airbases on the largest islands. It has been recommended by the Navy Department that an International Security Base should be established somewhere in the islands, but *the establishment of such a base would not be a predominant factor in determining their future status.* (Italics by author.)

On the other hand, as both Formosa and the Mandated Islands are to be taken away from Japan, the Liuchiu Islands would have only limited strategic importance if left to Japan. If Japan is disarmed and an effective method of control to prevent Japanese rearmament is developed, the possession of the Liuchiu Islands by Japan would appear to constitute little threat either to the security of the North Pacific or to the security of Japan.

The paper ended by introducing the revised recommendations:

1. As the Japanese have a strong claim to the Liuchiu Islands on the grounds of historical possession, nationality and propinquity, as well as on the basis of the ethnographic and linguistic similarities between the Japanese and the Liuchiuans, it is recommended that the United States should favor no transfer of sovereignty of the Liuchiu Islands (comprising the Amami, Okinawa, Sakishima and Daito Islands).
2. However, if the Chinese Government, at the time of the general peace settlement, strongly presents a case for the acquisition of all or parts of these islands and presses its claim, or if after the occupation of the islands by the Allies considerable sentiment is found to exist among the

inhabitants of all or parts of these islands for a change in sovereignty, it is recommended that an international commission be established:

- (1) To determine the facts concerning the wishes of the people, and the political, economic, and security problems involved in any change of political status;
 - (2) To recommend a solution to the United Nations which would be most likely to contribute to peace and stability in the Pacific.
3. It is recommended that the final arrangement for the disposal of the Liuchiu Islands should not be prejudicial to the establishment under the authority of a General International Organization of a base or bases in the islands.

The recommendations in the revised version were approved the next day (December 5) at the IDACFE's 171st meeting.⁷⁴ Minor changes were however requested in the discussion on "Basic Factors," which Borton made on December 11.⁷⁵ The new document (CAC-307 Preliminary c) was approved by the IDACFE on December 14 again with some minor adaptations, including two changes in the wording (as italicized by author) of the discussion on the "Strategic Value" of the islands:

The location of the Liuchius athwart the approaches to the China coast and parallel to the great circle trade route gives them considerable importance. They contain various protected anchorages, suitable for seaplane and small vessels such as the port of Naha, the capital city, and several secondary airbases on the largest islands. It has been recommended by the Navy Department that an International Security Base should be established somewhere in the islands. *It is generally agreed, however; that* the establishment of such a base would not be a predominant factor in determining their future status.

On the other hand, as both Formosa and the Mandated Islands are to be taken away from Japan, the Liuchiu Islands would have only limited strategic importance if left to Japan so long as Japan is disarmed and an effective method of control to prevent Japanese rearmament is developed.?

IDACFE's policy for Okinawa thus took this shape. After these recommendations were finished, IDACFE turned its attention to the disposition of the Mandated Territories and the Bonin and Volcano Islands. It was not to begin reexamining its assumptions about Okinawa for another year in December 1945. In the meantime, numerous changes were to take place in the war against Japan and within the policy-making process of the U.S. government. Concerning the latter set of changes, the creation of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee on November 29, 1944 would have a major impact on the coordination of policy, particularly toward Japan and Okinawa.

VI. THE STATE-WAR-NAVY COORDINATING COMMITTEE AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE FAR EAST, 1945

The need for coordination between the U.S. military and the State Department did not stop as the end of World War II neared. Indeed, the limited role the State Department was allowed in making wartime policy meant that there had in fact been little coordination with the agency responsible for U.S. foreign policy. In the immediate postwar period, the role of the State Department increased and the need for interdepartmental coordination to handle both the political and military aspects of the broadened scope of America's foreign affairs became ever clearer. This was especially true with policy over Okinawa. The dilemma was how to satisfy U.S. security needs and at the same time live up to its political and diplomatic responsibilities.

The creation of SWNCC in November 1944 arose, for one reason, out of this need to better coordinate policy between State and the military. In order to facilitate its work, and specifically to prepare policy papers on Japan and Korea, SWNCC created the Subcommittee on the Far East (SFE), also known by the acronym SWNCCFE, on January 5, 1945.⁷⁷ The Japan group logically was tapped to fill it and provide their expertise. Dooman was appointed Chairman, and Blakeslee and Borton were asked to be regular representatives from the State Department. Fearey, and later Edwin M. Martin, represented the Division of Economic Studies. Military members of SFE likewise included Navy representative Admiral Harold C. Train, formerly with Naval Intelligence, and Major General Strong, who as we saw above, had worked with State on the Security Subcommittee back in 1942. Strong's presence would be important. While "considerable rivalry had traditionally existed between these two groups, especially when prestige or self-interest was involved," Borton noted, "one of the remarkable characteristics of SWNCC and its subcommittee [on the Far East] was the mutual trust and respect that developed between the armed forces representatives and those from the Department of State." "Indeed, this was shown early on at a February 1 meeting of the SFE, with Dooman presiding. There, as described by Borton, the subcommittee decided the two basic principles by which it was to operate:

Where a question is primarily military in character and tentative policies are prepared by non-military persons, the military requirements for operations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff are governing and will control...in so far as any differences...may actually prejudice accomplishments of the military objective. Where a political question comes up and political policy is being considered by this committee, there will be no change involved in that policy unless the policy itself could serve to defeat a military objective.⁷⁹

However, as the following suggests, attempts to cleanly separate political and military problems, as particularly in the case of Okinawa, would prove to be not easy.

At the end of January 1945, SWNCC began to consider the "politico-military problems which now, or soon will, confront the United States," with the result being a tentative listing of the "more urgent problems" with the SWNCC designation number of the problem to be studied.⁸⁰ The problem of the territorial disposition of Okinawa came under the heading "Territorial Adjustments," and was later given the designation number "SWNCC 59" with the somewhat dramatic but descriptive title, "Disposition of Areas to be Removed from Japan's Sovereignty."⁸¹ On March 13, the Subcommittee for the Far East submitted SWNCC 59 (at this point titled "Politico-Military Problems in the Far East: Territorial Adjustments") to the SWNCC secretariat.¹¹¹ In this report the SFE concluded that any future paper on territorial adjustments should examine "the political and security interests of the United States in the future status of certain areas of the Japanese Empire, such as...the Liuchiu Islands" and recommended that SWNCC request the State Department to prepare a draft paper on the subject. The State paper would then, SFE recommended, be submitted to the SWNCC secretariat for consideration by a JCS-designated agency. The SFE also recommended that there be coordination between the JCS and itself on acquiring each other's views.

It was not until June of the following year (1946) however before the State Department was able to complete its study on the Liuchiu Islands and other territories and submit its report, SWNCC 5911 (see next chapter) to SWNCC. In other words, the review took more than 15 months to complete. Indeed, by the time the report was finished, more than one year had passed since the effective end of the Battle of Okinawa in June of 1945. By this time, some scholars of the occupation of Okinawa have written, the military had firmed up its position on Okinawa and dug in.⁸³

The fact that territorial disposition of enemy states, and for that matter, the territorial disposition of the Ryukyu Islands, was not a top priority in policy matters at the time (a time which Borton calls, with some understatement, "the hectic period...prior to Japan's surrender") explains why there was such a delay.¹¹² Indeed, territorial adjustments traditionally took place at a peace conference. In any case, State began its discussions on the Ryukyu Islands in December 1945, because, in the words of Blakeslee, "it was strategically valuable for the Area Committee to formalize its views so that they would be forwarded to the higher levels of the State Department and there used to counter the views of the War and Navy Departments."⁸⁵

As was introduced in the previous chapter, the Navy began demanding the inclusion of a United States base on Okinawa in the JCS study of post-war U.S. security requirements in the latter part of 1945. Likewise, while not finalized, representatives to the San Francisco Conference of the United

Nations had developed the concept of strategic areas and international trusteeships to break the impasse over satisfying the military's strategic requirements and the State Department's desire to see the United Nations Organization function and international cooperation to prevail. While the State Department at this point assented to the fact that Okinawa was strategically important, it did question the way in which the military sought to acquire control of the islands. Finally, of importance, was the phrase developed at the July (1945) Potsdam Conference relating to Japanese territories, "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.""" This last phrase, "such minor islands as we determine," would become a point of conflict between the State Department and the JCS, because while the JCS considered it allowing America flexibility in making a decision on Okinawa's disposition as seen in the three words "...as we determine," State would emphasize the former two words, "minor islands," reflected Okinawa's relation to Japan. Indeed, as Blakeslee stated at the start of their December 20 meeting concerning Okinawa, the Ryukyus were "'minor islands' within the meaning of the Potsdam Declaration."⁸⁷ This had in effect been the basis of State Department thinking regarding Okinawa all along.

The IDACFE at this December meeting discussed the first draft of the paper on the "Disposition of the Liuchiu (Ryukyu) Islands (PR-35 Pre[liminary])," which had been prepared by a professor of international relations on leave from Harvard, Dr. Rupert Emerson, of the Division of Research for the Far East." Emerson's seven-page paper introduced a total of five conclusions, as well as a short section on "Facts Bearing on the Problem" and a longer section for "Discussion." The contents were based directly on Borton's paper of the previous year (and thus indirectly on the Masland paper of 1943). However, due to events of 1945, including the horrific Battle of Okinawa and the end of the war, as well as Blakeslee's desire to counter the military's strong and, as he felt unreasonable, demands, Emerson's paper was able to offer more tentative conclusions than the earlier Borton paper, as seen in the following:

- a. The United States should make no objection to the retention of sovereignty by Japan over the Liuchiu Islands (comprising the Amami, Oltinawa, Sakishima, and Daitojima Island groups). The retention of the islands by Japan should be subject to the principles of disarmament to be applied to the whole Japanese Empire.
- b. If the Chinese Government strongly presents a case for the acquisition of all or part of these islands or for their being placed under the trusteeship system of the United Nations with China as trustee, the views of the Chinese Government should be given careful consideration although neither of these alternatives appears to be a desirable solution.

c. If during the Allied occupation of the islands, considerable sentiment is found to exist among the inhabitants for a change in sovereignty!; an international commission might be appointed to determine the facts concerning the desire of the inhabitants and to recommend a solution to the United Nations which would be most likely to contribute to peace and stability in the Pacific. The United States should continue to favor no transfer of sovereignty of the islands unless it were clearly established by such a commission that a transfer would be in conformity with the wishes of the people and would not create unfortunate political, economic, and security problems.

d. The final arrangements for the disposition of the Liuchiu Islands should not prejudice the establishment in the islands of an international base under the authority of the United Nations Organization. The Security Council should recommend such a base.

e. It is the view of the State Department that the establishment by the United States of a base in Okinawa or elsewhere in the Liuchius would be politically inadvisable. If it should, however, be the decision of the United States Government that such a base is necessary, it should take the form of a strategic area trusteeship, and be limited to as small an area and embrace as small a segment of the indigenous population as possible.

In addition to re-emphasizing the view of the earlier papers that China's claims to Okinawa were weak and the Okinawan people would probably not wish to be transferred to Chinese control, this new paper by Emerson importantly also comes out more strongly against both U.S. control over Okinawa and a trusteeship for Okinawa.

Concerning American control over the islands, the paper argues against it for three reasons: economic, political, and strategic. Firstly, regarding economic concerns, the paper argues (prophetically) that the United States would have to become responsible for "a large Oriental population which is poverty-stricken and would in all probability require considerable continued economic assistance to maintain itself at any adequate standard of life." Next, the paper touches on the political issue of sovereignty vis-à-vis Japan, stating that even a small base would create "very difficult problems...in connection with somewhat technical questions of sovereignty." Strategic problems would also arise, the paper continues if a base is to be maintained "in territory entirely surrounded by areas presumably under the control of Japan or China and inhabited by an essentially Japanese population. The island of Okinawa, which is the most probable site for a base of any magnitude, is the most heavily and densely populated of the Liuchius...The establishment of an American base in these islands...could not fail to be resented by China and perhaps by the Soviet Union as well.""

In taking up this paper for discussion at their December 20 meeting, it was clear that the changed circumstances and new membership would make agreement less easy in several areas. The discussion focussed on two

issues—how to view the Ryukyus (as well as its inhabitants) and the geopolitical factors in building a base in Okinawa.

Harding F. Bancroft, Assistant Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs, who had been on the drafting committee for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration as well as being a delegate to the first session of the U.N. General Assembly (and still later to become a senior executive with the New York Times), challenged the assumption of the paper altogether that the Liuchiu Islands should be considered "minor islands" of Japan. He stated that it was not a good idea to give them back to Japan and asked the committee why the paper dismissed the idea of a trusteeship. In response, the paper's author explained that the Liuchiu Islands "had been an integral part of Japan and [therefore] the idea of trusteeship did not apply." E.D. Chase of the Division of Dependent Areas suggested that "trusteeship was preferable to outright Chinese control." Bancroft, attempting to draw on his U.N. experience, stated that "in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, the Liuchiuans were a dependent people." Dr. Edwin O. Reischauer, at this time a young Japan expert on loan to the State Department from Harvard University (and later to become Ambassador to Japan), shot back that the Liuchiuans "were not a dependent people," implying that they were to be considered as Japanese and a part of Japan. Erle Dickover, then with the Washington-based Far Eastern Commission, challenged Reischauer's statement saying that the Okinawans "had no political consciousness." Borton stated that he did not consider them to be a "separate people" although he added, "they may have been in the seventeenth century." Borton's comment was clearly a reflection of the complicated state of relations between Okinawa (the former Ryukyu Kingdom) and mainland Japan, a problem that in many ways continues today." Dickover was in any case against the establishment of a U.S. base in Okinawa for both political and economic reasons and lamented later in the discussion that the "American public would probably demand retention for sentimental reasons" after the horrendous battle of Okinawa which cost nearly 15,000 American lives. The committee agreed to address the economic issue by inserting the words "and economically" after the word "politically" in conclusion number five. Subsequently, near the end of the discussion however, the committee changed its mind again. Borton questioned the initial phrase, but Emerson defended his position stating that State "should take a strong stand on this matter of a base." After Blakeslee stressed the belief that the Soviet Union "take amiss the establishment of a base so far north," Dickover added "the establishment of a base [in Okinawa] was the best way to get into a war in the Far East" and argued that the phrase should be made stronger in order to demonstrate to the military the undesirability of holding on to Okinawa. Borton suggested the use of "severe political repercussions," while another committee mem-

bers suggested the word "provocative." The committee eventually agreed to leave the rewording of the phrase to Emerson.

Significantly, as proposed at the meeting, the title of the paper also saw a change. Until this point, the State Department had consistently used the Chinese pronunciation of the name islands (Liuchiu). However, from this point on, the Japanese pronunciation (Ryukyu) of the islands' name was adopted. Although the reason for the change was not included in the minutes of the meeting nor discussed in the memoirs left by some of the participants, it is likely that it was not just a simple matter of pronunciation. It was, the author suggests, a visible or symbolic way of showing that State (particularly the Japan hands), overcoming its earlier inconsistency, did not consider the islands to be a part of China, but rather a part of Japan.

Emerson's reworked paper was completed later that same day following the meeting, with its conclusions reworked in two ways." Firstly, the order of the latter two conclusions was reversed. Secondly, the conclusion concerning the bases was redrafted in the following manner:

It is the view of the State Department that the establishment by the United States of a permanent base in Okinawa or elsewhere in the Ryukyu Islands would be likely to provolze serious repercussions and would be politically objectionable. If, however, despite these strong political objections, it should be the decision of the United States Government that such a base is necessary for purposes of security, it should take the form of a strategic area trusteeship, and be limited to as small an area and embrace as small a segment of the indigenous population as possible.

In the discussion of the reasons against American control of the islands, Emerson added that "It seems probable that it would be regarded by both powers [China and the Soviet Union] as a provocative threat to their own security rather than as a proper defensive move by the United States." Likewise, he addressed the trusteeship question by adding to the original statement "The establishment of a trusteeship arrangement under the United Nations Organization does not appear desirable in view of the political and social advancement of the Ryukyuans and their apparent lack of desire for separation from Japan" the phrase, "The ultimate creation of an independent Ryukyu state as the goal for such a trusteeship does not appear desirable, and the permanent retention of trusteeship is unfeasible."

The IDACFE took up discussion of the new draft two weeks later on January 3, 1946 at its first meeting of the new year." Borton, assuming the chairmanship of the meeting with Blakeslee away, said that because he had not received any new information from the military services on their attitudes toward bases in the Ryukyu Islands, the committee should continue with its policy drafting. Emerson suggested that the committee state its views and let the military respond. Discussions in this early January meeting focussed again primarily on the strategic, geo-political considerations

of acquiring a base in Okinawa. Edward E. Rice, a diplomat with extensive China experience (who shortly after was to become Assistant Chief of the Division of China Affairs), did not think China would oppose the establishment of an American base on Okinawa.⁹³ In fact, he stated, "China at the present moment would be delighted to have the United States establish a base on the Ryukyus" due to its own "divided house." Rice suggested therefore, that the phrase, "The establishment of an American base in these islands, in addition to other Pacific bases to be held by the United States and in such proximity to the China coast might come to be resented by China and would probably be regarded by the USSR as a provocative threat than as a proper defensive move by the United States," be substituted for the phrase cited above. (This suggestion was adopted.) Rice went on to express his doubts over "whether it was a wise policy for the United States to show all its cards and not make our policy towards the Liuchius conditional on Russia's policy toward bases perhaps in Turkey." The committee however, the minutes record, did not "favor this type of bargaining," with Borton explaining that the committee was to make "optimum recommendations." Emerson likewise expressed his fear (prophetically, in retrospect) that the United States "might not be able to let go of the Liuchius if [we] ever showed any desire to keep them." Concerning the Soviet Union, Emerson added that while it might not oppose the establishment of a U.S. base on the islands, he warned "it might use our action as a precedent in relation to its own desires regarding bases." The committee suggested that Emerson seek out expert advice in the Division of Eastern European Affairs.

In addition, William W. Bishop, Jr. of the Office of the Legal Advisor offered an important suggestion as well regarding America's historic relations with Okinawa. Bishop proposed that a reference be made to the United States having signed a treaty with the Ryukyu Kingdom in 1853 "in order to show that the United States had once acted directly with the people of the islands."" This suggestion was adopted along with a statement that France and the Netherlands had as well joined in treaty relations with the Ryukyu Islands.

At the end of the meeting, Borton, perhaps somewhat prematurely, pronounced that the draft was ready to be prepared in its final form. Emerson had the new version of the paper, "PR-35 Final" ready two days later, on January 5, which incorporated the numerous recommendations above." The revised paper would not receive immediate attention however because the committee had begun its discussions on the "Disposition of the Japanese Mandate Islands," which came under the series numbered "PR-31," and the related "PR-40 Preliminary, Disposition of the Outlying and Minor Japanese Islands," which included the Ryukyu Islands in its focus (as is discussed below). Thus, due to these other studies, and the fact that a JCS paper (JCS 570/50) had been prepared (delineating the Nansei

Islands south of 31° North Latitude [essentially, as seen in [Map 1-1](#) the southernmost tip of Kyushu island, one of the four main islands of Japan] as a strategic trusteeship) as these discussions were going on, the next time the committee was able take up the question of the disposition of Okinawa was in its February 12 meeting.

Because of the receipt by the State Department (through SWNCC) of the new JCS study, Emerson's paper ("PR-35 Final") of January 5 underwent further revision to bring it in line with the JCS study, which, as seen in the previous chapter, Byrnes had requested in mid-January (the JCS study was given to Byrnes on January 31). The latest draft of the paper appeared then as "PR-35 Final (Revision a)."⁹⁶ Emerson's paper recommended in its conclusions that:

If such a base is established, the remainder of the central and southern Ryukyus should be made a non-strategic trust territory with either the United States or the United Nations Organization itself as the administering authority, depending upon the extent of the strategic area required by the United States. The northern islands (north of 28° 40' N. Lat., or north of such line as may be found to separate islands primarily inhabited by Okinawans from islands primarily inhabited by Japanese) should be returned to Japan.⁹⁷

When the committee examined this latest draft on February 12, it decided to remove the reference to the United Nations Organization because of the argument introduced by Alice L. Dunning of the Division of Research for the Far East (later joining the Division of Japanese Affairs), that if a base were established, the United States, not the UN, "should be willing to assume the economic liability of the other areas, rather than shift the burden to an international authority." Dunning also stressed the point that "the fundamental policy of the Area Committee that the Ryukyu Islands be retained by Japan [should] be highlighted in some fashion." As a result, Borton suggested that the conclusions be reworked and reordered. The committee accepted this suggestion and authorized the preparation of the final form of the paper.

Emerson's final version appeared on March 4 as "PR-35 Final (Revision B)," and representative of the extensive debate put into the discussions and reworking of the paper, it now covered nine pages, rather than the original seven.⁹⁹ The six recommendations eventually agreed to by the Area Committee took the following form:

[1] It is the view of the State Department that the establishment by the United States of a permanent base in Okinawa or elsewhere in the Ryukyu Islands would be likely to provoke serious international repercussions and would be politically objectionable. If, however, despite these strong political objections, it should be the decision of the United States Government

that such a base is necessary for purposes of security, it should take the form of a strategic-area trusteeship, and be limited to as small an area and embrace as small a segment of the indigenous population as possible.

[2] If such a base is established, the remainder of the central and southern Ryukyus should be made a non-strategic trust territory with the United States as the administering authority. The northern islands (north of 28 DGS 40' N. Lat., or north of such line as may be found to separate islands primarily inhabited by Okinawans from islands primarily inhabited by Japanese) should be returned.

[3] If no such United States base is to be established, the Ryukyu Islands should all be regarded as minor islands to be retained by Japan. The retention of any of the islands by Japan should be subject to the principles of disarmament to be applied to the whole Japanese Empire.

[4] If, however, there is clear evidence during the period of Allied occupation of the islands that the Okinawans, who inhabit the central and southern islands, have strong objection to returning to Japanese rule, an international commission should be appointed by the states having responsibility for the disposition of the islands to determine the facts concerning the desire of the inhabitants and to recommend to the appointing states a solution which would be most likely to contribute to peace and stability in the Pacific.

[5] If the Chinese Government strongly presents a case for the acquisition of all or parts of the islands or for their being placed under the trusteeship system with China as the administering authority; the United States should attempt to persuade the Chinese authorities of the undesirability of pressing the claim.

[6] The final arrangements for the disposition of the Ryukyu Islands should not prejudice the establishment in the islands of an international base under the authority of the United Nations Organization, if the Security Council should recommend such a base and if no United States base is established.

Following the completion of this study, as well as the other territorial studies, the State Department was able to submit a draft policy paper to SWNCC on June 19 (1946), which was given the designation number SWNCC 59/1 (and is discussed in the next chapter).⁹⁹ A comprehensive study amounting to 22 pages, its conclusions were clear: "The Ryukyu Islands should be regarded as minor islands to be retained by Japan and demilitarized." Although there was some flexibility shown on the recognition of the possible strategic need for a base on the main island of Okinawa, the State Department's official position that the Ryukyu Islands as a whole were "minor islands" of Japan to be returned was made clear and firm at this point.¹⁰¹ It would, as seen in the next chapter on the trusteeship debate regarding Okinawa, necessarily clash with that of the military.

NOTES

1. Frederick S. Dunn, *Peace-Making and the Settlement with Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 7.
2. Louis devotes an entire book to this question. See his *Imperialism at Bay*. Also see Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald E. Ridinger, "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (March 1955), 1-18.
3. "Joint Declaration of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 5, No. 112 (August 16, 1941), 125-126.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Dulles, *op. cit.*, 1-2.
6. Quoted in *Ibid.*, 3-4. Also see Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (July 1928), 584.
7. Ioltibe, Maltoto, *Beikoku no Nihon Senryo Seisaku* (U.S. Occupation Policy for Japan), Vol. 1 (Toltyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1985), 23; Harley Notter, *Postwar Foreign Policy Preparation, 1939-1945* (Greenwood, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1975), 19; Rudolf V. A. Janssens, 'What Future for Japan?' *U.S. Wartime Planning for the Postwar Era, 1942-1945* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1995), 11. On the Council of Foreign Relations, see Laurence H. Shoup, "Shaping the National Interest: The Council of Foreign Relations, the Department of State, and the Origins of the Postwar World, 1939-1943," (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1974).
8. Notter, *op. cit.*, 19. On Pasvolsky, see Shoup, *op. cit.*, 69-70.
9. Shoup, *op. cit.*, 70-71.
10. Notter, *op. cit.*, 20-21; Shoup, *op. cit.*, 71.
11. Notter, *op. cit.*, 21.
12. On the weaknesses of the Advisory Committee, see *Ibid.*, 22. Also see Ioltibe, *op. cit.*, 61-70. A complementary Division of Special Research (SR) was proposed on November 22, 1940 (and finally established on February 3, 1941 with Pasvolsky as its director) in order to cope with the problems of research and analysis. See *Ibid.*, 61.
13. Maltoto Ioltibe, ed., *The Occupation of Japan: U.S. Planning Documents, 1942-1945*, hereafter cited as Vol. 1, (Bethesda: Congressional Information Service, Inc., 1987), iv. For Hull's memorandum to the President, and a tentative list of members, see Notter, *op. cit.*, 63-65.
14. Ioltibe (1985), *op. cit.*, 70; Notter, *op. cit.*, 78.
15. Iokibe (1987), ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, iv.; Notter, *op. cit.*, 81-82.
16. Notter, *op. cit.*, 117.
17. *Ibid.*, 122.
18. "P Minutes 20," Ioltibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, microfiche 1-D-6.
19. Oltinawa was called the Luchu or Liuchiu Islands, which is the Chinese pronunciation, by the State Department in its discussions and memorandums as late

as December 1945, despite, ironically, being considered a part of Japan by the department (see below).

20. Welles' memoirs, *Seven Decisions that Shaped History* (New York: Harper and Erothers Publishers, 1951), and his *The Time for Decision* (New York: Harper and Erothers Publishers, 1944), do not shed any light on this statement either.

21. "P Minutes 20."

22. "S Minutes, August 21, 1942," *Ibid.*, microfiche 1-A-23.

23. Strong was the first language officer sent to Japan by the Army. He was assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo as a language officer in approximately 1905 at the time of the Russo-Japanese War, in which Japan emerged victorious, hut exhausted.

24. The Joint Chiefs of Staff came into being in early 1942, having held its first meeting on February 9, 1942. See Historical Division, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *op. cit.*, 1-3.

25. "Letter from William D. Leahy to Norman H. Davis on the Subject of Post War Security Needs of the United States in the Pacific and Far Eastern Regions (September 15, 1942), Annex to Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 179 (January 2, 1945)," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, microfiche 2-E-160.

26. "P Document 110, S Document 38, Tentative Conclusions of the Security Subcommittee Concerning the Disposition of Japanese Insular Possessions (September 22, 1942)," *Ibid.*, microfiche 1-A-17.

27. Miyazato, *op. cit.*, 185.

28. Notter, *op. cit.*, 41.

29. "Memorandum from Cordell Hull on the Research Staff (February 3, 1941-January 14, 1944)," Appendix 22, in Notter, *op. cit.*, 518-519.

30. *Ibid.*, 153. One of the scholars, Japan expert Hugh Eorton, brought into the Division of Special Research later, explained the significance of having a large presence of non-government people involved. Eorton writes:

As special adviser to the secretary of state, Dr. Pasvolsky had become convinced that while many career foreign service officers wrote excellent reports on current situations, they were reluctant to make predictions as to future developments, and that academicians trained in research and problem-solving techniques were better equipped to tackle the complicated postwar problems. So he persuaded Secretary Hull to allow him to appoint to SR persons from the academic community with responsibility for preparing papers on postwar problems and policies for consideration by the Territorial Subcommittee. Consequently, the heads of the various sections of the SR—including Drs. Harley Notter, Mosely, Elakeslee, and those of us who worked for them—were noncareer Department of State employees in a newly created division that threatened to impinge on the responsibilities and influence of the traditional geographic divisions whose members were almost exclusively career foreign service officers.

Understandably, they were jealous of their positions and saw our division as a threat to their influence and authority.

Hugh Borton, *Spanning Japan's Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh Borton* (unpublished manuscript, hereafter *Borton Memoirs*), 137. This book does appear in Japanese as *Sengo Nihon no Sekkeisha: Borton Kaisorokzt* (Builder of Postwar Japan: The Eorton Memoirs), (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1998). Hereafter the page number from the English manuscript, to be called the Borton Memoirs, will be cited.

31. Hugh Eorton, *American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan* (Occasional Papers of East Asian Institute), (NY: Columbia University, 1967), 8.

32. "Meeting of the Subcommittee on Political Problems, Chronological Minutes, Meeting of March 14, 1942," Iokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, microfiche 1-D-2.

33. Notter, *op. cit.*, 517-520; Iokihe Makoto, ed., *Nihon Senryo Shiryo Kaidai* (An Annotated Bibliography of Japan: U.S. Planning Documents, 1942-1945), (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1987), 11; Borton, *op. cit.*, 8. Of the group, Borton would continue to be involved in policy for Okinawa until his leaving the State Department officially on October 5, 1948. Fearey, on the other hand, would spend the better part of 30 years being involved directly or indirectly with Okinawa policy. His last related assignment was as U.S. Civil Administrator for the Ryukyu Islands from August 21, 1969 to May 12, 1972. Author's interview with Robert A. Fearey, Bethesda, Maryland, February 8, 1998. Fearey and Grew (along with some 100 U.S. diplomats) were placed under house arrest in Tokyo at the time of the declaration of war by Japan on the United States. Fearey and his colleagues were repatriated in the summer of 1942, at which time he entered the State Department as a divisional assistant. See Fearey's interesting recollections in his "My Year with Ambassador Joseph C. Grew," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1992), 99-136.

34. *Borton Memoirs*, 139. Borton records that Blakeslee was more than twenty years older. Indeed, Blakeslee was actually more than thirty years senior. Blakeslee was born in 1871 and died in 1954 at the age of 82; Borton was born in 1903, passing away at the age of 92 in 1995.

35. *Ibid.* 139.

36. *Ibid.*, 136-137.

37. Notter, *op. cit.*, 156.

38. *Borton Memoirs*, 141.

39. *Ibid.*, 141-142.

40. Miyazato, *op. cit.*, 185-186. In actuality; there were several other studies done by Masland as well.

41. The other territorial studies done by Masland include: "T-321, Southern Sakhalin: Japanese Karafuto (May 24, 1943)", "T-322, Kurile Islands (Chishima), (May 24, 1943)", "T-323, Nanpo Shoto (Bonin and Other Islands), (May 25, 1943)," and "T-324, Spratly and Other Islands (Shinnan Gunto), (May 25, 1943)." Borton conducted two studies on the Korean Peninsula and Blakeslee himself

undertook approximately five studies on the Japanese Mandated Territories, one of his areas of expertise. Concerning Blakeslee's interest in the area, see his "The Mandates of the Pacific," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (September 15, 1922), 98-115. In this article written some twenty years before his involvement with the State Department, Blakeslee notes that some of the Pacific Mandates were a source of "severe international friction" between the U.S. and Japan. Indeed they so became, as another article published in 1944 pointed out. See Huntington Gilchrist, "The Japanese Islands: Annexation or Trusteeship?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (July 1944), 635-642.

42. Miyazato, *op. cit.*, 186.

43. Concerning their treatment, Borton relates in his memoirs (pp. 147-1481,

None of us knew anything about a conference in Cairo except that Prime Minister Churchill, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and President Roosevelt had been meeting at an undisclosed place. To our knowledge, the president had made no request for documents or papers on postwar Far Eastern problems in preparation for the meeting...When we subsequently learned that President Roosevelt had taken only military advisers to Cairo, and the single State Department officer present had only acted as interpreter for the president during his conversations with Chiang Kai-shek, Dr. Blakeslee and I were extremely apprehensive lest all our planning on postwar problems in the Far East would be completely ignored by the president.

44. See for example, Iokibe Makoto, "Kairo Sengen to Nihon no Ryodo (The Cairo Declaration and Japanese Territory)," *Hiroshima Hogaku* (The Hiroshima University Law Review), Vol. 4, Nos. 3-4 (March 1981), 85.

45. For China's views on the Ryukyu, or Liuchiu Islands, see Xiaoyuan Liu, *A Tentative Partnership: The United States and China Contemplate the Postwar Disposition of Japan and the Japanese Empire, 1942-1945* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1990), 179-189. On the Yalta Conference, and the implications of Roosevelt not being familiar with Japanese territorial boundaries, see the memoirs of Roosevelt's Russian language interpreter and 40-year diplomat. Charles E. Bohlen, *Witness to History, 1929-1969* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1973), 196-198.

46. "Chinese Summary Record (translation) of Roosevelt-Chiang Dinner Meeting (November 23, 1943)," *Foreign Relations of the United States* (Hereafter FRUS), *The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1961), 324. Chiang, in his own notes, explained that he responded this way because he did not want Roosevelt to think that China had territorial ambitions in mind, and thus sought to "put the U.S. (government) at ease." See Chiang Kai-shek, *Sho Kai Seki Hirokzt 14—Nihon Kofuku* (Chiang Kai-shek's Secret Records Vol. 14—Japan's Surrender), (Tokyo: Sankei Shimbunsha, 1977), 122.

47. Iokihe (1981), *op. cit.*, 94.

48. "The Ambassador in China (Clarence E. Gauss) to the Secretary of State (June 22, 1942)," *FRUS, 1942, China* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1956), 732.

Importantly, enclosed in this despatch is a copy of a memorandum of conversation by the Third Secretary of the Embassy, John S. Service, later persecuted during the McCarthy era, with the Director of the Eastern Asiatic Affairs Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry; Dr. Yang Yun-chu. Regarding the islands, according to Service's report, the director said that

it was unfortunately inevitable during war time that there should be exaggerated statements by private individuals concerning war aims; that the truth of the matter was that the people of the Liu Chius were not Chinese and the number of Chinese residents there probably were not more than a few tens, that the islands, which had only been tributary to China, had been entirely separated from it for almost eighty years; that they were unimportant economically and strategically, and that they were now in effect an integral part of Japan, to which they were geographically closely related. He was sure, therefore, that neither the Minister for Foreign Affairs nor any other part of the Chinese Government contemplated their return to China in a peace settlement.

See "Memorandum by the Third Secretary in China (Service) to the Ambassador in China (June 17, 1942)," *Ibid.*, 732-733. Perhaps representative of the confusion at the time over the question of policy regarding the Ryukyus within the Chinese government, or perhaps the lack of sincere, consolidated efforts to "recover" the Ryukyu Islands, Service explained to the author that he "does not recall that Okinawa was a very hot topic" among the Chinese at the time. See "Letter from John S. Service to Author, October 16, 1998."

49. "The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State (January 7, 1943)," FRUS, 1943, *China* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1957), 842-843.

50. "The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State (November 5, 1942)," FRUS, 1942, *China*, 174.

51. Years later these claims would still be heard. The controversy regarding Chiang Kai-shek's book, *China's Destiny*, where a phrase relating to the Ryukyu Islands was later added in the second edition, is well known. Regarding China's views on an early peace treaty with Japan, Chang Hsia-hai, "The Treaty with Japan: A Chinese View," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (April 1948), 505-514. Moreover, Chiang's government later expressed opposition to the return of Okinawa to Japan prior to and following the peace treaty; and voiced its displeasure when the Amami Islands were returned in 1953.

52. Iokihe (1981), *op. cit.*, p. 127. For the origins of "unconditional surrender," see Makoto Iokibe, "American Policy towards Japan's Unconditional Surrender," *The Japanese Journal of American Studies*, No. 1 (1981), 19-53.

53. "The Conference of President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill in North Africa," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 9, No. 232 (December 4, 1943), 393.

54. "T Minutes 58, The Post-War Territorial Settlement with Japan (December 3, 1943)," Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, microfiche 1-C-8.

55. On this point, in addition to the minutes, see the Borton Memoirs, 150.

56. *Ibid.* Borton writes that with Hornbeck's comment, he "was indirectly informing the committee members that President Roosevelt was personally making the basic decisions on important postwar policies without the direct advice of Secretary Hull or the Department of State. By implication, he indicated that all of our careful planning and lengthy committee discussions might come to naught."

57. Notter, *op. cit.*, 164. On the reorganization of the State Department as a whole, see Walter H. C. Laves, "The Reorganization of the Department of State," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (April 1944), 289-301. Also see Graham H. Stuart, *The Department of State: A History of Its Organization, Procedure, and Personnel* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949), 400-411.

58. Janssens, *op. cit.*, 230.

59. Iokihe, ed. *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, iv.

60. Technically speaking, prior to 1944, IDACFE was actually known as the Inter-Divisional Country Committee on the Far East as well as the Inter-Divisional Regional Committee on the Far East.

61. See footnote no. 2, Janssens, *op. cit.*, 229. The Division of Territorial Studies became a part of the Office of Special Political Affairs (OPSA), which was created in January 1944 by the upgrading of the Division of Political Studies.

62. Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.* Vol. 1, iv.

63. "CAC-307 Preliminary; Japan: Territorial Problems: Liuchiu (Ryukyu Islands) [October 7, 1944]," *Ibid.*, microfiche 2-A-96.

64. Masland had by this point left the Far Eastern group (on September 1, 1943).

65. Chapter XI, "Ballantine Memoirs," Joseph W. Ballantine Papers, Box 1, 249, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, California. Ballantine added in this same discussion, "The pains we took to make our papers lucid, convincing, and sound were well repaid, for we were successful in having all our papers cleared by the Postwar Program Committee and approved by Mr. Hull."

66. "Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 148 (October 10, 1944)," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, microfiche 2-B-129.

67. Ballantine relates in his Oral History given to Columbia University that "There was no question of an irridenta of areas where there was a Japanese population in predominance. [Concerning our idea on Okinawa, Dooman strongly took the position that we should not take Okinawa, and I agreed with him, but in deference to military opinion, the idea at least of having or holding Okinawa for an indefinite period and then having its final disposal depend upon the will of its inhabitants was what prevailed." See "The Reminiscences of Joseph Ballantine," Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, 1961, 239.

68. "Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 149 (October 12, 1944)," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, microfiche 2-B-130.

69. "CAC-307 Preliminary a, Japan: Territorial Problems: Liuchiu (Ryukyu Islands) [October 14, 1944]," *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning, State*

Department Records of Harley A. Notter, 1939-1945 (Bethesda: Congressional Information Service, 1981), microfiche CXC-307 Pre-a.

70. "Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 153 (October 26, 1944)," in Iokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, microfiche 2-B-134.

71. The minutes of the meeting do not make clear who else was among those opposed to considering the Liuchiu Islands as all one chain. However, Japan-hand Ballantine was likely among them. He had, for example asked Borton at the committee's October 10 meeting "whether the Xmami Group [was] usually considered part of the Liuchiu Islands." Eorton responded that he believed that "the term usually used to include the Xmami group." He agreed to further examine that point. At the committee's next meeting, on October 12, Borton reported that according to two well known Japanese geographers, Yoshida Togo and Sawada Hashio, the Liuchiu Islands are defined as extending from the Amami in the north to the Sakishima group in the south. Eorton adds, "[the geographers] mention that the Liuchians are often considered to be identical with Okinawa Prefecture...strictly speaking this is not correct." Thus, the first sentence of the paper by Eorton, explaining that the Liuchiu Islands are comprised of the four island groups of Amami, Okinawa, Sakishima, and Daitojima was left as originally drafted.

72. "Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 166 (November 20, 1944)," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, microfiche 2-B-147.

73. "CAC-307 Preliminary b, Japan: Territorial Problems: Liuchiu (Ryukyu Islands) [December 4, 1944]," *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning*, microfiche CXC-307 Pre-b.

74. "Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 171 (December 5, 1944)," in Iokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 1, microfiche 2-B-152.

75. "CAC-307 Preliminary c, Japan: Territorial Problems: Liuchiu (Ryukyu Islands) [December 11, 1944]," *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning*, microfiche CXC-307 Pre-c.

76. "CXC-307 (final): Territorial Problems: Liuchiu (Ryukyu Islands) [December 14, 1944]," *Ibid.*, microfiche CAC-307 (final).

77. In its early days, SFE was also known as the Pacific Far Eastern Subcommittee (PFESC).

78. *Borton Memoirs*, 186.

79. *Ibid.*, 194.

80. "SWNCC 16, Politico-Military Problems in the Pacific (January 31, 1945)," in Makoto Iokihe, ed., *The Occupation of Japan, Part 2: U.S. and Allied Policy, 1945-1952*, hereafter cited as Volume 2 (Eethesda, Maryland: Congressional Information Service, 1989), microfiche 2-A-6; "SWNCC 1612, Politico-Military Problems in the Pacific (February 19, 1945)," *Ibid.*, microfiche 2-A-7.

81. "SWNCC 16/3, Politico-Military Problems in the Pacific (March 21, 1945)," *Ibid.*, microfiche 2-A-8; "SWNCC 1618, Politico-Military Problems in the Pacific (December 4, 1945)," *Ibid.*, microfiche 2-A-15.

82. "SWNCC 59, Politico-Military Problems in the Far East," *Ibid.*, microfiche 2-A-157.

83. See for example, Miyazato, *op. cit.*, 191.

84. "SWNCC 59, Politico-Military Problems in the Far East: Territorial Adjustments (March 13, 1945)," *op. cit.*

85. "Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee of the Far East, Meeting No. 243 (December 20, 1945)," Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, microfiche 2-B-224. Blakeslee had by this point been named Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on January 12, 1945. Borton likewise was assigned to that office as a country specialist and on November 13, 1945, he was promoted to Assistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs. In his memoirs (pp. 191-192), Borton described these changes in the following way:

Our new assignments improved the effectiveness of our work. For the first time since we came to Washington, our offices were in the main Department of State Building where the Office of Far Eastern Affairs was located. Thus we were readily available for impromptu consultations and could more easily keep abreast of current developments. The career foreign service officers no longer considered us as interlopers and through their associations with us in committee meetings they came to respect our opinions, although they did not always agree with them.

86. "Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 313 (July 29, 1945), 137-138.

87. "Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee of the Far East, Meeting No. 243."

88. "PR-35 Pre, Disposition of the Liuchiu (Ryukyu) Islands (December 14, 1945)," Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning, microfiche 1192-PR-35 Pre. In addition to Emerson's academic experience, he also served from 1944 to 1945 as the Director, Liberated Areas Bureau in the Foreign Economic Administration. Emerson's personal views on territorial problems can be found in an article he wrote in June 1947 after returning to Harvard. Concerning Okinawa he writes,

In taking over Okinawa or the Liuchius as a whole, the United States would be saddling itself with the burden of governing a large Oriental population and of supporting an economy which is now at a shockingly low ebb and has few prospects of attaining any acceptable level of self-sufficiency. Nor would it be a burden that could be easily dropped once it had been assumed. Furthermore, no such move could escape being chalked up against the United States as a justification of the charge that this country was embarking on a new surge of imperialist expansion. The taking over of control of Okinawa by the United States and the establishment there of major bases would in all probability be regarded by the Soviet Union as

an only slightly veiled threat against its own security, and, even if one or more of the Chinese factions were now to view it as a desirable move, it is by no means beyond the bounds of possibility that in the not distant future China would come to regard it as a menacing gesture. If an international decision should be taken that, for whatever reason, the return of the Liuchius or some part of them was undesirable, the United States might well join in some general United Nations or multi-nation trusteeship, but it is difficult to believe that the United States should take on the problem single-handed.

See Rupert Emerson, "American Policy Toward Pacific Dependencies," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 20 (September 1947), 259-275.

89. This argument, as we saw in the previous chapter, was also seen in some statements by military officials at the time, although the views were strongly denounced by the JCS.

90. See for example, Koji Taira, "Troubled National Identity: The Ryukyuan/Okinawans," in Michael Weiner, ed., *Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity* (London: Routledge, 1997), 140-177.

91. "PR-3.5 Preliminary a, Disposition of the Ryukyu (Liuchiu) Islands (December 20, 1945)," *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning*, microfiche 1192-PR-3.5 Pre-a.

92. "Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee of the Far East, Meeting No. 244 (January 3, 1946)," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, microfiche 2-B-225.

93. Rice, in a letter to the author added that "none of us [saw] much validity to Chinese claims to Okinawa." Letter from Edward E. Rice to author, June 12, 2000.

94. For the Commodore Matthew C. Perry visit in 1953-1954, see Kerr, *op. cit.*, 297-341.

95. "PR-3.5 Final, Disposition of the Ryukyu (Liuchiu) Islands (January 5, 1946)," *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning*, microfiche 1192-PR-3.5 final.

96. "PR-3.5 Final (Revision a), Disposition of the Ryukyu (Liuchiu) Islands (February 11, 1946)," *Ibid.*, microfiche 1192-PR-3.5 Final (Revision a).

97. Reischauer was one of the who suggested the new line of 28° 40' N. Lat., which would reduce the areas acquired by the United States, thereby allowing Japan to retain as much of its territory as possible. Reischauer made this suggestion at the February 1 meeting of the committee, which had met to discuss the disposition of the outlying and minor Japanese islands. According to the minutes, Reischauer "thought that the committee should decide on a definite line (preferably 28° 40'), south of which they would agree to a trusteeship if such was to be established at all. The islands north of 28° 40' were traditionally a part of Satsuma territory, while those south of the line belonged to the ancient kingdom of the Liuchius." See "Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 248 (February 1, 1946)," in Iokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, microfiche 2-B-229. Reischauer, in his memoirs, refers to this debate in somewhat less detail. See Edwin O. Reischauer, *My Life Between Japan and America* (New York: Weatherhill, 1986),

107. Two days before this meeting on January 29 in Tokyo, General MacArthur had issued SCXPIN (SCAP Instruction) 677 which separated the Ryukyu Islands south of 30° North Latitude from Japanese administrative control. It is uncertain whether the committee was aware of this announcement or not at the time of the meeting.

98. "Minutes of the Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Meeting No. 251 (February 12, 1946)," in Iokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, microfiche 2-B-232.

99. "PR-35 Final (Revision b), Disposition of the Ryukyu (Liuchiu) Islands (March 4, 1946)," *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning*, microfiche 1192-PR-35 Final (Revision b).

100. "SWNCC 5911, Policy Concerning Trusteeship and Other Methods of Disposition of the Mandated and Other Outlying and Minor Islands formerly controlled by Japan (June 19, 1946)," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, microfiche 2-A-165.

101. Chase, of the Division of Dependent Areas, explained in a memorandum on the SWNCC paper that "The Far East Area Coininittee was definite as to the serious political undesirability of the establishment of a permanent United States base in the Ryukyus...However, this paper does not attempt to prejudge the case of Okinawa from the strategic point of view. If, however, during the consideration of the paper by [SWNCC] the representatives of the other Departments press for a recommendation for a base on Okinawa, the representatives of the Department of State should be prepared under suitable conditions to permit the amendment of the paper." See "Memorandum From Chase to Borton and Green on SWNCC Paper on Trusteeship for Japanese Islands (June 14, 1946)," in *Ibid.*, microfiche 2-A-164.

The SWNCC Debate Over Okinawa, 1945-1947:

An Unresolved and Unresolvable Question of Trusteeship

I. INTRODUCTION

Discussions between the State Department and the military over the securing of strategic control for Okinawa through a trusteeship arrangement, as desired by the JCS, were so involved that they warrant here a separate chapter. These discussions, as introduced in part earlier, began in earnest in 1945 and 1946. In a different setting, they continued nominally at least into the early 1950s, as seen in Chapter Seven, as the question of the form of U.S. control over Okinawa arose in the Treaty of Peace with Japan.

As examined in Chapter Two, the Joint Chiefs of Staff had decided in the fall of 1945 that the Ryukyu Islands (Nansei Islands) were vital and that they were to be considered as one of the primary base areas in American postwar security arrangements. The JCS thus argued that it was "essential to our national defense that the United States have exclusive strategic control" of Okinawa and many of the islands in the Pacific. What form exclusive strategic control would take was suggested in the document JCS 570150 of January 21, 1946 which stated that, while full sovereignty would be assumed over the Caroline, Marianas, Marshall, and Palau Islands, the United States should, in the case of the Nansei and Nanpo Islands, seek a trusteeship agreement designating these islands as a "strategic area." However not many in the U.S. government were satisfied with this arrangement. The military in fact doubted whether a strategic trusteeship would in fact be enough to safeguard America's strategic interests. Likewise, the State Department hoped to see the islands returned to Japan. This chapter examines this debate over whether to place Okinawa in a trusteeship arrangement, starting in 1945, but focusing on the years 1946 to 1947. A discussion of the Trusteeship System follows first however.

II. THE UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIP SYSTEM

The outline for the International Trusteeship System of the United Nations was established in Chapters XII and XIII the Charter of the United Nations signed in San Francisco in June 1945. With the contents and technical details to be worked out later, subsequent negotiations and implementation of these details did not go well during follow-up meetings in the fall of 1945 and throughout 1946.¹ It was not until the end of 1946 that the Trusteeship Council (made up of Australia, Belgium, France, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom as Administering states and China, Iraq, Mexico, the United States, and the Soviet Union as Non-administering states) was in fact created, finally meeting for the first time March 26, 1947.²

The International Trusteeship System, as described in Chapter XII of the United Nations Charter, was established under the authority of the United Nations "for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements" (Article 75). Goals more lofty, and important, however, were the objectives of the trusteeship system as defined in Article 76: 1) to further international peace and security; 2) to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advancement of the inhabitants and their progressive development towards self-government; 3) to encourage respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms.

As discussed earlier in Chapter Two, the territories that were to be placed under trusteeship (Article 77), as desired by the Army and Navy and approved by President Truman included: 1) territories then held under the mandate system (of the League of Nations); 2) territories which were detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War; 3) territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsible for their administration. For our discussion, it is the second category of territory that applies to Okinawa—"territories detached from enemy states." However, it was not only the second category, but the first one as well, which presented problems from the beginning for America vis-à-vis the other Allies, and within the U.S. government, between State and the military. The problem, relating to the Japanese Mandates (the Caroline, Marshall, and Marianas Islands), was that they were originally administered by Japan under the League of Nations system but now, in the aftermath of the Pacific War, occupied by the United States. For that reason the U.S. government wanted the trusteeship organized as soon as possible and to place the islands under a U.S. strategic trusteeship (if not annexed outright as desired by the military).³

Within the International Trusteeship System, two types of trusteeships were defined. The functions of the first one, "strategic areas," later more commonly known as "Strategic Trusteeships," were to be exercised by the Security Council, as defined in Article 83. On the other hand, all other areas of trusteeship, known as "non-strategic areas", "Ordinary

Trusteeships" or "Non-Strategic Trusteeships," operated under the authority of the General Assembly, as defined in Article 85. While the administering authority (the country granted the responsibility for the trusteeship) was responsible for fulfilling the basic objectives of the trusteeship, in practice, more freedom of action and control was found for the administering country in the Strategic Trusteeship, than in the Ordinary Trusteeship. Moreover, Article 84 granted the administering country the right to "make use of volunteer forces, facilities, and assistance from the trust territory in carrying out the obligations towards the Security Council undertaken in this regard by the administering authority, as well as for local defense and the maintenance of law and order within the trust territory."

Conflict arose between the State Department and the JCS over the best trusteeship arrangement for the Ryukyu Islands (and whether a trusteeship was in fact necessary). Each type of trusteeship had both merits and drawbacks. For example, while an international agreement for Ordinary Trusteeship was politically easier to acquire and internationally more acceptable through a vote in the General Assembly, it would require inspections by the Trusteeship Council and controls over the administration of the trust territory on behalf of the welfare of the people of the territories. Meanwhile, the right to a Strategic Trusteeship, which allowed a relatively free hand in the administration of the territory, would have to be acquired in the Security Council where the veto of the Soviet Union, no longer regarded as an ally, likely awaited. Moreover, State later argued that much of the security guarantees that the JCS sought could be obtained in an Ordinary Trusteeship or in a limited Strategic Trusteeship; the military did not see it that way.' As this debate was intensifying, the military continued with its strategic planning.

III. THE SEARCH FOR AN OFFICIAL CONSENSUS ON U.S. INTERESTS IN THE PACIFIC ISLANDS AND THE QUESTION OF UNITED NATIONS TRUSTEESHIPS

Although recognition of the Soviet Union as a potential enemy varied among the services, it was becoming clearer in 1945 within the U.S. government that the Soviet Union was likely to become a rival, as complications over postwar arrangements increased. Roosevelt had established a good working relationship with Soviet leader Stalin, but he was also well aware that things would be not be as easy with the wartime necessity for cooperation nearly over. From the U.S. embassy in Moscow, George F. Kennan, who appears later in this study, and others had warned policymakers not to get their hopes up for true and long-lasting cooperation with the Soviets.' With Roosevelt's passing on April 12, 1945, it was up to the new president, Harry S. Truman, the former Senator from Missouri and Vice-president since only January of that year, to try to salvage the worsening atmosphere in 1945. With complications arising vis-à-vis the Soviet

Union over the postwar arrangements for Eastern Europe and other areas and the feeling that the Soviets were going against their agreements, Truman increasingly found it difficult to find room for cooperation, as his famous comment, "I am tired of babying the Soviets," would suggest.

The Potsdam Conference of late July 1945 took place in the middle of this worsening atmosphere. There were pressures within the government to seek nominal agreement with the Soviets in the hopes that international cooperation would prevail in the long run, as well as calls to get tougher with the Soviet Union.⁶ The conference had been arranged to secure Soviet entry into the war with Japan as well as to attempt to seek Soviet cooperation in political and security arrangements for the postwar. However, U.S. participants, disillusioned going into the meetings, were realistic that the likelihood for true Soviet cooperation was slim.⁷ Moreover, the chances of the emerging United Nations Organization succeeding in preserving the peace, or more specifically, guaranteeing American security, particularly in the Pacific under trusteeship arrangements for the thousands of islands there, were not viewed as high, either by policy-makers or military leaders.

For example, earlier in the year from January to April 1945, prior to the start of the San Francisco Conference on the United Nations (April 25-June 26), Secretary of War Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, the latter in particular known for his increasingly anti-Soviet views, expressed their opposition to the trusteeship arrangements being considered in the Pacific. Both Stimson and Forrestal were in favor of U.S. control over the Pacific area and sought to exclude the islands of the Pacific from United Nations supervision, as State had been proposing.⁸ Arguing along these lines, Stimson in a memorandum to Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, a progressive and strong believer in an international organization like the future United Nations, wrote that the Pacific Islands

do not really belong in such a classification [as territories subject to trusteeship]. Acquisition of them by the United States does not represent an attempt at colonization or exploitation. Instead it is merely the acquisition by the United States of the necessary bases for the defense of the security of the Pacific for the future world. To serve such a purpose they must belong to the United States with absolute power to rule and fortify them. They are not colonies; they are outposts, and their acquisition is appropriate under the general doctrine of self-defense by the power which guarantees the safety of that area of the world."

In late March, as the Battle for Okinawa was set to begin, Stimson, America's veteran statesman, expressed these same worries to Forrestal and Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy. Forrestal recorded in his diary entry for March 30 that Stimson was concerned "over the trend of thinking [of the State Department] as regards the trusteeship discussion at San Francisco. [Stimson] was fearful ...that we might be tempted into making

quixotic gestures the net result of which might be that we would surrender the hardly won islands which we had taken in the Pacific to the principle of trusteeship.""" Indeed, Forrestal's impressions were accurate. Stimson likewise wrote in his diary that "The State Department proposals were meticulously building up a world organization which was to be the trustee and were proposing that we should turn over these bases to this trustee and then take back the management of them and try to make the powers of management big enough to give us the power which we now hold from our efforts in the war."" To Stimson, State's plans for trusteeship were "pointlessly roundabout," himself preferring that it be stated "plainly that the defense of strategic islands was essential to the United States and a definite advantage to all Pacific powers."¹² Stimson expanded on this by expressing in his diary that:

With that attitude properly demonstrated I feel sure that we could have met with no objection to our retaining enough bases to secure our position in the Pacific. My point was that we had always stood for freedom and peace in the Pacific and we had waged this war to throw out an aggressor and to restore peace and freedom and everybody knew it; that these bases had been stolen by the aggressor, who had used them to attack us and destroy our power; that we had fought this war with much cost of life and treasure to capture these bases and to free from the threat of aggression all of the peace-loving nations of the Pacific. We had actually thus saved from threat Australia and the Philippines and we were engaged in the process of doing it to the East Indies and to China; that if we had called attention to all of this and then said that we proposed to hold the bases which we now had gained in this painful struggle as a means and for the purpose of protecting freedom and peace in the Pacific, no one would have objected. In other words, we should have announced our possession with a declaration of trust in which all peace-loving nations were the beneficiaries.¹³

Stimson was frustrated. In his memoirs, he explains that "the real issue in the trusteeship question was one of attitude; both sides in the Government [the military and the State Department] wanted the same results. They differed about the way of getting it." Stimson thus proposed to Forrestal that they both write to the State Department emphasizing the strategic importance of the bases and islands of the Pacific but that retention be framed or portrayed in terms of international cooperation. The proposed letter would, according to Forrestal's account of the meeting, "recite the fact that: a) these islands [of the Pacific] were of primary importance not merely to the security of the United States but of the world, and essential to the success of any world security organization; and (b) that we propose not only to keep them but to exercise our ownership as a trust on behalf of world security, not for any national advantage.""

Early the following week on the morning of April 2, the three met to discuss the trusteeship question. Although Stimson recorded that both Forrestal and Stettinius agreed with his opinions on the strategic questions, Forrestal noted, likely reflecting the State Department's concerns with the military's strong demands at the expense of the United Nations or international cooperation, that "the net result of the considerable time of discussion" was an agreement to postpone discussion of the "whole subject of trusteeships" at the San Francisco United Nations Conference and to make a vague public statement by either the Secretary of State or the President that the United States intended to keep the islands but "only for the continued insurance of peace and equity and liberty for all nations and peoples" adjacent to the Pacific." The Secretaries appointed their assistants to work out drafts of the trusteeship statement.

While at this meeting, agreement apparently had been reached at this meeting between Stimson, Forrestal, and Stettinius, at their follow-up session on April 9, Stettinius told his War and Navy counterparts that "he did not propose to associate himself with the document...[instead] he proposed to let the document go as a statement by War and Navy, informing the President that he reserved judgment."¹⁶ Stimson was angry about what he called "Stettinius's right about face," complaining that "Stettinius had agreed to [the trusteeship statement] and now he has gone back on it."¹⁷ Stimson and Forrestal "decided to stand our ground" and report to the President their views, which Stimson recorded again in the following way:

We think...that a tremendous mistake is being made in confusing the islands in the Pacific, which we have conquered and which are not colonies in any sense but which are outposts of defense, with the general question of trusteeship of big colonies and we think this is sure to make trouble at the meeting in San Francisco this month and we have tried to arrange a system by which that will be avoided."

President Roosevelt later, it seems, agreed to review these recommendations upon his return from Warm Springs where he planned to recuperate after the strains of traveling to the Yalta Conference (February 4–11) and to nurse what in fact was his very ill body.¹⁹ The Secretaries would not have a chance to make these views known to Roosevelt, for three days later he died while resting in Georgia. However, at a meeting of the three secretaries on April 16, and again the next day for a final conference, they were able to go over their views again."²⁰ Likewise, prior to these meetings, Forrestal had a chance to speak with both Stettinius and Stimson separately on April 14, the day Roosevelt's casket arrived in Washington from Warm Springs."

While not an auspicious setting, Stettinius spoke with Forrestal, along with Admiral King and General Marshall, in the early morning at

Washington's Union Station while waiting for Roosevelt's funeral train to arrive.²² Stettinius, recalling the progressive nature of the Atlantic Charter, explained that "it was impossible for [the State Department] to go into San Francisco with the policy of annexation which representatives of the armed forces had publicly enunciated."²³ Stettinius added that he was "willing to meet them half-way, but [the State Department] would never agree to a policy of annexation."

The day before this conversation took place, Stettinius, Special Assistant to the Secretary Dr. Leo Pasvolsky (a leading postwar planner in the State Department who appeared in more detail in the last chapter), Under Secretary of the Interior Abe Fortas, and others held a meeting on trusteeships as an "attempt to develop some proposal which might have a chance of breaking the existing deadlock" with the military.²⁴ The memorandum prepared for the meeting by Pasvolsky outlined both the agreements reached at the Yalta Conference between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin regarding trusteeship, as well as the possible proposals for upcoming talks with representatives from the "Four Powers," the United States, British, Soviet Union, and China.²⁵ The State Department envisioned one of the three following resulting.

The first scenario considered possible was that there would be no discussion at the United Nations Conference itself, where difficulties were expected, but would instead be postponed for consideration at some later date. The second proposal envisioned was that a provision would be included in the United Nations Charter stating that the United Nations Organization, after its creation, would undertake to establish a trusteeship system. The third proposal was to include a provision in the Charter statements on the objectives of the trusteeship system and the definitions of powers and procedures, thus setting up the machinery of trusteeship while leaving to future determination the following questions to be handled by special agreements: a) Territories to be placed under trusteeship; b) Designation of strategic areas; c) Precise terms under which each particular territory would be placed under trusteeship; d) Selection of the country to be the administering power of each particular territory; e) Definition, in each case, of the respective rights and responsibilities of the administering power and of the United Nations Organization as a whole.²⁶ Stettinius and the others decided in seeking agreement with the military and within the U.S. government as a whole, the problem of the trusteeships should be "place[d]...before the U.S. delegation" at their Executive meeting on April 17, at which time the Secretaries of War and the Navy were to be invited to express their views."

Stettinius brought up the decision of the preceding day before with Forrestal and the others at the station. He suggested that in the meantime, their representatives work on the issue more the next day (a Sunday) before the U.S. delegation met for their 11th Executive Session the following week

in the hopes that an inter-departmental compromise could be reached.²⁸ Throughout his talk, Stettinius observed that Forrestal, King, and Marshall all "listened sympathetically and obviously appreciated the importance of the point [he] was making."²⁹ Perhaps, the generally optimistic Stettinius felt, there was still room for compromise between the military desire for absolute national security and that of State Department for more consideration of trusteeships as an act of faith in international cooperation.

Before leaving for Roosevelt's funeral in Hyde Park, New York later that day, Forrestal also met with Stimson to talk more about trusteeships and informed him of Stettinius' suggestion. Stimson, it seems, expressed his agreement for a conference of the State, War, and Navy representatives to meet the next day.³⁰ Subsequently, on the morning of April 17, Stimson and Forrestal attended the U.S. delegation meeting in the hope, expressed by Stettinius, that a policy recommendation on the question of trusteeships could be worked out for submission to the new president, Truman, prior to the start of the San Francisco Conference.

Stettinius began the meeting by explaining that on the "diplomatic side," he felt that the United States "would be in a weak position" if the trusteeship question was not dealt with at the United Nations Conference.³¹ While State, Stettinius emphasized, was "in complete agreement with the Army and Navy with respect to the necessity for full protection of [U.S.] security interests," he and his staff "appreciated the difficulty this country would find itself if it should lay itself open to the charge of expansionist ambitions by pursuing a policy of annexation," which would be "contrary to the policy consistently followed by the late President Roosevelt."

Stimson responded first, stating that the question of the trusteeships was "imperative from the standpoint of the safety" of the United States. He pointed out the distinction between "territories" and "bases," and argued that the United States did "not desire the acquisition of any kind of territory" but rather bases, because America was "not an exploiting nation." America was, Stimson added, "not taking a selfish attitude but [wa]s nevertheless much concerned that its own safety w[ould] be preserved." In possessing bases, Stimson pointed out, it was in any case necessary to have "complete control of that base." However, he explained that he was "avoiding the use [of the word] 'sovereignty'" in regard to the bases islands. What the U.S. government should seek, Stimson said, was "complete management over such areas" which would be "the only insurance against espionage, and the only means of protecting military installations." To Stimson, the "error of our ways after the last war...was burnt into his soul," regarding the failure to maintain the security of the Pacific region, which had been taken over by a hostile nation—Japan—they had denied access to the Philippines and other points of U.S.-controlled territory. Stimson closed his presentation by arguing that the United States could "not allow the necessity of the draftsmanship of the artifices of treaty-mak-

ing to destroy what we in common sense know must be done." There were two important factors, or "essentials," in his opinion. Firstly, the Secretary of War felt the United States "must be affirmatively provided with full power over necessary protective bases," and secondly, the United States "must have our eyes peeled as to what aggressive-minded but now quiet nations may wish to do." Both of these "essentials" could still be worked out "within the framework of international cooperation."

Secretary Forrestal spoke next, noting that America was recognized by the world as being responsible for the future security of the Pacific. The United States therefore "must have the means," the Navy Secretary felt, "to implement this responsibility." These means, Forrestal explained, would not be "isolated bases—pin points—but a system of defense in the Pacific." Forrestal recalled that the United States had lost all but the southern-most sea "essential American defense routes" at the time of Pearl Harbor and spoke of the costs involved in being able to control once again these routes. In any future arrangement or in "whatever abstract ideas of trusteeship may be evolved," Forrestal requested in his closing statement, there should be "no commitment with respect to the islands in the Pacific which the [United States] occupies or will occupy without naval approval."³²

General discussions on the question of the trusteeships continued, after which it was decided that the delegation would study the question further later that day.³³ In the evening, a draft statement on recommended policy drawn up by Stettinius and his staff, was shown to Stimson who reportedly gave his approval to it." The next morning, Stimson, Forrestal, and Stettinius met with President Truman in the Oval Office.;' Stettinius explained that the State, War, and Navy Departments had been involved for "many months endeavoring to find a satisfactory solution" to the fundamental dilemma in which the United States was finding itself over the question of trusteeships: "maintaining [U.S.] strategic bases in the Pacific and at the same time not being charged with annexation and expansionist policies."³⁶ The memorandum on "Recommended Policy on Trusteeship," which was "the result of much labor" and for which the secretaries sought the President's approval (to be sent to the Chairman of the American Delegation [Stettinius] as a public statement of U.S. policy), read as follows:

It is not proposed at San Francisco to determine the placing of any particular territory under a trusteeship system. All that will be discussed there will be the machinery of such a system.

The United States Government considers that it would be entirely practicable to devise a trusteeship system which would apply only to such territories in the following categories as may, by trusteeship arrangements, be placed thereunder, namely: (a) territories now held under mandate; (b) territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of this war; and (c) territories voluntarily placed under the system by states responsi-

ble for their administration. It shall be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which of the specific territories within the foregoing categories shall be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.

This system would provide, by agreements, for (1) the maintenance of United States military and strategic rights, (2) such control as will be necessary to assure general peace and security in the Pacific Ocean area as well as elsewhere in the world, and (3) the advancement of the social, economic, and political welfare of the inhabitants of the dependent territories.'

Truman read it carefully and commented that he "thought it gave him a clear understanding of the subject."³⁸ He then approved the statement and returned it to Stettinius." In Volume I of his memoirs, Truman sheds more light on his decision to accept the recommended statement, recording that

the trusteeship problem was one of long standing. It had become more pressing as the end of the war approached...With victory in the Pacific now assured as American forces drove the Japanese from one after another of their island strongholds, peacetime control of these islands assumed growing importance in the development of American postwar policies.

In earlier meetings with Cabinet members on the question of trusteeships, I found that the State Department held views that differed from those of the War and Navy Departments. I listened carefully to both points of view. In the end I sustained the Army and Navy chiefs on the major issue of the security of the bases. But I also saw the validity of the ideal for which the State Department was contending—that the United Nations should not be barred from the local territories beyond the bases, if at any time the United Nations should want to look into the social and economic conditions on these islands."

Eventually, during the course of discussions in San Francisco, it was decided along the lines of the U.S. desire (as shown in the above memorandum approved by Truman) that implementation of the trusteeship system would be left for later action. Indeed, as is discussed below, it would take exactly two more years for all of the mechanics to be worked out in regard to the trusteeships for the Pacific Islands and for the trusteeship to be approved on April 2, 1947.

IV. THE JCS 1619 SERIES, 1946

As is discussed in Chapter Two, the services began to reach a consensus regarding Okinawa's strategic importance in the fall of 1945. Subsequently, detailed studies within the Joint Chiefs of Staff on ways to ensure exclusive U.S. control of islands in the Pacific began ten days after the JCS gave its recommendations to Secretary of State Byrnes on January 31 (1946), with the focus being the type of trusteeship necessary. Two days later on February 2, Admiral Ernest J. King's successor as Chief of Naval

Operations, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, submitted to the JCS a recommendation entitled "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific," which was given the designation JCS 1619.⁴¹ JCS 1619 requested that the Joint Staff Planners, in collaboration with the JSSC, study the question of the military requirements regarding trusteeships in the Pacific for the purpose of preparing recommendations "representing the views of the JCS."⁴² Nimitz's memorandum suggested that in their study, the JPS and JSSC look at: 1) parties to an agreement; 2) strategic areas; 3) administering authority; 4) terms of a trusteeship.

Concerning the Nansei Islands, Nimitz appended what he considered to be the U.S. position regarding these four points. First, concerning the parties to a trusteeship agreement, Nimitz wrote that the United Kingdom, China, the Soviet Union, and the United States would be the first preference, while its second preference would include all the signatories to a Japanese peace treaty (expected to be a much larger number). Next, regarding strategic areas, Nimitz suggested that America's first preference should be for the "entire area to be designated as strategic" with the second preference being to designate only base areas as strategic. Thirdly, Nimitz felt that only the United States was to be the designated administering authority. Fourthly, Nimitz argued that the JCS should request the terms for a trusteeship agreement be drafted with the following five provisions:


1. The trusteeship agreement would not limit the right of the administering authority to establish fortifications, bases and military installations in the area;
2. The area could be administered by any governmental agency of the administering authority designated by it;
3. The administering authority will adhere to the provisions of Article 83, paragraph 2 of the U.N. Charter;
4. The administering authority will report on political, economic, social and educational matters affecting inhabitants of the area, will consult with the trusteeship council on such matters, and will permit visits of inspection to the area by officially designated representatives of the trusteeship committee to observe the compliance of the administering authority to observe compliance of the administering authority with the provisions of Article 83, paragraph 2. The administering authority may exclude such representatives from any area in which there are fortifications or military installations.
5. The administering authority shall not be required by virtue of the trusteeship over the area to make any report upon or submit to any inspection of any fortifications or military installations in the area."

Nimitz's recommendations were approved by the JCS on February 16 and on the same day, the JCS directed the staffs of the JPS and JSSC to begin their studies.

The study that emerged three months later as JCS 161911 was indeed a massive undertaking, going through several stages, involving several individuals and groups, and requiring the reevaluation of JCS 570140, which was the revised basic plan for overall base requirements in the postwar. As expected, the concluding section to JCS 161911 essentially reaffirms the basic assumption that the Mandated Islands and the Nansei/Nanpo Islands were vital to U.S. security, as argued in JCS 570140, JCS 570148, and JCS 570150. As a result, it recommended that strategic control over the Nansei Shoto be obtained by the establishment of a strategic trusteeship (with the exception of the very northern islands adjacent to Kyushu, which could be retained by Japan provided they were demilitarized). Importantly, the JCS also recognized here that U.S. security requirements could also possibly be satisfied by the establishment of a trusteeship over the Nansei Islands in which only "Okinawa and adjacent small islands" were designated as strategic areas. While not clearly spelled out in places, taken together this essentially meant the following arrangement as seen in [Map 4-1](#): the northern islands of Nansei Shoto would be demilitarized and retained by Japan; the central part of the Nansei Islands (not named but probably meant to be Amami Oshima) would be put under an ordinary (or non-strategic) trusteeship; and strategically important Okinawa and adjacent islands would be designated as a strategic area (or strategic trusteeship). This more flexible arrangement explains the changed wording that appeared in the conclusions to JCS 161911: "Vital U.S. security interests require retention by the United States of exclusive *and unlimited* strategic control of *parts* of the Nansei Shoto."⁴⁴ (Italics by author.)

This recognition, that not all of the Nansei Islands needed to be placed under the strategic area, was based both on strategic calculations and political considerations. Militarily speaking, a study by the JPS of the base requirements in the Ryukyus suggested that army, naval, and air bases on the main island of Okinawa for its 18,000 personnel would be enough." Likewise, political concerns entered into play as was first shown in the planners' studies on April 19 after consultations with members of the State Department responsible for Dependent Area Affairs, International Security Affairs, and International Organization Affairs. In a draft memorandum to the Secretaries of War and Navy, the JPS stated that "the Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto have fairly large heterogeneous and more [as compared to the Japanese Mandates] advanced populations. In accord with the position of moral leadership which the United States has taken in the United Nations, we should offer these areas for trusteeship."⁴⁶ In JPS 78512 "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in Pacific"), revised again on May 10, the JPS further stated:

Map 4.1



Source: Designed by author and Emiko D. Eldridge based on JCS 161911 and Japanese version of map of Nansei Islands provided by Okinawa Prefectural Government.

Although the Ryukyu Islands of the Nansei Shoto are designated as a primary base area in J.C.S. 570140, only the island of Okinawa (and small offlying islands) is now planned for military base development. There is considerable native population, Oriental in origin, customs and mentality, with well-established economy in the Ryukyu Islands. The administration of such territories was the purpose for which the trusteeship system was designed. Thus, it appears that the desired position from a military viewpoint would be a U.S.-trusteeship over the Nansei Shoto, with Okinawa, including small off-lying islands, designated as a strategic area. As in the case of the Nanpo Shoto, the northern islands of the Nansei Shoto adjacent to, and formerly part of, a prefecture on the main islands could be left demilitarized under Japanese Government, if such action seems propitious.⁴⁷

JCS 161911 met resistance however (primarily relating to the Japanese Mandates over which the JCS called for the "assumption of unlimited and exclusive sovereignty"). In a memorandum from General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the new Army Chief of Staff, pointed out that in a memorandum sent to him dated June 8 from Assistant Secretary of War Howard C. Petersen (and concurred in by Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson), Peterson had stated his belief that the arguments for trusteeship over the Japanese Mandates were weak and called for JCS reconsideration of the issue.⁴⁸ Eisenhower thus recommended that the study be resubmitted for further consideration."

Eisenhower's recommendation was in turn rejected by Admiral Leahy two weeks later. In JCS 161913, Leahy stated that "the military considerations which are in the cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are accurately stated in JCS 161911 and that political implications are a proper subject for consideration by the President, the Cabinet, the Department of State, and the Congress"; in other words, "beyond the cognizance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." Nimitz likewise supported Leahy's recommendations. In a June 26 memorandum to the JCS (JCS 1619/4), the Chief of Naval Operations suggested that JCS 161911 be approved after including the suggestion that the draft memorandum to the Secretaries of War and Navy in "Appendix A" be sent to SWNCC for study and then transmitted to the Secretary of State. In so doing, Nimitz continued, JCS 161911 (and any comments made on it in SWNCC) would be brought to the attention of the President.⁵¹ On June 27, JCS 161914 was approved and on the next day, Colonel Alexander D. Reid, the War Department representative on the SWNCC secretariat, submitted JCS 161911 to SWNCC for its consideration."

IV. SWNCC AND THE SWNCC 59 SERIES, 1946-1947

The political problems in securing control over Okinawa—historically a part of Japanese territory—would become more noticeable and time-consuming than those related to the former Japanese Mandates. At the same

time the JCS was examining policy on trusteeships in the Pacific, the State Department (as looked at in the last chapter) was completing its own study on the minor islands of Japan. That document, completed on June 24, 1946 and circulated for consideration and discussion the same day, was designated SWNCC 59/1 ("Policy Concerning Trusteeship and Other Methods of Disposition of the Mandated and other Outlying and Minor Islands Formerly Controlled by Japan")." Combining several members from several divisions within the State Department, it was in essence, State's united policy for Okinawa.

State's policy position on Okinawa went directly against that of the military, concluding that "The Ryukyu Islands should be regarded as minor islands to be retained by Japan and demilitarized."⁵⁴ This was, as we have seen in the previous chapter, an expected conclusion by the State committee responsible for drafting the policy paper because their planning papers to date had recommended this same policy all along. Specifically, State once again made clear its reasoning regarding Okinawa:

The northernmost islands of the Ryukyu chain have been closely associated for many centuries with Japan and their population is culturally and racially Japanese. Japan's retention of the central and southern islands of the chain is justified by the fact that the Okinawans who inhabit these islands are closely related to the Japanese in language and culture and that the islands have been administered as an integral part of Japan for more than six decades and have been politically subordinate to Japan for over three centuries. For the United States to take over any part of the Ryukyu Islands would be contrary to its policy of opposing territorial expansion whether for itself or for other countries. Furthermore, from a practical point of view, control of the Ryukyus by the United States would in all probability require a considerable financial outlay by the United States for the support and development of the islands and would involve the United States in the thankless task of governing three-quarters of a million people of totally alien culture and outlook. The establishment by the United States of a permanent base in Okinawa or elsewhere in the Ryukyu Islands would be likely to provolze serious international repercussions and would be politically objectionable. The existence of such a base, in addition to the other Pacific bases to be held by the United States and in such proximity to the China coast, might come to be resented by China and would probably be regarded by the Soviet Union as a provocative threat rather than as a proper defensive move by the United States. If the United States should acquire such a base, it would be considered by other states as stepping outside the zone of its legitimate political regional interests. Political and diplomatic considerations indicate that the Ryukyu Islands should therefore be considered minor islands which should be returned to Japan and demilitarized.

The JCS fought back. As seen below in [Figure 4-1](#) regarding the early SWNCC debate over trusteeships and the disposition of Okinawa, the JCS first directed the JPS and JSSC to review and comment on SWNCC 59/1 (which was also given the designation JCS 161915).


On July 3, the JPS submitted its report commenting that the views of the State Department "with respect to the control of Pacific Island base sites [are] sharply at variance with those expressed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in JCS 161916 and on a number of other occasions." The JPS also suggested that because "nothing new has been presented in SWNCC 5911," the JCS as military advisers need not "reced[e] from their considered views as to the Pacific island base system and the degree of control which should be exercised by the United States over the islands in question." Strengthening its argument, the JPS added that "in fact, developments in the world military situation in recent months lend additional weight to these views." The JCS immediately gave its approval and a memorandum for SWNCC included with JCS 1619/7 was submitted the following day.

The SWNCC secretariat accepted the two-page memorandum, designated it SWNCC 5913, and circulated it among the members of the committee for their consideration. The State members of the committee were probably already expecting, if not dreading its contents. In it, the JCS stated that they "fe[lt] particular concern over the proposal to return Okinawa to Japanese control" because the State Department draft planned for trusteeship "rather than sovereignty" over the Japanese Mandated Islands and "proposes retention of not even military base rights in the Nansei Shoto (Ryukyus)." The JCS response went on to say that its "careful consideration of these proposals [SWNCC 59/1] does not change the view of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the necessity...for obtaining sole trusteeship in the Ryukyus." Furthermore, the JCS reemphasized its warning that retention of strategic control was vital to U.S. security: "The United States currently possesses strategic control of the Pacific by reason of our necessary and extremely costly conquest of the islands and areas in question. This control can be relinquished, weakened, or in any way jeopardized only at the expense of our security." ⁵⁶

The divergence in the views of the JCS and State Department was obviously large. Because of these differences, the Navy representative to SWNCC, John L. Sullivan, proposed at SWNCC's 42nd meeting on July 11—the day before the JCS submitted its comments on the State Department's views—that an *ad hoc* committee be appointed to study and comment on SWNCC 59/1, SWNCC 5912 (JCS 1619/1), and the comments expected (the following day) from the JCS on the State Department's views. The *ad hoc* committee would then be responsible for drawing up "as a matter of priority and for explanatory purposes" two separate types of trusteeship arrangements for the former Japanese mandates as well as for pre-war Japanese territory. This, the other members agreed to do. Moreover,

Figure 4-1

Early Important Papers Presented by the JCS and the State Department to SWNCC Relating to Trusteeships and the Disposition of Okinawa, 1946



Sullivan and Dean Rusk, acting for the War Department member, agreed in the meantime to forward the views of the JCS in SWNCC 59/2 (as requested by the JCS) to the Secretary of State for submission to the President. (In doing so, Rusk suggested to his State Department counterparts that forwarding the views of the JCS did not necessarily have to signify State's concurrence in their views.)"

Subsequently, SWNCC secretary Alexander Reid circulated a memorandum on July 15 that the members of the SWNCC "Ad Hoc Committee on Trusteeship Agreements" had been appointed by their respective departments. Looking at the number of organizations represented, the balance of the Ad Hoc Committee was in favor of the military, three members to two. Hugh Borton, nominated as the Steering Member, and Eugene P. Chase, who had been on the Secretariat of the United Nations Conference in 1945, represented the State Department. The military representatives were Brigadier General George A. Lincoln (for the Army), who we saw in the last chapter as having felt bases too close to Russia or China might provoke them, Colonel Sidney L. Giffen (for the Army Air Forces), and Navy Captain Robert L. Dennison.

In the first report prepared by Borton on August 7, the Ad Hoc Committee was asked to consider "all possible contingencies for territories formerly mandated to Japan or formerly under Japanese sovereignty," which Borton summarized as the following five:

1. The establishment of a trusteeship, with the United States as administering authority, for the Japanese Mandated Islands, such area to be designated as strategic;
2. The establishment of a trusteeship, with the United States as administering authority, for islands formerly under Japanese sovereignty; such area to be considered as strategic;
3. The establishment of a trusteeship, with the United States as administering authority, in the Japanese Mandated Islands, such area to be designated as other than strategic;
4. The establishment of a trusteeship, with the United States as administering authority, for islands formerly under Japanese sovereignty; such areas to be designated as other than strategic;
5. The establishment of a trusteeship for a base area, with the United States as administering authority, either for Japanese mandated territory or for territory under Japanese sovereignty, in which area there will be only a few or no permanent inhabitants.⁵⁸

Of these, numbers 2, 4, and 5 could be specifically applied to the Ryukyu Islands at the time. The Joint Chiefs of Staff in any case continued with their reservations toward State's recommendations found in SWNCC 59/1 that the Ryukyu Islands should be considered as minor islands of Japan and thus be demilitarized and returned." On September 7 the JPS, in the

memorandum entitled JCS 1619/8, argued that the question over the strategic control over the Ryukyus "could and should be resolved apart from the general questions...as to the degree of United States political control over [the] Pacific Islands." It added that "Recent press reports appear likely to stimulate a public impression that United States control of [the] Pacific Islands should be purely nominal; an extension of such reports might readily prejudice the future disposition of Okinawa."

In an attached (and later amended) memorandum for the President on the disposition of the Ryukyus, the JCS reiterated that its members "view with grave concern the proposal that the Ryukyu Islands should be returned to Japan. It would appear that a decision on this question could and should be reached apart from consideration of the general degree of political control to be exercised by the United States over other Pacific Islands."⁶¹ The JCS then went on to state that it considered that the "necessary degree of United States control in the Ryukyus could be obtained by placing this group under a trusteeship in which Okinawa and adjacent small islands were designated as a strategic area. Under such circumstances, these northern islands of the Nansei Shoto adjacent to and formerly a part of the prefecture of Kyushu may well be given back to Japan ...and demilitarized." The memorandum importantly goes on to elaborate its views of the JCS in regard to Okinawa:

Oltinawa is a key base of primary importance in the overall United States Pacific base plan. It covers that area of the Pacific between the Aleutians and the Philippines and west of the Marianas. In the event of war involving the USSR, Soviet Power would inevitably flow southward into Manchuria and North China, completing Soviet control over the industrial heart of northeast Asia in the area surrounding the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. Other than Japan proper, Oltinawa is the only base area from which our forces could be projected into that area. Furthermore, control of the Ryukyus by an Asiatic power possessed of the weapons of war which will be available in the near future could give dominance of the northwestern Pacific and of the lines of communication to China. In hands other than our own the Ryukyus will become a major adverse element in the defense of the Philippines. The area around the Yellow Sea is the best, if not the only hope for a bastion against Soviet progress to the southward which could within two decades extend to the Malay barrier by war or even by means short of war. In short, Oltinawa in our hands, is a springboard from which to exercise some stabilizing influence over the area around the Yellow Sea. Conversely, in the hands of another great power, it constitutes the open door to achieving or at least disputing control of the northwestern Pacific. Certainly, with the world situation as it now is, the basic essentials of U.S. long-range military security require that no action be taken to prejudice our ultimate possession of Oltinawa as a military base. In light of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the

question of Okinawa is of such military importance as to warrant further consideration by the Department of State. The Joint Chiefs of Staff request that no action be taken which in any way prejudices the stand stated in this memorandum prior to a complete presentation of the problem to the President.'

The SWNCC Ad Hoc Committee subsequently agreed at its 49th meeting on September 17 to have members from their respective departments make an oral presentation to selected State Department officials on the strategic importance attached to the Pacific islands. On September 19, the JCS decided to send its memorandum, written for the President, to the SWNCC committee as well as to the Secretary of State for their information. The following day, Chief of Naval Operations Nimitz requested that the JSSC develop a more convincing argument concerning "justification for annexation by the United States of the ex-Japanese Mandated Islands and retention of the Nansei Shoto, Nanpo Shoto and Marcus Island under a United Nations trusteeship administered by the United States."⁶³

The JCS was requested on September 20 to review a draft trusteeship agreement (JCS 1619110) developed by SWNCC for the former Japanese Mandates, which SWNCC believed could also be applied to other areas, and subsequently had the JSSC study the issue and submitted its conclusions (JCS 1619113) on October 2.⁶⁴ The JSSC concluded that the draft trusteeship "appear[s] adequate" concerning the protection of U.S. security concerns. However, noting that "strategic control through the mechanism of trusteeships is untested and uncertain," the JSSC suggested in what it called a "constructive and logical step" that a trusteeship agreement and trial period should first be applied to the Nansei Islands before arranging such an agreement for the Japanese Mandates." The JCS quickly vetoed the recommendations of the JSSC stating that the JSSC memo did not "sufficiently emphasize the necessity for exclusive and permanent control of the Japanese Mandates nor the necessity for assurances that the terms of the draft agreement are the minimum acceptable, and that the agreements when made will be permanent." The JCS nevertheless agreed that the proposed trusteeship agreement represented the "minimum acceptable arrangement."" On October 18, the JCS formally agreed to forward its recommendations to SWNCC.

In the meantime, the JSSC had also been directed by Nimitz on October 4 to prepare a presentation "as a matter of priority" on the need for exclusive and permanent control by the United States of the former Japanese Mandates and retention of the Nansei Shoto by the United States in the form of a trusteeship. This ten-page report of the JSSC was ready by October 10. Entitled "Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific," the report called for the retention of the Nansei Shoto south of latitude 29 ° the first time that 29th parallel was designated. It was also the beginning of the inclusion of the Amami Oshima Islands in the JCS' desired area of con-

trol—an argument that would continue until Amami was returned to Japan in late 1953.⁶⁷ The historic and strategic rationale behind the military's desire for strategic control of the area and the relationship between the Nansei Shoto with the Mandated Islands was explained in detail.

In arguing for trusteeship of the ex-Japanese Mandates, the question has been raised, as indicated previously, as to why the Joint Chiefs of Staff are willing to accept trusteeship for the Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto while at the same time they are not willing to accept trusteeship for the Mandates. Actually they would prefer, from the security point of view, exclusive and permanent control of all these places, but they would accept trusteeship, in deference to the Cairo Declaration, where populations and land areas are of consequence (Nansei Shoto) or where the security stake is not so vital (Nanpo Shoto) as in the Mandates. Hence, the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is that exclusive and permanent control for the Mandates must be had in order to assure us as long as we deem necessary one complete line of communication to the Asiatic mainland—namely, via the Hawaiian Islands, the ex-Mandates and the Philippines. The Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto are not vital elements to this particular line of communication, though they are essential annexes thereto. The Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto are vital, however, as regards our need and our ability to deny them to a future potential enemy. In short, the Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto are areas which must be denied to any enemy to prevent his harassing our own vital line of communications, which can be maintained only by unquestioned strategic control in the former Mandates. It will be recognized that this point is one of absolute minimum essential requirements; there can be no question as to the importance of the Nansei Shoto as a base for any offensive operations of our own that may become necessary in the East China Sea, the Yellow Sea, or the Gulf of Chihli, or against the Asiatic mainland.⁶⁸

The reference, "that may become necessary," is illustrative of the concerns that the military had toward the region and future uncertainties particularly vis-à-vis the Soviet Union: the relationship of the islands in the Pacific to the security of the United States "will be even more vital in the future in view of rapid advances in the science of aeronautics, the advent of new weapons, and the magnitude of the potential danger which would confront us with an East Asia, comprising one-half of the world's population, dominated by the Soviets." This theme was developed in another part of the same memorandum. In addition to the development of bases for security, the memorandum explained, the denial of locations for bases to a potential enemy was equally important particularly as "funds for development of our own actual base needs are reduced." The JSSC asked the JCS (and the President who would also read the memorandum) to consider the following scenario:

Assume that China has become Communist and a satellite of Russia and that the Soviets in pursuance of their expansionist policies have obtained or seized base rights in the demilitarized Nansei Shoto after they are returned to Japan as proposed by the Department of State. Under such circumstances the United States would be confronted with two alternatives: (a) Expend tremendous funds really to build up our own remaining holdings in the Pacific or (b) Follow the process which we adopted before and during World War II, with all the cost of lives and treasure which that process involved. In such a case, not at all beyond the realm of possibility, the position taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, particularly with reference to denying a potential enemy a foothold in the Pacific Islands, constitutes the most economical method of assuring our future security in the Pacific.⁶⁹

This memorandum is all the more interesting considering the fact that it was written in 1946, before the Cold War had begun in earnest (although when in fact the Cold War began is admittedly a debatable point itself). The JSSC memorandum (JCS 1619115) was submitted to the JCS on October 11. Subsequently on October 18, the JCS reviewed and amended it slightly (1619/19), and submitted the new memorandum to the president for his reference." Leahy, as the president's Chief of Staff, met with Truman the following week and forwarded the conclusions found in 1619115 to the Secretaries of State, War, and the Navy."

V. TRUMAN'S ANNOUNCEMENT: TRUSTEESHIP FOR THE MANDATED ISLANDS AND OTHER JAPANESE ISLANDS (WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE RYUKYUS AND BONINS)

Although Leahy met with Truman, he was not able to convince the President to go along with the conclusions of the JCS. But, as Truman's staff was aware, he could "not dodge this issue."⁷² On November 6, 1946, the President announced that the United States "[wa]s prepared to place under trusteeship, with the United States as the administering authority, the Japanese Mandated Islands and any Japanese islands for which it assumed responsibility as a result of the second World War."" Nothing was said directly about Okinawa however at this point.

While Truman supported the military on the question of the importance of the bases, he also was impressed and moved by the State Department's position against annexation and strategic trusteeship. Truman himself was against annexation or military rule, and seems to have preferred the idea of an ordinary trusteeship, as he recorded in his memoirs: "I had always been opposed to colonialism. Whatever justification may be cited at any stage, colonialism in any form is hateful to Americans. America fought her own war of liberation against colonialism, and we shall always regard with sympathy and understanding the desire of people everywhere to be free of colonial bondage."⁷⁴ He continued by writing of his decision on the matter:

The United States would never emulate the policy of Japan in the areas that were given her under mandate by the League of Nations. We thus assured full protection to our nation against a future Pacific aggressor and, at the same time, laid the foundation for future self-government of the island people. My attitude was always that while it was necessary for us to control certain islands in the Pacific until Peace was established, these territories should not be closed to the rest of the world. I believed we should set up civil governments as soon as possible to replace the military governments. Some of the military objected, but while I remained President I intended to try to get as near to self-government as we could wherever we had the responsibility.

Although Truman's feelings were clear, it still was hard for the JCS to fully concur the decision. Indeed, in the memorandum forwarded to Truman, the JCS had stated that they "c[ould] not agree to, nor accept any responsibility for, a modification of their position in this matter that will, in their opinion, jeopardize the security of the United States."" Secretary of State Byrnes thus found it necessary to convince Forrestal that the State Department would not "accept an arrangement that would jeopardize the proper maintenance of the base" at the United Nations conference.⁷⁶ With those assurances, the military acquiesced and a draft strategic trusteeship agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands was eventually submitted to the Security Council on February 26, 1947. However, resolution of the problem over trusteeship or other arrangements for the Nansei and Nanpo Islands was yet to be realized. The debate between the State Department and the military over the Mandated Islands, islands that had never been Japanese but only mandated or entrusted to them, was one of degree—the degree of strategic control—and eventually it was agreed that the United States would maintain a strategic trusteeship over these islands. However, concerning the Nansei and Nanpo Islands (which were Japanese islands), the question was not one of degree but rather one of two completely opposing arguments—retention by Japan or by the United States (in the form of trusteeship). As a result of these opposing arguments, the disposition of the Nansei (and Nanpo) Islands was not resolved and eventually taken off the agenda.

This decision was confirmed a few weeks later in a December 4 memorandum (SWNCC 5919) from the War Department representative, George Lincoln, to SWNCC. Lincoln suggested that "SWNCC is in accord with all recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning specific islands or island groups to be controlled by the United States, with the exception of the Ryukyus. It would appear that the Ryukyus question, and possibly the matter of timing United States trusteeship proposals other than for the Mandates, will continue to require active SWNCC consideration."" Not known for understatement, it was in any case perhaps one of the biggest understatement the military ever made.

On April 2, 1947, the draft trusteeship agreement was approved by the Security Council of the United Nations (going into effect later that year in July). With that, strategic trusteeship over the former Japanese Mandated Islands was assigned to the United States as the sole administering authority. However, trusteeship for the Nansei and Nanpo Islands was not introduced and thus remained unresolved both internationally as well as within policy-making circles of the American government, and would so for several years to come. On the other hand, by mid-summer (1947) a draft peace treaty for Japan was tentatively drawn up within the State Department, capping off nearly a year's worth of work. Because the draft classified the Ryukyu Islands as "minor islands...in the territorial limits of Japan," the JCS immediately grew worried, stating in a late August (1947) report that the draft treaty's "proposed disposal of the Ryukyus would, if confirmed, deny the control recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for that area."" Simple but powerful words reflecting the sense of crisis the military felt over the State Department's treaty draft.

Before we examine the next stage of the debate within the U.S. government over Okinawa policy, which eventually led to an important, albeit temporary, compromise, it is necessary first to examine how the Japanese government looked at the question of Okinawa and its possible detachment from Japan, during this time period, specifically the years 1945-1948.

NOTES

1. See Armstrong and Cargo, *op. cit.* For the preparations leading up to the San Francisco Conference, see Robert C. Hilderbrand, *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990).

2. For a personal account of a U.S. participant, see William I. Cargo and Margaret I. Cargo, *Wherever the Road Leads: A Memoir* (Arlington: private publisher, 1997), particularly 159-183.

3. "Statement by U.S. Representative (Warren R. Austin), Submission of U.S. Draft Trusteeship Agreement for Japanese Mandated Islands (February 26, 1947)," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 16, No. 401 (March 9, 1947), 416-423.

4. For contemporary discussions, see Hans W. Weigert, "U.S. Strategic Bases and Collective Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (January 1947), 250-262; and Malti, *op. cit.*, 175-178.

5. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs, 1925-1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967). Kennan writes in the first volume of his memoirs (pp. 224-225): "What I saw during [the first several weeks after my return to Moscow] was enough to convince me that not only our policy toward Russia, but our plans and commitments generally for the shaping of the postwar world, were based on a dangerous misreading of the personality, the intentions, and the political situation of the Soviet leadership."

6. Forrestal in his diary entry for March 14 (1945) noted a problem that had emerged as just another "example of the increasing difficulty of keeping unity of action and thought among the Allies as the victory comes in sight." He would grow increasingly skeptical of the intentions of the Soviet Union and was an early proponent of what become known as the "containment policy." James V. Forrestal (edited by Walter Millis), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), 36.

7. See for example the memoirs of Kennan's friend and colleague, "Chip" Eohlen, who was an advisor at the conference. Eohlen, *op. cit.*, 225-240.

8. Dowel; *op. cit.*, 157; also see Dunn, *op. cit.*, 7.

9. Quoted in Henry L. Stimson, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (New York: Harper and Erothers, 1947), 600.

10. Forrestal, *op. cit.*, 37.

11. Stimson, *op. cit.*, 601. Also see Diary entry for March 30, 1945, The Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries (hereafter Stimson Diaries), Yale University Library, New Haven, Connecticut.

12. Stimson, *op. cit.*, 602; Diary entry for March 30, 1945, *Stimson Diaries*.

13. Stimson, *op. cit.*, 601.

14. Forrestal, *op. cit.*, 38.

15. *Ibid.* According to Stimson's diary entry for the same day, he originally called the meeting to discuss the trusteeship question but Stettinius said he needed to discuss another issue related to problems with the Soviet Union. Eventually they were able to return to the original subject of trusteeships. See Diary entry for April 2, 1945, *Stimson Diaries*.

16. Forrestal, *op. cit.*, 38.

17. Diary entries for April 6 to April 11, 1945, *Stimson Diaries*.

18. *Ibid.*

19. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, Volume I: Year of Decisions* (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955), 274. Roosevelt appeared worried about the Navy's distrust of the trusteeship system asking one advisor rhetorically, "What is the Navy's attitude in regard to territories? Are they trying to grab everything?" See "Memorandum of Conversation with President Roosevelt by the Adviser on Caribbean Affairs Charles Taussig (March 15, 1945)," *FRUS, 1945, Vol. 1, General; The United Nations* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1967), 122. One week before this conversation took place, according to Forrestal's diary entry of March 9, 1945, Roosevelt explained his "concept of the trusteeship idea" as being "based on the concept of what he called multiple sovereignty—that is, sovereignty would be vested in all of the United Nations, for example, of the Pacific Islands, hut that we would be requested by them to exercise complete trusteeship for the purpose of world security." Forrestal, *op. cit.*, 33.

20. Forrestal, *op. cit.*, 44-45

21. *Ibid.*, 44; Edward R. Stettinius (Campbell, Thomas M. and George C. Herring, eds.) *The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 1943-1946* (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), 319.

22. "Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn and Special Assistant to the Secretary Leo Pasvolsky (April 14, 1945)," *FRUS, 1945, Vol. 1*, 290. This memorandum is also reproduced in part in Stettinius, *op. cit.*, 319.

23. Stettinius, *op. cit.*, 319. For insightful views on Stettinius' progressive nature and commitment to the creation of the United Nations, see the "Introduction" to the edited set of his diaries.

24. "Memorandum by Pasvolsky on Trusteeship Problem (April 13, 1945)," *FRUS, 1945, Vol. 1*, 288-289.

25. According to the above-cited memorandum, at Yalta, the following points were discussed regarding trusteeship: 1) That there will be included in the Charter provisions for the establishment of a trusteeship system covering principles and machinery; 2) That the question of the precise territories to be placed under that system will be discussed later; 3) That, in any event, the system would apply only to the former mandates, the newly detached territories and such areas as might voluntarily be placed under the system; 4) That, prior to the Conference, consultation would take place between the five sponsoring powers for the purpose of agreeing upon proposals to be placed before the conference. *Ibid.*, 288.

26. *Ibid.*, 288-289.

27. Footnote number 64, *Ibid.*, 288.

28. Stettinius, *op. cit.*, 319-320.

29. *Ibid.*, 319.

30. Forrestal, *op. cit.*, 44. Stimson it seems invited both Stettinius and Forrestal to fly back to Washington from New York after the funeral. Stimson recorded in his diary that "on the way I took the occasion to bring up the question of trusteeships, telling Stettinius that Forrestal and I did not want to express any possible divergent views on trusteeship until we had at least presented our paper to him. We then talked over the matter, all three of us in the friendliest spirit, and I think possible disagreement has been averted. We are to meet if possible tomorrow [April 16]—and iron out final phraseology." Diary entry for April 15, 1945, *Stimson Diaries*.

31. "Minutes of the 11th Meeting (Executive Session) of the United States Delegation (April 17, 1945)," *FRUS, 1945, Vol. 1*, 311-312.

32. *Ibid.*, 315-316; for Forrestal's own notes and observations on the meeting, see Forrestal, *op. cit.*, 45.

33. "Minutes of the 11th Meeting (Executive Session)," *op. cit.*, 321.

34. "Minutes of the 12th Meeting of the United States Delegation (April 18, 1945)," *Ibid.*, 331.

35. *Ibid.* Also see Stettinius, *op. cit.*, 320-321; and Truman, *op. cit.*, 59-60.

36. "Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary (Joseph C. Grew) on the Meeting With the President on Trusteeship (April 18, 1945)," *FRUS, 1945, Vol. 1*, 350-351.

37. "Recommended Policy on Trusteeship," Annex to *Ibid.*, p. 351.

38. "Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary (Joseph C. Grew)," *op. cit.* Also see Robert H. Ferrell, *Off the Record: The Private Papers of Harry S. Truman* (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1980), 20.

39. *Ibid.*; also see Stettinius, *op. cit.*, 320. This memorandum became the basis of the U.S. proposal for arrangements for international trusteeships at the San Francisco Conference. See "United Nations Conference on International Organization: Amendments Offered to Dumbarton Oaks Proposals," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 12, No. 306 (May 6, 1945), 854.

40. Truman, *op. cit.*, 274-275.

41. "JCS 1619, Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific (February 2, 1946)," Section 14, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1946-47, RG 218.

42. *Ibid.* Also see "Note by the Secretaries, Decision on JCS 1619 (February 16, 1946)," *Ibid.*

43. "JCS 1619." Article 83, paragraph 2, itself is actually a reference to Article 76 of the same Charter: It reads: "2. The basic objectives set forth in Article 76 shall be applicable to the people of each strategic area."

44. "JCS 161911, Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific (May 24, 1946)," Section 21, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1946-1947, RG 218. The word "unlimited" here likely was added based on Nimitz's recommendations in JCS 1619.

45. "JPS 794, Ease Requirements in the Ryukyus (12 March 1946)," Section 16, CCS (12-9-42), JCS 1946-1947, RG 218.

46. "Draft Memorandum for the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy (undated), Appendix attached to JPS 78512 Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific (April 19, 1946)," Section 18, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1946-1947, RG 218.

47. "Appendix B, Facts Bearing on the Problem and Discussion, in JPS 78512, Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific (April 19, 1946)," Section 18, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1946-1947, RG 218. This discussion is also found in JPS 785/3, in the same section, and in "JCS 161911.

48. Eisenhower had replaced Marshall on November 19, 1945 as Army Chief of Staff. Expecting retirement, Marshall was immediately called into service again as the President's representative in China to bring about an end to the civil war there. Eisenhower continued as Chief of Staff until February 7, 1948.

49. "JCS 1619, Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific (June 8, 1946)," Section 22, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1946-1947, RG 218.

50. "JCS 161913, Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific (June 24, 1946)," Section 23, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1946-1947, RG 218.

51. "Memorandum from Nimitz to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on JCS 161912 Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific (June 26, 1946)," *Ibid.*

52. "List of Papers, Politico-Military Problems in the Far East: Territorial Adjustments (undated)," Tokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, microfiche 2-A-165.

53. "SWNCC 5911, Policy Concerning Trusteeship and Other Methods of Disposition of the Mandated and other Outlying and Minor Islands Formerly Controlled by Japan (June 24, 1946)," Section 22 CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1946-1947, RG 218.

54. *Ibid.*

55. "JCS 161917, Policy Concerning Trusteeship and Other Methods of Disposition of the Mandated and Other Outlying and Minor Islands Formerly Controlled by Japan (July 3, 1946)," Section 25, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1946-1947.

56. "Memorandum for the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee from the JCS (July 11, 1946)," enclosure to SWNCC 5913 (July 12, 1946), Section 26, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1946-1947, RG 218.

57. "Minutes of 42nd Meeting of SWNCC (July 11, 1946)," *Ibid.*

58. "Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Ad Hoc Committee on Trusteeship Agreements (August 7, 1946)," in Iokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, microfiche, 2-A-69.

59. SWNCC 5911, labeled as JCS 161915 by the JCS, was forwarded to the President by the Secretary of State with JCS 161916, which expressed the views of the JCS concerning the Pacific Islands. JCS 161916 (June 28, 1946) was approved by the JCS on July 2 and sent to SWNCC, becoming SWNCC 59/2 "Strategic Areas and Trusteeship in the Pacific" on the same day.

60. "JCS 161918, Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands (September 7, 1946)," Section 27, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1946-47, RG 218. A memorandum for the Secretaries of the Army and Navy enclosed with JCS 161918 was amended on September 10 as JCS 161919 and forwarded instead to the President.

61. "Memorandum for the President (September 10, 1946)," *Ibid.*

62. *Ibid.*

63. "JCS 1619111, Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific (September 10, 1946)," Section 28, CCS (12-9-42), JCS 1946-1947, RG 218. On October 4, the JCS approved Nimitz's recommendations with the following correction: "As a matter of priority, prepare a presentation justifying exclusive control and permanent control by the United States of the ex-Japanese Mandated Islands and retention of the Nansei Shoto, Nanpo Shoto and Marcus Island under a United Nations trusteeship administered by the United States."

64. "JCS 1619110, Draft Trusteeship Agreement—Pacific Islands (September 20, 1946)," *Ibid.* "JCS 1619113, Draft Trusteeship Agreement—Pacific Islands (October 2, 1946)," *Ibid.*

65. "JCS 1619/13."

66. "JCS 1619114, Draft Trusteeship Agreement—Pacific Islands (October 10, 1946)," *Ibid.*

67. Gabe, *Nichibci Kankci no Naka no Okinawa*, p. 56.

68. "JCS 1619115, Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific (October 10, 1946)," Section 28, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1946-1947, RG 218.

69. *Ibid.*

70. "JCS 1619119, Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific (October 18, 1946)," *Ibid.*

71. For documents relating to this debate, see Papers of George M. Elsey, Folder: Foreign Relations—Pacific Islands, Box 60, Truman Library.

72. "Memorandum, Pacific Islands (October 10, 1946)," *Ibid.*

73. "Statement by U.S. Representative (Warren R. Austin), Submission of U.S. Draft Trusteeship Agreement for Japanese Mandated Islands (February 26, 1947)," *op. cit.*, p. 416.

74. Truman, *op. cit.*, 274-275. Hugh Eorton later recalled that "those of us who had worked on the proposed terms for the trusteeship agreement were deeply grateful that President Truman had upheld the promise made by President Roosevelt in the Atlantic Charter." See *Borton Memoirs*, 284.

75. "JCS 161911.5," *op. cit.*, 121.

76. James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly* (New York: Harper and Erothers, 1947), 219-220.

77. "SWNCC 59/9, Draft Trusteeship Agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands (December 4, 1946)," Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, microfiche 2-A-177.

78. "JCS 1619124, Report by the Joint Strategic Survey to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Review of United States Control Needed over the Japanese Islands (August 26, 1947)," Section 30, CCS 360 (12-9-42), JCS 1946-1947, RG 218.

The Japanese Government's Planning for a Peace Treaty and its Views Regarding Okinawa's Territorial Status, 1945-1948

I. INTRODUCTION

This study so far has given considerable attention to the U.S. decision-making process regarding Okinawa policy. It is necessary now to look at the views of the Japanese government on the issues surrounding the territorial disposition of Japan.

With its surrender in August 1945, Japan, it should be pointed out, also renounced its diplomatic rights and thus was not permitted to conduct foreign relations *per se*. For that reason, the Foreign Ministry, among other tasks such as liaison responsibility with the occupation troops, focused its attention on planning for the future peace treaty with the hope that their early preparation would allow them to be ready when a peace conference was called. Of this planning, although little known, the territorial disposition of Okinawa would take up a relatively large proportion of their studies. It would also attract the attention of the Emperor and his immediate advisers who were worried about Japan's post-treaty security as well as Okinawa's fate and possible detachment from Japan.¹ This chapter examines in detail the planning, views, and movements of the Japanese government regarding Okinawa and a peace treaty prior to the 1947 aborted peace treaty.

During World War II, as discussed earlier, Allied leaders met on several occasions to coordinate military strategy and to discuss political and diplomatic postwar issues that arose during the course of the war. Regarding Japan, three of those conferences, as well as the early directive on surrender policy for Japan issued by the U.S. government (and later adopted by the 11-nation Far Eastern Commission), would have a major effect on Okinawa's territorial status after the war.²

The first conference was the meeting held at sea in August 1941 between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill where the two leaders announced the Atlantic Charter in which they declared that "their coun-

tries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other" and that "they desire no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned," policies strongly supported by the State Department. Although it was "the Hitlerite government of Germany" that the two leaders were addressing, Japan, although not specifically named, was necessarily included by the phrase "and other governments associated therewith." The underlying Allied principles of "no territorial aggrandizement" and "self-determination" for the inhabitants, enunciated in the Charter (as discussed in Chapter Two) figured prominently in the discussions within the U.S. government over territorial settlements throughout the 1940s.

The second important meeting affecting Japan's territorial status, as discussed in Chapter Three, was not until the Cairo Conference in late November 1943, this time between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. In their short statement of November 27, known as the Cairo Declaration, the Allied leaders reemphasized the Atlantic Charter by stating that "They covet no gain for themselves and have no thoughts of territorial expansion." The leaders also showed a strictness toward Japan by declaring that "Japan will...be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent."

Thirdly, the Potsdam meeting in July 1945 again discussed Allied (U.S., British, and Chinese) military and political intentions toward Japan. Concerning Japan's territorial status, the Allied leaders stated in the "Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender," otherwise known as "the Potsdam Declaration," that "The Terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine." Subsequently, the phrase "such minor islands as we determine" became a sticking point between agencies in the U.S. government, between the Allies, and finally between the Japanese government and the Allies, particularly America. Indeed, the question revolved around how "such minor islands as we determine" was to be defined in terms of the Ryukyu Islands, historically an independent kingdom but later a part of Japan, and itself comprised of hundreds of smaller islands.

Finally, while the "Instrument of Surrender," signed on September 2, 1945 aboard the *U.S.S. Missouri* in Tokyo Bay, did not specifically refer to Japan's territorial status, it did make clear that in signing, "the Japanese Government and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters" accepted the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.⁴ However, the "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," issued shortly thereafter on September 6 did make clear that "Japan's sovereignty w[ould] be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor outlying islands as

may be determined, in accordance with the Cairo Declaration and other agreements to which the United States is or may be a party.'"'

While it is of course very likely that the Japanese government was unaware of the contents of the many secret discussions within and between the governments of the Allies, it did follow closely the above Allied statements as well as the later proceedings for the conference on the United Nations Organization.⁶ It is with those statements and information in hand that the Japanese government began its work on the questions that would likely evolve in the future, yet undetermined, peace settlement.

II. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S EARLY RESEARCH ON A PEACE SETTLEMENT, NOVEMBER 1945

It was not clear to the Japanese government or even to the American and Allied governments how long the occupation would last and when the peace treaty would come about at the time of the Japanese surrender on August 15, 1945. Indeed, Yoshida Shigeru, who shortly thereafter became Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister of Japan during most of the Occupation period (1945-1952), observed in his memoirs:

At the outset of the Occupation, prospects regarding the drafting and signing of a peace treaty were remote. While the Potsdam Declaration stated that the Allied forces would be withdrawn from Japan upon the objectives of the Occupation being accomplished and a peacefully inclined and responsible Government established in my counts!; it was up to the Allied Powers to decide whether the objectives of the Occupation, such as the democratisation of the country, had been accomplished, and whether the Government in office was, in fact, responsible and peacefully inclined or not. Thus, should the Allied Powers so desire, they could go on occupying the Japanese homeland indefinitely...Weighing upon us...heavily was the thought that a prolonged Occupation of the country might take away from our people all spirit of independence, after which it would not greatly matter any longer when the Occupation ended. Thus...we in the Government...desir[ed] that the period of Occupation should be as short as possible.⁷

Due to this uncertainty over the timing of a future peace treaty, and more specifically, the demands of the Allies in such a treaty and the proper response to those demands, the Foreign Ministry came to understand the need early on to initiate studies on the likely contents of a future peace treaty. A participant at the time, Shimoda Takezo, later Ambassador to the United States (1967-1970), records in his memoirs that he, as chief of the first section of the Treaty Bureau (Joyakukyoku) and Yukawa Morio of the Political Affairs Bureau (Seimukyoku), were called to meet with former ministry officials, Ashida and Shigemitsu, the latter who several weeks before had represented the Japanese government at the surrender cere-

mony. At this meeting, Shimoda and Yukawa were asked whether "since the Occupation would obviously not last forever and the day Japan recovered her independence w[ould] come again, had [they] given any thought at all about how Japan in its demilitarized state w[ould] defend itself?" Shimoda later considered this advice (in the not so subtle form of a question) from his former superiors to have been an important stimulus to begin studying the problems of a peace treaty.'

Based on this advice and his own (now well-known) idea about being "victorious in the peace," Foreign Minister Yoshida formed the Peace Treaty Problems Executive Committee (Heiwa Joyaku Mondni Kenkyu Kanjikai) on November 21, 1945 with then-Director of the Treaty Bureau Sugihara Arata heading the committee.¹⁰ Comprised of 11 members, its task was to undertake preparatory studies on problems likely to arise in the peace treaty, including studies to be done as the occasion called for, and to present these conclusions to the committee, Vice Minister, and Minister.¹¹

Stage One: The First Research Undertaking, January to May 1946''

It was not until January 16 of the following year (1946) that this executive committee first met to decide the topics of a future peace treaty to be studied and the bureaus of the Foreign Ministry responsible for the research and drafting. The five categories of almost thirty topics for study decided upon were: A) General Problems (in 4 parts); B) Problems Relating to Political Clauses (7 parts); C) Problems Relating to Economic Clauses (8 parts); D) Problems Relating to International Administration (1 part); and finally, E) Reference Materials."

It was the Political Affairs Bureau that first tackled the territorial question in its study of General Problems.¹⁴ In the fourth section of that study, the bureau laid out what were understood to be the guiding principles, or *shido gensoku*, of the Allies toward territorial issues." They were, as introduced earlier, found in the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration and can be summarized as disavowing territorial aggrandizement for themselves, encouraging self-determination, while stripping Japan of territories it had "stolen." The second part of this territorial study, "essence of the problem," or *mondai no shozai*, introduced the Potsdam Declaration's clause on territory which limited Japanese sovereignty to "the four main islands...and such minor islands as (the Allied Powers) determine." The bureau also recognized that the Allies were not yet in agreement over whether the United States would have the right to request naval bases in the neighboring minor islands.¹⁶

This point was further pursued by the Political Affairs Bureau in a January 31 study of territorial clauses, this time examined under the topic of "Problems Relating to Political Clauses." Concerning the Ryukyu Islands, as well as the Ogasawara and Kazan Islands, the study noted that:

the United States will want to secure strategic bases in the Far East. Moreover, there will be strong arguments in the U.S. that it should keep the islands which it paid for by the blood of its soldiers. In light of these considerations, it must be recognized that the United States will want to secure rights to both station troops in the mainland of Japan and at the same time establish air bases for quite a long time on the main island of Okinawa and Ogasawara. It is also possible that the United States will want to annex Iwo Jima. Concerning the return of the remainder of the Ryukyu Islands, it is possible that a referendum of the inhabitants could take place.¹⁷

On February 1, 1946, the day after the above study was completed, members of the Treaty Bureau synthesized their ongoing study by comparing the desires of the Japanese government with the public positions of the Allied Powers regarding numerous issues. One of the issues they studied was that of territorial problems. Although this document has been only partly declassified, it is clear from the available portion of the document that the Foreign Ministry took the position that in the disposition of former Japanese territories, their historical, economic, and anthropological relations with Japan should be considered."

Subsequently, after four months of study and discussions, the executive committee adopted five reports and submitted them to the relative bureaus and sections within the ministry for further study and implementation of the recommendations. These reports were titled as follows: A) Basic Courses of Action and Preparatory Measures Relating to Problems in Signing a Peace Treaty; B) Principle Directions Relating to the Contents of a Peace Treaty; C) A Comparison Between the Likely Draft of a Peace Treaty by the Allied Countries and the Draft of Our Wishes; D) Possible Political Clauses Arising in the Treaty of Peace and Our Responses to Them; E) Possible Economic Clauses Arising in the Treaty of Peace and Our Responses to Them." Of these, the third one, (C), comparing a future, possible draft by the Allied countries with that of the Japanese government, concerns us the most here in that it is in this document that territorial issues are considered separately and in great detail.

The study begins by stating that the Allied Powers had made clear in numerous declarations that they did not have any territorial ambitions and thus Japan would also work for a just settlement of territorial problems. In the next section, a general paragraph on "Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan," the executive committee's report reaffirms the earlier position described above of the need that Japan work toward allowing the islands to remain in Japanese possession by stressing the anthropological, geographical, historical, and economic relations between Japan and the islands. Here the report suggested that it was necessary to try to convince the Allied Powers that Japan's claims for continued possession of the islands were appropriate by preparing "a scientific document" on Japan's

relations with the islands.'" Significantly, the executive committee report specifically discussed the problem of the Ryukyu Islands and noted the likelihood that the islands would be put under a United Nations joint trusteeship or one under exclusive U.S. military control. Faced with this situation, the report recommended that the Japanese government should not try to oppose the islands being placed under either form of trusteeship.²¹

Stage Two: The Second Research Undertaking, May 1946 to May 1947

With the completion of the first stage of research on May 22, 1946 the executive committee next launched on the same day the second stage of research, which Nishimura has called the "the Second Research Undertaking," or *Dai Niji Kenkyu Sagyo*.²²




Its task was to build upon the studies done during the first stage and delve into the deeper political and economic problems, and at the same time to develop position papers and reference materials for a future peace conference. These studies were to be completed by the end of the following month, but due to the depth, scope, and number of the problems involved, it soon became clear to the committee that the June (1946) deadline was impossible to meet. Hence after discussions at the end of August 1946, it was decided that the studies were to be concluded by the end of September that same year. Later, at the proper time, the Foreign Ministry would call together representatives from other related ministries and agencies to form a special committee that would study and eventually submit to the Allied Powers, via SCAP, its views and wishes regarding a peace treaty.

In the meantime, the executive committee was still unsure as to whether SCAP and the Allies would be receptive to such a memorandum. It thus decided to test the waters by first having the Research Bureau (*Chosnkyoku*), complete its "scientific" studies on territorial problems, as recommended above, and submit them to SCAP.²³

The Territorial Study (2): Ryukyu and Other Nansei Islands, March 1947

The first of these studies completed concerned the territories of the Kurile Islands, also known in Japanese as *Chishima* Retto, as well as those of Habomai, and Shikotan, the latter two which make up what Japan calls the Northern Territories.²⁴ It is the second of these studies seen in [Figure 5-1](#), namely that on the Ryukyus, which concerns us here. This 29-page study on the Ryukyus, completed in March 1947 as part of a series entitled "Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper," was undertaken in an attempt to clarify the territorial boundaries of Japan because the phrase "such minor islands as we determine" as found in the Potsdam Declaration was considered to be too vague.²⁵

Figure 5-1 Explanatory Documents on
Ryukyu and Nansei Islands
Prepared by Foreign Ministry



Source "Tainichi Koua ni Kansuru Honpo no Junbi Taisaku Kankei Beigawa e Teishutsu Shiryō—Eibun Dai Ikkan, Ryodo Mondai (Documents Relating to Preparatory Measures on Our Part for the Treaty of Peace With Japan. English Materials Handed to the U.S. Side, Vol. 1, Territorial Problems)." Reel Number B'0012, Flash Number 1, Diplomatic Records Office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo, Japan

Labeled *torintsukai chui*, or "handle with care," and composed of five maps, six descriptive sections, and six supporting illustrations, the booklet form report sought to explain the geographical, anthropological, racial, historical, and political relationship between Japan and the islands. Because this study is the first full explanation of the Japanese government's views on its relations with Okinawa, it needs to be explored here in some more detail.

The Maps—The first map shows the Nansei Islands and their two main groups, the Satsunan Gunto (with the three subgroups of Osumi Gunto, Tokara Gunto, and Amami Gunto, as well as their smaller islands), and the Ryukyu Group (with its two subgroups of Okinawa and Sakishima Gunto, and their smaller islands). The prefectures to which these two groups belong and are administered by, Kagoshima, in the case of Satsunan, and Okinawa, in the case of Ryukyu, are also clearly demarcated. In the remaining four maps, four historic periods (Early Days, 12th-14th Century, 17-18th Century, and After the Meiji Restoration of 1868) are shown juxtaposed on the maps which show the islands' anthropological, economic, and political ties with neighboring China and Japan, with Japan eventually coming to control the islands.

Physical Geography—This section explains more fully the first map and gives an introduction to the origin of the names Nansei and Ryukyu. Importantly, it also describes most of the islands as "dry and barren," noting that "water supply is generally inadequate" on most of the islands and that "fierce typhoons are frequent in summer and autumn while in winter there blows a strong monsoon" on the others. These descriptions may have been added as an attempt to discourage other countries from wanting to claim any of the Ryukyu Islands.

The Origin of the Nnnsei Islanders—This section relies for the most part on the accounts of visits to Okinawa by U.S. Commodore Matthew C. Perry (1853-1854) and English philologist Basil Hall Chamberlain (1893) to explain the racial and linguistic similarities between the Japanese and Nansei islanders. This section, suggests that "the present inhabitants of the Amami sub-group and islands to the north bear greater resemblance to the inhabitants of Kyushu than those of the Okinawan sub-group and islands to the south...however even the latter, generally called Ryukyuans, can be regarded as a local type of the Japanese race."

The History of the Ryukyu Group—This section, the second longest in the report, discusses the history of the Ryukyu monarchy, first said to have been established at the end of the 12th century, and then the relationship between the Ryukyu Group and Japan and China. Citing early works, *Nihon Shoki* (Chronicle of Japan) and *Shoku Nihongi* (Supplementary Chronicle of Japan), both written in the 8th century, the report states that "Japan's relations with the Nansei Islands date back as early as 616 A.D."

growing into an active tributary relationship. The study then states that "towards the end of the 9th century these relations gradually began to weaken." Later, "official tribute from Ryukyu to Japan, which had long ceased to be paid, was resumed in the beginning of the 15th century." However, it continues to explain that "the official tribute of Ryukyu to Japan...was often neglected which led to the Shimazu (feudal Lord of Satsuma) expedition of 1609...[when] the country was definitely placed under Japanese suzerainty." It goes on to explain that "a magistrate appointed by Lord Shimazu was stationed in Naha (principal city on the island of Okinawa) to supervise domestic and external affairs of the local government" and "Ryukyu which had remained a sort of protectorate of Lord Shimazu for 260 years was eventually incorporated in 1872 as an integral part of Japan under direct control of the newly established Meiji Government. In 1879, Okinawa Prefecture was instituted with governor appointed by the central government and the former ruling house of Ryukyu was granted peerage with the title of Marquis."

Concerning the relationship of the Ryukyus with China, the study explains that formal relations with China started in the 14th century when China "dispatched a mission to demand the Ryukyuans to pay tribute...[and] thereafter missions bearing gifts were regularly sent from Ryukyu to China." Through this tributary relationship, trade developed and, the report notes, because "the commodities which were brought to China together with official tributes were purchased by the Chinese government agencies at ten or twenty times the current prices...Ryukyu could conduct a lucrative trade with China in the name of tribute." Japan, the study also notes, "not only allowed Ryukyu to remain nominally a tributary state of China but loaned money to encourage the trade and shared in the profits." China eventually found this relationship to be economically costly and unilaterally decided to limit the "tribute missions to once every two years, and later to once every three or five years." Finally, it states that Ryukyu continued its tributary relations with China until 1875 when the Japanese government no longer allowed it.

History of the Satsunan Group—The study next briefly discusses the Northern part of the Nansei Islands, the Satsunan Group, explaining that these islands were "historically bound with closer ties with Japan proper than the Ryukyu Group...[and] Japanese sovereignty over these [islands] w[ere] never contested either by Chinese or Ryukyuans."

The Ryukyu Problem After the Meiji Restoration—This section focuses primarily on the Ryukyu Islands as a bilateral issue between Japan and China, which included primarily conflicting claims over the islands. Eventually, after an incident in 1871 where Ryukyuans were killed on Taiwan by locals to which in response Japan launched a punitive attack demanding compensation from China, the problem of this vague, dual sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands, came to a head. According to the study,

after protracted negotiations, "China recognised Japanese nationality of the Ryukyans and the justifiableness of the expedition." The other major powers, moreover, took "no objection to incorporation [of Ryukyu into Japan proper]" asking only that "the Japanese Government...observe the provisions of...compacts [with] Ryukyu."

Conditions of the Nansei Islands Prior to Japanese Surrender—This section, the longest of the report, gives narrative and statistical data on government, education, economy, population, culture, and meteorological observatories. Of particular importance are the first three descriptions on government, education, and economy, as well as that on culture. The description on government states that "following the establishment of Okinawa Prefecture in 1879, the Ryukyu group was governed in the same manner as any other prefecture....The people of Okinawa Prefecture had their representatives in both Houses; laws enacted by the Diet were *ipso facto* applicable in Okinawa; in the sphere of judicature, there was no difference from other prefectures. Likewise, in the education description, the study notes that education...was carried out in the same way as in any other prefecture" and that "Many of those who have received higher education are now occupying important posts in the government and business circles of Japan." In the part on the economy, the report states that "Owing to its meagre resources Okinawa Prefecture can hardly sustain [a] self-sufficient economy" and noted that Okinawa's "pre-war annual crop [of rice] could only meet 16 percent of the local consumption." It then notes that "in no year was Okinawa able to do away with the excess of import over export," and includes a statistical table comparing exports with imports for the 1930s. Finally, in the culture description, which is further subdivided into language, religion, and modes of life, the study states that "the native Ryukyuan language may be considered a dialect of Japanese with the same grammatical structure and much of its vocabulary derived from Japanese. This dialect is still spoken by the Ryukyans in their daily conversations, where as the standard Japanese is exclusively used in writing as well as in conversation at schools and offices." Concerning religion, it notes that "Buddhism and Shintoism are ingrained in the daily life of the people in Okinawa Prefecture." It then states that "there still exists a very popular aboriginal religion. It bears a close likeness to the original Shintoism of Japan." It also notes the influences of Christianity, Taoism, and Confucianism on Okinawan culture. Finally, in the description for modes of life, it concludes by stating that "Many Japanese manners and customs of ancient times are retained in Okinawa in connection with birth, marriage, and other functions."

Illustrations The six illustrations include archival materials and photographs, which are introduced in the report to supplement and support the above conclusions.

There is no doubt that the Japanese government sought to portray its historical, cultural, and political relations with the Ryukyu Islands in a favorable light. Many Okinawans and others would disagree, and strongly at that, with the accuracy of the portrayal produced by the Foreign Ministry, particularly in view of the way the mainland Japanese looked down on the Okinawans and treated them as "second class citizens" at the time.²⁶ In any case, the Japanese government was determined to see to it that the Ryukyu Islands would be recognized as a part of Japan and left under Japanese sovereignty.

Stage Three: The Establishment of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Executive Committee on the Peace Treaty, May 1947

With the first several studies on territorial issues completed, and with further studies on territory, economic, and other problems in the works, the Foreign Ministry officials working on the peace treaty found that the time had come to seek the cooperation of related ministries and agencies. On May 28, 1947, the Inter-Agency Coordinating Executive Committee on the Peace Treaty, (Heiwa Joyaku Kakusho Renraku *Kanjikai*), which coordinated assignments on research, material gathering, and documentation, was established informally within the Foreign Ministry, bringing together officials from the Foreign Ministry, Central Liaison Office, the Home Ministry, the Finance Ministry, as well as several other agencies.²⁷ Subsequently, later that summer in the middle of movements by the Allies to hold a peace conference for Japan, the International Committee (Kokusai Iinkai), comprised of bureau directors from related ministries was established by an August 6 (1947) Cabinet decision under the direction of the Foreign Minister, with the Vice Minister as chair, to coordinate studies on particular problems of the peace treaty and organize materials and studies done to date. Within the Foreign Ministry, a deliberation group, or *shingi shitsu*, was set up for the purpose of assisting the International Committee with its work. As explained by Nishimura, three weeks later a clearer picture of the overlapping responsibilities was gained through a memorandum of August 29 prepared in the Foreign Ministry which described the working relationship the deliberation staff would also have with the executive committee, still in existence. According to the memorandum, plans to be discussed between concerned agencies and ministries (and then considered by the Inter-Agency Coordinating Executive Committee), would have to first undergo deliberation by both the staff and the executive committee at a joint meeting. Moreover, plans formulated between the concerned agencies were to be given to the deliberation staff and executive committee for their consideration, then submitted to the top ministry officials for their discussion before being sent on to their destination.

The deliberation staff had its work cut out for it with those arrangements. In any case, the staff continued with their deliberations throughout the remainder of 1947 and all of 1948. However, as will be discussed below, movements toward a peace treaty died down in 1947 with the failure to open a conference due to the U.S.-Soviet rivalry, with the later Allied criticism of Japan's studies on the peace treaty (discussed below), and with the increase in economic and political problems in Japan and related redefining of U.S. occupation policy for Japan amidst the onset of the Cold War (discussed in the next chapter). In the meantime, based upon its continuing studies concerning the problems of the peace treaty, the Foreign Ministry, anxious for a peace treaty, began to make several attempts to express its views to the Allied Powers.²⁸

III. THE FOREIGN MINISTRY AND APPROACHING THE ALLIES, MARCH 1947 TO JANUARY 1948

With the completion of the first set of territorial studies in November 1946, Foreign Ministry officials sought to relay them as feelers to the Allies, and specifically officials in GHQ. The first such attempt was undertaken by Asakai on March 12, 1947 during his sixth meeting with GHQ Political Adviser George Atcheson, who had just returned from a month-long trip back to the United States for consultations on the peace treaty. Asakai sought to discover the Allied mood toward a peace treaty with Japan during their meeting. Asakai recorded that day that he first discussed territorial issues with the Political Adviser and handed him the first territorial study done by the Research Bureau. Atcheson responded that it would be helpful and mentioned that while the United States planned to have a strategic trusteeship for the former Japanese Mandated Islands, the disposition of the other areas was still undecided.²⁹

Approximately one month later, during an April 14 meeting with Ambassador MacMahon Ball, British Commonwealth Representative to the Allied Council for Japan from March 1946 to September 1947 (and concurrent Australian Counselor of Mission, April 1947 to September 1947), Asakai inquired about the timing of a potential peace conference to which Ball responded as "likely to be held by the end of 1947 or early 1948." Alluding to the oncoming Cold War the Australian diplomat added, "However, the attitude of the Soviet Union present[s] a problem—it could act to block efforts by the U.S. to arrange a peace treaty for Japan. Blocking the peace treaty for Japan meant blocking the U.S. The U.S. would not likely want to find itself in that situation." Ball likewise asked about Japan's preparations for the peace treaty. Asakai took the opportunity then to hand him the first territorial study, which he had given Atcheson one month earlier.³⁰ No special note seems to have been taken of the study by Ball however and their discussion moved on to other topics.³¹

Territorial Concerns and the "Ashida Incident" of June 1947

In the meantime, with movements toward a peace treaty on the Allied side becoming increasingly clear, the new Foreign Minister, Ashida, began to make public statements on his country's treaty desires. The first opportunity came in early June when Ashida, who had just assumed his position in the Katayama Tetsu Cabinet on June 1, held two press interviews with foreign correspondents in Tokyo. These interviews were very much the start of Ashida's diplomatic drive to set forth Japan's peace treaty preferences to the Allied Powers. In particular, Japan's desires regarding territorial issues seem to have attracted the most attention.

The first press meeting, an exclusive interview held on the morning of June 4 with United Press correspondent Leslie Nakajima, dealt with large issues, such as a peace conference, foreign trade, the reparations problem, the introduction of foreign capital, labor issues, and finally, the possibility of war between the Soviet Union and the United States, and were capably dealt with by the former diplomat Ashida.³² Concerning a peace treaty with Japan, Ashida explained that Japan desired an early peace conference and thus his "most important job was to work toward bringing about an early treaty." Ashida also explained that the signing of a peace treaty with Japan "would contribute to stability in the Far East." Ashida, a Soviet expert, also expressed his doubts that a U.S.-Soviet war was likely, carefully stating that "there were no reasons why both countries would have to go to war, nor were there problems not able to be worked out by means other than war." He was either optimistic or purposely maintaining a façade of expecting cooperation to continue between the Soviet Union and the United States.

On the following day, June 5, Ashida met with Tom Lambert, a correspondent from the Associated Press, at the Foreign Minister's Official Residence in Meguro, Tokyo. There, Ashida, perhaps to his later regret, overly focused his discussion on territorial issues." Ashida, according to the article published the following day, stated that "Okinawa is not very important to the Japanese economy, but speaking from sentimental reasons, the nation desires the return of these islands." Ashida further said that the "Japanese people question the applicability of the Potsdam Declaration toward Okinawa and a part of the Kuriles." Ashida also stated that "Japan was ready at any time to begin discussions on the peace treaty," mentioning that his government did "have some concerns with the draft peace treaty."

Ashida's comments to the press, particularly those of his second press conference concerning his country's territorial desires, drew strong criticism from the Allies. Atcheson, as Political Adviser in Japan, felt it necessary to inform the State Department and President Truman of this incident and in a letter to the President (that also described the Occupation and the state of the Japanese economy), Atcheson touched on Ashida's remarks. He

noted that Ashida's comments "caused an easily understood resentment in some foreign quarters," adding however "We do not believe Ashida speaks in this matter for the Japanese masses or even the Japanese government." Atcheson included the opinion, later used by MacArthur almost verbatim in his September 1 reply to the State Department's peace treaty draft (see below), that

Oltinawa is of no economic value to Japan; on the contrary it was an economic liability. To us it is the western keystone of our military power vested in our air force island bases in the Western Pacific. For the future our real and most lasting control vis-a-vis Japan in this whole area lies in Allied ability to impose economic sanctions (cutting off of petroleum and other supplies) and this extension of our air power. I am inclined to think that the latter will exert the greater and more permanent influence.³⁴

Actually it is likely Atcheson who was influenced by MacArthur's own well-known views of Okinawa; i.e. that Okinawa did not contribute to Japan economically, its people should not be considered as Japanese, the Japanese themselves did not expect to be allowed to keep Okinawa, and most importantly, Okinawa was necessary to the United States for strategic reasons. Indeed in what was likely an effort to refute Ashida's claims, MacArthur publicly stated that the "Ryukyans [we]re not Japanese" and that the Japanese did "not object to the U.S. occupation of the islands."³⁵ Atcheson's comment that Ashida did not speak for the Japanese government or the people thus should be probably viewed in this context.

Ashida likewise was aware of the Allied criticism his comments invited. In his diary entry for June 8, he recorded that he "probably talked too much about the territorial problem" noting that "reaction[s]" came from London and Manila, while the U.S. response was not so bad.³⁶ Ashida also interestingly records the domestic reaction. He noted that public opinion in Japan toward his statements was divided three ways: 1) "quite satisfied," supporting Ashida for making Japan's wishes known to the Allies; 2) "worried" that antagonizing the Allies would only lead to trouble; 3) that which believed Ashida's comments came at GHQ's direction.;

Whatever the reactions to Ashida's public statements on territorial issues, he and officials at the Foreign Ministry did not stop in the desire to bring about an early peace treaty and to make the desires of the Japanese government on territorial known to the United States and its Allied partners. The Foreign Ministry, as noted above, had by this time (June 24) completed opinion papers on the peace treaty and decided that the time had come to approach the Allies. The problem of expressing Japan's desires was "quite delicate," as Ashida observes in his diary. Thus, as Ashida recalls, he needed someone to talk to about his next step and sought out experienced advice."

About four weeks after becoming Foreign Minister, Ashida met with former Foreign and Prime Minister Shidehara on June 28 at the latter's villa in Tamagawa in Tokyo for a one-hour Saturday morning meeting. Ashida explained that he had come to consult Shidehara about steps the Japanese government should take toward a future peace conference and observed that the time had come for further preparations relating to the peace treaty particularly with the arrival shortly of Australian Foreign Minister Herbert V. Evatt.³⁹ Ashida next stated that he thought it was necessary for the Japanese government to coordinate with the United States on problems relating to a peace treaty and asked Shidehara the best way to approach the Americans. "That is the problem," Ashida recorded in his diary as having said to Shidehara, adding "concerning this point, I am considering speaking secretly with Acheson." Shidehara responded that Ashida should work with MacArthur on this: "Concerning with whom to begin private discussions, I think you should first directly confront MacArthur and have him pick someone for you. In other words, the choice of whom to have contact with should be done under [MacArthur's] authority and responsibility." It seems that Ashida and his Foreign Ministry associates did not follow this advice however (perhaps because MacArthur's strong views on Okinawa were already known at the time) and instead sought out Acheson on his own, as he had originally planned.

Shortly after the Ashida-Shidehara meeting, Asakai of the Central Liaison Office visited Acheson again for their seventh (and, as it would turn out, final) meeting on July 3 to inquire about the progress of the peace treaty conference.⁴¹ Asakai seemed to be particularly worried about the possibility of the Soviet Union vetoing or delaying progress on the treaty as well as linking progress on the German treaty with that of Japan. Acheson calmed Asakai's worries by responding that the United States, Canada, and Great Britain were all positive about a treaty and speculated that the preparations for a conference would begin after the British Commonwealth meeting in Canberra in August.⁴² It was here also that Asakai handed Acheson the study done by the Research Bureau on the Ryukyu Islands that had been completed in March. Upon receiving it Acheson, hinting at Ashida's comments the month before, responded that "it was necessary to point out that not only in the United States but in other countries there existed strong reactions to recent Japanese views on territorial issues." Asakai returned to the Foreign Ministry where he briefed Ashida and other officials.⁴³

Territorial Observations and the Okinawa "modus operandi"

Based on the above study on the Ryukyu Islands (and that of the Ogasawara and Kazan Island groups, completed in June), as well as earlier studies comparing the Allied Drafts with those of the Japanese government, Vice Minister Okazaki Katsuo on July 7 drafted a document on special

problems related to the peace treaty as part of the series of opinion papers mentioned above." (This opinion paper, "General Observations on the Questions of Japan's Territory," formed the basis of a later, more general, memorandum on Japan's treaty desires given by Ashida to Atcheson and Chief of the Government Section of GHQ, Major General Courtney Whitney, at the end of July.) Unlike the earlier March study on the Ryukyu Islands, which looked at in some detail the historical, economic, political, and anthropological relations between Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, this next stage of study was in fact a position paper written up by the second highest ranking official of the Foreign Ministry, Vice Minister Okazaki.

Okazaki's position paper first examined the position of the Allied Powers on territorial issues vis-a-vis Japan in general noting the Potsdam Declaration limited Japan's sovereignty to the four main islands and "such minor islands as [the Allies] shall determine." It then stated that the Japanese government believed that:

in determining the disposition of such minor islands, (the Allied Powers) will take into full consideration the history of their becoming Japanese islands, their geographical and economic relations with the main islands of Japan, the ethnical characteristics, culture, languages of their inhabitants and other factors. Further, the Japanese Government desire that the Allied Powers will, on such considerations, so determine that the islands which have long belonged to Japan and the majority of whose inhabitants have been Japanese remain as Japanese territories.

The paper next observed that the Allied Powers expressed in the Atlantic Charter that they would not seek territorial aggrandizement and that they would respect the wishes of the inhabitants when making territorial changes. "Granted that such is the policy set by the Allied Powers," the policy paper argued, "the desire that the minor islands which have long been inhabited by the Japanese be allowed to be retained by Japan would also seem to be in keeping with the said policy." The paper then sought to explain the position of the Japanese government on "questions [that] may... be raised in one way or another in regard to a few of these islands...where Japanese administration is now suspended, which may possibly be made a subject of discussion." The islands considered first were the Nansei Islands (and then the Ogasawara and Kazan Islands which are not discussed here).

Among the Nansei Islands, while the Osumi Islands which lie North of 30 degrees North remain, in accordance with the Memorandum of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers dated January 29, 1946, under the Japanese administration as part of Kagoshima Prefecture, the Tokara Islands which lie immediately south have, same as the Osumi Islands, long been Japanese territory and formed part of Kagoshima Prefecture. The Amami Islands which lie further south, although they were for a time under the influence of the Ryukyu dynasty when it was in

its prime, are an integral part of Japan from the ethnological, historical and any other point of view. Their inhabitants are Japanese and they had been part of Kagoshima Prefecture until the surrender of Japan. In regard to the Okinawa Islands and Sakishiina Islands, while it is a fact that they were for a certain period of time under the rule of the Ryukyu dynasty which had a quasi-sovereign status, they had been Japanese territory prior to the formation of the said dynasty and were under the suzerainty of Japan since 1609 when the dynasty was put under the protection of the feudal Clan of Shimazu. In particular, since the Meiji Restoration, they have enjoyed, as a prefecture of Japan propel; the exactly [sic] same status as other prefectures. Their inhabitants being a type of the Japanese race, the islands are inseparably bound with Japan from the linguistic, cultural and other points of view. Economicall; unable to be self-supporting, Okinawa Prefecture has been and will remain to be a burden on the central government. It is, however, the wish of the people and the government of Japan that the islands may be left as Japanese territory because of the long-standing relationships with them.

At this point we see clearly that the Foreign Ministry, while noting differences between the northern and southern populations, sought the return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japan, and based its arguments on the pronouncements of the Allies and Japan's own historical and racial connections. However the Foreign Ministry was also realistic in its assessment of the strategic needs of the Allies, particularly the United States and thus had to be accommodating while seeking to avoid a division of Japanese territory, as seen in the following passage.

Should the areas of the Okinawa and Sakishiina Islands be required by the Allied Powers from the strategic point of view it would fully be possible to make such arrangements with the Japanese Government as would adequately meet their requirements. The desire on the part of Japan is only to see a *modus operandi* so devised that she is entrusted with the common affairs of administration of the inhabitants such as education, economy and culture—a measure which would naturally conform with the racial and historical background.

What this memorandum was essentially suggesting is an arrangement with the Allies granting them use of what can be assumed from the context to mean bases and nearby land areas. The Japanese government would be allowed to keep administrative rights over the islands, as well as sovereignty over the islands. Although not clearly spelled out, the “modus operandi” would be in other words the granting of base rights (or perhaps land leases) to the Allies while the Japanese would keep administrative rights and sovereignty. In other words, the “modus operandi” would be based upon the plan to separate base rights from administrative rights.

Based on this study concerning the question of Japan's territories, as well as on numerous other problems, a summarized version of Japan's desires and expectations on a peace settlement (known as the First Ashida Memorandum) underwent drafting. It was in the middle of this effort when on July 11 the State Department issued invitations to a preparatory meeting on the Japanese peace treaty. That announcement seemed to have caught many by surprise including other divisions and bureaus in the State Department, SCAP, and the military. It also caught the Foreign Ministry off guard, although it had been preparing for just such a day. The Foreign Ministry sped up its work on the summary of Japan's treaty expectations and further considered ways to relay it to the Allies. Ashida meanwhile planned to meet with Acheson and Whitney, the former for his having direct contact with Washington and the latter for his having MacArthur's ear. With those two meetings scheduled for the end of July, the Foreign Ministry sought to complete its summary in time for the Ashida-GHQ meetings. Its discussions on and drafting of the paragraph on the territorial question was completed on July 24, two days before Ashida's scheduled meeting with Acheson.⁴⁵

The Ashida-Acheson Meeting, July 26, 1947: The First Ashida Memorandum⁴⁶

Ashida started off the afternoon (4:00 p.m.) meeting with Acheson by stating that Japanese government was aware that a preparatory meeting for the peace treaty was already tentatively scheduled and that as Foreign Minister, he wanted to "informally express Japan's opinions and desires relating to the peace settlement," which he hoped Acheson would relay to the State Department.⁴⁷ He then handed Acheson a nine-point, four-page memorandum which the Political Adviser quickly read and agreed to send to Washington, explaining that although the Soviet Union was refusing to participate due to questions over conference procedures, it would likely eventually join. The memorandum, as later explained by Nishimura and discussed above, was a combination of the studies and memorandums prepared within the Foreign Ministry beginning at the end of May on general opinions for a peace treaty and special clauses relating to a peace settlement." The memorandum began by stating that with "...the opening of a preliminary conference...reported to be imminent, the Japanese government wishes to be permitted to convey informally to the Allied authorities its desires and expectations relative to the peace settlement. If such permission is granted, we shall be ready to submit for their information detailed statements..." on a number of issues. While not all of the points need to be discussed here, it is the first two, "1. Peace-making Procedure" and "2. Basis of the Peace Treaty," as well as the seventh point, "Territorial Question," that should be introduced in full here. The first point of this, the "First Ashida Memorandum," argued that the Japanese government

hoped that "the coming peace conference would be conducted in such a manner as to convince our people of the justice and fairness of its procedure," and that it would "not be a dictated peace, but a settlement in which [the Japanese have been made to feel that they] have been permitted to take part, so that they will subscribe to it of their own free will, and be morally bound to abide by its terms."⁴⁹ Along similar lines, it continued in the second point that "It is expected that the peace settlement will be made in accordance with the established principles of international law. We trust that the spirit of international equity and fair play which pervades the Atlantic Charter will be made the guiding spirit of the peace settlement with Japan." Likewise, in the seventh point, territorial problems, the memorandum explained that "The Potsdam Declaration leaves to the Allied Powers the disposition of the minor islands adjacent to the four principal islands of Japan. It is desired that in the determination of their territorial status full consideration will be given to the historical, racial, economic, cultural and other relations existing between these islands and Japan proper."

Importantly, this memorandum also discussed security-related issues in two adjoining points. In the fourth point, "Admission into the United Nations," it states, "From the ruins of war and defeat we are emerging a new nation chastened and free, and thoroughly committed to the ways of peace. Our nation is eager to contribute to the world's progress by joining the United Nations. Furthermore, it is thought that for unarmed Japan her membership in the United Nations will be a potent factor to enhance her sense of security." In the next point, "Internal Peace and Order," the memorandum states, "Even if the Allied Occupation forces are withdrawn with the conclusion of peace, we feel we can manage, though totally demilitarized, to preserve peace within our borders, if given an adequate police force [for which] it is desired that the treaty will provide for an increase of our present police force to a level such as will be proportionate to our population."

After the submission of this memorandum, according to Ashida's diary, Ashida and Acheson then discussed Australian Foreign Minister Evatt's trip to Japan, who had arrived earlier that same day and who had that afternoon lunched with MacArthur and Acheson at MacArthur's residence. Ashida believed that he would likely have a chance to meet with Evatt, in Tokyo for consultations on the proposed peace treaty. For their meeting, Ashida suggested that he would limit his talk to Japan's present situation and not go into Japan's opinions and expectations for a peace treaty that "Japan was dependent on America's efforts and goodwill in the upcoming peace conference." Their near 40-minute meeting ended with Acheson telling Ashida that he hoped to see him before his own departure for Washington scheduled for August 20.⁵⁰

The Ashida-Whitney Meeting, July 28, 1947

Two days later, Ashida paid a visit on Major General Courtney Whitney, Chief of the Government Section (GS) within SCAP. Ashida likely hoped that the close relationship Whitney enjoyed with MacArthur would guarantee that the General saw or at least became aware of Ashida and the Japanese government's thinking. At their morning meeting (10:00 a.m.), Ashida explained to Whitney, as he had to Atcheson two days earlier, that with the approaching preparatory peace conference on Japan, he thought it necessary to "informally offer the Japanese Government's desires informally to the American Government."⁵¹ He then passed to Whitney a copy of the same memorandum given to Atcheson outlining the nine-point expectations of the Japanese government in the peace treaty. Whitney, according to Ashida's account, carefully read the document and then said to Ashida that "the problem still remained over notifying [the U.S. government in Washington] of Japanese desires," to which Ashida responded that he had already spoken with Atcheson the Saturday before (July 26).⁵² Ashida related that he requested Atcheson to informally transmit Japan's views and that Atcheson had agreed to arrange it. Ashida, curious as to Whitney's reactions to the memorandum, asked him directly his views of it. Whitney responded that "the views expressed here are those which MacArthur hold" and that the Supreme Commander was constantly thinking about how to bring about a just peace treaty.

Their 20-minute meeting ended with Whitney warning that since it was an important time for Japan, the Japanese government should take care that the document should not be leaked, for, as Whitney warned, it could be used by countries with "hostile intentions." Ashida explained that the government was using extreme care with the document so as not to have it leaked to newspaper writers or others. He added that he believed Japan's requests were few and fair and that they were likely in line with the thinking of the U.S. government. Whitney concluded the meeting by stating that GHQ had high expectations for the views expressed by Ashida."

The Document Returned—Follow-up Meetings with Atcheson and Whitney, July 28, 1947

When Ashida returned to his office in the ministry that morning, he found messages waiting for him from both Atcheson and Whitney. Ashida likely assumed that the two wanted to discuss in more detail the contents of the memorandum and probably was not expecting the documents to be returned to him, but that was what happened.

Ashida met first with Atcheson later that same day at 3:30 p.m. During this meeting, Atcheson stated that he had read the memorandum "intensely" and found that there was something which prevented his accepting it. He explained that the presentation of the memorandum list-

ing Japan's expectations prior to the peace conference would not be in Japan's best interest. Atcheson added that the situation was a delicate one. He repeated that he could not accept the memorandum and asked for Ashida's understanding.

Ashida, the diplomat, understood the seriousness of the situation; were Atcheson, the State Department representative in Japan, to refuse to accept the document, the Japanese government would have little way of transmitting its views (even informally) to Washington. Ashida, according to his diary, launched his rebuttal by stating:

As you can see, this memorandum is an informal expression of the hopes of the Japanese Government to the U.S. Government. To date, I believe these are very moderate desires of Japan. At the Versailles Meeting, which imposed the treaty upon the Germans, I recall even the Germans having had about a week to express their views. For these reasons, I think that Japan should be allowed at least to express these desires. I would like to know exactly why the memorandum was inappropriate—was the form bad, the contents, or were all eight clauses just unsuitable?"

Ashida was not satisfied with Atcheson's response, which was "extremely vague." According to the same diary entry, Atcheson said that "it appears that Japan at present is expecting the peace conference to be done by debate and discussion. That is presenting a problem for America." Again, Ashida argued:

Japan has never said that we are expecting a peace settlement based on discussion [with us]. Precisely because of this, and the fact that the Allied Powers have yet to make up their minds, we have tried to present very informally in this memorandum our hopes. We completely understand that the decision as to whether or not to allow Japan to express its opinions on a treaty to be imposed upon Japan rests entirely with the Allied Powers and will be decided by them at the conference. However, this memorandum is not such a case. It is completely different. It is no more than a simple expression of [our] hopes."

Atcheson replied that he was afraid "any expression of [Japan's] desires at this point by anyone would be viewed as an arrogant attitude on the part of Japan and that definitely would not be in Japan's favor!" Ashida noted that Atcheson looked sincere as he handed the memorandum to Ashida. Ashida thanked him by saying, "I appreciate your view that it would not be in Japan's interest [to accept the document] and consider your opinion to be an expression of America's sympathy [toward us]. I do not feel awkward or embarrassed by taking it back." With that, Atcheson said to Ashida that he would like for them both to consider that he had never accepted the memorandum in the first place, and apologized once again to

Ashida. The two shook hands and the meeting ended after approximately 30 minutes."

Immediately following Ashida's meeting with Atcheson, the Foreign Minister met with Whitney, arriving at the latter's office shortly after 4:00 p.m. It is likely that Ashida, having been stunned by his meeting with Atcheson, had time to better prepare himself for this meeting. Upon entering Whitney's office in the Government Section, Ashida noticed that the memorandum he had handed him earlier that morning was on top of the general's desk. Whitney began the meeting by explaining to Ashida that he had shown the memorandum to MacArthur who said that Japan was to be in the position of having the treaty imposed upon it." "Nevertheless," Whitney continued, "General MacArthur feels that the peace concluded [with Japan] would be fair. Yet, to accept at this point from the Japanese government or from the Foreign Minister this type of memorandum, no matter how informal, would anger other countries and invite their opposition. Thus it would not be in Japan's interest." With that, Whitney handed the memorandum back to Ashida.

Having concluded that it would be pointless to repeat what he said to Atcheson, Ashida replied in another, simpler way: "I understand your opinion that it would be wise for Japan to wait quietly until a peace conference opens. There will likely be an opportunity for Japan to state its opinions at some point and we will proceed with caution. We will rely on MacArthur's opinion, that of sympathy for Japan's position. We hope for America's sense of fairness and will continue to keep silent." Whitney agreed that that was a wise judgment. Ashida next decided to ask the general's opinion about the ministry's preparatory work relating to the peace settlement. Ashida explained that with the opening of the conference in the near future, the government must prepare documents and related materials. For that reason, the Foreign Minister continued, he wanted to establish a special section in the ministry to handle the peace settlement. Whitney, according to Ashida's diary replied, "That is quite all right. We [GHQ] will authorize it. But what is important is that [your] officials do not leak anything to newspaper reporters. Newspaper reporters are always plotting and looking for opportunities to destroy things. Japanese officials need to learn to keep their mouths shut." Ashida concurred and their meeting finished after 20 minutes.

Ashida's use of his first memorandum stopped here temporarily due likely to the warnings by Atcheson and Whitney. However, Ashida did continue to meet with foreign diplomats, particularly Australians, who had a strong interest in the treaty with Japan. The Foreign Ministry was aware that a British Commonwealth meeting was scheduled for the end of August (26th) and the preparatory conference for the Japanese peace treaty would likely be put up for discussions there. With Australian Foreign Minister Evatt in town, Ashida arranged for him and Prime Minister Katayama to

pay a visit with the substance of their talks, according to the memorandum of conversation written by Asakai, based upon a prepared statement read by Ashida. Ashida did not mention the memorandum presented to GHQ nor did he touch upon specific desires or requests of the Japanese government.

A second meeting took place with Ambassador Ball on August 11 for a lunch meeting at Ball's study in his home. Here, Ashida, with little time left before the planned British Commonwealth Conference (only two weeks away) in Canberra, moved boldly forward in expressing his views. Unlike the description found in Yoshitsu's work, Ashida presented not a copy of the same memorandum, but a slightly revised eight-point memorandum, which Nishimura later recorded "could be considered as the same as" the earlier memorandum.⁵⁸ After explaining that the document was "not a government memorandum nor an official statement" but rather "a summation of our country's popular views," Ashida handed it to Ball who read it quickly." Importantly, this memorandum also included the territorial section identical to the First Ashida Memorandum.'" After asking questions about police powers, Ball asked about "islands in waters near Japan."⁶¹ This question was likely asked in reference to point six in the memorandum, "Territorial Question," which repeated the commonly known (but difficult to clarify) phrase, "The Potsdam Declaration leaves to the Allied Powers the disposition of the minor islands adjacent to the four principal islands of Japan." According to Ashida's diary, which in this case unfortunately does not go into detail, Ashida "explained his views on the islands of Shikotan and Amami Oshima," the latter of which, as seen above, form part of the Nansei Islands, and were once administratively a part of Kagoshima Prefecture." What Ashida's views were on the rest of Okinawa are not directly explained here, but based on the conclusions of previous studies done in the Foreign Ministry on Okinawa and the Southern Kuriles and Ashida's own public announcement in early June of Japan's wish to see the islands returned to Japan, we can assume that Ashida expressed those same desires to Ball.

The Second Ashida Memo: The Suzuki-Eichelberger Meetings and Post-Treaty Security Concerns

The remainder of the August would usually have been spent in the traditional Japanese way, visiting one's family home for the *Obon* holidays. However August of 1947 was a particularly busy one for Ashida because of the movements for a peace treaty on the Allied side and thus he would have no time for a vacation. Ashida and officials at the Foreign Ministry were closely watching events relating to the holding of a peace conference. However, it became increasingly clear to them that the Soviet Union and China would continue to argue against the holding of a conference due to procedural matters. On July 22, Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Foreign Minister

of the Soviet Union, had already informed U.S. Ambassador W. Bedell Smith of his country's opposition to a conference based on the eleven countries of the Far Eastern Commission." The Soviet Union felt that its vote, particularly if there were no veto power, would be diluted and would have little influence over the United States and the other Allies. It therefore proposed a four-power conference, where its weight would increase, and the right of veto would be guaranteed. Three weeks later, Secretary of State George C. Marshall had Counselor to the State Department and veteran diplomat Charles E. Bohlen, the Russian specialist, meet with Russian representatives in Washington to urge their participation in the conference. While stressing its intention to honor its commitments set forth in the various wartime agreements, the State Department said in a statement communicated to Soviet Charge d'Affaires Semen K. Tsarapkin that "In reference to the Cairo Declaration, the decisions of the Yalta Conference, or the Potsdam Declaration on Japan, they contain no provisions which give the Council of Foreign Ministers any authority in connections with a Japanese Settlement."⁶⁴ The Soviet Union officially rejected the American invitation a second time on August 29, ten days after the conference's proposed start, repeating its claims of July 22 and 23. This refusal to attend the conference, as well as its earlier (June 30) dramatic departure from the Marshall Plan meetings in Paris clarified for the Japanese that a Cold War had emerged between the Soviet Union and the United States. The previous plan of the Japanese to rely on the United Nations for its security guarantee, as seen in the vaguely worded fourth point of the First Ashida Memorandum ("It is thought that for unarmed Japan her membership in the United Nations will be a potent factor to enhance her sense of security") was now no longer realistic. The ministry would have to revise its thinking on not only the timing and contents of the peace treaty, but would have to tackle the security issue once and for all. As Yoshida noted, the shift in security thinking moved from "security against Japan" to "security for Japan" at this point.⁶⁵

The First Suzuki-Eichelberger Meeting, September 5, 1947

The opportunity for these reconsiderations came more quickly than anyone had imagined. On Friday, September 5, during one of their regular meetings, Lieutenant General Robert L. Eichelberger, Commanding General of the Eighth Army in Yokohama, who was second only to MacArthur, related to Suzuki Tadakatsu, head of the Yokohama Branch of the Central Liaison Office, as well as to Suzuki's two assistant chiefs, Yoshizawa Seijiro and Yamagata Kiyoshi, that he was scheduled to return to the United States for consultations in the near future.⁶⁶ Eichelberger explained that he believed the reason he was being asked to return to the United States concerned the question of the continued stationing of the Eighth Army in Japan. The general then asked Suzuki for his view on Japan's security after

the conclusion of a peace treaty. Particularly, according to the memorandum of conversation included in Ashida's diary, the general was concerned about how long U.S. forces could remain in Japan, recognizing that the stationing of foreign (U.S.) troops involved "the problem of national pride."⁶⁷ Eichelberger then suggested that the two meet privately again the following Wednesday (September 10) at which time the general could hear out Suzuki's opinions.⁶⁸

Eichelberger was strongly against the removal of the Eighth Army and had serious concerns about the ability to prevent a Communist takeover in Japan, whether internally or externally. He wrote, for example, in his diary entry for June 27, 1947 that he did not see how the U.S. government "could take troops out of Japan until the Communist question is settled. We can't afford to let Russian or Japanese Communists get control of this country."⁶⁹

Perhaps on no other professional point did MacArthur and his second-in-command, Eichelberger, disagree more. MacArthur, as we have seen, sought a quick end to the Occupation. He discounted the threat posed by the Soviet Union and on numerous occasions in 1947 and 1948 stated that American forces in Okinawa would be sufficient to protect both Japan and guarantee U.S. security and thus a post-treaty withdrawal of American forces from the main islands should be realized. In a September 11 (1947) memorandum on developments in American policy toward a peace treaty, the Government Section of SCAP outlined MacArthur's views on earlier drafts of a Japanese peace treaty prepared by the State Department. MacArthur, according to the memorandum, had stated on occasion that:

Insofar as the post-treaty defense of Japan is concerned, redeployment of these forces to other Pacific areas, after development of an adequate Japanese defense organization, will increase their overall effectiveness. Provided this redeployment includes the Ryukyus, United States troops will remain in close enough proximity to Japan to be effectively employed in the event of a threat to Japan.⁷⁰

MacArthur's views reflected to a large extent general military thinking. The JCS in particular considered the need for U.S. bases in and control of Okinawa as vital as can be seen in their studies on bases abroad." (Japan's importance as a base would of course grow significantly in JCS thinking later on.)

Upon receiving Eichelberger's request, Yoshizawa and Yamagata immediately went to Ashida to report on their meeting, followed by Suzuki three days later.⁷² At their Monday, September 8, meeting, Ashida and Suzuki also met with Yoshizawa, Okazaki, Ota Ichiro (the General Affairs Bureau Director), and Hagiwara. There they concluded that it would be impossible to complete a memorandum on Japan's post-treaty security concerns by the September 10 meeting, even if these views were presented as the per-

sonal views of someone (Suzuki). Japan until then, as we have seen, considered that the United Nations would be responsible for Japanese security even if they still doubted that the United States and Soviet Union would be able to overcome their rivalry and cooperate for world peace. At a minimum, with a continued U.S.-led occupation, Japan's security, in the eyes of the Japanese was more or less guaranteed. However, if a withdrawal of American troops became necessary (and the U.N. failed to function as a guarantor of Japan's security), then the basis for Japan's security concept would have to be totally reconsidered.⁷³ This would be no easy task on short notice. Thus, it was decided that at the next meeting with Eichelberger, Suzuki would present a copy of the First Ashida Memorandum and ask for a follow-up meeting at which time "Suzuki's" views on security issues would be presented in more detail.

The Second Suzuki-Eichelberger Meeting, September 10, 1947

As scheduled, Suzuki paid a visit on the general at 8:00 a.m. on September 10. Eichelberger, who was busy getting ready to leave for the United States, met with Suzuki for almost one hour. Here, Eichelberger repeated that he hoped to hear Suzuki's views for his own reference and said that, unlike others in GHQ, he felt that it was necessary for a detailed plan and conception to be developed concerning Japanese security. Eichelberger then restated his views that Japan was threatened both internally through "Communist elements that would permeate [Japanese society] once the Allied troops picked up and left" and externally by "the Soviet Union which could invade Japan overnight from Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles." The United States had been studying what to do, Eichelberger said, and suggested that although strengthening its constabulary force to combat "the dangers of [Japan] turning red internally" and dropping some "atomic bombs on Vladivostok and a few other key points from Okinawa and Guam" concerning external aggression by Soviet troops, these measures would not necessarily be enough, predicting the difficulty of preventing the fall of Japan once Hokkaido was lost to the Soviets.

Suzuki responded that he and his staff had not yet been able to prepare a detailed outline of their opinions, but expected to have a document finished by Saturday, September 13, one day before the general's scheduled departure. Suzuki then, as planned, handed Eichelberger the First Ashida Memorandum, which Suzuki called "The Japanese government's desires and expectation (sic) relative to the peace settlement," and explained that it had been handed back by Whitney and the late Acheson who said that it could not be accepted even informally. Eichelberger, according to memorandum of conversation in Ashida's diary, listened excitedly and offered to take it back with him to Washington, saying that he expected to meet Secretary of State Marshall and would use the memorandum for reference. Suzuki next orally explained several parts of the contents of the memoran-

dum including the position that Japan would rely on the United Nations for its defense." Eichelberger questioned this and asked Suzuki his views on the prestige of the organization. Suzuki emphasized that at one point prospects for the organization were good but with "the Soviet abuse of the veto power the United Nations has been stalled." He then admitted that obviously a problem thus existed if the United Nations was not able to function as designed, because Japan had sought to rely on the United Nations. Suzuki explained that his country's policy of reliance on the United Nations had been based on public statements relating to the duty of the United Nations, such as MacArthur's announcement on March 17 (1947) that Japan's security could be entrusted to the United Nations. However, in recent statements by MacArthur and Allied officials, Suzuki pointed out, the ability of the United Nations to provide for international security had been increasingly questioned. "If U.S.-Soviet relations do not improve and the true function of the United Nations is not able to be exercised," Suzuki elaborated, "then Japan will have to reconsider how to respond, without necessarily changing the larger principles of the renunciation of war and demilitarization." Suzuki then asked Eichelberger if there would be a continued occupation even after the conclusion of a peace treaty, to which Eichelberger responded he did not believe a "consolidated opinion" had been reached yet and that an eventual decision would not likely be reached until a peace conference. Suzuki continued by mentioning that questions concerning Japanese security have increasingly been raised in the press and certain U.S. Navy and Air Force officials had suggested that post-treaty arrangements between the United States and Japan might be sought to acquire usage of Yokosuka Naval Base and some bases for the Air Force. Eichelberger answered that the shift from continued occupation to "security stationing" (through an agreement or agreements) represented a good trend. Here, it must be noted, Suzuki does not seem to have raised the recommendations found in the study done by Okazaki on arrangements for Okinawa. His hesitation may have been likely because of Eichelberger's already described views on the importance of bases in the mainland of Japan in addition to Okinawa and the Foreign Ministry had not yet clarified its position with respect to American bases. In any case, their one-hour conversation concluded with Eichelberger asking his views on the timing of the withdrawal of the Occupation troops. Suzuki suggested the Italian treaty as a model. Signed in February 1947 and ratified in August by the Soviet Union, the Italian treaty stipulated a withdrawal of Allied troops after within three months of the treaty going into effect six months after ratification. Thus the whole process in Suzuki's estimation took less than a year or so. In Japan's case, as reported in the news, Suzuki said the peace treaty could be signed as early as the spring of 1948, which would make Allied troop withdrawal likely to take place in the spring of 1949. However, Suzuki added, that the main problem concerned the need to

increase and train police forces, preferably the sooner the better, and to introduce these new police forces during any phased withdrawal of Allied troops. Suzuki said that nothing had been clearly decided."

Later that afternoon at the Foreign Ministry, Suzuki reported on his meeting with Eichelberger to Yoshizawa, Okazaki, Ota, and Hagiwara and discussed the memorandum to be prepared for the meeting on the September 13. Since Ashida was out of town (visiting the Kansai region) and would not be back until the morning of Friday, September 12, they would have to wait for the Foreign Minister's final opinion, which he gave upon his return."

In the meantime, Eichelberger met with MacArthur in the morning of September 11 for one hour during which time Eichelberger raised the question of the reduction of the size of American forces. MacArthur did not think that the question would come up during Eichelberger's trip to the United States. Eichelberger continued that it was indeed likely to come up and that it would be suggested that MacArthur was the one who recommended withdrawal or reduction of troops. MacArthur said, according to Eichelberger's record of the conversation, that he "had stipulated...that certain conditions would have to be met such as police powers of the UN, possible force for Japan, etc."⁷⁷ Eichelberger responded that he could suggest that the Russian condition had worsened and that the United Nations had not shown any indication of being able to guarantee international security, to which MacArthur agreed. Eichelberger's diary curiously does not mention whether he told MacArthur about his two meetings with Suzuki and his planned one. However, due to their differences over U.S.-Japanese security issues, it is likely that he did not tell him.

The Third Suzuki-Eichelberger Meeting, September 13, 1947

As planned, Suzuki called on Eichelberger in the morning amidst the chaos before the general's scheduled departure. Suzuki handed Eichelberger the newly prepared statement on Japan's post-treaty security calling it his "very secret and personal views."⁷⁸ Eichelberger happily received it and said he would read it on the airplane.

The four-page memorandum passed to Eichelberger was divided into two parts; one discussing the preservation of Japan's security by the United Nations, and the other discussing Japan's security being guaranteed by the United States. The first part, that of a United Nations' guarantee of "Japan's independence," was based on the assumption "that American-Soviet relations w[ould] improve to such an extent as to warrant elimination of all apprehensions about world peace." Here, the Foreign Ministry suggested that "As long as the United States and Russia are to cooperate wholeheartedly to ensure world peace, it may be expected that the United Nations will soon function properly as the guarantee for peace. Then Japan, demilitarized but provided with police forces adequate to maintain

internal peace and order, can afford to wait for the United Nations to provide her with security without the fear of any danger." However, this as we have seen, was no longer seen as a viable option, which led to the second part of the memorandum, the assumption "that unfortunately American-Soviet relations do not improve, causing world-wide unrest." Here, the Foreign Ministry argued that "in the case of the worsening of the world situation the best measures of guaranteeing Japan's security is for her to conclude with the United States a specific agreement against aggression by third Powers, and at the same time to reinforce her police forces on land and water." In order for the United States to help Japan with her external security, the Foreign Ministry concluded that Japan would have to provide bases for the U.S. military. However, the memorandum was drafted with the intention of having American forces use the bases on an emergency-only basis, suggesting the signing of a bilateral agreement which, without compromising "Japan's independence in peacetime," would "permit the United States to make full use of the bases in Japan in cases of emergency." It continues,

Such specific agreement...would have provisions that if and when Japan's independence and security is threatened (that is, peace of the Pacific is menaced), the United States may, after consultation with the Japanese Government, send her armed forces into Japan and use military bases there. Of course, the necessary stipulations will have to be made, under which the military bases can be constructed and maintained in Japan as satisfactorily as possible to the American requirements.

Importantly, the Second Ashida Memo presumed that "at all events...the United States will maintain sufficient military strength on certain strategic points in areas outside of but adjacent to Japan." Although Okinawa is not specifically named here, it was Okinawa to which this memorandum was referring. Indeed, this reference to Okinawa was confirmed in an article written in 1975 by Nishimura where he stated that "the memorandum given to Eichelberger had as its premise that Okinawa and Ogasawara [Bonins] were [by this point] outside of Japanese territory."" Likewise, Suzuki in an earlier interview with Weinstein, also confirmed this view. Of interest, he also alluded to what seems to have been the position of the Foreign Ministry at the time, namely, that with the full-time stationing of American troops in Okinawa, Japan would only need to grant the United States the use of bases on the Japanese mainland in times of emergency. Weinstein writes, "Mr. Suzuki stated that the memorandum explicitly proposed the stationing of U.S. forces in areas adjacent to Japan, which included the Ryukyus and Bonins but not in Japan itself, and the maintenance of emergency-use bases in Japan by the Japanese government."" Thus it seems that the Foreign Ministry believed that type of arrangement, stationing of U.S. troops near Japan with the use of mainland bases in times

of emergency, would have been enough to guarantee Japan's security. The Foreign Ministry may have also believed that by allowing the regular stationing of American troops on Okinawa and other islands but not on the more populous mainland, the Japanese government would avoid the political effects of the appearance of a continued occupation by foreign troops. Interestingly, however, for reasons not clear, the Foreign Ministry did not include in the Second Ashida Memo a reference to the arrangement for Okinawa that it had considered in the memorandum by Okazaki in early July, which sought a "modus operandi" that would have given the Allies strategic use of the Ryukyu Islands and at the same time allowed the Japanese government to retain administrative rights to the islands. Perhaps a reference to this arrangement was not included because the purpose of the Second Ashida Memo was to discuss general security considerations and not specific arrangements or territorial issues. Nevertheless, a reference here, the author suggests, would have been wise in order to clarify Japan's stance on sovereignty and administration.

The Fourth Suzuki-Eichelberger Meeting, September 14, 1947

Due to a typhoon canceling Eichelberger's September 14 flight, Suzuki was able to get in a follow-up visit with the general to discuss the Second Ashida Memorandum. When the general admitted that he had been unable to read it, Suzuki repeated that the views of the Japanese government on the Peace Treaty and his views on post-treaty security in response to questions raised the other day were represented in the documents handed to Eichelberger on September 10 and September 13. Eichelberger said to Suzuki that he believed that by the end of June the following year (1948) after the peace treaty, MacArthur would likely be returning to the United States and that GHQ would be disbanded. Issues after the American troop withdrawal would likely be taken up in the peace treaty, he continued, but even with the increase of Japan's constabulary ability and a two or three year delay in the withdrawal of U.S. forces, he believed that there still was a chance that Japan could go communist.⁸¹

Suzuki stated that he too was not sure if a police force of 100,000 could in fact handle a strike like the one that had been planned for February 1, 1947 (in which MacArthur intervened by calling it off). In the meantime however, if the United Nations was not to function, Suzuki explained, then it would be necessary, "as is shown in the conclusion to the memorandum to arrange a special agreement between the U.S. and Japan in which a part of Japan's international security would be handled by the U.S." Suzuki added, "This is, I believe, also the opinion of most Japanese." According to the memorandum of conversation, Eichelberger took great interest in Suzuki's comments and the memorandum, saying he would carefully read it on the airplane and exchange views on it with officials in Washington. Finally, Suzuki unsuccessfully tried to learn Eichelberger's views on the

memorandum one more time on the morning of September 15 when he went to see Eichelberger off, but noted that "due to the confusion of the general's departure, we were able to exchange no more than farewell greetings.""

Eichelberger spent three months in the United States, including stops in Hawaii and Guam." During that time, he may have discussed the views of the Foreign Ministry, particularly those views of Ashida and Suzuki, with officials he met. His diary entries from this time record no such discussions as having occurred although he did in fact meet with high military officials during his stay in Washington in October and November. No documentation however has been found on such meetings, and thus it is probable that the Second Ashida Memorandum, like the First Ashida Memorandum, died an early death and was not relayed to officials in Washington.⁸⁴ Thus, the evidence suggests that the Foreign Ministry was unsuccessful in its attempts to influence or at least successfully express its opinions on security, territorial, and other matters related to the peace treaty to the United States and its Allies at this point.

Indeed, the failure of the Foreign Ministry's attempts was symbolized in December 1947 when the American press reported on the Foreign Ministry's studies of the peace treaty, including its desire to see Japan's territories returned, which later led to the resignation of Okazaki as Vice Minister in January 1948." In response, Ashida sent Okazaki to GHQ on December 9 to explain what was described by the Chief of the Diplomatic Section (Office of the Political Adviser), William J. Sebald, as "a premature disclosure."⁸⁶ Ashida, through Okazaki, offered "informally to give a copy of the entire Japanese study under discussion to the Diplomatic Section at any time if the Diplomatic Section desires to receive it." Sebald turned Okazaki down stating that he "felt it was premature to receive such a document from the Foreign Office" and, in a subsequent telegram, sought State Department guidance on the matter, which later supported him." Sebald did leave hope with Okazaki however when he said that "Perhaps a suitable occasion would offer itself at a later time when we might be interested in knowing current Japanese thought on various problems which presumably would be covered in a treaty of peace." That opportunity however would not come for some time however as preparations for the peace treaty were delayed due to the emerging Cold War and political problems regarding the Foreign Ministry's activities regarding planning for a peace treaty." While the Foreign Ministry was thus unsuccessful at this early point in conveying to the U.S. government its opinions on territorial and security issues, the Emperor and his advisers, as is looked at below, were more successful.

IV. "THE TENNO MESSAGE": ATTEMPTS BY THE EMPEROR AND

HIS ADVISORS TO INFLUENCE THE PEACE TREATY AND SECURITY DISCUSSIONS, SEPTEMBER 1947 – FEBRUARY 1948

As discussed above, the Foreign Ministry anticipated at an early point the U.S. desire to hold on to some or all of the Ryukyu Islands for strategic reasons. At the same time, it wished for the return of the Ryukyu Islands and other territories. Thus the July Okazaki memorandum sought to make arrangements with the United States and its Allies for Okinawa whereby Japan would keep sovereignty and administrative rights over the islands while meeting the strategic needs of the Allies, likely through a base agreement. The Foreign Ministry did not at this stage however pursue this plan in subsequent meetings with American officials, nor in the First and Second Ashida memorandums, likely because it had been warned not to make its requests too strongly.

In the meantime, the Emperor and his advisers, through their numerous contacts in the Foreign Ministry, were aware of general thinking in the Foreign Ministry toward a peace treaty and security arrangement and probably as well were familiar with the contents of the Okazaki study on Okinawa. Based on this awareness, the lack of progress on the Foreign Ministry side, and the fear of domestic and regional instability, the Emperor and his advisers sought to influence the debate on the territorial/security issues of the peace treaty by an attempt to suggest an arrangement with the United States regarding Okinawa in what has been called the "Tenno Message," discussed earlier in the introductory chapter.

On Friday, September 19, 1947, Terasaki "Terry" Hidenari, as *Goyogakari*, or Adviser to the Emperor, paid a visit on Sebald, then the Acting Political Adviser in GHQ, at the latter's third floor office in the Nihonbashi section of Tokyo to convey the Emperor's ideas on the future of the Ryukyu Islands and the need for a continued U.S. there." For reasons discussed below, this one message seems to have had more of an effect on the State Department's making of policy toward Okinawa than any other movement by the Japanese government to date at that time.

Terasaki and Sebald

Terasaki, a diplomat with extensive experience in the United States and married to an American woman, Gwendolen Harold, from Tennessee, ironically, but significantly, found his last foreign posting in Washington, as the assistant to Japanese Ambassador to the U.S., Nomura Kichisaburo, and diplomat Kurusu Saburo, in the period up until Pearl Harbor." After returning to Japan in late summer of 1942 after the exchange of diplomats, Terasaki was labeled as "pro-Western" and prevented from holding any position of responsibility in the Foreign Ministry.⁹² After the war, Terasaki, then working in the Central Liaison Office, was asked by Foreign Minister Yoshida to become *Goyogakari*, which Terasaki explained to his wife to

mean "liaison and adviser for the Emperor" and Yoshida described as a "spokesman."⁹³ Gwen later recorded in her autobiography that her husband was chosen because of the need "that there be an official liaison to advise the Emperor and to meet with him and MacArthur, someone who knew the languages and customs of both nations and who would be trusted by both." Terasaki officially assumed his new position on February 20, 1946, and at the suggestion of Yoshida, immediately set out to call on the occupation officials, in particular seeking out MacArthur's military secretary Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers, with whom Gwen was distantly related.⁹⁴ Despite physical illness, which, combined with overwork led to several strokes, Terasaki undertook the task of adviser and liaison to the Emperor, assisting in five of the total 11 meetings between the Emperor and MacArthur during his time as adviser from February 1946 to April 1948.⁹⁵

According to Terasaki's diary, he met frequently, both officially and socially, with officials from SCAP and also from the Foreign Ministry.⁹⁶ In addition to the Fellers, the Terasakis became particularly close with the Atchesons. As Gwen's autobiography reveals they got to know Atcheson when, following the Japanese declaration of war on the United States in December 1941, the State Department assigned him responsibility for the welfare of the families of Japanese diplomats in Washington, who were eventually exchanged for American diplomats (and their families) in the summer of 1942 and brought back to Japan. Although an American citizen, Gwen (with daughter, Mariko, then aged 9), chose to go with her husband. After the war, Atcheson, a China specialist (as well as a victim of the 1937 *Panay* sinking by Japan and witness to the Japanese atrocities in Nanking), was sent to become Political Adviser to SCAP on September 22, 1945, which according to Gwen, some in the Japanese community viewed with "dismay" because he might "be too hard on the conquered."⁹⁷ However, Atcheson and Terasaki quickly built up a good relationship, both personally and professionally. Terasaki, with his Foreign Ministry connections and placement near the Emperor, offered his American counterparts an important channel of communication. Indeed, so did the Americans for Terasaki and the Emperor.

These channels of communication continued despite the death of Atcheson in August 1947. Sebald, who had been political officer under Atcheson, subsequently assumed the position of Acting Political Adviser upon the latter's death." As Atcheson's legal and political assistant, Sebald had on several occasions met Terasaki both socially and for official business. Although not a diplomat by training, Sebald himself had been in Japan since early 1946 and also had extensive pre-war experience in Japan as a naval Japanese language student/officer and later as a lawyer in his father-in-law's Kobe-based firm.

Actually, some officials in GHQ/SCAP, particularly in the Government Section were distrustful of Terasaki, fearing that he was a spy or an oppor-

tunist or both, to the extent that they called for his purging on July 1946. However, the Civil Intelligence Section of the General Staff-2 (G2), the Intelligence Division of GHQ, recognized the importance of Terasaki's connections and eventually won the debate. Terasaki was thus spared from the purge.

Sebald likewise recognized the importance of Terasaki's connections and appreciated Terasaki's efforts at keeping the channels of communication open. In his memoirs, Sebald recorded this of the Emperor's Adviser:

Terry was adviser and liaison officer for the Emperor with SCXP (Goyogalzari) and was, therefore, in constant touch with the intimate details of the political situation. Probably the frankest Japanese I have known, Terry was exceedingly helpful in explaining the reactions of his people to the some times quixotic actions of the Occupation. Moreover, as an adviser to the Emperor, he was able to convey some of my views and explanations of American policy to court circles and, indeed, to the Emperor himself."

Terasaki's approaches to Sebald began almost immediately after Sebald's assumption of his new post. As is related below, Sebald was presented with a major initiative by the Japanese side concerning Okinawa in only his second official meeting with Terasaki.

The Terasaki-Sebald Meeting Concerning Okinawa, September 19, 1947

Following Atcheson's death, Sebald and Terasaki met briefly on September 4, 1947 to talk about Atcheson and discuss procedural arrangements for further meetings between the Political Adviser's Office and Terasaki. There they agreed to meet every week on Fridays at 3:00 p.m.¹⁰⁰ However due to the time needed for Sebald to get adjusted to his new position, the two did not meet the following Friday, September 12. Instead, Terasaki briefed the Emperor on the relations between Atcheson, Sebald, and Ashida.¹⁰¹ It was not until September 19 that Terasaki and Sebald officially met again.¹⁰²

Despite the regular official and social meetings between Terasaki and the Political Adviser's Office, the September 19, 1947 meeting stands out in importance because of a direct message from the Emperor concerning Okinawa.¹⁰³ According to the memorandum of the afternoon meeting that Sebald prepared for MacArthur, Terasaki requested the appointment with the Political Adviser "for the purpose of conveying to me the Emperor's ideas concerning the future of Okinawa."¹⁰⁴ An introduction of the contents of the memorandum of conversation of the meeting follows.

In their meeting Terasaki first related that "the Emperor hope[d] that the United States w[ould] continue the military occupation of Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus. In the Emperor's opinion, such occupation would benefit the United States and also provide protection for Japan." Perhaps in response to a question as to how the Japanese people would feel

about that, Terasaki explained that "the Emperor fe[lt] that such a move would meet with widespread approval among the Japanese people who fear not only the menace of Russia, but after the Occupation has ended, the growth of rightist and leftist groups which might give rise to an 'incident' which Russia could use as a basis for interfering internally in Japan."

Terasaki next stated that "the Emperor further feels that United States military occupation of Okinawa (and such other islands as may be required) should be based upon the fiction of a long-term lease—25 to 50 years or more—with sovereignty retained in Japan. According to the Emperor," Terasaki continued, "this method of occupation would convince the Japanese people that the United States has no permanent designs on the Ryukyu Islands, and other nations, particularly Soviet Russia and China, would thereby be stopped from demanding similar rights."¹⁰⁵

Their conversation then turned to the method of implementing such an arrangement. Sebald writes, "As to procedure, Mr. Terasaki felt that the acquisition of 'military base rights' (of Okinawa and other islands in the Ryukyus) should be by bilateral treaty between the United States and Japan rather than form part of the Allied peace treaty with Japan. The latter method, according to Mr. Terasaki, would savor too much of a dictated peace and might in the future endanger the sympathetic understanding of the Japanese people."

Their conversation concluded with Terasaki expressing the need for this information to be told to MacArthur that day.¹⁰⁶ Whether Sebald met with MacArthur that same day after his meeting with Terasaki or the following day when he presumably typed up the memorandum, remains unclear, as Sebald's memoirs and MacArthur's *Reminiscences* do not refer to this conversation at all.¹⁰⁷ However, the above-cited memorandum was at any rate given to MacArthur, who as we saw above was a strong proponent of maintaining bases and unilateral control of Ryukyu Islands for strategic reasons, at the expense of Japan's sovereignty over the islands—of which, the Emperor was likely aware (due to MacArthur's views reported in the press) and which he was trying to prevent.

Two days later, the message was sent as Despatch No. 1293 to the State Department with the comment: "It will be noted that the Emperor of Japan hopes that the United States will continue the military occupation of Okinawa and other islands of the Ryukyus, a hope which undoubtedly is largely based upon self-interest." After being received by the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on September 30, as is discussed more fully in the next chapter, it seems to have been used by Borton to support the State Department's plan for leased bases on Okinawa in its discussions with the military. Likewise, as is discussed in the next chapter in more detail, a copy of the memorandum and despatch went to the State Department's Policy Planning Staff where George F. Kennan's team was in the process of reex-

amining overall American policy towards Japan as well as deciding what to do about Okinawa.

Concerns for Japan's internal and external safety were prevalent in the "Tenno Message." Indeed, a worsening economy with high inflation and increasingly violent labor unrest had caused growing political problems for the Japanese government. Earlier in the year on February 1, it had become necessary for MacArthur to intervene and prevent a large strike. Shortly after, the first Yoshida Cabinet was forced to resign due to the worsening economic and political situation. Meanwhile, the conservative government watched nervously the coming into effect of the postwar Constitution on May 3, which guaranteed liberties never before had in Japan. Conservative leaders feared that the new progressive Constitution, symbolized by Article Nine preventing the possession of an army and rejecting force as means of settling international disputes, would unleash political instability. They felt that radical labor leaders, as well as Leftist political parties, particularly the Communist Party, were taking advantage of these new liberties and creating instability.

Sebald later recorded in his memoirs similar conversations with Terasaki: "Time and again, Terry expressed his concern that nothing was being done to counteract the rapid growth of the Communist Party in the fertile field of postwar Japan. Although a man of great discernment and understanding of democratic methods, he emphasized his belief that SCAP was creating a great danger by showing too much leniency toward the Japanese Communists."¹⁰⁹ This view had been echoed as strongly by others close to the Emperor. Yoshida Shigeru and Prince Konoe Fumimaro, who was prime minister immediately before Pearl Harbor, had warned the Emperor in February 1945 in the "Konoe Memorial" that the destruction and damage brought about during the war would weaken Japan and make its people vulnerable to communism and anarchy.¹¹⁰ The Emperor and his advisors increasingly felt that those warnings were coming true in 1947, and with the emergence of the Cold War, which pitted the two former Allies—the United States and the Soviet Union—against one another, Japan's internal and external security was increasingly questioned.

These anxieties were clearly shown in the Emperor's meetings with MacArthur and those with Foreign Minister Ashida. In one of his eleven sessions with MacArthur, the Emperor on May 6, 1947 introduced the question of Japan's security after the conclusion of a peace treaty to which MacArthur is said to have responded that "as California is protected, so Japan would be guarded by the United States."¹¹¹ Two months later on July 22, one week before Ashida was scheduled to meet with Acheson and Whitney, the Foreign Minister called on the Emperor at the latter's request for thirty minutes to discuss "diplomatic problems," including the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the progress of the conference for a peace treaty with Japan. The Emperor was in particular concerned about the

state of U.S.-Soviet relations which appeared "threatening" and stated that "Japan would have to side with the U.S." to which Ashida agreed.¹¹²

Another meeting of interest took place between the Emperor and Ashida two months later on September 19 at which Ashida discussed in detail the movements of his ministry in preparing for the peace treaty. Ashida explained Japan's desires regarding the peace treaty and on security matters, noting the earlier meetings with Acheson and Eichelberger. In his diary, Ashida observed that the Emperor was particularly interested in the security debate and "nodded" his understanding.¹¹³ Of note, it was later that same day that the Emperor sent Terasaki to meet with Sebald to deliver the "Tenno Message" regarding Okinawa.

The Second Terasaki-Sebald Meeting on Okinawa, October 3, 1947

Two weeks after the Ashida-Tenno and Terasaki-Sebald meetings, on Friday morning, October 3, Terasaki again sought Sebald out to inquire as to the effect "the Tenno Message" had on SCAP and American thinking.¹¹⁴ After meeting with Hagiwara from the Foreign Ministry earlier in the morning, Terasaki visited Sebald's office in the Mitsui Building. According to Terasaki's diary entry for that day, Sebald responded that "America wants to use Okinawa freely. However, whether it will be in the form of a trusteeship or a lease [arrangement] is as of yet undecided [back in Washington]. The former [arrangement] is the strong preference of the military. The State Department is still undecided."¹¹⁵

As seen in the Policy Planning Staff document drawn up approximately two weeks later (which is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter), Sebald's information and assessment of the situation stateside was correct. The PPS document, "PPS 10/1, Special Recommendation on Ultimate Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands," stated, as discussed in the next chapter, that the "formula [as suggested in 'the Tenno Message'] might well be explored as an alternative to strategic trusteeship." Strategic trusteeship, with the United States as the sole administering authority, had been the choice of the military, specifically the Army, Navy, and JCS. MacArthur, as seen above, while not clarifying the means and duration of control, described U.S. control over Okinawa as absolutely essential.

Sebald likely based this conversation with Terasaki on information he received in messages from the State Department and in helping one month earlier (September 1) to write MacArthur's comments on the State Department's Draft Treaty for Japan of August 5, 1947, which suggested that the Ryukyu Islands would be included in Japan's territorial limits (Territorial Clauses, Article I).¹¹⁶ In that seven-page memorandum of September 1, 1947 sent to the State Department via the Joint Chiefs of Staff, MacArthur first explained that as the draft treaty was "still under study in Washington from which marked revision in both form and context [would] be expected," he would "limit [him]self to comment only upon the

following features which instantly appear...as highly questionable."¹¹⁷ MacArthur argued in point one that "The draft provides for the retention of the Ryukyu Islands by Japan. Control over this group [of islands] must be vested in the United States as absolutely essential to the defense of our Western Pacific frontier." Reflecting military thinking from the early to mid-1940s, MacArthur continued, "[this group of islands are] not indigenous to Japan ethnologically, does not contribute to Japan's economic welfare, nor do the Japanese people expect to be permitted to retain it." MacArthur concluded by stating, "[this group of islands] is basically strategic, and in my opinion failure to secure it for control by the United States might prove militarily disastrous."¹¹⁸

With Sebald aware of both State Department and military approaches to the Ryukyu Islands, he was clearly capable of explaining thinking in Washington to Terasaki. Since there seems not to be any documentation of this October 3 meeting between Sebald and Terasaki in the records of the State Department, based on Terasaki's diary we will have to assume that this meeting was held as more of an information exchange for the benefit of Terasaki and indirectly for the Emperor and his other advisers, than as one of note to report to State or SCAP. However, interestingly, Terasaki records Sebald as having told him at the end of their meeting that "it is mistaken to think that anyone can influence U.S. policy-making."¹¹⁹

The Third Terasaki-Sebald Meeting on Okinawa, February 26, 1948

Shortly after this discussion Sebald found an opportunity to visit Okinawa for the first time due to a request from the State Department to ascertain the poor state of occupation affairs in Okinawa and the unprofessional way in which the Okinawan people were being taken care of. Sebald's report and impressions are discussed in more detail in the next chapter in the context of U.S. policy-making for Okinawa, but suffice it to say here that it was a critical attack on the occupation and would become one in a number of recommendations that a decision should be made by the United States to establish a long-range policy for Okinawa as is discussed below.

Following his trip to Okinawa, Sebald did not meet with Terasaki again formally until November 21. However at this meeting, they did not seem to discuss his trip to Okinawa or anything related to it. They did not discuss Okinawa again until the following year when an important and timely third meeting concerning the Ryukyu Islands and Japanese security issues took place on February 26, 1948.¹²⁰

Their meeting was timely for the following three reasons. First of all, it took place at the time the Socialist Party-led Katayama Cabinet was collapsing (it officially fell on March 10), which likely made it easier to talk about security issues because the Socialists pursued a strongly pacifist line. (Its conservative partner, Ashida's *Nihon Minshuto* [Japan Democratic

Party], which took up the helm and formed the Ashida Cabinet [until October 1948], was more interested in national defense issues). Secondly, it was timely because it was one of Terasaki's last official meetings with Sebald before he left his position as adviser to the Emperor in April. Thus it was one of his last chances to relate his and possibly the Emperor's views on Okinawa and security issues. Thirdly, it took place just as George Kennan of the Policy Planning Staff and Marshall Green, a young Foreign Service Officer and Japan specialist with the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, were on their way to Japan to confer with MacArthur, Sebald, and other GHQ and Japanese officials and thus was ideal timing to directly influence U.S. policy-making toward Japan (if indeed that could be done).

In their meeting, Terasaki first talked about the China problem and the imminent collapse of the Nationalist regime of Chiang Kai-shek stating that "China may be likened to a swamp into which unlimited resources may be poured without any visible result...even the United States is not wealthy enough to bring about concrete improvement in China." Terasaki suggested then, according to Sebald's memorandum, that "a realistic policy would be one which adopts, as an American perimeter, South Korea, Japan, Ryukyus, the Philippines, and if possible, Formosa. He felt that the American position in the Orient would be unassailable if a clear-cut line of demarcation of an American security zone were established with the areas mentioned as the outer perimeter." Furthermore, Sebald records, "Terasaki visualize[d] a strong American effort to hold these areas against possible Soviet aggression or even infiltration, to the exclusion of China proper, which he felt should largely be left to its own devices to work out its own salvation."

Sebald's analysis of the conversation, as recorded in the same memorandum, is of equal interest. He writes: "It is, of course, possible to detect Japanese self-interest in the above views, namely, a strong desire on the part of the Japanese to be assured of American protection against Soviet Russia even at the expense of a prolonged military occupation of Japan, and possible a Japanese hope that China will remain weak and thus incapable of an aggressive policy against Japan in the foreseeable future.""

But it is Sebald's conclusion to the memorandum that is most interesting and could almost lead one to call this meeting "The Second Tenno Message." Sebald records, "I have reason to believe that the above views are representative not only of Mr. Terasaki's personal opinions, but result from his discussions with various influential members of the Imperial Household, including the Emperor." As seen in the earlier meetings of May 1947 between the Emperor and MacArthur, the Emperor and Ashida, and the Terasaki-Sebald meeting of September 1947, this February discussion would not have been the first time the Emperor (or the Emperor through his liaison Terasaki) to have tried to influence policy-making on security issues.¹²²

V. CONCLUSIONS: INTERPRETING THE FOREIGN MINISTRY'S PLANNING AND THE "TENNO MESSAGE"

The above examination of this period, 1945-1948, showed that the Japanese Foreign Ministry began preparations for a peace treaty at an early stage. However, the Foreign Ministry was not the only agency in the Japanese government interested in the peace treaty. The Emperor and his advisers also took a special interest in the preparations for the peace treaty, and in particular, security issues.

Moreover, as was discussed above, in addition to security issues, the inter-related territorial problems were of a high priority in the planning for the peace treaty by the Foreign Ministry. Based on the pronouncements of the Allies in the Atlantic Charter, the Cairo Declaration, and the Potsdam Declaration, the Foreign Ministry continued to call for the return to (and retention by) Japan of the Ryukyu Islands. However, at the same time, the Foreign Ministry was quick to recognize that due to the security interests of the United States (and Allies), arrangements for the Ryukyu Islands had to be given special consideration. Thus, while strongly desiring and appealing for the return of islands, it also had to consider the need for a "modus operandi" whereby Japan would keep sovereignty over the islands and administrative rights but make arrangements with the Allies meeting their strategic requirements, as seen in the July 1947 Okazaki memorandum. In the summer of 1947, prior to the planned opening of the preparatory peace conference, the Foreign Ministry sought the "ideal" solution, Okinawa's retention by Japan, and expressed so in the First Ashida Memorandum. However the aborted peace conference and the emergence of the Cold War confirmed to the Japanese government that a more realistic approach to security and other issues was necessary. In September, the opportunity appeared to privately express Japan's views on its security in which suggestions were made for a special treaty with the United States to allow the emergency-use of bases in the mainland of Japan. The evidence suggests that in this, the Second Ashida Memorandum, the Foreign Ministry was by this point working with the premise that Okinawa was outside of Japan, which meant that it recognized the United States would want to station a large force on the islands near Japan. (However, for some reason, it did not introduce its plans for an arrangement to lease bases while keeping sovereignty and administrative rights in any detail.) Thus Japan's territorial desires were conditioned on not only its own security requirements, but those of its future ally, the United States which was requested to guarantee Japan's external security, as well. The record shows that the Foreign Ministry's approaches to the United States in expressing its desires on territorial, security, and other issues were not successful at this point, which suggests that the United States and the Allies were not ready to hear Japan's territorial (treaty) desires nor its views on security issues. As is discussed in Chapter Seven, the United States did not eventually accept the studies on

Japan's treaty desires and related materials until almost the end of 1948, when the Japanese government, under Yoshida's direction again, sent through the GHQ Diplomatic Section hundreds of pages of documents.

In the meantime, by meeting frequently with Ashida and officials from the Foreign Ministry, as well as having his advisors act as liaisons with GHQ, the Emperor, who greatly worried about Japanese security and the permanent loss of Okinawa, and his advisors were kept abreast of the thinking of the Foreign Ministry and the Allies. They concluded much in the same way as the Foreign Ministry that Japanese security would have to be guaranteed by the United States. However, at this stage, it was only the "Tenno Message," granting base usage to the United States in the form of a lease arrangement with sovereignty to be retained by Japan, which was successfully relayed to Washington and was used by members of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to argue their case that sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands should remain with Japan while providing for base arrangements, as is discussed next in the following chapter. It is to the State Department's planning for a treaty and the attempt to forge a policy consensus within the U.S. government on policy for Okinawa that we turn next.

NOTES

1. A shorter version of this chapter appeared in Japanese entitled "Showa Tenno to Okinawa: 'Tenno Messeji' no Sailzosatsu (The Showa Emperor and Olzinawa: A Reexamination of the 'Tenno Message')," *Chuo Koron* (The Central Review), Vol. 114, No. 3 (March 1999), 152-171.

2. While the Yalta Agreement of February 11, 1945 would have profound effects on the territorial status of Japan concerning Salzhalin and the Southern Kuriles (Northern Territories), Okinawa's territorial status was not considered in the agreement and thus is not included in this discussion. The Northern Territories (Hoppo *Ryodo*) problem remains unresolved in 2000.

3. "Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 313 (July 29, 1945), 137-138.

4. "Instrument of Surrender," in Kajima Heiwa Kenkyujo, ed., *Nihon Gaiko Shuyo Bunsho-Nenpyo 1, 1941-1960* (Important Documents and Chronological Table Relating to Japanese Foreign Policy, Volume 1, 1941-1960), (Tolzyo:Hara Shobo, 1983), 77-79.

5. "U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan," *Ibid.*, 81-91.

6. Toshikazu Kase, *Journey to the Missouri* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950), 202.

7. Shigeru Yoshida with Kenichi Yoshida, *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973), 243-244. This book is a translation of Yoshida's memoirs in Japanese entitled, *Kaiso Junen* (Recollections of Ten Years), (Tolzyo: Shinchosha, 1957). The above quote can be found in Volume 3, p. 18, of the Japanese edition. Yoshida was Foreign Minister in the Higashikuni Naruhiko Cabinet (August 17 to October 9, 1945) having replaced Shigemitsu

Mamoru on September 17. He was reappointed during the Shidehara Kijuro Cabinet, which began on October 9, 1945 and continued until May 21, 1946, at which time Yoshida himself took over as Prime Minister and continued as Foreign Minister.

8. Shimoda Takezo, *Sengo Nihon Gaiko no Shogen: Nihon wa Koshite Saisei Shita* (Testimony of Postwar Japanese Diplomacy: This is How Japan was Reborn), (Tokyo: Gyosei Mondai Kenkyujo, 1984), 51.

9. *Ibid.* Shimoda emphasized in his memoirs (pages 52-53) that throughout these studies, their biggest concerns were preventing a "retaliatory peace treaty like that of the Versailles Treaty." Other concerns, Shimoda noted, were the security and territorial issues as described below.

10. Yoshitsu notes that Hagiwara Toru was asked by Yoshida to be chair, which was true, only later. Initially, Sugihara headed the Treaty Bureau as director until being replaced by Hagiwara on February 1, 1946. For Hagiwara's role, see Yoshitsu, *op. cit.*, 1-7.

11. The members were bureau chiefs (*Kyokucho*) and section chiefs (*Kacho*) from the Political Affairs Bureau (Sections 1 and 3), Economic Bureau (Section 1), Treaty Bureau (Sections 1, 2, and 3), Research Bureau (Sections 1, 2, and 3), Administrative Bureau (First Division, Section 1), and the General Affairs Department of the Central Liaison Office (Section 1). Later under administrative changes in February 1946, the Political and Economic Bureaus were combined to form the *Somukyoku* (General Affairs Bureau). See Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 21. Also see "Heiwa Joyaku Mondai Kenkyukai Kanjikai Kankei (Materials Relating to the Peace Treaty Problems Executive Committee), November 1945," Flash Number 1, Microfilm Reel Number B'-0008, *Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankai Junbi Kenkyu Kankai, Dai Ikkan*, (Materials Relating to the Preparations for the Treaty of Peace with Japan, First Roll), DRO-MOFA, 0004-0160.

12. This phrase, *Dai Ichiji Kenkyu Sagyo*, is used in Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 21.

13. With the exception of the first category, which had to be completed by the end of January, the other studies were to be finished by the end of the following month, February. Those completed studies then underwent a total of sixteen review meetings by the executive committee, which were concluded near the end of May. See *Ibid.*

14. "Ippan Mondai, 4 (General Problems)," Heiwa Joyaku Mondai Kenkyu Shiryo (Materials on the Study of the Problems of the Peace Treaty), Heiwa Joyaku Mondai Kenkyu Kanjikai Kankei in *Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankai*, 0027.

15. Yoshida writes of this time, "In regard to [the minor islands], we had no course open to us but to accept the ruling of the Allied Powers as to the extent of the outlying islands included in this definition. But since this part would be determined at the peace conference, it was important that we should make every effort to have the treaty framed with a minimum of disadvantages to us, and particularly to ensure that the definition of territory gained by aggression was not stretched to include territory that did not fall into this category." See Yoshida, *op. cit.*, 261; 60-61 in Volume 3 in the Japanese edition.

16. "Ippan Mondai, 4," 0036.
17. "Seiji Joko—Ryodo Joko (Political Clause, Territorial Clause)," Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei, 0060.
18. Joyakukyoku, "Heiwa Joyaku no Rengokokuan to Wagaho Kiboan to no Hikaku Kento (A Comparative Study of the Allied Powers' Draft of the Peace Treaty With Ours)," *Ibid.*, 0134.
19. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 22-23.
20. "Heiwa Joyaku no Rengokoku (Sotei) to Wagaho Kibo to no Hikaku Kento (A Comparative Study of the Allied Powers' [Assumed Draft] of the Peace Treaty With Ours)," Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei, 0195. The above recommendation led to the study on "Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan" described below.
21. *Ibid.*, 0197.
22. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 24.
23. *Ibid.*, 24-25. Yoshida, who was by this point both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, observed,

It was necessary for [American] leaders to be put in possession of all the facts concerning post-war Japan and for those facts to be presented in a form that would make them comprehensible to the U.S. authorities in Washington, who were still ignorant of many problems. Especial pains were taken in compiling data concerning such integral parts of Japan as Okinawa...alike from the historical, geographical, racial and economic points of view, and...explained in detail the circumstances that made them an integral part of Japan. The material thus presented in regard to the territorial question alone filled seven volumes.

See Yoshida, *op. cit.*, 247 and Vol. 3, Japanese edition, 25-26.

24. This study was completed in November 1946 and given to the Political Adviser's office on March 12, 1947 by Asakai Koichiro, then bureau chief of the Central Liaison Office, and later himself Ambassador to the United States (1957-1963). *Ibid.*, 31; Gaimusho, ed., *Shoki Tainichi Senryo Seisakz Asakai Koichiro Hokokztscho* (Early U.S. Occupation Policy: The Reports of Asakai Koichiro). (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1979), Vol. 2, 8; and Yoshitsu, *op. cit.*, 7-8. Yoshitsu cites an interview with the author of the territorial reference documents, Dr. Kawakami Kenzo of the Chosakyoku Dai Sanka (Research Bureau, Third Section), which along with the Shomukyoku and the Joyakukyoku, played instrumental roles in preparing for the Peace Treaty. See page 109 of Yoshitsu's study for biographical information on Kawakami. Also see Suzuki Tadakatsu, *Shztsen Kara Kowa Made* (From Surrender to Peace), Vol 26, in the series edited by Kajima Heiwa Kenkyujo, *Nihon Gaikoshi*. (Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyujo Shuppankai, 1973), 174.

25. *Ibid.*, Also see "Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper: Part II, Ryukyu and Other Nansei Islands, March 1947," Flash Number 1, Microfilm Reel Number B'-0012, Beigawa ni Teishutsu Shiryō (Eibun)(Dai Ikkan) [Materials Submitted to the United States (English Copies) (First Roll)], Tainichi Kowa ni Kansuru Honpo no Junbi Taisaku Kankei (File on Preparatory Measures by our Country Relating

to the Peace Treaty), DRO-MOFA, 0066-0083. Asakai gave this study to Atcheson in early July 1947 (see below).

26. See for example Kerr, *op. cit.*, 10.

27. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 25-27; also Drifte, *op. cit.*, 67, 72-74. Drifte does not translate this committee name, but leaves it abbreviated as *renrakukan-jikai*.

28. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 25-27. The overlapping of duties became quite confusing and name changes were common. For example, the deliberation staff later became known as the "peace treaty deliberation staff (Heiwa Joyaku Shingi shitsu)" and sometimes the "treaty deliberation staff (Joyaku Shingi shitsu)."

29. Gaimusho, ed., *op. cit.*, 8.

30. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 29. Nishimura records this meeting as having occurred on April 15, 1947 but according to Asakai's report, the meeting was held the day before.

31. Gaimusho, ed., *op. cit.*, 15.

32. "Gaishi Donyu o Yoho (Desire for Foreign Capital)," *Asahi Shimbun*, Friday, June 6, 1947. Ashida recorded in his diary entry for (Sunday) June 8 that the interview earlier in the week went off without any problem. See Ashida, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, 4-5.

33. "Okinawa to Chishima no Ichihu Henkan o Kibo (Desire for the Return of Okinawa and A Part of the Kuriles)," *Asahi Shimbun*, Saturday, June 7, 1947. Also see Tom Lambert, "Okinawa, Kuriles Asked by Japan, Ashida Declares," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, Friday, June 6, 1947 (Tokyo-Yokohama Edition); Tom Lambert, "Japan Not Rearming, Says Ashida; Seeks Return of Okinawa, Kuriles," *Nippon Times*, June 7, 1947.

34. "The Political Adviser in Japan to President Truman (June 19, 1947), Enclosure to The Political Adviser in Japan to the Secretary of State (June 19, 1947)," in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. VI, The Far East* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1972), 231-233. Unfortunately in the FRUS volume, the last section of the letter to President Truman is cut off during the discussion of Ashida's comments and Okinawa. According to the editors of the volume, the remainder of the text was missing from Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.00119 Control (Japan)/6-1947), RG 59 at the National Archives when they were compiling the volume. That remained the case when the author checked the original file in September 1997. However, the author discovered Atcheson's letter to Truman at the Truman Library. See Eox 159, Subject Files—Cabinet-Foreign Countries, Presidential Secretary Files, Harry S. Truman Papers. Drifte, in his work, assumes Atcheson's letter was in response to a meeting with Ashida, but it was in fact based on his public comments to the press. See Drifte, *op. cit.*, 152, fn. 34.

35. "MacArthur Foresees Japan Peace Within 18 Months," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, June 29, 1947.

36. Ashida, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, 5. Ashida added that "the Soviet Union in Pravda severely criticized me as Imperialist Ashida. This of course is to be expected."

37. Ashida it seems was eventually forced (perhaps due to MacArthur's public refutation) to retract or deny that Japan had any territorial ambitions by claim-

ing in a statement at a plenary session of the House of Representatives in early July in reply to a question by Representative Kato Kanju that his interview had "unfortunately...[been] erroneously reported." See "Xshida Declares Japan Desires No Territory, Denies Press Reports," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, July 3, 1947.

38. Ashida, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, 11.

39. *Ibid.*, 10-11.

40. *Ibid.*, 11.

41. Gaimusho, ed., *op. cit.*, 13-15.

42. *Ibid.*, 13. Also, Nishiinura (1971), *op. cit.*, 32.

43. Gaimusho, ed., *op. cit.*, 14-15; Nishiinura (1971), *op. cit.*, 32.

44. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 26. Also see "General Observations on the Questions of Japan's Territories," Microfilm Reel Number B'-0008, Flash Number 2, Heiwa Joyaku Kankei Tokushu Mondai ni Taisuru Iken Oyobi Nihon no Genjo ni Kansuru Shiryo, (1) Ryodo Mondai (Opinions on Special Problems Relating to the Treaty of Peace With Japan and Materials Relating to Japan's Present Situation, 1. Territorial Problems), Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei Junbi Kenkyu ICankei (Dai 2 Kan), DRO-MOFA, 0143-0167, of which the English version of this document can be found on pages 0161-0167. Okazaki was originally appointed Administrative Vice Minister, or *Jimu Jikan*, on February 4, 1947 while Yoshida was still Prime Minister and Foreign Minister. Because Xshida strongly requested that Okazaki stay on, and Yoshida did not object, Okazaki continued as Vice Minister until January 31, 1948 when a leak (see below) forced his resignation. See Okazaki Katsuo, "Yoshida Naikaku no Shutsugen to Heiwa Joyaku Teiketsu no Eutai Ura (Behind the Scenes of the Emergence of the Yoshida Cabinet and the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty)," *Gaiko Jiho* (Revue Diplomatique), April 1964, 59.

45. "Xchison Taishi ni Taisuru Kaidan An (Plan for Meeting With Ambassador Atcheson) (July 24, 1947)," Microfilm Reel Number B'-0008, Flash Number 2, Heiwa Joyaku Ippan Kenkai (General Opinions on the Peace Treaty), Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei Junbi Kenkyu Kankei (Dai 2 Kan), DRO-MOFX, 0043.

46. Drifte employs this term. See Drifte, *op. cit.*, 68-72.

47. "Achison Taishi, *op. cit.* The English memorandum lacks a date, title, and signature. It later was called "The Japanese Government's Desires and Expectation (sic) Relative to the Peace Settlement" by Suzuki. See *Ibid.*, 400. It can be found in "Achison Oyohi Hoittonii Shosho to Kaiken, Oboegaki Henkyaku no Ken (Meeting with Xtcheson and General Whitney and the Returned Document)," Microfilm Reel Number B'-0008, Flash Number 3, Kowa Joyaku Kankei Juyo Kaidan Kiroku (Records on Important Meetings Relating to the Peace Treaty), DRO-MOFX, 0046-0050.

48. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 32.

49. "Achison Oyobi Hoittonii Shosho to Kaiken, Oboegaki Henkyaku no Ken," *op. cit.*, 0047.

50. Ashida, *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 386-387.

51. *Ibid.*, 387. Interesting!!; Ashida also added, "after having consulted Prime Minister Katayama," who was also the leader of the Socialists, in his discus-

sion with Whitney, and records having said so in his diary, although he did not directly state that at his meeting with Atcheson. His *diary*, however, does not in fact reveal where, when, or even if such consultations with the Socialist leader took place. Nishi~nura notes that such consultations took place prior to both meetings with Atcheson and Whitney but does not provide details. See Nishi~nura (1971), *op. cit.*, 35. Weinstein writes that after Xshida consulted Katayama, on June 28 he met with both Atcheson and Whitney to submit the First Xshida Memorandum, a factual error in date, but in line with Nishimura's argument. See Weinstein, *op. cit.*, 22. Drifte and Yoshitsu do not mention this.

52. Ashida, *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 387.

53. *Ibid.*, 387-388.

54. *Ibid.*, 388-389. It is curious that Xshida records having said "eight clauses" here because in fact there were nine, as is discussed above. Xshida may have confused it with the memorandum he later gave Australian diplomat Eall on August 11 (see below).

55. *Ibid.* Xshida uses the English word "imposed" here in its katakana alphabet form for foreign loan words.

56. *Ibid.* Yoshida records in his memoirs that the copy of the First Xshida Memorandum (handed to Atcheson) was lost in the plane crash that killed Atcheson later that summer. However, as Ashida's diary and other accounts make clear, Yoshida was incorrect. See Yoshida, *Kaiso Junen*, Vol. 3, 112. The English version of his memoirs do not seem to include this episode.

57. Again, here, Xshida uses the English word "impose" in his diary entry.

58. See Yoshitsu, *op. cit.*, 12 (his footnote number 12, page 101, should read "*Ibid.*, pp. 78-79"; Nishi~nura (1971), *op. cit.*, 36-37; Nishi~nura (1975), *op. cit.*, 79. A close reading of Nishimura's work sheds light on this discrepancy. Nishimura clearly writes in his 1975 article that "After looking [at the document] one would understand that the first clause (Peace-making Procedure) was dropped from the memorandum secretly given to and returned by the U.S. side. It was necessary to have this clause explained to the United States as the country inviting the other nations to a peace conference, but for Australia, it was decided that it was not necessary [for the clause to be included]."

59. Ashida, *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 392.

60. Nishimura (1975), *op. cit.*, 79.

61. Ashida, *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 392.

62. It is both interesting and important to note that the Okazaki memorandum prepared on July 7 distinguishes between those inhabitants living in the northern Nansei Islands, particularly the Xmami Islands, which the memorandum labels "Japanese" and those of the southern Nansei Islands, including Okinawa, which the memorandum calls "a type of Japanese race."

63. "The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State (July 23, 1947)," FRUS, 1947, Vol. VI, 473-474.

64. "The Secretary of State to the Soviet Charge (Tsarapkin), (August 13, 1947)," *Ibid.*, 488-489.

65. Cited in Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 38.

66. *Ibid.*, 37; also Nishimura (1975), *op. cit.*, 79.
67. Ashida, *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 399.
68. *Ibid.* Also Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 37; Nishiinura (1975), *op. cit.*, 79.
69. Eichelberger diary entry for June 27, 1947, The Papers of Robert L. Eichelberger (Hereafter, Eichelberger Papers), Box 1 (Diaries), Special Collections Lihrral; Duke University.
70. "Developments Toward Formulation of United States Policy With Respect to a Japanese Peace Settlement (September 11, 1947)," Folder 5 "B," Box 88, Record Group 5, MacArthur Memorial Archives, Norfolk, Virginia. The memo also contained the following concerning troop withdrawal:

Japan is not likely to present a threat to the security of the United States at any time in the foreseeable future. United States security measures in the Far East are, therefore, designed primarily to safeguard, within the means available, against Russian armed aggression in the Orient. With respect to Japan, present estimates of Soviet capabilities recognize Russia's lack of adequate naval forces to carry out an amphibious attack on the Japanese Islands, hut admit the ability of the Soviet Union to launch a large-scale air invasion of Japan. Inasmuch as current United States air and land forces in Japan are considered adequate to disrupt the continued support of such an invasion after the initial surprise assaults, Soviet success would be extremely limited...Nevertheless, United States occupation forces in Japan constitute a heavy drain upon the United States military budget and manpower authorizations. Their redeployment from Japan will greatly facilitate the carrying out of the armed forces peacetime missions within the prescribed limitations on budget and manpower and is therefore desirable. However, if redeployment will mean that Japan is left completely without troops capable of opposing invasion even temporarily, withdrawal of U.S. troops should he delayed pending organization and training of Japanese forces.

71. Of particular interest see for example JCS series 570 found in RG 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, NA. See Chapter Two as well for a discussion on JCS 570.

72. Ashida, *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 399.

73. For a recent study on the Foreign Ministrys security planning, see Ayako Kusunoki, Senryoka Nihon no Anzen Hoshō Koso: Gaimusho ni Okeru Yoshida Dokutorin no Keisei Katei (Japanese Security Conceptions During the Occupation: The Foreign Ministry and the Formation of the Yoshida Doctrine), 1945-1949, *Rokkodai Ronshu* (The Law and Politics Review of the Graduate School of Law, Kobe University), Vol. 45, No. 3 (March 1999), 1-55.

74. The memorandum of conversation shows that Suzuki explained four of the nine points of the memorandum, but it is unclear whether the territorial question and the Japan's desire for the return of Okinawa was mentioned or not. Nevertheless, Suzuki took the opportunity to express his misgivings about the Yalta arrangement and said that President Roosevelt had given away too much to the

Soviet Union, particularly concerning Southern Sakhalin, the Southern Kuriles, fishing rights, as well as in Korea and Manchuria, problems that would be hard to win at a peace conference.

75. *Ibid.*, 401-402. According to Eichelberger's diary entry for this day, Suzuki (with and his wife and Mrs. Xshida, wife of the Foreign Minister), visited him again for tea at 4:00 p.m., likely as a courtesy call to wish him a safe trip back to the U.S. Eichelberger recorded the following about his morning meeting with Suzuki:

Mr. Suzuki had called earlier in the day and we had a little discussion. He said that one of the various worries that the Japanese have is the question of who will defend Japan when the American troops are withdrawn. I said that the constitution renounced war but that it was certainly done on the basis that there would be a United Nations or a general agreement in defense of Japan. They wondered whether a small constabulary or other force will (sic) be permitted. He gave me a copy of a memorandum which Ashita (sic) had previously given to SCAP through General Whitney. It had been returned with no definite word. In this connection it must be remembered that at the last conference between General MacArthur and the Emperor that Hirohito raised this same question. The interpreter had indicated that General MacArthur said that the United States would defend Japan and this was denied by General MacArthur.

Diary entry for September 10, 1947, Eichelberger Papers.

76. Nishimura recalled that Ashida consulted with Katayama before having Suzuki present the memorandum. See Nishimura Kumao, "Kowa Joyaku (The Peace Treaty)," in Asahi Shimbun, ed., *Kataritsugu Showashi: Gekido no Hanseki* (Oral History of the Showa Period: Half-Century of Rapid Change), Vol. 6 (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1977), 222.

77. Diary entry for September 11, 1947, Eichelberger Papers.

78. Ashida, *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 402. The memorandum handed to Eichelberger lacks a title, as did the July 26 memo, but has come to be known as the "Xshida Memo" in both Japanese and English scholarship. However, this memorandum could better be called the "Suzuki Memo" or as Drifte notes, the "Second Xshida Memorandum." See Drifte, *op. cit.*, 74. X copy of the original English version of the memorandum along with the Japanese language version can be found in "Suzuki Yokohama Shusen Renraku Jimukyokucho no Xikerubaagaa Dai Hachi Gun Shireikan to no Sesshoku (Central Liaison Office, Yokohama Branch Chief Suzuki's Contacts with Commander of the Eighth Army Eichelberger)," Microfilm Reel Number B¹-0008, Flash Number 3, Heiwa Joyaku Kankei Juyo Kaidan Kiroku (Files of Important Meetings Relating to the Peace Treaty), Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei Junbi Kenkyu Kankei Dai San Kan (Files Relating to the Preparatory Research on the Peace Treaty [Roll Three]), DRO-MOFA, 0070-0085. Also for a copy of the Japanese version, see Xshida, *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 403-404, which is simply called "Xikerubaagaa Ate Shuko Bunsho (The Document Handed to Eichelberger) (9/13/47)," here.

79. Nishimura (1975), *op. cit.*, 80.

80. See Weinstein, *op. cit.*, 25, fn. 32.

81. Ashida, *op. cit.*, Vol. 7, 402.

82. *Ibid.*, 402-403.

83. See Eichelberger handwritten diary entries for September 16 to December 19, 1947 found in a bound volume in the Eichelberger Papers.

84. Weinstein, based on an interview with Suzuki, states "Me Suzuki met General Eichelberger soon after his home leave, and he asked him about the reaction in Washington to Foreign Minister Ashida's memorandum. The General's reply indicated to Me Suzuki that for the time being the United States was not ready to conclude separate peace treaties with its recent enemies, Germany and Japan." See Weinstein, *op. cit.*, 25. When that meeting took place is not clear from Eichelberger's diaries, although after his return from the U.S. on December 19, he did meet with Suzuki on December 22, December 30, as well as at Suzuki's home on December 29 for a social function. See Eichelberger's Diary entries for these dates in the Eichelberger Papers.

85. "Tokyo's Secret Plans for Peace," *World Report*, Vol. 3, No. 24 (December 9, 1947), 18-19; 33-36.

86. "Airgram A-130, Chief of the Diplomatic Section, GHQ, SCXP Sebald to the Secretary of State (December 9, 1947)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/12-947, RG 59. Sebald had replaced George Atcheson after the latter's death in a plane crash off Hawaii on August 17, 1947 on his way to Washington to assist in preparations for the scheduled preparatory peace conference on Japan. See "Untimely Death of George Atcheson, Jr.: Statement by Acting Secretary (Robert X.) Lovett," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 17, No. 426 (August 31, 1947), 437. According to Richard B. Finn, who worked in the Political Adviser's Office from September 1947, when the State Department suggested a replacement for Atcheson, MacArthur turned it down saying that the services of Sebald, Atcheson's assistant, were fine. Author's interviews with Finn, August 29, 1997 and November 26, 1997.

87. *Ibid.* Also see "Secretary of State to the Acting Political Adviser for Japan, (January 13, 1948)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949, RG 59.

88. "Airgram A-130"

89. As a result of the embarrassment caused by the scoop, Okazaki was forced to resign, as mentioned earlier, on January 31, 1948, to be replaced by Yoshizawa Seijiro, who was particularly close to Ashida, as Xshida's son was married to Yoshizawa's daughter. Yoshizawa continued as Vice Minister until October 1948 when the Xshida government collapsed as Yoshizawa was replaced by Okazaki. See "Memorandum of Conversation on Current Foreign Office Problems (February 7, 1948)," 1948-711.6-800 Folder, Box 33, Post Files (Tokyo), RG 84.

90. Sebald's memo is dated (Saturday) September 20, but does not directly say whether or not the meeting took place that day. However, Terasaki noted in his September 4 entry that he and Sebald had agreed that their meetings would take place on Fridays. Likewise, Terasaki's own diary records Friday September 19 as the date of the meeting. Because the memorandum, as the only official documentary evidence of their meeting, is dated September 20, this has generally been mis-

takenly believed by Japanese researchers to have been the date of the meeting. See "Despatch No. 1293." The author suggests based on Terasaki's diary (the September 4 and September 19 entries) as well as the lack of a record of date and time on the official (Sebald) document of that meeting that September 19 was the more likely date of the meeting. Sebald it seems after his arrival established early on in Japan the habit of working on the weekends, including Sundays, because it was "an excellent time to work as the office is then free of the constant interruption which plagues me during the week." See Diary entry for January 27, 1946, Personal Diary of William J. Sebald (hereafter Sebald Diaries), Eox 48, William J. Sebald Papers, Special Collections and Archives Division, Nimitz Library; U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.

91. Their story is dramatically told in Gwen Terasaki, *Bridge to the Sun* (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1973); Mariko Terasaki Miller, "'Isan'no Omomi (The Weight of a Legacy)" in Terasaki and Miller, eds., *op. cit.*, 379-421. Also see Yanagida Kunio, *Mariko* (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1980), 1-66.

92. Gwen Terasaki, *op. cit.*, 105; Terasaki and Miller, eds., *op. cit.*, 399.

93. Terasaki and Miller, eds., *op. cit.*, 173; Gwen Terasaki, *op. cit.*, 205-207. Here Gwen wrote that Yoshida was Premier at the time, but in actuality, he was Foreign Minister. He was not to first become Prime Minister until some three months later, on May 22, 1946

94. Gwen Terasaki, *op. cit.*, 206. Also see Terasaki and Miller, eds., *op. cit.*, 195-196. Terasaki's daughter, Mariko, mistakenly wrote the date of his appointment as February 1947. See Terasaki and Miller, eds., *op. cit.*, 400.

95. For a chart on the dates of the MacArthur-Emperor meetings, the contents (whereknown), and list of interpreters, see Matsuo Takayoshi, *Kokusai Kokka e no Shuppatsu, Nihon no Rekishi* (Toward an International State: Japanese History Series), Vol. 21 (Tokyo: Shueisha, 1993), 109.

96. As Terasaki's diary reveals, he also met with Drs. Borton and Bacon from the State Department on at least three occasions (March 28, March 31, and April 4, 1947) during their trip to study problems of the peace treaty. See Terasaki and Miller, eds., *op. cit.*, 307-309.

97. Gwen Terasaki, *op. cit.*, 227.

98. William J. Sebald with Russell Brines, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation* (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1965), 50. 99 *Ibid.*, 96.

100. Terasaki and Miller, eds., *op. cit.*, 326.

101. *Ibid.*, 330.

102. *Ibid.*, 326-331.

103. Terasaki's diary entry from that day reads: "Met with the Emperor. Okinawa Island. A Day of Hard Work and Great Success....[Scheduled] To meet with Ashida but no time today...Met with Sebald. Talked about Okinawa. [Said he] Should discuss it today with the General [MacArthur]. Other opinions discussed. Should not be put in a Peace Treaty but done in a Bilateral Treaty." See Terasaki and Miller, eds., *op. cit.*, 332.

104. "Memorandum for General MacArthur, Enclosure to Despatch No. 1293."

105. *Ibid.* The use of the word "fiction" here generates curiosity. It is uncertain whether the word was actually spoken by Terasaki in the conversation, or if Sehald simply used the word when he drafted the memorandum. If indeed it was used by Terasaki, it may have been used in the same context as the word "expedient" as seen in the July Okazaki memorandum, if the assumption that the Emperor and his advisers were aware of the contents of that memorandum is correct. Likewise, in some Japanese translations of the "Tenno Message," for example that of Miyazato Seigen, the word "fiction" sometimes appears as "kyoko" which means in addition to fiction, a lie, fabrication, and falsehood. A better translation of "fiction" in Japanese may be "gisei," which is a legal term for something that is different from the real thing but viewed as the same, i.e. "a (legal)fiction." If Sehald, a lawyer by training, used the word on his own when drafting the memorandum of conversation, he may have had the second meaning in mind.

106. Diary entry for Friday, September 19, 1947, Terasaki and Miller, eds., *op. cit.*

107. Sehald, *op. cit.*; Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (NY: McGraw Books, 1964). The author visited the Special Collections and Archives Division of the Nimitz Library, U.S. Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland to examine Sehald's personal diary and his engagement hooks (Box 44), hoping to discover additional information relating to either his meeting with Terasaki or MacArthur. Although the diary was very detailed, the volume for entries from April 1, 1946 to March 25, 1948 was unfortunately lost prior to the time of donation to the library and thus remains incomplete. According to the Director of the Special Collections Division, the volume thus had not been given to the Nimitz Library; indeed Sehald himself later was not able to locate it as his type written notes suggest in the diary. Considering the number of times he and his wife, Edith, moved, it is likely that this one set of diaries was tragically (to the historian, anyway) lost during one of the relocations. Unfortunately as well, his engagement hook from that time was less detailed and thus offered little insight to this period of his work. One exception however refers to Sehald's having dinner with the newly installed Army Under Secretary, William H. Draper, Jr., who was in Japan for a short visit on September 19, the same day as the Tenno Message. (There is a chance that Sehald may have shared the information with Draper and Major General Paul J. Mueller, MacArthur's Chief of Staff.)

108. "Despatch No. 1293."

109. Sehald, *op. cit.*, 96. Sehald later seemed to feel that the Emperor's advisers were perhaps more overzealous than the Emperor himself. One entry in his diary says, "Call by Me Terasaki who said the Emperor would like to know what I think about the China situation. I have my doubts that the Emperor asked this, so was rather careful in my remarks." Diary entry for April 29, 1949, *Sehald Diaries*.

110. For a discussion on the "Konoe Memorial," see John W. Dower, *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), 255-265. While too long to quote in

its entirety here, the "Konoe Memorial" read, "More than defeat itself, what we must be most concerned about from the standpoint of preserving the *kokutai* [national polity] is the communist revolution which may accompany defeat."

111. See editorial note, Terasaki and Miller, eds. *op. cit.*, 313. Terasaki was ill at this time and was not available to interpret for the two. Also see Hata (1984), *op. cit.*, 189.

112. Ashida, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, 13-14. Importantly, Ashida, while conservative in his political views, also held a somewhat strict interpretation of the postwar political status of the Emperor. In other words, as he recorded in his diary, "With the entrance of the new Constitution [on May 3, limiting the role of the Emperor in Articles 1 and 4 as a 'Symbol of the State'], his Majesty should not give the impression of interfering with domestic or diplomatic affairs. That would not be good for the Imperial family, nor would it be good for Japan as a whole. Therefore I did not want to go and have to brief the Emperor [on foreign affairs]. However because I was asked I decided I had to go." At the end of his session with the Emperor, according to Ashida's diary, the Emperor said to him to "'be sure and come by again and again' to which I answered 'yes' but in my head all I could think about was the new constitution."

113. *Ibid.*, 14.

114. Diary Entry for Friday, October 3, 1947, Terasaki and Miller, eds., *op. cit.*, 336-337. Although Sebald and Terasaki spoke on the telephone on September 26, the two did not meet that day due to Sebald's being out of the office. The two however agreed to meet the following Friday (October 3) at 11:00 a.m. See *Ibid.*, 334.

115. *Ibid.*, 337.

116. See "Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan (August 5, 1947)," in Iokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 1-A-20.

117. "Incoming Classified Message from GHQ/SCAP Tokyo to Joint Chiefs of Staff (for State Department), No. C 55205 (September 1, 1947)," in *Ibid.*, microfiche 1-A-22.

118. *Ibid.*

119. Terasaki and Miller, eds., *op. cit.*, 337. Terasaki reported his meeting with Sebald that afternoon to the Emperor.

120. "Airgram from the Office of Political Adviser for Japan, Tokyo to the Secretary of State, A-37 (February 26, 1948)," Folder: 800 Political Affairs General, 1947, Box 22, Records of the Foreign Office Service Posts of the Department of State. RG84, NA.

121. The reference here to "Japanese self-interest" is perhaps the same "self-interest" used in the September 19, 1947 memorandum by Sebald on the first substantial Terasaki-Sebald meeting. The "self-interest" in the "Tenno Message" has been interpreted in some scholarship to mean, or have meant, the Emperor's own self-interest. Comparing the February memorandum with the September memorandum leads the author to believe that Sebald was referring to Japan's self-interest in the "Tenno Message," and not the Emperor's own personal "self-interest."

122. Terasaki's diary unfortunately stops around this time and his movements, at least in his official liaison capacity, become more difficult to trace. In early 1948 or 1949, it seems, he became ill again with a stroke. (The author unsuccessfully tried to confirm the date of his illness with Terasaki's daughter Mariko since the autobiography of Gwen is contextually mistaken in the timing of his illness. Correspondence and telephone interviews with Mariko Terasaki Miller, September 11 and November 12, 1997. Gwen Terasaki, *op. cit.*, 237-240.) In June 1949, Terasaki took a less demanding position in the Minister's Secretariat, retiring two months later likely due to his weak physical condition. Still, Terasaki did continue to meet with Sebald, although less frequently (July 6, 1948, September 21, 1948, November 1, 1948, November 2, 1948, November 18, 1948, November 30, 1948, February 25, 1949, April 19, 1949, and March 7, 1950, and interpreted for the Emperor and MacArthur another two times (May 6, 1948 and January 10, 1949). Terasaki, eventually, passed away on August 21, 1951, at the young age of fifty, ironically just two weeks before the start of the San Francisco Peace Conference.

Forging a Domestic Policy Consensus for Okinawa: The Formation of NSC 13, 1947-1949

I. INTRODUCTION: PREPARATIONS FOR AN EARLY PEACE TREATY

Around the time that the State Department members were clashing with their counterparts in the military over the question of trusteeships for the Pacific and the status of Okinawa during the SWNCC meetings in the early fall of 1946 (as discussed in Chapter Four) Under Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson was asked to meet with General Charles P. Echols and Colonel D. Dean Rusk of the War Department to discuss his views, as Acting Secretary, on the reparations problem for Japan and a peace treaty with Japan.² Their meeting was attended by several others responsible for Japan policy, many of whom have appeared earlier in this study, including James C. Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Hugh Borton, Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs (within the Office of Far Eastern Affairs), Ernest Gross, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Major General John H. Hilldring, who was formerly chief of the Army's Office of Occupied Areas) and Edwin O. Reischauer of the same office.;

There, Vincent suggested that a "special committee" should be set up to consider the views of the U.S. government before they were submitted to the Far Eastern Commission or any peace treaty preparatory conference. Acheson likewise explained that the same had been done in the case of Germany, when Byrnes had requested that the U.S. government should decide its own views concerning Germany before undertaking discussions with other countries. Acheson argued that it would be better for the United States to "formulate its own views" on a Japanese peace treaty before undertaking any public discussions on it.' An informal committee to consider the problems of a peace treaty for Japan was thus agreed upon and set up shortly thereafter. The composition of the committee was left for Hilldring to decide.' This committee, nicknamed by contemporaries and

scholars later as "the Borton Group" eventually comprised the following members: James I. Penfield, Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, as Chair of the committee; Borton; Edwin M. Martin, Japan-Korea Economic Affairs, Warren S. Hunsberger, Division of Research for Far Eastern Affairs; John I. Emmerson, special assistant to Borton; and Dr. Ruth E. Bacon, special assistant to Vincent.

The committee, working separately as directed by Secretary Byrnes, immediately set out to draft the contents of a peace settlement with Japan. By October 25 (1946) the committee had the outline of a "Peace Treaty with Japan" ready comprising a preamble, eleven clauses, and several annexes.⁶ Being a simple outline however, the contents and positions were not formalized in any great detail. Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands as a whole were not referred to directly in the first section on territory, "Designation of territorial limits of Japanese sovereignty," which was, according to the outline, to include a list of the islands and groups of islands to remain under Japanese sovereignty as well as a reference map showing the boundaries of Japan. Conversely, Okinawa was not referred to in the other section on Japan's territory, "Disposition of the remainder of the former Japanese Empire," which was made up of eight parts listing islands and other territories. One may conclude therefore, first by comparing the first section with the second section, that Okinawa, although not referred to directly, was included within the territorial limits of Japan. This view of course was in agreement with earlier positions of the State Department, as discussed above in this study.

Throughout the fall and winter of 1946-1947, the Borton Group continued its study of the Japanese peace treaty.⁷ At their January 17, 1947 meeting, the working group formally decided the division of work relating to the peace treaty.⁸ Of these responsibilities, the task of drawing up the territorial clauses (Chapter I of the outlined peace treaty) was given to Borton and his assistant, Emmerson, appropriately because the former had, as we saw earlier, been so involved in the territorial debate since 1942.⁹

Early on, the committee realized that the disposition of the Ryukyu Islands remained "the one controversial issue of a territorial nature yet to be determined."¹⁰ As explained in Chapter Four, a decision on American policy for the Ryukyus was temporarily shelved in the fall of 1946 after President Truman announced that the United States would seek to place the former Japanese Mandated Islands under a United Nations Strategic Trust Area with it as the sole administering authority in order to allow time for the State Department and the military to coordinate its views on the disposition of the Ryukyus. Likewise, as previously looked at, the JCS had argued that Okinawa and some adjacent small islands should be retained as a strategic trust area under sole U.S. administration and that the remainder of the islands between Okinawa and Formosa) could be placed in an ordinary trusteeship under U.S. administration. Meanwhile, the State

Department in SWNCC 5911 (June 24, 1946) had stated, although the paper was not approved in that form, that "The Ryukyu Islands should be regarded as minor islands to be retained by Japan and demilitarized." This position was taken from a "purely political view," as a later memorandum stated, "the point of view which it is the State Department's function to advance." The State Department continued to develop these ideas during the fall of 1946 and into the following year.

II. THE TWO FEAREY PAPERS ON THE "DISPOSITION OF THE RYUKYUS"

The First Fearey Paper, September 1946 to March 1947

As early as November 2, 1946, a few days before President Truman decided to put the Pacific islands (minus the Ryukyu and Ogasawara/Kazan islands) up for strategic trusteeship, Robert A. Fearey, a country-specialist appointed to the Division of Japanese Affairs in September 1946, had prepared for the treaty working group a highly regarded memorandum entitled "Disposition of the Ryukyus," which argued along the same lines that the State Department had been developing since 1943, as seen in [Figure 3-2](#) of Chapter Three." Fearey's memorandum was later forwarded by Penfield, as Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, first to his boss Vincent and then to Gross in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas on March 18 (1947).

Fearey explained that the memorandum had been prepared for the following three reasons: 1) to marshal support for the arguments of the State Department; 2) to evaluate the position of the military, primarily that of the JCS; 3) to suggest terms of compromise were compromise between the State Department and the JCS to become necessary. The memorandum was likewise comprised of three parts: 1) arguments for retention of the entire archipelago by Japan; 2) evaluation of arguments for retention by the U.S.; and 3) compromise solutions. Fearey summarized the arguments of the State Department for the retention of the Okinawa by Japan as follows: 1) Okinawa's historic ties to Japan; 2) U.S. policy of opposing territorial expansion; 3) Fear of provocation—bases in Okinawa would be seen as threat to Soviet Union; 4) Financial and administrative problems; 5) Japanese control of the Ryukyus would present no significant military threat—from Japan. These views, as we saw in Chapter Four, had formed the basis of the State Department's position in SWNCC 5911. Fearey emphasized thus that the political disadvantages of controlling the Ryukyus were "clear and important." Yet Fearey also noted that "whether these disadvantages should nevertheless be incurred depends...on how necessary the islands are to an effective security plan for the United States,"

and suggested that "a strong case [presented by the military] that our security would be jeopardized by our failure to possess [the Ryukyu Islands] would constitute grounds for retention *even in the face of the strongest political disadvantages.*" (Italics by author.) This latter phrase can be said to suggest the desire of the State Department to avoid such a situation if possible.

The memorandum then turned to noting the arguments of the JCS (as seen in its September 10, 1946 memorandum to the President) for retention of the Ryukyu Islands by the United States in the following way: 1) Okinawa in hands of another power (particularly the Soviet Union) would endanger U.S. lines of communication and "overall position in the Pacific;" 2) Okinawa would be an important base to exert a "stabilizing influence in the Pacific" and if necessary, to "interpose our force to Russia's on the Asiatic continent." In both of these arguments, Fearey did not seem convinced. While he writes that "the first argument seems far more telling than the second" and admits that "in Soviet hands Okinawa would indeed be a threat," Fearey challenges this hypothesis by arguing that the United States (and probably China) would resist Soviet attempts to control the islands, including using military means. Therefore, Fearey suggests, "the risk that the Soviets might make such an attempt if the Ryukyus were left with Japan would seem no greater, however, nor our and China's determination to prevent it any less, than in the case of the four main Japanese islands." He goes on to argue that "if effective machinery and full determination to maintain a sovereign but demilitarized Japan...the Ryukyus will be effectively protected from Soviet aggression." Fearey addressed the second argument more strongly. Stating that the argument was "not entirely convincing," Fearey wrote that any war in the Far East would be started first by the Soviet Union, with it firing "the first shot (rocket barrage)," in which "a confined target like Okinawa" would "probably [be] neutralize[d]" if the Soviet Union's air and rocket power had not been destroyed first. Thus, the memorandum continues, "America's advantage...would appear to lie in the greater mobility and wide striking power provided by our Navy, not in the possession of a fixed and vulnerable offshore base." In other words, Fearey was suggesting that the JCS' strategic rationale for Okinawa was militarily unsound.

After Fearey countered the two arguments of the JCS, he introduced three more arguments that potentially could be used, if such a situation arose, in favor of the retention of the Ryukyu Islands by the military. The first one, which Fearey described as "harder to refute," had to do with the fact that following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the occupations of Japan and Korea, with Soviet forces in the Kuriles, Vladivostok, Sakhalin, and Port Arthur, and China located nearby, "the Japanese looking out from their shores will perceive a very different situation...American strength at isolated island bases in the Aleutians, Hawaii, the Bonins, the Mandates,

and the Philippines, in most cases thousands of miles away, may seem remote and unimpressive." Because it was imperative that Japan not be dominated by any one power, the memorandum continued, "a substantial American land area near Japan, such as Okinawa, would seem an almost indispensable counterweight to Soviet power on the Japanese horizon." Fearey thus argued that

An American claim to Okinawa advanced on the basis that only through possession of a sizeable land area near Japan can the United States discharge its share of responsibility for the maintenance of a stable power relationship in the neighborhood of a demilitarized Japan would be much easier to justify and less likely to incur the enmity of other powers than one based on the transparent plea of the necessity for ensuring against a renewal of Japanese aggression.

The next possible argument in favor of retention that Fearey's memorandum suggests is the military's view that Japan did not really want or need the Ryukyu Islands, or felt that Okinawa was a part of Japan—a view that we have seen was in marked contrast with that of the State Department to date. The memorandum suggests that because the "Japanese have never derived anything of value from the islands except a small proportion of their sugar requirements...the islands' loss would be a matter of little consequence to them." It goes on to suggest that the Okinawans themselves during their 18 months under U.S. occupation "would be at least as happy under American rule as under the Japanese, who never overextended themselves in their behalf." Accordingly, retention by the United States, this argument went, would not be challenged by Japan—obviously not the view of the State Department.

The final possible argument that Fearey suggests for the retention of the islands concerns the domestic public opinion "popular with Congressmen, that America acquired a moral right to Okinawa because American troops died to conquer it." He quickly dismisses this emotional argument however as "scarcely valid...On this basis, the United States and various of our Allies would be entitled to numerous territories throughout the world occupied during the campaigns against the Axis powers."

The memorandum as a whole, in any case, recognized that the JCS' arguments "while subject to certain weaknesses, [bear] evidence of a genuine military concern, and clearly should be accorded the most careful consideration." Fearey thus recommended that the State Department should be prepared to consider and submit compromise solutions. Considering that the two departments took almost completely opposite views regarding Okinawa (State believing that the Ryukyus should be left under Japanese sovereignty and the JCS arguing that at a minimum, a strategic trusteeship should be put over Okinawa), Fearey offered the following two compro-

mises, the first one, he noted, being more favorable to the State Department than the second.

Fearey's first compromise suggestion was for an ordinary trusteeship to be established over all of the Central and Southern Ryukyus with the United Nations as administering authority (with the Northern Ryukyus being retained by Japan). He cited that from a political point of view, it was nearly as satisfactory as retention by Japan, and thus would not be exposed to international and domestic criticism. In addition, by being under international control, it would also address the JCS' fear of Okinawa falling into Soviet hands. Moreover, it had the advantage that the islands could be made available for base development under the United Nations' Military Staff Committee. The only disadvantage of this suggestion, Fearey notes, is that it would be more cumbersome than simply allowing Japan to retain sovereignty over the islands. Fearey thus argued that if the JCS were to be made more aware of the "serious political disadvantages of full U.S. control," then the JCS would likely accept this arrangement.

The second option, which in Fearey's words at the time amounted to "virtually complete surrender to military point of view," would envision the above formula but with the "Required Military Areas on Okinawa Designated Strategic Under U.S. Administration." Fearey pointed out the plus side of this solution, from State's point of view, would be that the areas designated as strategic under U.S. control would be limited to the smallest possible areas with the bulk of the area and population being subject to the requirements of the Trusteeship Council. This formula would thus "render our demand for the Okinawa base slightly more acceptable in world eyes." But it clearly was not an option that Fearey wanted, nor did he believe it was what State desired.

The last part of the eight-page memorandum concerned the timing and manner of an announcement on the disposition of the Ryukyu Islands. Fearey recommended that the final disposition of the islands could only be carried out through a peace treaty. However, symbolic of the political volatility that territorial matters represent, the memo continued, if the United States were to decide that a base in Okinawa was necessary, it should announce that intention at the earliest possible time so as not to effect the peace discussions. If the United States, on the other hand, were to decide not to retain the islands, Fearey suggests, the decision "should be kept secret as a bargaining point in the peace negotiations." In a sense, that is what would happen five years later.

The Second Fearey Paper, March to April 1947

Fearey's memorandum, as noted above, drew praise within the State Department as a "sound appraisal of the problem of the Ryukyus." After its receipt Assistant Secretary Hilldring suggested in a memorandum to Penfield that the State Department consider a definite position on the

Ryukyus for submission to SWNCC.¹⁴ As directed next by Penfield, Fearey immediately began this new look at the "Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands." Completed and submitted to Vincent, Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, on April 7, the study introduced three new angles into the debate in order to better probe the problems relating to the disposition of the islands: an economic analysis, a discussion of the undesirability of a joint U.S.-China trusteeship for Okinawa, and a recommendation for the leasing of bases in Okinawa (as opposed to a trusteeship.).¹⁵

Fearey was a political-economic analyst and followed Japan's economy closely.¹⁶ In this report, he notes that Japan was the principal market for Ryukyuan products such as sugar, dried fish, *sake*, and other items. Although trade ties would not necessarily have to be severed, his report explains, the establishment of a trust area under an American or joint U.S.-Chinese control "would necessitate the detachment of the Ryukyus from the Japanese financial and currency systems, and alignment with the American or Chinese systems." Fearey then warns that as a result "the possibility, if not probability, exists that pre-war standards of living could not be regained and maintained without some subsidization and assistance by the administering power or powers." The memorandum then explains that the degree of financial burden would depend upon how ambitious of a program the administering power (the United States) were to undertake. "If we launched," Fearey states,

a comprehensive program of political, social and economic betterment in accordance with the letter and spirit of Chapters XI and XII of the [U.N.] Charter, continuing substantial expenditures would be required, considering the islands' numerous (574,000), backward and poverty-stricken population, favored by only the meagrest physical resources. On the other hand, if we were content merely to assist the Ryukyans to reestablish and maintain their pre-war mode of living the expense would be minor. Considered on the basis of our record in Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and the Philippines, where, at least in the Philippines, our administration has been progressive but within definite limits of expense and effort, the likelihood is that the United States could administer the Ryukyus without undue expense, and that coast need not be considered an important deterrent to our assuming a trusteeship over the islands.

While economically feasible, however, Fearey explained that the practical possibilities of a joint U.S.-China trusteeship were limited and not desirable and thus would not "warrant the added difficulties this arrangement would entail."

In addition to the administrative problems of a joint trusteeship, Fearey argued against it for reasons of world opinion, restating that State continue to hold to its view that the Ryukyu Islands should be demilitarized and

returned to Japan. In a section critical of America's handling of the trusteeship for the Mandates early that same month, Fearey writes:

It would further appear that the United States should seriously reflect before again misusing and subverting the trusteeship system of the United Nations by employing it to impart the moral air to what is in effect annexation of desired territory. The world was not deceived by our Mandates action, which did our own reputation and the cause of the United Nations no little harm, and it would not be deceived by similar tactics in regard to the Ryukyus. The extra sugar coating contained in the proposal for an ordinary instead of a strategic trusteeship confers in practice precisely the same military rights and privileges on the administering power as a strategic trusteeship (it can build as many and as large bases as it wants and is under no obligation to admit them to inspection), and the participation of China is a transparent device to pacify world opinion and assuage our own consciences. These considerations are advanced not as arguments for outright annexation rather than trusteeship but as arguments against assuming control of the islands.

Fearey importantly addresses the question of the military's security requirements vis-a-vis the Ryukyus by suggesting that if agreement between the State Department and the military can not be obtained over the question of annexation-trusteeship-retention by Japan, the State Department should support the military in seeking a lease of a military base area in Okinawa. Fearey explains that the base would be similar to bases in the Philippines, or to the base in Guantanamo, Cuba, except that it would be primarily an air instead of naval base. Moreover, Fearey's memorandum continues,

The base would occupy a limited area on Okinawa and American rights outside that area would be carefully defined and circumscribed. It is believed this arrangement would serve our purposes fully as well as a trusteeship over the whole central and lower portion of the chain, would be far less burdensome, would be no more objectionable in Soviet or world eyes, and would avoid the necessity of detaching the islands from Japan with which they are naturally associated.

This suggestion by Fearey may have come about after informal consultations with military representatives, some of whom were thinking along these lines at the time. For example, Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, a respected judge and administrator, recorded in a memorandum to Army Chief of Staff Dwight D. Eisenhower that he had "grave misgivings as to the wisdom of planning to retain Okinawa as a permanent base" and felt that Okinawa "is likely to prove one of the most expensive bases we have ever had."

Eisenhower responded in a March 15 memorandum that while he did not agree with Secretary Patterson's discounting of the strategic importance

of Okinawa, he did sympathize with Patterson's "estimate of the great cost to which the U.S. would be put, economically, politically and socially, by an assumption of permanent administration over the affairs of some three quarters of a million Orientals whose economy has, at best, been one of deficit."¹⁹ Eisenhower went on to suggest therefore that "what we need is the use of naval and air installations which would probably be located, for the most part, only in the southern third of Okinawa. These installations would represent as (sic) an asset. Any other U.S. commitments in the Ryukyus would constitute a liability. I believe it should be possible to work out arrangements to keep the asset and lose the liability...We might leave the Ryukyus under Japanese administration while retaining necessary U.S. base rights in Okinawa, during a period of 25 years after consummation of the peace treaty with Japan."

Patterson in turn responded to Eisenhower's memorandum noted that "it is of great importance that the possibility of getting the asset without the liability be weighed in a realistic way, rather than a theoretical point of view."²⁰ Patterson, who left office later that year in July (after declining for personal reasons President Truman's appointment of him as Secretary of Defense of the newly-created National Military Establishment), continued in his memorandum to the Chief of Staff that he

had the feeling, though it may be without warrant, that the people who have done the planning for the retention of bases in the Pacific have carried on their planning in isolation from the practical limitations as to the number of bases we can maintain. The program a year ago for bases in the Pacific was a most ambitious one. If any account was taken of the fact that the Army and the Air Forces would have nothing like enough resources in the way of men and money to maintain all these bases, the fact was not evident. None of the studies that I saw gave adequate consideration to these practical considerations.

In what seems to be a conclusion to this exchange, General Thomas T. Handy, in his capacity as Acting Chief of Staff, wrote to Patterson on April 2 (echoing the Truman Doctrine of three weeks before) that he felt it would be of "considerable benefit...to the continued presence of the American flag on Okinawa after the U.S. has withdrawn from China, Korea, and Japan. Among those peoples of the Far East who look to the United States as the only real source of moral and material aid against aggression, a U.S. base in Okinawa might well represent a substantial assurance that U.S. interest in their well-being was real and continuing."²¹ General Handy thus advised that it would be "strategically advisable that we remain in the Ryukyus for an extended period" and that the Ryukyus be left in their current status in the military's planning until the time comes when it would be necessary to take final action on their territorial status.

Despite the entertaining of similar ideas regarding leased bases in the Ryukyus within the Army as shown by the above memorandum from Eisenhower, it is unclear and unknown how much Fearey's memorandum was circulated within the State Department and among the interested agencies of the government. Fearey's suggestion for a base agreement was a bold one in any case—one not appearing before in any of the records of the State Department's discussions on the disposition of the Ryukyus to date. It seems however that in regards to implementation, this recommendation was 25 years ahead of its time.

III. THE BORTON TRIP TO JAPAN: TOWARD PEACE TREATY

Around the time that the first memorandum by Fearey was sent to Hilldring's office, two members of the committee, Borton and Bacon, were in Japan to meet with MacArthur and other SCAP officials, as well as leading Japanese (including Terasaki, as mentioned in the previous chapter), to hear out views on the Japanese peace treaty. Political Adviser to SCAP George Atcheson, who was in Washington for one month of consultations, accompanied Borton and Bacon to Tokyo in early March.²²

On March 17, 1947 General MacArthur announced at a luncheon given in his honor that the time had come for a conference to be held on Japan's peace treaty and called for placing Japan's security under the guarantee of the new (and yet untested) United Nations Organization.²³ The sudden announcement surprised Borton (and Washington). Making policy in Tokyo (and not having it decided in Washington) was something that MacArthur was used to. After their arrival in Japan on March 8 (1947), according to Borton's memoirs, Atcheson sent MacArthur a copy of the early draft treaty that the committee had been working on.²⁴ While that does not seem to be correct, MacArthur did in fact receive copies of the Chapter (I) on territorial clauses on March 20, forwarded by Atcheson via Borton and Bacon. This draft of March 19 considered the territorial limits of Japan (in relation to Okinawa) to be as follows:

Article 1. The territorial limits of Japan shall be those existing on January 1, 1894...As such these limits shall include the four principle islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shilzolzu and Holzlaido and all minor offshore islands excluding the Kurile Islands, but including the Ryukyu Islands forming part of Kagoshima Prefecture...

Article 7. Japan hereby renounces all rights and titles to the Ryukyu Islands forming part of Okinawa Prefecture, and to Daito and Rasa Islands."

In forwarding this copy of the draft treaty to MacArthur, Atcheson included the following comment, "With reference to Chapter I, Territorial Clauses, Article A, 1, I understand that discussion is still continuing between JCS and SWNCC in regard to the future of Okinawa and the most

southern part of the Kuriles.”²⁶ In reality however, no progress in the discussions was being made.

The suggestion here by the Treaty Working Group in the draft peace treaty for Japan to retain the northern part of the Ryukyu Islands but to renounce the central and southern parts is curious and, as earlier chapters have shown, went against the policy of the State Department since about 1942 or 1943. Indeed, it is doubly curious because it also went against Borton's own views on the subject, despite his having been directly involved with the subject matter of territorial disposition.

In any case, this deviation, for lack of a better word or explanation, in State's policy was "corrected" as the Borton group continued its work on the peace treaty. On August 5, the group produced a draft treaty which included the Ryukyu Islands within the territorial limits of Japan." Not only would this draft treaty force the U.S. government to reexamine the still undetermined status of Okinawa, but it would also have a profound effect on the American government and its policies toward Japan.

The draft treaty as submitted by Borton's group stated in Article 1, Territorial Clauses, that "The territorial limits of Japan shall comprise the four principal Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido and all minor islands, including...the Ryukyu Islands." Borton, in forwarding the draft treaty to Counselor of the State Department Charles E. "Chip" Bohlen, acknowledged however that "the Territorial Clauses (Chapter 1) are based on what is believed to be firm United States policy with the exception of the provision concerning the Ryukyu Islands which is under discussion in the government."²⁸ Indeed, unlike the position taken by the State Department in its draft, the position of the military, as seen next, was that the Ryukyu Islands were absolutely vital. As a result, the JCS came out quite critical of the draft.

IV. MILITARY CRITICISM OF THE DRAFT PEACE TREATY

Borton and Penfield, then-Acting Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Vincent had left for a posting in Switzerland on July 24), sent the draft treaty informally to the JCS, Army, Navy, and GHQ on or about August 11 for their review and comments. The informal transmittal of the document was likely done in the interest of time since a peace conference for Japan was still being considered (now for early September). In any event, the State Department received all of the responses, albeit informal ones, by September 1. In each, the question of the Ryukyu Islands in relation to the territorial limits of Japan was highlighted, with recommendations like the one from the Army of August 21 that the "conflict be resolved."²⁹

Rear Admiral E. T. Woolridge, the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs, was the first to respond with the views of the Navy Department.³⁰ Woolridge noted that the JCS had already indicated in

their October 19, 1946 memorandum to President Truman that there was a need for the retention of the Ryukyus south of latitude 29°North (as well as the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan and Marcus Island) under a U.N. strategic trusteeship administered by the United States. "Therefore," he commented, "the territorial limits of Japan as specified [in State's draft] do not coincide with the viewpoints of the JCS as indicated above."

MacArthur's comments on the draft treaty, temporarily delayed due to the death of George Atcheson on August 17, who was on his way back to Washington to assist in the peace treaty preparatory conference, were less restrained. He writes, "The draft provides for the retention of the Ryukyu Islands by Japan. Control over this group [of islands] must be vested in the United States as absolutely essential to the defense of our Western Pacific frontier. [This group of islands is] not indigenous to Japan ethnologically, does not contribute to Japan's economic welfare, nor do the Japanese people expect to be permitted to retain it. It is basically strategic, and in my opinion failure to secure it for control by the United States might prove militarily disastrous."³¹ These views of MacArthur regarding Okinawa were not new or unexpected.

Within the JSC, specifically the JSSC, reactions to the Borton draft were similar. The JSSC was unhappy with the provision to return the Ryukyus, stating in the conclusions to its memorandum to the Secretaries of War and Navy entitled "Review of United States Control Needed Over the Japanese Islands" (JCS 1619/24) that "although the draft treaty is tentative, its proposed disposal of the Ryukyus would, if confirmed, deny the control recommended by the [JCS] for that area."³² The JCS sought to challenge what it felt was State's limited understanding of Okinawa's strategic importance. In an enclosure to the above memorandum, the JSSC argued that while "there [wa]s no question as to the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the vital importance of the Ryukyus to our national security...there continues to be a contrary belief in other quarters." The JSSC outlined what it called "the reasoning associated with this belief" and commented on each of these statements.

The first line of reasoning that the JSSC identified State as holding was that "since the Potsdam Declaration stated that 'Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine,' the Ryukyus may appropriately be regarded as '*minor islands*' to be retained by Japan." The JSSC responded to this by arguing that the "classification as minor begs the entire question. While such a view may be applicable to the northern Ryukyus, which are of negligible military importance and which are adjacent to Japan and have always been administered as a part of [Japan]...the southern Ryukyus cannot correctly, from the military viewpoint, be considered 'minor' in view of the extreme potential strategic importance, both defensively and offensively, of Okinawa."

The second line of reasoning that the JSSC identified being held by State concerned the priority given by the JCS to the Ryukyus vis-à-vis the Japanese Mandates. In other words, because the JCS demanded sovereignty over the Mandates and trusteeship for the Nansei and Nanpo Islands, "there seems to be an inference that the Ryukyus are regarded as relatively unimportant from the military viewpoint," the JSSC memorandum noted, responding, "the distinction arises only in deference to the Cairo Declaration regarding aggrandizement in the case of the Ryukyus where population and land areas are of consequence...To ascribe lesser importance to areas other than the Mandates, however, does *not* alter the fact that their importance is great."

The third line of reasoning concerned the fear that having bases in Okinawa near other powers would "threaten the[ir] security...or impair friendly relations with them" to which the JSSC observed "It is evident that little effective provision for our security in the way of bases can be achieved if such considerations as this are to be paramount. In fact, retention of only such bases as may be agreeable to others would weaken immeasurably our defenses and hence our [own] security." Likewise, the JSSC argued, "specifically, objection on the score of provocativeness cannot reasonably outweigh the advantage to a future enemy of our abandoning, and thus making available for his offensive use, a base that is already ours; nor our own highly likely future need of the base; nor the great cost in lives and logistics of retaking the base in war; nor our firm reputation for non-aggressiveness."

The fourth observation on strategic issues that the JSSC believed the State Department held was the idea that the further the distance from the United States, the weaker the security interest or justification. To this the JSSC argued that "emphasized by predictable trends in war of the future, national security must depend to a vital degree on a base system with the widest predictable limits."

The next concern was the argument that a strategic trusteeship over a large local population, such as in the Ryukyu Islands, would open the U.S. to charges of imperialism. The JSSC argued that line of reasoning "has no bearing on our security needs. In any case Ryukyuan trusteeship could more logically be considered a humanitarian step since Japan is in no position to provide [the] needed help for the natives to the extent that the United States is now doing and would continue to do." Likewise in a related comment, the JSSC explained that a trusteeship is not the assumption of sovereignty and thus could not be "classed as territorial expansion. Since sovereignty is not at issue, neither is territorial expansion."

Finally, the JSSC introduced State's argument that the Japanese retention of not only the northern part of the Nansei Islands, but the entire chain is justifiable because the Okinawans were closely related, culturally and linguistically, to the Japanese and their islands have been administered as an

integral part of Japan for more than six decades. The JSSC outright dismissed this view however by stating that "the relationship in language and culture south of the northern Ryukyus is not close and the natives consider themselves racially and culturally distinct from the Japanese."

The JSSC was particularly concerned over the worsening international situation: "As scarcely need be pointed out, developments in the world situation have steadily emphasized the importance to the United States of taking all practicable steps for keeping our national security strong, a major feature of that strength being recommended control in the Ryukyus." The "developments in the world situation," refers to the growing concerns over the worsening social and economic situation in Europe and Soviet actions in Greece and Turkey. (This in the middle of increasing budget cuts in the military and reductions in service personnel.) The concern with Soviet power increasingly dominates military thinking in 1947, as it does the rest of the government and educated public with the publication of the "X" article in *Foreign Affairs* by George F. Kennan of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (PPS) in July.³³ It is to the PPS and specifically Kennan's role that we turn next.

V. CRITICISM OF THE DRAFT TREATY WITHIN THE STATE DEPARTMENT: THE POLICY PLANNING STAFF

The draft treaty's stating that the territorial limits of Japan would include the Ryukyu Islands was a reemphasis, as we have seen, of the traditional view of State, particularly its Office for Far Eastern Affairs, toward the islands. However, beginning officially in May of 1947, another office, with a broader and more long-range perspective, had become influential in policy-making. It was headed by George F. Kennan, who was by this time widely known in the government for his calling for the containment of the Soviet Union. Before we look at the critique of the draft treaty by his Policy Planning Staff (PPS), a look at the creation of this important (and still-going) office is necessary.

The Creation of the PPS

Even before World War II ended in the summer of 1945, the United States was increasingly faced with strategic and political responsibilities that it had never encountered or undertaken before. This state of affairs was equally true in the immediate postwar years, although with even more and unprecedented responsibilities. This unfamiliar environment forced policy-makers to initiate a new, more involved foreign policy to meet its newly arrived at role as world leader after World War II. As the editor of *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers* writes in the "Introduction" to that collection of valuable documents, "it [had become] clear to Truman and the harried members of his administration that the United States was

conducting a global foreign policy with a jerry-built system of wartime bureaus and agencies imposed upon an administrative framework barely adequate for the conduct of foreign policy in 1939." The result, of course, of this review of foreign and military policy was the National Security Act of July 26, 1947, which created the National Military Establishment, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Council.

Within the department, the new secretary of state, General of the Army George C. Marshall, realized developing a global foreign policy necessitated the creation of new division with long-term, all-encompassing thinking. It also required the State Department to become a more modern and efficient organization. Marshall recalled later that when he first entered the State Department, he "was horrified to find...that each sub-division was a separate industry—a compartment by itself—which is all of the nonsensical organization things [he had] ever heard of." One of the most significant changes Marshall therefore brought to the State Department was the creation of the Policy Planning Staff in May 1947, which essentially was established to examine broader issues affecting U.S. foreign and military policy that simply could not adequately be undertaken at the country or even regional section level. Kennan, who became one of the prime participants in the creation of the PPS described the necessity and importance of such an organization by stating, "There was no place in the realms of government or of academe that lent itself better to an exercise of this sort than General Marshall's newly created Policy Planning Staff. Other divisions of the State Department, geographic and functional, could express themselves, as a rule, only on subjects that fell within the areas of their respective limited competencies, and then only with the framework of established general policy."³⁶ To Kennan and his staff in the PPS however, the "world was their oyster," Kennan would write later."

Like his belief in organizational reforms to produce sounder planning and policy-making and overall efficiency, Marshall's reason for setting up the PPS arose out of his military experience. Soon after becoming Chief of Staff of the Army, General Marshall came to feel that the military spent too much time and effort in reacting to crises (rather than attempting to prevent or avoid them) and therefore felt that the establishment of a section in which "several people who could put up their feet and think hard about policy for the future" was needed.³⁸ Marshall had helped create such a section, the Division of Plans and Operations, in the War Department.³⁹ Likewise, Marshall told his "chief of staff," Under Secretary of State Acheson, early on that he wanted this sort of planning staff in the State Department so that the regional and country divisions would not work at cross-purposes."

Marshall had just returned from a failed attempt to reconcile Nationalist and Communist forces in the Chinese Civil War when he took office on January 21, 1947. Along with other officials in the U.S. government as a

whole, Marshall was also finding it increasingly difficult to deal with the Soviet Union after the wartime coalition collapsed and the rivalry over the peace began. His unsuccessful Foreign Minister's Meeting in Moscow only ended up confirming this for him. Upon receiving advice from several people, including Acheson, Navy Secretary James Forrestal, and then-U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Walter Bedell Smith, Marshall asked Acheson in January to seek out Russian expert Kennan, "the Foreign Service officer whose penetrating dispatches from Moscow in 1946 attracted so much attention among the higher officials in the Administration," to head the PPS.⁴¹ Acheson subsequently called Kennan into his office shortly after this discussion on January 24, 1947 to discuss with him the appointment.⁴² Kennan, a twenty-plus-year veteran of the Foreign Service who had spent most of his career based in Europe, was intellectually excited about his appointment and the challenge it presented. Moreover, after trying to improve U.S. policy decisions from his postings abroad for so long, he would now be at the center of policy-making, symbolized by having his office adjoining that of the Secretary of State in the new State Department building at Foggy Bottom.⁴³

Years later, Kennan recorded this of his appointment as the first director of PPS:

After many years of official duty in the Foreign Service of the United States, it fell to me to bear a share of the responsibility for forming the foreign policy of the United States in the difficult years following World War II. The Policy Planning Staff—it was my duty to set up this office and direct it through the first years of its existence—was the first regular office of the Department of State to be charged in our time with looking at problems from the stand-point of the totality of American national interest, as distinct from a single portion of it.⁴⁴

Kennan's own frustrations with the failure of the U.S. government to distinguish between macro principles and micro policies in its foreign policy, yet understand their interrelationship at the same time, made Kennan all the more sympathetic to Marshall's desire to create the PPS. Moreover, he too was aware of the difficulty in State, due to its composition, to look at foreign policy from a larger global, if not regional, perspective. Kennan, based on years of reporting from abroad—usually with little effect—expressed this frustration in the following way from one episode a half-decade before.

[After returning to Washington in 1942] I asked the man on the German desk in the State Department whether they had received [my long report analyzing the German occupational policies in Czechoslovakia and experiences in general] and whether it had been of any interest. The answer was: yes, they had received it, but it had been of no use because the dis-

cussion was not broken down by individual countries and therefore could not be cut up and distributed to the "country desks" in the various Washington agencies. So no one had read it.⁴⁵

At the time of Acheson's approach to him IZennan was on loan from the State Department as the first Director for Foreign Affairs at the newly established National War College in southeastern Washington, D.C. and was intensively involved in lecturing and designing course work along with his military colleagues on the interrelationship of military strategy and diplomatic/political methods; a critical time of study for IZennan himself. IZennan, who records that his time at the National War College was "intensely enjoyable" as well as "enormously stimulating and interesting," was at first hesitant to leave his post immediately, at least until the first year of the new course was completed in June 1947 and firmly in place. Kennan during this time assisted in discussions on aid for Greece and Turkey during the critical late February, early March discussions prior to the March 12 announcement of the Truman Doctrine.⁴⁶

In late April, Marshall had returned from Moscow however, as Kennan noted, badly "shaken by the realization of the serious and urgency of the plight of Western Europe, where economic recovery had failed to proceed as expected and where something approaching total economic disintegration seemed now to be imminent..." "The patient is sinking while the doctors deliberate." On April 29, 1947, the day after Marshall's arrival from Europe, IZennan was called into the Secretary's office and told that he would have to return to the State Department as quickly as possible due to the necessity of quickly examining the political and economic problems of Europe. Kennan was at this meeting instructed to establish the Policy Planning Staff and begin work immediately to come up with recommendations, and importantly, to "avoid trivia."⁴⁸ Indeed, the rapid establishment of the PPS and sense of urgency at the time was also exemplified in the press release concerning the establishment of the PPS (in the Office of the Under Secretary of State the press release, released on May 7 and effective two days earlier on May 5, was issued less than one week after Marshall and Kennan's meeting.⁴⁹ Organizationally, the PPS was designated to be headed by a director who would report and be responsible to the Under Secretary. It was to be serviced administratively by the Executive Secretariat and assisted by panels of special advisers from the operating branches of State, from other departments or agencies, and/or from outside the government. Finally, while the PPS' relationship to the policy process was described as having no operational responsibility and ability to issue directives or instructions, the departmental order did point out that "in order to insure a realistic basis for planning, close contact shall be maintained between the Staff and operational organizations; and the latter shall be responsible for keeping the Staff informed of their planning activities." With the enactment of the National Security Act in 1947, the PPS also

undertook the responsibility for the preparation of position papers for the State Department on matters before the National Security Council." With the above departmental order in place and his immediate staff gathered, Kennan, Executive Secretary Carlton Savage, and assistant George Butler were ready to begin their urgent tasks of examining European policy."

Reexamining U.S. Policy for Japan

It was not until the summer, however in Kennan's words, "before we could, so to speak, come up for air, look around us, and attempt to take stock of America's world position as a whole."⁵³ When the PPS did look around, particularly at U.S. policy for Japan, it found itself shocked at what was happening.

In early August, the Office of Far Eastern Affairs sent the draft peace treaty, upon completion by the Borton Group, to the Policy Planning Staff for its review. Kennan assigned John P. Davies, an Asian affairs expert in the PPS personally chosen by him to join the staff, to examine it." Davies, who had recently arrived from his assignment at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, was critical of the draft, stating in an August 11 memorandum to Kennan:

It would seem that a peace settlement for Japan proposed by the American Government should further American aims in Japan and the Pacific area. The central American objective in this respect is taken to be a stable Japan, integrated into the Pacific economy, friendly to the U.S. and, in case of need, a ready and dependable ally. Rather than assuring a furtherance of our central objective, the Draft Treaty of Peace for Japan appears to be preoccupied with drastic disarmament and democratization under continuing international supervision, including the U.S.S.R. ...It is likely that the U.S.S.R. in this position would be a disruptive influence in Japan, placing the onus for continued supervision on the U.S. and conspiring to bring about sovietized totalitarianism. The ease with which a coup could be engineered under the proposed treaty is manifest on cursory examination of Chapter V [on disarmament and demilitarization]. Occupation forces having been withdrawn, the Japanese government would have at its disposal for the maintenance of security and order only a police force equipped with small arms."

The PPS, in other words, as Kennan would say to this author later, was "shocked that the Far Eastern Division had agreed so lightly to the treaty."⁵⁶ Kennan immediately reported to his immediate superior, Under Secretary Robert A. Lovett, that the "draft does not seem to be related to any realistic pattern of [our] objectives [with respect to Japan and the Pacific area]," warning that "it would highly dangerous...for us to enter in on discussions of peace terms until we know precisely what it is that we are trying to achieve."" Kennan thus recommended that a peace treaty confer-

ence be delayed "until this matter can be systemically, United States objectives agreed upon at a high level, and our peace treaty draft related strictly to those objectives." Lovett concurred, noting on Kennan's memorandum "GK: I have sent the 'treaty' back as being wholly inadequate in present form. Your views are being passed along."⁵⁸

Although not spelled out in Davies' memorandum to Kennan (indeed Davies added the comment that there were in fact "secondary questions and objections which need not be brought up here"), one of the areas where Davies and later Kennan expressed their concern was on the strategic position of Okinawa within the context of a peace treaty with Japan and U.S.-Japan post-treaty security requirements. While being a confirmation of traditional policy, this clause, suggesting that Okinawa was an integral part of Japan, went against this new reexamination of U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis the Soviet threat and in particular, it went against the JCS recommendations for a strategic trusteeship, of which Kennan became aware and sensitive to early on.

Indeed, during Kennan's leave from the State Department to be Deputy Commandant for Foreign Affairs at the National War College from 1946 to 1947, Kennan had developed an awareness of the importance of overseas bases, and particularly those in the Pacific." This realization was best expressed perhaps in a talk given on January 23, 1947 to the National Defense Committee of the United States Chamber of Commerce, that

We must remember that the first line of American defense might be many thousands of miles from American shores. We already hold a number of outlying bases which it is essential for us to staff, and it might be necessary for us on very short notice to seize and hold other...outlying island bases or peninsula bases on other continents during the period required for further military preparations. But here, again...the greatest value of our forces lies in their quality as a deterrent. If we do not maintain such forces, there will always be an incentive to unruly people elsewhere to seize isolated and limited objectives on the theory that we would be able to do nothing about it at the moment and that they could count on maltreating the seizures with impunity and talking about it afterward.⁶⁰

Following receipt of Kennan's note, Under Secretary Lovett directed Counselor to the Department Chip Bohlen to call a meeting between Kennan and Davies, representing the Policy Planning Staff, and Penfield and Borton, representing the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.⁶¹

At this meeting, held on August 13, the participants agreed that the PPS would undertake a study to consider what the basic assumptions of a peace treaty and Japan policy were to be." The next day, however, in a memorandum forwarded to Kennan, Penfield unsuccessfully made one more attempt to emphasize the importance of an early treaty for Japan: "The crying need of the moment is believed to be the assertion of leadership by

the United States in the Pacific. The peace settlement with Japan is the ideal springboard for such a program and failure to use or delay in using this springboard could well threaten, and would at least be an important obstacle to any program of leadership."'' Penfield's appeal was both late and misplaced; Lovett, as we saw above, was already convinced by Kennan's arguments. Kennan was already extremely disturbed over the draft and would not consider not revising it.

Despite the high priority Kennan gave to the draft treaty, the work of the PPS started off slowly. Indeed, there were other several items already crowding up the tight agenda of the small staff at first, including atomic energy affairs, an upcoming conference in South America, and developments in Greece. Also complicating the progress of the work was the difficulty of the subject matter: the relationship of the peace treaty for Japan to the realistic, long-term U.S. interests in light of the emerging Cold War. In order to better understand the situation and the reasoning that went into the draft, as well as to draw on outside expertise, Kennan, Davies, and their PPS associates Savage, Isaac N. P. Stokes, and Burton Y. Berry met on numerous occasions with Borton and Penfield from the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, as well as economic and military specialists, to discuss the draft treaty and the basic assumptions going into it.⁶⁴ By late August, Kennan decided that the point in the discussions on the peace treaty terms had been reached "where [they] fe[lt] the need of constant consultation with military and naval planners."⁶⁵ In a letter to his Army and Navy counterparts, Kennan requested that they each provide someone to consult with the PPS about the draft policy outlines being drafted under Davies' direction

The day before Kennan sent this letter, the PPS drafted a seven-page outline of general terms relating to a peace with Japan, and specifically, the objectives of the United States in a peace settlement.⁶⁶ Essentially, the PPS paper called for a Japan, internally stable, friendly to the United States, commercially active, and diplomatically and militarily dependent on America, with the United States guaranteeing Japan's external security with facilities provided by Japan through a bilateral treaty signed following the peace treaty. The paper went on to state in territorial matters, the "territorial limitations should be as lenient as is consistent with our essential security needs and our commitments to China [at Cairo] and the USSR [at Yalta]."⁶⁷ The PPS paper did not specifically discuss the Ryukyu Islands here, however.

A September 4 version of this paper, now titled "United States Policy Toward a Peace Settlement with Japan," does in fact mention the Ryukyu Islands, introducing a twist traditional State Department policy.⁶⁸ The paper suggests that those islands of "the Ryukyu Islands, which lie within Kagoshima prefecture should be retained by Japan. Those islands in the Ryukyu chain right south of the prefectural line should be withheld from

Japan and should be granted their independence." Why this last phrase, calling for the independence of the Central and Southern Ryukyu Islands was included, is uncertain and curious, to say the least, considering that it was never really a serious idea within the State Department. (It could simply have been a reflection of the ability of the PPS to incorporate many ideas and options in its thinking.) It is also curious in the context of an earlier part of the paper which clearly highlights the emerging Cold War:

American objectives toward Japan are conditioned by the present world situation. The present world situation is characterized by the fact that out of World War II there emerged two super powers—the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.; that the relationship between these two powers is one of struggle with the U.S.S.R. on the offensive and the U.S. on the defensive; that no third political powers can conceivably act as a balance which would bring the world situation into a stable equilibrium; and that, therefore, a process of political polarization is occurring with states thus far uncommitted to either side gravitating into the orbit of one or the other super powers. In these circumstances, Japan cannot possess an independent identity. It can only function as an American or Soviet Satellite.

The change in policy regarding Okinawa can not unfortunately be explained other than to note that at the time this paper was written, Kennan, who usually led the discussions and much of the drafting, was away in Paris (having left on August 28) at the time for talks on European recovery. Kennan returned to Washington on September 8 and led the discussion that afternoon on the military aspects of the draft treaty." It is in this revised paper, as well as in a list of recommendations for the treaty, that the first serious consideration of the Ryukyu Islands emerges."

With the Cold War a reality, America's vital interest in Japan's internal economic and political stability and alignment with the United States became clearer. The necessity that the Ryukyus be brought under U.S. strategic control was becoming clearer too, although the PPS paper recommended that it not be portrayed that way:

For strategic reasons the southern portion of the Ryukyus, including Okinawa, should be placed under U.S. strategic trusteeship. Because such a proposal represents an expansionist move on the part of the U.S., care should be taken that it is presented to our allies in the most acceptable context. That context is not territorial delineations—awarding China, Formosa and the U.S.S.R. its Yalta gains. The most acceptable context is negotiations regarding future measures to ensure that Japan does not again become a threat to peace. Therefore, the U.S. should in its draft state that the disposition of the Ryukyus is reserved for subsequent negotiation and in the territorial negotiations postpone discussion on the Southern Ryukyus until disarmament of Japan is taken up by the conference. It will be observed that Annex A [not included here] shows the strategically

unimportant northern Ryukyus as retained by Japan. However, at least until such time as the U.S.S.R. reveals its attitude on the disposition of the southernmost Kuriles, the U.S. should apply its reservations regarding the southern Ryukyus to the whole Ryukyu archipelago. Thus if the U.S.S.R. should concede the southernmost Kuriles to Japan, the U.S. would be in position to make, without strategic cost, an offsetting gesture with regard to the northern Ryukyus. If the U.S.S.R. does not make this territorial concession, the U.S. should still reserve negotiations on the northern Ryukyus until it proposes the strategic trusteeship for the southern portion of the chain. At this time it should, for a desirable psychological effect, however slight, also propose that Japan retain the northern Ryukyus.⁷¹

Discussions on the paper continued for more than one week. A new draft was ready on September 17 and it re-emphasized the importance of "a suitable disposition of our forces in the Pacific Area" through the maintaining U.S. armed force near Japan in the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands in order to prevent an "incursion into the territory of a disarmed Japan." The paper therefore continues by recommending that in the treaty, "the southern Ryukyus, the Bonins, Volcano Islands and Marcus should be detached from Japan and placed under U.S. strategic trusteeship."

Kennan circulated this September 17 paper to his military counterparts on September 22, receiving a reply from Brigadier General Schuyler two days later on September 24 on matters which "concerned the military interest." Schuyler, who would come to play an important role in working with Kennan and formulating policy for Okinawa as will be seen shortly, undertook a careful study within his Plans and Operations Division and had already met with representatives of the Civil Affairs Division of the Department of the Air Force to ascertain their views. Schuyler felt that the draft should delineate more clearly what parts of the Ryukyus were to come under a strategic trusteeship and thus recommended that a phrase to the effect that "the Ryukyus desired under U.S. strategic trusteeship are those south of 29 degrees north latitude." This recommendation would see itself introduced in the final PPS paper.

Admiral Forrest Sherman also replied to the PPS on September 24." In contrast to Schuyler's comments on particular points, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations wrote a shorter memorandum on larger issues, specifically the strategic importance of Japan to America's national security and the role that bases in Japan and the Ryukyu Islands play. Sherman writes, "In my opinion our national security would be impaired if our forces were withdrawn from Japan and the Ryukyus (Okinawa) before we have settled our differences with Soviet Russia, before the situation in China is resolved satisfactorily, or before other means are available to ensure that a demilitarized Japan is secure against aggression from the Asiatic mainland." Importantly as this memorandum shows, Sherman's Navy like the rest of

the military was no longer concerned about defense from Japan, but rather the defense of it.

A week later, on September 30, the day the Office of Far Eastern Affairs received a copy of the "Tenno Message"—the plan, as discussed in the previous chapter, for a base leasing arrangement in Okinawa and other islands with sovereignty retained by Japan, as suggested by Terasaki on behalf of the Emperor to Acting Political Adviser Sebald in mid-September—Borton called together military and State representatives for a SWNCC Subcommittee on the Far East meeting at his office." Borton's purpose in calling the meeting was to consider the following two questions: 1) Was a U.S. base in the Ryukyus still considered essential to U.S. security; and 2) If so, would a leased based area instead of a trusteeship be adequate for the purpose?⁷⁶

In response to these questions, both Colonel Westover of the Army and Captain Austin of the Navy answered that the military in fact considered bases in the Ryukyus to still be necessary, and stated that the JCS had found that a leased base (as the State Department had been proposing since at least March) was found to be "inadequate." The military representatives, basing their arguments on JCS 1619124 of the month before, explained why the United States still considered the Ryukyus as essential for the following four reasons: 1) The United States should have a base there in order to deny it to anyone else; 2) Even if the base could not be held long, it would be of great military value as a delaying tactic; 3) A base in the Ryukyus would circumscribe the area in which submarines could effectively operate in the first stages of conflict; and 4) A base in the Ryukyus would be an equivalent counterpoise to Soviet and Chinese bases in the event of a resurgent Japan. Not only would a leased base not be sufficient, the representatives explained, but the JCS, in a paper to be forwarded to Secretary of State Marshall by Secretary of Defense Forrestal, "now consider that a strategic trusteeship for the entire Ryukyus area south of the 29th parallel should be required by the United States." By this new proposal, the JCS in effect was rejecting both a leased-bases option and the ordinary trusteeship option (for the remainder of the islands not put under a strategic trusteeship), both options that the Office of Far Eastern Affairs had been proposing in the event that bases were needed in the Ryukyus and, in the latter case, that the islands could not be returned to Japan.

Borton and the other State Department representatives immediately pointed out that it would be difficult to get the approval of America's allies and that of the members of the Security Council, as well as to take care of the large local population. The military representatives acknowledged that those concerns might prove difficult, but stated that now "circumstances require it." Borton, obviously in shock, found it necessary to suggest that further consideration be given to the matter when the military formally submitted its papers. In the meantime, Borton suggested that a technical

study be launched on whether bases in an ordinary trusteeship could be used in the same way as in "closed areas" would in a strategic trusteeship. Ben Gerig of the Division of Dependent Areas agreed to undertake the study, as will be discussed later.

PPS/10/1: Special Recommendation on the Ultimate Disposition of the Ryukyus

In the meantime, Kennan's PPS continued its discussions on the problems of the draft peace treaty. By mid-October, there was enough agreement among its members to submit a paper redefining U.S. policies toward Japan to Secretary Marshall.⁷⁷ The paper submitted was not however a final set of recommendations, for Kennan had decided not to submit final recommendations at this time because "in regard to several of the most important issues involved we do not have before us to make firm and sound judgments on some of the most important points at issue." Rather, it was an explanation of the thinking of the PPS and the results of their studies.

While not a set of recommendations per se, it was in any case full of suggestions on how to handle upcoming issues. In order to more fully develop these recommendations, Kennan requested that someone be dispatched to Japan to speak with General MacArthur and to see first hand the progress of the Occupation.

In addition to certain treaty issues like voting procedures, reparations, industrial disarmament, and other matters, Kennan and his staff were primarily concerned that both U.S. strategic and political goals as well as Japanese inner and outer defense requirements were met. Kennan explained in the paper that the "Staff sees great risks in an early relinquishment of Allied control over Japan." Kennan, concerned that Japan was vulnerable politically, economically, and socially, did not think that "Japanese society would be politically or economically stable if turned loose and left to its own devices at this stage. If Japan is not politically and economically stable when the peace treaty is signed, it will be difficult to prevent communist penetration."

Militarily, Kennan recognized that demilitarization and disarmament had left Japan "without means of self-defense against foreign aggression," a policy he said was unavoidable. Instead, Kennan suggested that "in the coming period Japanese military security must rest primarily on the proximity (or in the extreme event, the presence in Japan) of adequate U.S. forces, and that it should be accepted as a principle of American defense policy to retain in the Pacific areas sufficient armed strength to make plain our will and determination to prevent any other military power from establishing itself in the Japanese home islands."


Based on this logic, and the fact that the PPS did not look favorably on the acquiring of base facilities on the main islands because it involved "far-reaching political considerations," the importance of Okinawa was clear to

Kennan and his staff. It was thus suggested in PPS/10 that the United States "should proceed in [peace] negotiations on the assumption that we will require military facilities in Okinawa." Kennan's explained that a more detailed recommendation would follow.

That recommendation, drafted by Davies and discussed by the staff, was ready the next day becoming PPS 1011, "Special Recommendation on the Ultimate Disposition of the Ryukyus."⁷⁸ As indicated in this document, the problem that the U.S. government faced was to determine the ultimate disposition of the Ryukyu Islands south of Latitude 29°, which implied that it was American policy to return (at some point) the northern part of the Ryukyu Islands. Davies' report noted that the JCS sought placing the islands south of Latitude 29° under a strategic trusteeship. However, the report continues, while the PPS "accepts the principle of U.S. control over the southern Ryukyus...it [had] not seen...convincing evidence that a strategic trusteeship would be, in all-around terms, the most satisfactory form of U.S. control."⁷⁹

The PPS noted that the strategic trusteeship would "probably involve a heavy financial burden on the U.S.," continuing by explaining that "The islands are a deficit area. Before the war, they depended upon Japan to make up deficiencies in their economy. It is understood that the Joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively estimate that U.S. expenditures for the Ryukyus in the fiscal year 1948 w[ould] amount to \$28-30 millions." Likewise, the PPS noted that the unknown costs of a civil administration over a strategic trusteeship following the conclusion of a peace treaty. As a result, Davies stated that the PPS "would not feel justified in making any recommendations concerning a strategic trusteeship over all or part of the Ryukyus" until it knew whether "the islands c[ould] attain a balanced economy...and if they cannot, what the continuing cost to the U.S. for the U.S. administration, both in funds and personnel, is likely to be." Davies also pointed out that that information would have to "be on hand if the Congress is to be asked to support a recommendation that the U.S. undertake a strategic trusteeship over the Ryukyus."

In addition to the strategic trusteeship plan suggested by the JCS, Davies' memorandum also highlighted the "Emperor's Message." Davies called this plan by the Japanese Emperor a formula which might well be explored as "an alternative to strategic trusteeship." Indeed, as we have looked at, the idea for a leased base in Okinawa also existed in the Office



of Far Eastern Affairs. Its inclusion here may have been to support the State Department's position vis-a-vis the Defense Department. Davies' memorandum thus noted that it was not entirely satisfied with the JCS request for strategic trusteeship and recommended that SWNCC (now SANACC, or State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee) should prepare a "thorough analysis" on the types or forms of control the United States should acquire over the southern Ryukyus and suggest a "formula which would meet U.S. military needs and involve minimum disadvantages to this government." It was precisely this problem however that had and would continue to elude the United States for some time.

VI. THE SANACC AD HOC COMMITTEE AND THE JCS REVIEW

Kennan gave PPS 10/1 to Under Secretary Lovett that same day and Lovett immediately approved the recommendation of Kennan and Davies. However, instead of referring PPS/10/1 "in toto" to SANACC for its consideration and discussion, Lovett's assistant Humelsine, after considering Hilldring's August memorandum, agreed "to refer only the specific problem to the (*Ad Hoc*) committee inasmuch as there was some doubt as to whether the staff paper represented the full State Department view on this problem." In other words, rather than undergoing full SANACC review, the study "would be used by the State Department members of the *Ad Hoc* committee in working on this problem." Harold W. Moseley, the secretary of SANACC, thus requested Borton on October 20 to begin its study.⁸⁰

The newly constituted group of Borton and Dean Rusk from the State Department (formerly with the War Department as we saw earlier), Brigadier General Schuyler (for the Army), Colonel Westover (for the Air Force), and Rear Admiral Woolridge (for the Navy), was set to begin their study when Secretary of Defense Forrestal submitted the opinion of the JCS on its review of control over the Pacific islands to the Secretary of State."

The memorandum submitted by Forrestal was identical to the completed study found in JCS 1619124 introduced above, which summarized the strategic considerations as follows:

- a. Since a major feature of the ultimate security of the United States rests on the ability of the United States to control the Pacific Ocean and since no such control can be effective unless it is complete, a base system making that control possible is essential and any hiatus in such a system will necessarily tend greatly to weaken if not vitiate the effectiveness of the system as a whole.
- b. The two-fold purpose of strategic control of any Pacific area is to provide for the establishment there of the military bases that are necessary for the future security of the United States and to prevent military utilization of that area by any potential enemy. Thus, a base held by the United States can be used for our security not only defensively, but by counter-offensive operations, while its possession by any enemy would not only forestall

such use but give him the offensive advantage. In short, abandonment by us of a peripheral base will, in the event of war, penalize us one advance move while presenting to a potential enemy an advance move in our own direction.

c. No victory ever has been won statically. Since, in all probability, our initial operations in future war will be defensive, it is all the more essential that we be prepared, first as a deterrent and second as the only effective defense, to take the offensive with minimum delay from bases from which offensive operations can be most effective.

d. Therefore, defense, and defense by offense, in future conflict must, to the greatest practicable degree, originate from points farthest from our own vital areas and nearest those of the enemy. Our national attitude against striking the first blow, the development of weapons of mass destruction, the increasing importance of the role of aircraft in war, and the almost certain brevity of the time factor in any future war, all support this basic strategic fact.

e. The wholly essential strategic control that has now been obtained in the ex-Japanese Mandates does not make control in the Ryukyus, Nanpo Shoto and Marcus any less necessary. On the contrary, lack of control in these places would depreciate the value of our Mandates position. Our security status in the Mandates is so vital that, in all consistency, we must protect that area by advanced bases in the direction of the most probable future danger if we are to provide the cushion in time and distance that will be more than ever essential in future war.

f. Apart from the foregoing general truths, several important strategic considerations apply specifically to the Ryukyus. Okinawa in that group is a key base of primary importance in our Pacific base plan. It is in a controlling position in the northwest Pacific area. Other than from Japan proper, where only one air field is suitable for very heavy bombers and where, in any case, control may not be retained, Okinawa provides the only base area from which in the event of war our force could be projected by air into the Asiatic territory of our potential enemy and into Asiatic territories (perhaps including even Japan) that he might succeed in controlling. Okinawa's importance in this respect, as well as in other operations, both sea and air, in the entire northwest Pacific area, including the Eastern Sea, the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan, cannot be over-emphasized. Our lack of any foothold or development on Formosa lends additional weight to that importance.

g. On the other hand, control of the Ryukyus by a potential enemy could give to him dominance of the northwestern Pacific and threaten the line of communication to China that our control in the Mandates is intended to insure. In addition, the Ryukyus in enemy hands would become a major adverse element in our defense of the Philippines if this should become

necessary. Further, gaining control of the Ryukyus would always be an essential first step in any future undertaking by a potential enemy for conquest in the Pacific to the eastward. Consequently, Okinawa, lying neutralized ready for seizure, would offer a tempting opportunity to an unfriendly nation for reversing the potentialities, both defensive and offensive, that we shall lose if we abandon our hard-earned position in the Ryukyus.

11. Throughout the foregoing, it should be borne in mind that the question does not involve merely the present or the near future but the distant and unpredictable future as well, when the world situation may be altogether different. If as now unfortunately seems possible conditions in future become more threatening to our national security than they now are, retention of our control in the Ryukyus will become of increasing importance to our security. If as may still be hoped a stabilized, peaceful world develops, it will always be possible to relinquish control in the Ryukyus as elsewhere. Meanwhile, any weakening with respect to retention of such necessary base sites as the Ryukyus will necessitate, if loss in national security is to be partially compensated, the expenditure of tremendous funds to develop and strengthen our remaining Pacific holdings, or even greater expenditure in not only funds but our lives, in the event of war, in retaking needed bases or in possibly having to fight a losing war.

As a result of these opinions, and "in view of the weight added, from the military viewpoint, to the points therein by the trend of the world situation," the JCS reemphasized their opinion that the "Nansei Shoto (Ryukyus) south of latitude 29° north, Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan, and Marcus Island be retained under United Nations strategic trusteeships, administered by the United States, the terms of trusteeship to meet the same requirements as those upon which the trusteeship for the ex-Japanese Mandates was based." The military representatives to the SANACC committee held firmly to these views—a position that was drafted more than two months previously. The State Department was likely frustrated therefore that the JCS did not fundamentally reconsider the issue and that the military representatives were not willing to budge. Thus, due to the fact that the "Army, Navy and Air Force representatives are committed to the views of their Secretaries," discussions were discontinued before they even really began." Indeed, another problem was the fact that the JCS report submitted never directly addressed the problems for discussion originally outlined in the PPS report and the subsequent directive to SANACC on October 20. Talks would remain stalled for the rest of the year.

VII. THE SEBALD REPORT ON THE OCCUPATION IN OKINAWA: REINFORCING THE NEED FOR A DECISION

In the middle of these discussions, or actually lack of them, a report on conditions in Okinawa was sent to the State Department that likely added great doubt to the JCS argument that the military government was going well in Okinawa.⁸³ It would also show that a decision was necessary regarding Okinawa's still undetermined status.

As was introduced briefly in the previous chapter, this report was written by the Acting Political Adviser, William J. Sebald, who had been asked by the State Department to speak with MacArthur about reports it had heard that the occupation of Okinawa was being run poorly.⁸⁴ MacArthur denied any knowledge of the poor state of affairs, and in turn suggested that Sebald visit Okinawa to investigate the situation for himself." MacArthur provided a plane for Sebald and Niles W. Bond, a Foreign Service Officer temporarily on assignment in Japan who was on his way back to Washington to assume the position of Assistant Chief (responsible for Korean Affairs) Division of Northeast Asian Affairs." As a result, Sebald and Bond visited Okinawa on November 3 and 4. Their report was a critical attack on the state of affairs in Okinawa and U.S. indecision toward the islands, a report Sebald knew would generate attention in Washington. In a letter a week after his trip to Penfield, Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Sebald worried about knowledge of the despatch getting "into Army hands. As you can appreciate," Sebald wrote, "it would be most embarrassing for me if this despatch or its contents should filter back to Tokyo [GHQ]. On the other hand, I feel so strongly about what we saw and learned in Okinawa that I felt it necessary to apprise the [State] Department of conditions there.""

What Sebald was referring to concerned their witnessing the poor and embarrassing conditions in Okinawa. There, Sebald and Bond met first with the Commander of PHILRYCOM, Brigadier General Frederic L. Hayden and other military government officers. Sebald quickly saw that Okinawa was "a small country, occupied by military authorities whose policies are shortsighted and paternalistic, and who lack all appreciation of a long-term policy of democratization leading to the ends of self-sufficiency and a peaceful democratic society...The Military Government officers have little conception or appreciation of United States policies in so far as the Ryukyu Islands in general, and Okinawa in particular, are concerned." Sebald found that because the military government was run on a "day-to-day basis," the 500,000 Okinawans were "caught in a net of abject poverty, hopelessness, and inability to aid themselves by their own efforts or limited indigenous resources....I left with an impression of a helpless population merely attempting to keep itself alive at a bare subsistence level." Sebald noted that the military government officers felt that the "failure to receive guidance or direction from 'higher authority' makes it

inevitable that all policy must be implemented on a day-to-day basis consistent with available appropriations. Justification for lack of initiative was found in the economic situation and lack of funds...there is an appalling lack of material of all kinds." Sebald continued,

Conversations with various officers elicited information to the effect that the local Military Government blames the Department of State for failure to furnish clear-cut directives concerning American objectives in Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands. These authorities have apparently adopted the attitude that it would be superfluous to undertake a democratization program of any kind if the islands are to eventually revert to Japan or to another Power. They state that once a decision is made concerning the future of the island, Military Government could carry out proper programs without difficulty.

Based on the above, Sebald recommended that "it would appear desirable, or even necessary...that the same or similar program of democratization as in Japan—politically, economically, and socially—be carried on in the Ryukyu Islands, whether they are to returned to Japan (or other Power) or occupied by the United States for a period of years in the future." He ended his report by warning the State Department that "the Ryukyu Islands are a seed of future discord between the United States, China, Japan, and Soviet Russia. Such discord can perhaps be minimized by prompt action now; further delay will only result in the crystallization of a situation which at worst appears hopeless and, at best, bad."

Sebald's report came at a critical time when the U.S. government was reviewing its policy toward Okinawa. Its strong recommendations became one in a number of requests that a decision should be made by the United States to establish a long-range policy for Okinawa. That long-range policy was the one being forged by Kennan and his associates. In the meantime, the Office of Far Eastern Affairs would continue with its study of control in Okinawa."

VIII. THE LEASED BASES STUDY AND RESTARTING THE SANACC TALKS

An attempt was made by Secretary Marshall the following year in February to restart the discussions in the SANACC Ad Hoc Committee on the Ultimate Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands. Marshall himself, as we saw earlier, had in a July 1945 memorandum for the President on Pacific bases, recognized the strategic importance of the Ryukyus. Marshall, it seems, still held this view, as shown by his written comments to Hilldring's memorandum on August 7 (1947) in which he noted that while "the State Department presentation is logical from every point of view" he believed that "stony realism demands solution advocated by War and Navy Depts."⁸⁹

Butterworth, on February 6, submitted to Marshall a letter to Secretary Forrestal for his signing regarding the restarting of discussions in the SANACC subcommittee." Butterworth noted that the related offices in State, after "careful consideration" of the JCS proposal, were "unable to agree with it." Butterworth also explained that he and his staff were unable to give effective consideration to alternatives, such as long-term base leases, without further consultations with their military counterparts. Butterworth had earlier asked Robert Fearey to conduct a short study on the advantages and disadvantages of leased bases in the Ryukyus." In doing so, Fearey was able to draw on his memorandum written the year before. His new memorandum, as the following introduces, was clearly in favor of a leased base arrangement for the Ryukyus, although it did note that "it would probably...in the long run be as difficult to negotiate a lease arrangement as a trusteeship agreement."

Fearey first began by discussing why the study was undertaken. He argued that the heavy responsibility for the "welfare of the sizeable, poverty-stricken native population" was one of several disadvantages relating to the establishment of a strategic or ordinary trusteeship which made it necessary to consider the leased base arrangement as an alternative. Fearey noted that precedents for American leased military bases existed for this in Panama, Cuba, and the Philippines. Fearey also noted that the "Emperor of Japan has privately suggested that the United States remain in the Ryukyus under a lease arrangement," a reference to the "Tenno Message" introduced earlier. Fearey then went on to explain what he saw as the five advantages of a leased base arrangement.

The first advantage that Fearey wrote about concerned the fact that the leased base arrangement would be "a purely bilateral arrangement" between the United States and Japan and thus would not involve or necessitate participation by other nations. As a result, U.S. rights within the leased area "would be complete within the terms of the lease" and would not be subject to any type of international control or supervision—fears that the military held.

The second advantage was the fact that unlike a trusteeship, a leased base arrangement would not require the United States "to assume responsibility for the native population" with the result being that the "annual cost of a Ryukyus base would be materially less without this continuing responsibility."

The third advantage that Fearey saw accruing from the leased base arrangement relates actually to the first advantage in that Fearey argued that an arrangement for a lease would secure possession of a base for American use for a fixed, guaranteed period, in this case 50 years (Fearey notes that the Japanese Emperor—in the "Tenno Message" discussed in the previous chapter—proposed a period of 25 or 50 years or more). With the trusteeship arrangement however, Fearey expressed his concern that the

obligation of the United States as the administering authority, in accordance with the U.N. Charter (Article 76) "to promote...the development towards self-government or independence," could possibly "at a later date be seized upon by dissident groups, possibly spurred on from outside, to create popular pressure for our withdrawal, or at the very least to produce unsettled conditions in the islands. Growing nationalist sentiment throughout the Far East during the coming years and decades may spread to the Ryukyus and have this same result." Because of this concern, Fearey argued that a leased base arrangement would better secure U.S. rights in the Ryukyus than a trusteeship arrangement.

The next advantage Fearey wrote about concerned the possibility that the trusteeship system, and indirectly the U.N., would be weakened by the assuming a trusteeship over the Ryukyus by the United States, which "would be recognized everywhere as little more than a subterfuge of our military purposes." A leased base arrangement on the other hand, he argued, "would be realistic and straightforward as to our actual purposes." In explaining to the world community "our open acquisition of a leased military base in the Ryukyus," Fearey suggested, the United States should explain that it had "the responsibility together with the other major powers for the military supervision of Japan," and point out that "whereas the Soviet Union and China possess territories and potential or actual bases immediately adjacent to Japan, the nearest United States bases of any importance are long distances away." Likewise, it could also be pointed out that a base in the Ryukyus was "necessary both to supervise Japan and to preserve an approximate balance of power among the great powers surrounding a disarmed and defenseless Japan."

The final advantage of a leased-bases arrangement that Fearey included was a very forward-looking one. He argued that this arrangement would allow Japan to retain sovereignty over the islands and "would probably be more acceptable to Japan than any other solution except demilitarization and retention intact, and, in the Emperor's view, would be preferred by the Japanese people even to that." Some 25 years would elapse, however, before this arrangement was realized however.

The memorandum also discussed the disadvantages of a leased base arrangement, of which Fearey concluded there were five." The first disadvantage Fearey notes is the fact that under a base leasing arrangement, only the prescribed land area would be under U.S. control and thus there would be no "security controls over the island population outside the base area to prevent spying, the entry of unauthorized persons, etc." Meanwhile the small land area that a leased base would mean, as opposed to an entire island chain under a trusteeship, would limit the mobility of American forces there and would "offer a confined, fix target in the event of hostilities. Also [it] would not have the benefit of the warning stations and other

measures of defense in depth which possession of the entire area south of 29°N. Lat. would permit."

Fearey immediately countered these arguments by suggesting that while "it might be desirable to restrict the lease to one contiguous area on Okinawa, there would be nothing to prevent our arranging to lease several areas, and to acquire rights to set up and maintain warning stations wherever we thought necessary." Regarding the concern over security precautions, however Fearey notes that "it is questionable how effectively we could enforce these precautions among such a large population and over so large an area even under a trusteeship arrangement."

The second disadvantage that Fearey saw with leased bases was the concern that the American acquisition of a leased base "would set an undesirable precedent" with other countries in the Far East, such as the Soviet Union vis-a-vis satellite governments in Korea and Northern China, and might even pave the way for the Soviet Union to "bear on Japan to grant her a leased base in Hokkaido or elsewhere."

The next disadvantage noted in the memorandum concerns the opinion that the lease arrangement was in "violation" of the announcement by President Truman on November 6, 1946 that the United States was prepared to place under trusteeship Japanese islands "for which it assumes responsibility as a result of the Second World War." Fearey challenged this argument however by suggesting that the United States would not be assuming responsibility of any part of the Ryukyus because their sovereignty would remain with Japan.

The fourth disadvantage was the concern that the leased base arrangement would be "unpopular with the natives." The leasing arrangement, as described earlier, would "involve the ejection of the natives from a large proportion of the base farming land, with compensation it is true, but without assumption of continuing responsibility for their welfare." (This problem, identified by Fearey, would surface repeatedly throughout the postwar, first vis-a-vis U.S. military authorities until 1972, and against the central Japanese government which provides leased land for bases to the United States in the post-1972 reversion period.)

The fifth disadvantage of the leasing arrangement, Fearey pointed, could be that a American-leased base in the Ryukyus would "tend to weaken the Charter of the United Nations, which supposedly made ample provision for security arrangements with the United Nations framework."

In his concluding remarks, Fearey notes one more disadvantage regarding the leased base. He states that the Soviets and Chinese would likely demand at a Peace Conference that, if the Ryukyus are returned to Japan, there be a "provision binding Japan in future not to lease or otherwise alienate any of its territories without the consent of the principal signatories." As a result, Fearey concludes, that the leased base, despite his preference for it as a way to guarantee continued Japanese sovereignty over the

islands, would be as difficult to negotiate vis-a-vis a trusteeship arrangement.

It was likely because the memorandum pointed to possible problems with both arrangements that Butterworth asked Marshall to request the Secretary of Defense to reopen discussions in the SANACC ad hoc committee. Two weeks later on February 20, Marshall wrote to Forrestal requesting that SANACC "be authorized to consider the whole problem anew, without prejudice to the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." " Army Major General Alfred M. Gruenther, the first Director of the Joint Staff, rejected this approach." Forrestal's assistant, John H. Ohly explained to Forrestal that Gruenther believed "we should not, at this time, indicate any retreat from the prior JCS position" and added that Gruenther felt that "we need to smoke out the State Department position which has not been articulated."⁹⁶ Forrestal in turn wrote back to Marshall in early March suggesting instead "an alternative course of action." " Forrestal's suggestion was to have the State Department "develop tentative proposals of its own concerning the disposition of these areas" and then to have these proposals submitted to him to be considered by the National Military Establishment. Forrestal felt that such a procedure "would greatly facilitate our understanding of the variety of factors which the State Department believes should be considered."

Marshall seems to have accepted this for later in the year, upon the completion of Kennan's recommendations, the ideas of the State Department were further refined. In any case, as this exchange was continuing, Marshall's Director of the Policy Planning Staff, his "Global Planner," in the words of one newspaper description, Kennan, was getting ready to visit Japan and Okinawa to develop new and necessary policy recommendations for Japan.⁹⁸ State's proposals on the disposition of Ryukyu Islands, as requested by Forrestal, would have to wait until Kennan's return."

IX. PLANNING THE KENNAN TRIP TO THE FAR EAST

As will be recalled, Kennan recommended to Lovett and Marshall in submitting PPS/10 ("Results of the Planning Staff Study of Questions Involved in the Japanese Peace Settlement") that "some high official in this Department proceed to Japan and discuss in detail with General MacArthur and his assistants the issues involved." " " No immediate decision was made however and Lovett, Kennan, and Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs Norman Armour worked on the question of deciding who would go to meet with MacArthur.¹⁰¹

It was not until the beginning of the new year before a decision was made on sending "high ranking officers of the Department" to Japan to confer on Pacific defense issues, Japanese economic recovery, and the question of an early peace treaty. Kennan, with the concurrence of Butterworth, a friend and classmate of Kennan's from Princeton University days,

requested Marshall and Lovett on January 27 to consider again problem because all "further action both on occupation policies and on the Japanese peace treaty must await this step."¹⁰² Two days later on January 29, Butterworth recommended to Marshall that Kennan be designated as the State Department official to go to Tokyo, "once he is able to assemble the necessary background on subjects to be discussed," and moreover, suggested that Kennan "go armed with a personal letter from you to General MacArthur."¹⁰³ Marshall accepted Butterworth's recommendations and on February 9 informed Kennan that he was to go to Tokyo "to confer with General MacArthur on questions relating to: a. United States security needs in the Pacific; b. desirability of an early treaty...with or without the Soviet Union; and c. steps [to] be taken now to speed up Japanese economic recovery."¹⁰⁴ Marshall subsequently sent the following telegram to MacArthur on February 12:

In view of the present deadlock in Japanese peace treaty negotiations, we are making new estimate of situation to determine appropriate further diplomatic moves in light of position and probable motives of other interested powers. This will be centered about the question of the desirability of pressing for an early treaty with Japan (with or without the Soviet Union) and will involve a restudy of US security needs in the Pacific and additional steps which can be taken now to accelerate Japanese economic recovery We are working closely with Forrestal's and Royall's people on this problem.

The matter has so ramifications, both from your end and ours, that I believe it advisable to send the Director of the Department's Policy Planning Staff (equivalent of War Dept OPD), Mr. George Kennan, to Tokyo the latter part of this month, to consult with you. If agreeable to you, I will start Kennan on the way within the next ten days."¹⁰⁵

Representative of his style of leadership, Marshall gave Kennan discretion in choosing "one or two assistants from the Department to accompany" him to Japan.¹⁰⁶ Although Kennan had earlier recommended that a high official from the department go to Japan, he decided now nevertheless that he "wished very much to avoid giving the impression of this being a high-powered mission."¹⁰⁷ Kennan thus sought two intelligent and qualified people, one from State and one "who could speak for the Secretary of Defense in the matters I expect to discuss with General MacArthur."¹⁰⁸

After informing Major General Alfred M. Gruenther and Secretary Forrestal's office of his planned trip, Kennan asked Gruenther (his former colleague at the National War College) to recommend someone who would be "authorized to represent all three services and would not be accompanied by too large a retinue."¹⁰⁹ Gruenther and Secretary Forrestal subsequently asked Brigadier General Schuyler, then with the Joint Strategic Plans Committee as well as the Plans and Operation Division, to accom-

pany Kennan.¹¹⁰ The two had been working together since the summer review of the draft peace treaty and Kennan had come to respect him as "a highly competent, intelligent, and reasonable officer...I could have not wished for a more pleasant traveling companion; and I suspect that he, in his quiet, tactful way, was of considerable help behind the scenes in the accomplishment of my mission."¹¹¹ Schuyler in turn chose Colonel Harry O. Paxson and Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm Gilchrist, also of the Army Department's Plans and Operations Division to serve as his aides.¹¹²

For his own Department assistant, Kennan asked Butterworth to suggest "a younger officer" to accompany him. It was implicit, yet important, they both understood, that the State Department person chosen know his way around Japan and GHQ.¹¹³ By February 17, Butterworth had recommended Marshall Green, a young but experienced Foreign Service Officer in the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs.¹¹⁴ Green, who like Fearey after him, worked in Japan for Ambassador Grew as his private secretary from 1939 to 1941, had returned to the State Department as the Japan Desk Officer on the day after the draft treaty had been completed (August 5, 1947) following service in Wellington, New Zealand as the third (and then second) Secretary from 1946 to 1947.¹¹⁵ As Kennan wrote later, Green's "excellent background knowledge of Japanese affairs and his tactful effectiveness with intermediate levels of SCAP" would become "invaluable" to him in the performance of his mission.¹¹⁶

After making his selections, Kennan spoke with Marshall on February 19 about his upcoming discussions with MacArthur.¹¹⁷ After Kennan outlined for him the background of the situation in Japan and the approach he planned to take in the Tokyo discussions, Marshall gave Kennan advice on how to deal with MacArthur—a problem the State Department, the President, and the military had been having (and would continue to have) for quite a while. According to Kennan's memorandum of the conversation, Secretary Marshall cautioned that:

in the initial stages of the discussions I should, if possible, let General MacArthur do the talking and should listen to him as long as he cared to talk. When he had said all he had to say, then I could bring forward the considerations which we here [in the State Department] had in mind. I should open the conversations by asking for his ideas on the future position of Japan in our world strategy.

The Secretary cautioned me strongly about what I might say to others in Japan, besides General MacArthur. He emphasized that what would be reported to General MacArthur was not what I really said but what people wished to make out what I had said. He felt that I would be on much sounder ground to make directly to General MacArthur any statements I had to make which could possibly be interpreted as critical of SCAP.

Kennan, who became extremely critical of the Occupation and its scale upon visiting Japan, would have his work cut out for him.

Kennan met with Marshall Green on February 24 to finalize questions to be discussed with MacArthur and background materials to be brought with them. The weight that the Ryukyu Islands would have on their trip was apparent by the focus of the still-undetermined question of their disposition in Kennan's briefing materials prepared by Green.¹¹⁸ Within the State and JCS papers supplied to Kennan, several in fact dealt directly with the question of the Ryukyu Islands.¹¹⁹ Likewise, in the set of problems to be discussed with MacArthur, the question "What disposition of [the] Ryukyu Islands would best serve U.S. security needs and general interests in the Pacific[?]" was posed. In response, the following five options, all of which we have seen so far, were outlined for Kennan's benefit:

- a. Demilitarization and return to Japan;
- b. Demilitarization and return to Japan with leased U.S. base or bases;
- c. Ordinary trusteeship with U.S. administering authority and with specified closed areas for bases;
- d. Ordinary trusteeship for all except base areas to be designated as strategic trusteeship areas;
- e. Strategic trusteeship for whole area with U.S. as administering authority.

While Green was assembling these reports (and Kennan digesting them), the Director of the PPS was also busy with putting the final touches on another report entitled "Review of Current Trends of U.S. Foreign Policy."¹²⁰ While too long to cite here, one passage in particular reveals Kennan's thinking regarding Japan on the eve of his trip:

We should recognize that our influence in the Far Eastern area in the coming period is going to be primarily military and economic. We should make a careful study to see what parts of the Pacific and Far Eastern world are absolutely vital to our security, and we should concentrate our policy on seeing to it that those areas remain in hands which we can control or rely on. It is my own guess, on the basis of such study as we have given the problem so far, that Japan and the Philippines will be found to be the cornerstones of such a Pacific security system and that if we can contrive to retain effective control over these areas there can be no serious threat to our security from the East within our time."

Kennan after visiting the Far East and in particular Okinawa, would come to view Okinawa as absolutely vital to America's security.

X. THE KENNAN TRIP TO THE FAR EAST

Kennan and his party departed Washington on February 26, the day after a coup in Czechoslovakia toppled the government of President Eduard Benes (followed by the suspicious suicide on March 11 of the respected non-Communist foreign minister Jan Masaryk). Although anticipated by Kennan's PPS in a paper six months prior, it symbolized the degree of tension and crisis in the "Cold War" world at the time. While Kennan did not appear worried with this new development, the rest of Washington became nervous about Soviet intentions. His trip to the Far East in the middle of these ominous international signs in any case was particularly symbolic.

Early in the morning (4:00 a.m.) of March 1, Kennan's group touched down in the middle of a snowstorm at Haneda Air Field outside of Tokyo, after stops in Seattle, Anchorage, and "the tabletop landing field of the tiny island of Shemya, fourteen hundred miles from nowhere in the Northern Pacific."¹²² A tired Kennan tried to catch up on sleep at the Imperial Hotel but was interrupted by "correspondents and others [who] kept calling me up at intervals through the morning."¹²³ At 1:00 in the afternoon, a sleep-deprived Kennan and Schuyler had lunch with General and Mrs. MacArthur, and one of MacArthur's aides. Near the end of the meal, MacArthur, in Kennan's description, "turning his back to me, addressing himself exclusively to Schuyler, and thumping the table for emphasis with a single vertically held finger...embarked on a monologue which lasted...approximately two hours. Oppressed by weariness, I sat motionless in my humble corner." Kennan, in being met by MacArthur in this way, likely had Marshall's warnings to him in mind and realized then and there that it would not be an easy trip.

The following day, after a full schedule of briefings, which were "helpful but not greatly illuminating," and a dinner with Vice Admiral Robert M. Griffin, Commander of U.S. Naval Forces in the Far East, Kennan sat down at his desk in his hotel room to write MacArthur a note." Employing Marshall's advice to him before his departure, Kennan deferentially wrote to MacArthur, "I must make sure that in enjoying these briefings and the local hospitality I do not neglect my official mission," and asked for a personal interview with MacArthur in which "any comment which the Commander in Chief might care to make...would be much appreciated."¹²⁶

It would not be for a few more days until Kennan heard from MacArthur. In the meantime, Kennan was visited the following evening (March 3) by one of MacArthur's senior aides, Major General Charles A. Willoughby, who was Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the Far East Command. Kennan and the intensely anti-Communist Willoughby "passed a pleasant evening and found much to talk about" on Soviet affairs." At the end of their talk, Willoughby asked Kennan if he would lecture the following day to a group of senior SCAP officers. Having seen

at the luncheon with MacArthur that the general did not recognize in Kennan's view the Communist danger in Japan, Kennan accepted, likely with the same enthusiasm he showed when he wrote the "Long Telegram.""" The following day, Kennan gave his one-hour presentation on Russian and Soviet history and foreign policy to the assembled SCAP officers.""

Marshall Green, who assisted in arranging the presentation, recalled that Kennan's talk was "a brilliant performance, the impact of which on his audience most reminded me of that old advertisement for the Rosicrucian Society where a human eye is piercing the depths of eternity. For one hour he had his audience absolutely enthralled; for one hour all of us were at one with the eternal Truth, before the clouds rolled in obscuring that Truth but not the memory of a transcending hour."¹³⁰ Kennan's meeting with Willoughby and the later presentation "may have relieved some of the Supreme Commander's doubts as to the purpose of my mission and the nature of [his] interest in occupation policies."" Green, Kennan's right-hand man during the trip, goes further by explaining that

up to that moment, General MacArthur had treated Kennan with polite slzepticism, even standoffishness as if he were the diplomatic representative of a not-too-friendly power (the State Department). But after MacArthur heard about the speech, all doors were open to Kennan. It was not just that General MacArthur was impressed by George Kennan's wisdom but that, more important!!; he had come by then to realize that Kennan's thinking on key, long-range issues was superior to that of his own advisors.'³²

In any case, Kennan met with MacArthur on the evening of March 5, in which they "discussed—without exception, I think—all the leading problems of occupational policy as well as the problems of relations with our former allies in matters affecting the occupation and the peace treaty."¹³³ For our purposes, it is MacArthur's comments on Okinawa that concern us here.

Kennan and MacArthur, or perhaps more accurately, *MacArthur* spent a large part of the time discussing the problem of security in the Pacific, one of the questions that Kennan had prepared earlier that same day for MacArthur on the stationery of the Imperial Hotel, and indeed one of the three areas of study which originally brought Kennan to Japan. MacArthur began his discussion of security matters by explaining that the "strategic boundaries of the United States were no longer along western shores of North and South America; they lay along the eastern shores of the Asiatic continent."¹³⁴ MacArthur was in essence articulating a idea that developed particularly during World War II following the attack on Pearl Harbor and would grow into maturity with the concept of the "island chain." Indeed, according to Kennan's memorandum of conversation, MacArthur

described precisely this island chain—"a U-shaped area embracing the Aleutians, Midway, the former Japanese mandate islands, Clark Field in the Philippines, and *above all Okinawa. Okinawa was the most advanced and vital point in this structure.* From Okinawa [the United States] could easily control every one of the ports of northern Asia from which an amphibious operation could be conceivably launched. This was what was really essential. Naval facilities were important; but the air striking power was vital for the purpose in question."''' (Italics by author.) However, importantly MacArthur's concept of an island chain differed from some of his staff like Eichelberger (soon to return stateside from his command of the Eighth Army in Yokohama and even sooner to meet with Kennan), in that he did not see U.S. bases in Japan as necessary: "With adequate force at Okinawa, we would not require the Japanese home islands for the purpose of preventing the projection of amphibious power from the Asiatic mainland. That did not mean, of course, that it was not important to us to see that the strategic facilities of the Japanese islands remained denied to any other power."¹³⁶ In light of this, Kennan noted that MacArthur "attached great importance to Okinawa, and felt it absolutely necessary that we retain unilateral and complete control of the Ryukyu chain south of Latitude 29." The General was disappointed that the United States had "not adopted a firm and permanent policy of base development at Okinawa...[which] is reflect[ing] unfavorably on the morale and efficiency of the forces stationed there," Kennan recorded. "We ha[ve] complete unilateral control of the Ryukyus at this time," MacArthur explained because, "they were not under SCAP [allied] authority but were under the authority of the [U.S.] Far East Command. [The islands] were therefore today entirely in our power and under our flag and no one could force us to release them without our consent."

MacArthur next turned to his opinion the Ryukyu Islands themselves, opinions that he had stated in his September 1, 1947 comments (discussed above) on the State Department draft peace treaty, a copy of which was in Kennan's personal possession and one that he more than likely had read.¹³⁷ In any case, Kennan recorded MacArthur's views of Okinawa again here in the following way:

The people [of the Ryukyu Islands] were not Japanese, and had never been assimilated when they had come to the Japanese main islands. The Japanese looked down on them. [MacArthur] had been obliged to evacuate a half million of them back to the Ryukyus, as one of the first acts of occupational policy. They were simple and good natured people, who would pick up a good deal of money and have a reasonably happy existence from an American base development in the Ryukyus.

The "long evening's interview" with MacArthur continued on to other subjects including the Far Eastern Commission, reforms, and economic recov-

ery. Overall it went well in Kennan's estimate, and the two "parted with a common feeling, I believe, of having reached a general meeting of the minds. From that moment things went very well." MacArthur even invited Kennan to meet with him again before he left Japan.

Kennan's Trip to Okinawa

Kennan spent the next day and the first half of the following week finishing up his briefings and visiting (in a train provided by MacArthur) Kansai and other parts of Japan, including Kyoto, Osaka, and Nagoya, to get a firsthand perspective how the occupation and its reforms were affecting Japanese society. Kennan returned to Tokyo on March 10 after spending the day in Yokohama (south of Tokyo) to meet with Consul General U. Alexis Johnson, who was involved in reporting on affairs in Okinawa (since there was not a U.S. Embassy in Tokyo at the time to handle consular and political affairs there). Kennan was impressed with Johnson—indeed "it was an electric relationship," as Green later recalled. Likely to facilitate the meeting, Kennan brought Johnson along with him and Sebald (and the rest of the entourage) to a one and a half-hour meeting later that afternoon with Yokohama-based General Eichelberger in which the problem of occupation costs as well as the question of Japan's rearmament was discussed.¹³⁹ Overall, Kennan seemed satisfied with this meeting and his trip in general, writing later that evening that the "visit here has been entirely successful and that results will be distinctly helpful to [the] Department."''''

Despite suggestions to include China and Korea in his trip (which he did not think wise), Kennan decided to go on his "scheduled visit" to Okinawa and the Philippines." He and Marshall Green subsequently left the following morning, March 11.¹⁴² Upon arriving in Okinawa, Kennan met with Brigadier General Frederic L. Hayden, Chief Military Government Officer (who would be leaving his post on May 11) and his deputies, and was given a tour of the bases and military government facilities. Kennan was originally scheduled to meet Governor Shikiya Koshin, a well known local educator who had been appointed governor (*chiji*) on April 24, 1946, later that same day, but it seems that over-scheduling made it impossible. Kennan, slightly tired (and now sick), retired early that evening.¹⁴³ The next day, Kennan and Green did have a chance to visit briefly with Shikiya. Although the exact contents of this short talk are unknown, the governor very well may have asked Kennan about American intentions vis-a-vis Okinawa, considering that the local newspaper, the *Uruma Shimpō*, had been reporting about the U.S. desire for Okinawa to be a part of its defense line.¹⁴⁴ After this short meeting, Kennan and Green flew on to Manila around noon that same day.

Kennan did not record his impressions of Okinawa while he was there—probably being too busy and too exhausted to do so (and perhaps due to a lack of independent State Department communication facilities that a

Consulate could provide). He did manage to get a telegram off to Butterworth from Manila the next day on March 13 in which he wrote "[the] visit to Okinawa has confirmed my opinion that consideration of US national defense plus our responsibility to [the] islanders make [it] imperative [that an] early and definitive clarification of status of Ryukyus for at least ten years to come [be made]." ¹⁴⁵ Kennan was finally able to write a longer account of the trip, setting out his views on the situation in the Far East, the next day, a Sunday, from Manila. ¹⁴⁶ Before we look at Kennan's memorandum, a report made at the same time by Kennan's military traveling companion to Japan, Schuyler, will be introduced because it discusses the local situation on Okinawa in slightly more detail. ¹⁴⁷

Schuyler notes, like Kennan later, that the visit to Okinawa "strongly reinforced the impression already gained in Japan that Okinawa provides excellent facilities to permit development of the island as our primary air-base in the Far East." While his report does not go into great detail on the strategic reasons why he felt so, Schuyler did spend time on occupation policy and post-occupation deployment. Schuyler first and foremost expressed concern about the lack of funding and housing for U.S. forces and their families stationed in Okinawa. "With the possible exception of Guam, the need for dependent housing is greater in Okinawa than (sic) anywhere else in the Far East. Married officers are forced to serve approximately 18 months before they can hope to have their families join them. The effect on morale is obvious," Schuyler warned. ¹⁴⁸ Implying, but not stating, that more funding and a long-term policy was needed, Schuyler continued, "Such dependent housing as is available has largely been improvised by local conversion of Quonsets, with plumbing fixtures and other appendages scavenged from sunken vessels. The manner in which our small garrison has been able to shift for itself, with a minimum of assistance in the way of money or supplies from the outside, is quite remarkable."

Schuyler was also impressed with the people of Okinawa, "the natives," in the military jargon of the time. In a long section about the "Native Population," Schuyler notes that "the natives of Okinawa are industrious, fairly intelligent and very friendly toward the U.S. Most officers of the garrison consider them to be of a higher type than the Filipino. Local commanders do not subscribe to the common Army Department belief that the Okinawans can make little progress toward supporting themselves." Likewise, Schuyler highlighted the fact that the local commanders believed strongly that the Okinawans already serving in a local police force under American officers have taken "to their duties enthusiastically and have proved to be reliable and generally efficient" and thus could comprise an "Okinawan Scout Organization" which would "prove superior in all aspects to our present Philippine Scout units." General Hayden suggested as well, the report notes, that the Okinawan Scouts "would be valuable for

duty both in Okinawa and in certain of our overseas possessions, including Guam, Panama, and possibly Hawaii.”¹⁴⁹

Concerning other security and garrison considerations, Schuyler introduces the arguments he encountered with representatives of CINCFE's G-3 (Operations and Training Division). Officers there indicated that if one or more garrisons are to be permanently stationed in Okinawa (Guam or Saipan), where housing is "woefully short," then construction of housing for the troops and their families must be started immediately. However, since housing was at present so limited, "the full cost of such a construction program appears almost prohibitive." The G-3 representatives suggested an alternative plan, one they considered "far preferable." Their alternative recommended that "no major tactical unit of ground troops" be permanently stationed in the Far East, but "rather that divisions be rotated, one or more at a time, as an amphibious operation, either to the Marianas, to the Ryukyus, split between the two, or to other Pacific bases as might seem desirable at the moment." Air Force bombardment squadrons, according to the plan would also be rotated. Schuyler noted that while the plan had "considerable possibilities," it would require continuous availability of necessary amphibious capabilities and a large amount of coordination between the services.¹⁵⁰ Having examined the JCS debate to date, it is clear that this solution would not be accepted. Schuyler concludes his report on Japan and Okinawa by stating that it was in any case necessary to begin "immediate action to establish definitely the fact that we now intend to stay in Okinawa," recommending as well that it was necessary to maintain close liaison with Kennan his analysis of U.S. security interests in the Far East. It is to Kennan's views of Okinawa, after his visit there, that we now turn.¹⁵¹

Kennan began his initial report to Marshall, himself about to leave for South America, explaining that "Our most immediate and important problem in the western Pacific area is strategic. Today, as far as I can learn, we are operating without any over-all strategic concept for the entire western Pacific area." The problem of Japan's future, for example, Kennan continued, "has not, as far as I can learn, been integrated with the base development in the Marianas and elsewhere, or with the problem of the Ryukyus."¹⁵² The problem of the Ryukyus, Kennan described, was this:

Our forces find themselves in the Ryukyus by virtue of conquest and of a curious international hiatus concerning the future of those islands. Our people everywhere are agreed that Oltinawa has strategic importance, and that we have a serious responsibility to the natives of the islands, whose lives were terribly shattered by the war and who look to us with peculiar confidence and attachment to protect and help them in the future. Because of the uncertainty, however, concerning the future of the islands, we have been able neither to develop the islands adequately as a U.S. base nor to enter on any serious program of rehabilitation of the civilian economy and

social structure. (The communists are beginning to exploit this fact in order to influence local opinion against us.) Our authorities find themselves frustrated at every turn by the complete uncertainty surrounding the political future. Meanwhile neither our presence on the islands nor our plans for the future seem to rest on any firm concept of strategic objectives for the area as a whole.

Kennan went on to suggest a "strategic-political concept" for the area.¹⁵³ The first idea, which Kennan said did not need elaboration and "coincides with strategic thinking both in Washington and in Tokyo," argued that while the United States would attempt to influence events on the mainland beneficial to the American security needs, it would not consider particular areas on the mainland, including Korea, as vital. Secondly, IZennan, suggested that Okinawa should be made "the center of [U.S.] offensive striking power in the western Pacific area. It would constitute," Kennan continued in remarks that he admitted coincided with MacArthur's thinking, "the central and most advanced point of a U-shaped U.S. security zone embracing the Aleutians, the Ryukyus, the former Japanese mandated islands, and of course Guam. We would then rely on Okinawa-based air power, plus our advanced naval power, to prevent the assembling and launching [of] any amphibious force from the any mainland port in the east-central or northeast Asia." Finally, the third point concerned the argument that Japan and the Philippines should not be included in the security area." The United States would not keep military bases or forces there "provided that they remain entirely demilitarized and that no other power made any effort to obtain strategic facilities on them. They would thus," Kennan continued, "remain neutralized areas, enjoying complete political independence, situated on the immediate flank of our security zone." Kennan described this solution as being "by far the simplest and most practical from the political standpoint." It would form the basis of his later calls for the neutralization of Japan and the Korean peninsula.

In implementing the ideas he introduced relating to Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands, IZennan argued that "our first task...is to terminate the uncertainty surrounding their future." More specifically, IZennan suggested that "we should make up our minds right now (preferably in the form of a National Security paper) that we intend to hold on to Okinawa and to other strategic facilities as we require in the archipelago, south of the 29th parallel as long as the present international situation endure." Swayed by the views of the military, IZennan argued that while "the question should first be aired and cleared in the UN...we should accept no solution short of trusteeship for such of them as we require for our military purposes. If this cannot be obtained in the UN," Kennan continued, then

we should not hesitate to make a public announcement to the effect that the circumstances of the war have left us with the de facto custody of the

Ryukyu people; that they are incapable of looking after their own protection; that in the absence of international agreement as to their future security it would be an act of irresponsibility to leave them defenseless; that on the other hand we cannot proceed with an orderly and progressive rehabilitation and development of life in the islands unless there can be some certainty about the future and unless we can lay plans for some time in advance; and that we have therefore decided that the present status will be continued for a minimum of ten years and as long thereafter as world conditions may necessitate.

Having done that, IZennan explains in a reflection of his view that political and economic instability was one of the appeals of communism, the United States should make permanent arrangements for the handling of civilian affairs in the Ryukyus and proceed with "a vigorous program of base development and of economic rehabilitation." IZennan believed, as a comment to Marshall reveals, that "the Okinawans themselves...would be only too pleased with this solution." In closing, IZennan remarked that he "need hardly stress the desirability of an early clarification of our policy in this area in view of the trend of world events and the necessity of having all our hatches battened down for the coming period." This "early clarification" would eventually emerge in the NSC paper developed later that IZennan suggested above.

The Final MacArthur Meeting, Preparation of PPS/28, and Kennan's "Observations"

Kennan left Manila on the morning of March 15 and arrived back in Tokyo the following day. This gave him time to work on compiling his report on recommendations for Japan policy before his last meeting with MacArthur on the evening of March 21. The third meeting with MacArthur would also be attended by Under Secretary of the Army William H. Draper, Jr., one of Kennan's allies in the debate over ending the economic reforms which he and the PPS felt were weakening Japan and rendering it vulnerable to Communist takeover.¹⁵⁶ Kennan and Draper, among others, sought Japan's economic recovery and thus, political stability—not Japan's permanent weakening through extensive and damaging reforms.

For our purposes, however, it is the discussion on Okinawa that concerns us here. And on this issue, its strategic importance, all the participants were in agreement.¹⁵⁶ As was common in most meetings, MacArthur did most of the talking in this conversation, the first part of which focused on U.S.-Japan defense needs. MacArthur reemphasized his belief, told to Kennan two weeks before, that the "California [was] no longer our outer line of defense. This line now passes through the Marianas, the Ryukyus and the Aleutians, with Okinawa as its key bastion." Likewise, in order to defend Japan, the United States must rely on Air power rather than the Army and Navy. "With adequate Air power based upon Okinawa," he

continued, "we could protect Japan from outside attack." MacArthur felt that Okinawa had enough space to provide for the "operation of a powerful and effective Air Force, which could assure the destruction of enemy forces or harbor facilities along the Asiatic coast from Vladivostok to Singapore." With bases and an Air Force there in Okinawa, MacArthur felt therefore that United States did not need to maintain forces on "Japanese soil." It was thus very important, MacArthur urged, that "in light of these considerations the U.S. reach a decision *now* to remain in Okinawa and that we devote adequate funds at once to the necessary construction for a permanent garrison." It was indeed along these lines that Kennan was already thinking as we saw in his memorandum to Marshall as well as in the study described next of which he had already neared completion.

The long report that Kennan wrote became PPS/28, "Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy toward Japan." In it, Kennan reiterated that the U.S. government "should make up its mind at this point that it intends to retain permanently the facilities at Okinawa, and the base there should be developed accordingly. The problem of obtaining international sanction for our *permanent strategic control* of the islands should be studied at once in the State Department."¹⁵⁸ (Italics by author.) Importantly, Kennan was not advocating here however to obtain international recognition right away. Indeed, in a related section, Kennan argued "there is no need for us now to reach a definitive settlement on the Ryukyu's status by international action. At the appropriate time, the retention by the United States of facilities in the Ryukyus could be worked out in some practical manner."¹⁵⁹

In an appendix to PPS/28 entitled "Observations," from which the above quote was taken, Kennan expanded in the longest written format (of his entire trip) on his views of the Ryukyu Islands and their strategic importance.¹⁶⁰ Understanding Kennan's views on Okinawa *in toto* thus necessitates that that section be introduced in full here:

Not only is Okinawa well suited by natural factors (location, size, physical conformation, climate, water supply, etc.) to constitute an advance base for U.S. armed forces, particularly in the Air Force, but it is in a more favorable position politically than either Japan or the Philippines to serve that purpose. Its status is today completely indefinite. Technically still a part of Japan, the status of the Ryukyu Islands was left undecided in the Potsdam Declaration, which provided that the territory of Japan was to be limited to the four main islands and 'such minor islands as we determine'. (The term 'we', incidentally; apparently referred here to the signers of the document, namely: the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain.) Whatever the final interpretation of this may be, we can reasonably argue that Okinawa and other islands of the Central and Southern Ryukyu chain are not 'minor' islands and that the acceptance of the 30th Parallel as the southernmost boundary of the authority of SCAP consti-

tuted a tacit international recognition that the Ryukyus south of that boundary were no longer to be considered a part of Japan.

On the other hand, we find ourselves at present in control of the islands, and responsible for their inhabitants, as a consequence of military conquest. The islanders are clearly not fit for independence, and have advanced no claim to it. They would be utterly incapable, in any circumstance, of providing for their own defense.

We therefore have a clear responsibility to protect them internationally until some suitable arrangement for their protection can be made.

It is questionable whether the final disposal of the Ryukyus is a question for the Japanese peace conference. It need not necessarily be an international question at all unless it is raised in the United Nations. The Charter of the UN, referring to 'territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War', states that 'it will be a matter for subsequent agreement as to which of these territories will be brought under the trusteeship system and upon what terms.' The Charter does not state among what parties this 'subsequent agreement' is to be reached."

There is no form of trusteeship conceivable today which would give real protection to the Ryukyu islanders except a U.S. trusteeship. The experience of Formosa has revealed that a Chinese trusteeship would be worse than the former Japanese domination. The effects of a Russian trusteeship can easily be imagined. An international trusteeship, in present circumstances, would probably be inefficient and, in the long run, unsatisfactory. It would certainly become a bone of future international dissension unless it operated entirely to Russian satisfaction. A return of the islands to Japan would leave them militarily defenseless; and it is probable that they would constitute a more immediately desirable prize from the Russian standpoint than would the Japanese islands themselves.

We now have these islands firmly under our military control; we cannot be expelled from them except by major military force. I therefore see no reason why we cannot resolve at this time that we will remain there for at least a long enough period to justify treating them as a long-range responsibility. There is no need for us now to reach a definitive settlement on the Ryukyu's status by international action. At the appropriate time, the retention by the United States of facilities in the Ryukyus could be worked out in some practical manner.

Neither the base development nor the ordering of civil affairs in the islands can proceed satisfactorily until some reasonable certainty is created surrounding their future for at least the next few years.

As far as base development is concerned, there is much that should be done in the way of improvement and construction on the islands which our armed forces are unable to do or reluctant to do because of the uncertainty surrounding the political future. This has severely hampered the base development.

With respect to civil affairs, the situation is even worse. The life of the islanders was seriously shattered by military events. Except for preventing disease and unrest, we have done little to improve their situation; and what we have been able to give them has been taken, for the most part, from the odds and ends of surplus remaining in the islands. Meanwhile, the islanders continue to be subject to a series of restrictions which are becoming increasingly less justifiable as the period of hostilities recedes into the past. Foreign trade is still cut off entirely. Economic activity is still reduced between the population and the military establishment. There is no real economy among the islanders themselves. A certain degree of inflation is in progress, due partly to the smuggling in of yen from Japan (where the inflation is much worse) and partly to the fact that military government has been putting more yen into circulation than it has been taking back. While local elections have been held, there is no central legislative body and not even any provincial legislatures have been elected. Foreign travel by the islanders, or the entrance of foreigners into the islands, remains completely forbidden. There is no university in the islands. This has meant that university training for Okinawans and other Ryukyu islanders has been terminated. Thus the training of doctors, nurses, teachers, etc., practically non-existent, and the population is becoming increasingly dependent on us in these respects.

All of these conditions result from the uncertainty surrounding the political future of the islands and the natural reluctance of our authorities to make plans and institute measures which would imply a long-term U.S. control. Meanwhile, however, the conditions are becoming clearly burdensome and unjust to the inhabitants and discreditable to ourselves. The communists are beginning to take advantage of them, and are circulating propaganda point out (with some justification) that the United States has done practically nothing for permanent rehabilitation, and claiming that it will soon lose interest in the future of the islanders and that they are therefore ill-advised to waste their strength in efforts to collaborate with the Americans.

Ey and large, the islanders are still excellently disposed toward us—better, probably than any other people in the Far Eastern area. They are law-abiding, gentle and extremely cooperative. They seem to have earned the universal liking and respect of our forces stationed there.

Since we have control of the islands and responsibility for the inhabitants, and since no international arrangements have been made or suggested which could make decent provision for these people outside of U.S. control in the foreseeable future, we have a clear duty to establish creditable conditions in the islands, even though this implies unavoidably the assumption of a certain permanency of tenure on our part. The international community has no right to expect us to hear the responsibility and the expense of looking after these people unless we are able to guide their affairs in a constructive and progressive manner. If this necessitates our

laying plans on a fairly long-term basis, the international community will have to understand this and accept it. 800,000 people cannot be kept in a state of uncertainty and economic distress merely in order to demonstrate our international morality by holding ourselves in readiness to turn over the islands to someone else in the unlikely event that a favorable opportunity to do so should present itself and should find the agreement of the international community.

We should therefore resolve at this point that we are going to remain long enough in the islands to justify long-term planning on civil affairs and base development. But the question of obtaining international sanction for this policy should be given immediate attention in the Department of State. For we must be able to say, when the time comes, that we have shown every reasonable readiness to find an acceptable solution of the problem along international lines."

It was with these thoughts in mind that IZennan headed back to Washington.

When the talks with MacArthur and Draper finished, IZennan, Green, and Hessman left Tokyo on March 23 (after having been delayed more than 24 hours by bad weather). The group of weary travelers arrived in Washington, D.C. on March 25. The same day, IZennan submitted his report of recommendations on future policy toward Japan, PPS/28, telling Under Secretary Lovett that the "it is my feeling that these recommendations should form a point of departure for this Department in the effort which should be made, presumably in the National Security Council, to work out a government policy on these questions." IZennan also explained that the report represented a "unified concept" acceptable to both MacArthur and the War Department, and cautioned that, while "modifications will no doubt have to be made...fundamental alterations in individual recommendations would not only raise the prospect of disagreement with General MacArthur and the War Department, but would also ruin the concept as a whole and probably require us to seek some other one to take its place." With this caution given along with the report, an ill IZennan checked immediately into the 16th floor of the Naval Hospital in Bethesda, Maryland for a couple of weeks due to a recurrence of his pre-war malady—duodenal ulcers.

XI. THE INTRA-DEPARTMENTAL REVIEW OF PPS/28: MARCH–MAY 1948

Kennan remained away from his office until April 19 after his stay in the hospital, followed by some recuperation at his farm in East Berlin, Pennsylvania. During that time the State Department began its intra-departmental review of PPS/28, dubbed the "Kennan Report" within the U.S. government. Kennan, as we saw above, had recommended in particular that the "problem of obtaining international sanction for our perma-

nent control" of the Ryukyu Islands should be studied at once. In submitting the recommendations to Lovett, Kennan likewise had suggested that Butterworth be charged with seeing that the various opinions and comments on it are gathered and prepared for Lovett.¹⁶³ However, Carlisle H. Humelsine, Director of the Executive Secretariat, Office of the Secretary of State, explained to Butterworth and Frank G. Wisner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, that Lovett probably did not have any preferences as to who "carries on this study [but] it might be better if O[ccupied Areas, Office of] took action in conjunction with F[ar] E[ast], etc." Eventually Kennan's friend Butterworth was asked by Lovett to correlate the work of the various offices concerned with the problem.¹⁶⁴

Within the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, John M. Allison, Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs was responsible for reviewing and making comments on Kennan's paper.¹⁶⁵ Allison, who himself had just returned from a one-month trip to Japan and Korea in January, was impressed with Kennan's report telling Butterworth "I am in entire agreement with the general approach outlined in this report and I can subscribe to all of Mr. Kennan's recommendations. This report, if adopted, would give the United States a unified, consistent and constructive policy in a vital field of foreign relations." Importantly, Allison having been involved with Korea-related work in the Division, was particularly sensitive about the issue of elections in Korea and the effects a U.S. withdrawal would have in the area." His comments, which follow, thus introduced an interesting perspective on Kennan's Okinawa recommendations. Allison emphasized, in contrast to Kennan, that it was important to make known the U.S. position as early as possible because of the beneficial effects it would have in mitigating the concerns of the American withdrawal from Korea. Allison explained it this way:

I have long been disturbed by the possible reaction in the Far East and elsewhere to our military withdrawal from Korea. It has seemed to me that it would be extremely difficult to make such a withdrawal appear anything other than a retreat before Soviet pressure and that such a retreat would have grave effects on US prestige and position not only in the Orient but throughout the world. However, if prior to military withdrawal from Korea the world can know that the United States is not retreating from the Far East, I believe the possible psychological ill effects of withdrawal from Korea will in the main be averted."

Breaking with traditional policy within the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and particularly with his predecessor, Hugh Borton, Allison recommended that "immediate steps should be taken to prepare a *strategic trusteeship agreement* with the U.S. as the administrator covering Okinawa" and that this agreement should be presented to the U.N. Security Council for its concurrence after the start of diplomatic talks with members of the Far Eastern

Commission to seek their approval on the recommendations of the Kennan report.'" (Italics by author.) Until then, as we have seen, the Far Eastern Office had advocated retention by Japan, and experimented with the idea of base leasing. It had not looked favorably on ordinary trusteeships and was outright against strategic trusteeships. Allison's recommendation thus indeed represented a break in the policy of his office—a break brought about by the changing international situation and by Kennan's study of the problems in U.S. policy toward Japan and the Far East. (Allison indeed himself would come out more strongly in favor of retention by Japan later, as seen in Chapter Seven.)

An April 5 meeting of representatives from the principal Offices (and Divisions) concerned allowed the State Department to review Kennan's paper and overall State Department policy on Okinawa.¹⁶⁸ The representatives, Butterworth, Maxwell M. Hamilton, and Borton from the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, Allison, Fearey, and Marshall Green from the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, Davies from the PPS, Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs, and William I. Cargo, from the Division of Dependent Areas, met to discuss the disposition of Okinawa. A memorandum of the meeting notes that three issues were discussed: 1) the recommendation that the United States should now make a decision to remain on a long-term basis in Okinawa; 2) the question of the need for a public announcement on such a move; and 3) the type and form of control to be established.

Butterworth, it seems, was not so sure about Allison's recommendations introduced above. He stated at this meeting that he thought the military was "under some misapprehensions as to the possible values of strategic trusteeship as opposed to ordinary trusteeship," thus probably suggesting that he was not willing to support Allison's stronger call for a full strategic trusteeship agreement. Butterworth requested that the Office of United Nations Affairs examine the issue and the advantages of a normal trusteeship, including the safeguards on bases and inspections.

For legal and political reasons, Rusk, the former professor of international politics and law (as well as having later been a Colonel in the Army), questioned both the concept of a trusteeship for Okinawa and the timing of an announcement.¹⁶⁹ He argued that "legal doubts" would probably be held by "many interested states" over trusteeship arrangements before a peace conference, recalling the difficulties that had arisen at the time the United States sought a trusteeship agreement for the Japanese Mandated Islands. Rusk explained that "in the case of Okinawa, the argument of the United States for a definitive settlement in advance of the peace negotiations would be on much weaker legal grounds," and added that "it would be unfortunate to have opposition in the General Assembly...on the part of states who had legal doubts in addition to the opposition which might be expected from the Soviet Bloc and possibly China and other Far Eastern

States." Rusk's doubts about a trusteeship can probably be traced to three factors. The first one concerns the difficulty he was having at the exact same time (April 1948) with the plans for a trusteeship and partition plans for Israel and Palestine in the United Nations. A second factor was perhaps what one of his biographers calls a "deep philosophical belief in self-rule and a practical conviction born of his military service that colonialism was an anachronism bound to be swept away in the postwar world."¹⁷⁰ Rusk, a biographer writes, "saw colonialism as a moral issue as well, and believed that the principles for which both the United States and the United Nations stood demanded the adoption of policies in favor of independence and self-government for colonial areas."''' A third factor, which became more pronounced later, and is explored in the next chapter when Rusk became Assistant Secretary of State for Far East Affairs, was his strong desire not to disrupt or in any way damage friendly, postwar U.S.-Japan relations.

Rusk suggested that if the future of Okinawa was not to be definitely decided upon, the following steps could be taken: 1) The United States would remain in Okinawa until the peace treaty; 2) The United States would ask at a peace conference for an ordinary trusteeship over Okinawa; 3) The United States would seek approval of the trusteeship agreement in the General Assembly, the terms of which would provide that the Okinawans could determine their own future status at a subsequent point (including but not limited to a return to Japan). In any case, Rusk stated that he believed a trusteeship would not be the "most appropriate vehicle for a settlement" if the U.S. government was now determined that Okinawa should be returned to Japan in the future because that would be "somewhat incompatible" with the objectives of the United Nations Charter. When someone (unidentified) suggested that the United States could indicate now in a public announcement that it would request a trusteeship over Okinawa at a peace conference, Minister Hamilton of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs countered that it was "preferable to leave...unspecified^x for the time being the form of control America would retain over Okinawa. "The fundamental question," observed another participant, "was whether the military authorities could not achieve all that was necessary by a decision taken now by the United States Government to remain for an indefinite time in Okinawa and whether any considerable advantage would be gained by a public announcement at this time." Recognizing that this indeed was the question, the participants agreed that "a Presidential decision stating that the armed services should proceed on the assumption that the United States will remain in Okinawa for an indefinite period" was needed at this stage. The group also agreed that "under this conception the *status quo* would be maintained until the peace treaty," the status quo being that the American forces would continue to occupy Okinawa but that the United States would not attempt to reach a final settlement prior to the peace conference.

At the end of the meeting, the participants agreed that the Office of United Nations Affairs would prepare a paper on the types of international arrangements in which the United States would be able to establish its position in Okinawa on a long-term basis. The memorandum of the meeting stated that this study, after comments and approval by the group, would represent the group's "recommendations as to a State Department position regarding Okinawa."

XII. THE UNA PAPER ON THE DISPOSITION OF THE RYUKYUS

Later that same day, Rusk assigned William I. Cargo of the Division of Dependent Areas the task of drafting the memorandum on Okinawa. Cargo, who had a great deal of respect for Rusk (later describing him as an "absolutely wonderful man to work for"), eagerly set about his task despite their office being busy with preparations for the Second Special Session of the UN General Assembly (which was to take up the question of Palestine and saw in the middle of it the unexpected recognition of Israel by President Truman).¹⁷² Cargo in turn had his colleague William L. Yeomans, an Army veteran of five years (1941-1946) then with the Division of Dependent Areas, assist him in the drafting. The two came up with an 18-page position paper after discussing its contents with Robert Fearey, who was in agreement with its conclusions.¹⁷³ It was appropriate that Fearey was consulted and almost assured that he would agree—their paper was in many respects based on his own paper (and those of his predecessors) of 1946-1947, as seen in [Figure 3-1](#). The April 8 draft of the UNA paper set forth the conclusions reached at the meeting three days before, expanding on the options the United States might want to pursue in acquiring control over facilities in the Ryukyu Islands. The paper recommended that the State Department should take the position that:

1. The United States should decide at this to retain facilities in the Ryukyus on a long-range basis, and the military establishments should be directed by the President to proceed on this assumption.
2. Pending a peace settlement with Japan or any other international settlement respecting the Ryukyus satisfactory to the United States, the *status quo* with respect to the Ryukyus should be maintained, that is, United States forces should remain in occupation of the Ryukyus, but the United States should not attempt to reach a definitive settlement by international action. However, at an appropriate time, friendly states should be informed of the intention of the United States to remain in the area under suitable international arrangements.
3. At the appropriate time, the retention by the United States of facilities in the Ryukyus should be worked out by one of the following methods:

- a. Ordinary trusteeship over the Ryukyus Islands south of 29°N. Lat. with the United States as the administering authority;
- b. Leased base arrangements with Japan; or
- c. Facilities for the United States in the Ryukyus as a part of a long-term Four-Power security guarantee of Japan.

The memorandum importantly notes that the authors chose to use the phrase "on a long-range basis," rather than the words "permanent" or "permanently" as in Kennan's PPS/28 recommendation. Their objections were that the use of the phrase "the United States...intends to retain permanently the facilities" in the Ryukyus "carries the connotation of a permanent territorial acquisition," which could not be said to be the State Department's position, nor that of the U.S. government as a whole. Thus, the memorandum continues, "It is believed the desired results can be obtained by long-term lease arrangements or trusteeship arrangements which would be of indefinite length and require the consent of the United States to their termination." As a result, Cargo and Yeomans note, the memorandum adopted to change the phrase entirely.

One of the purposes of the memorandum was to examine each type of method for retaining facilities in the Ryukyus. Since the discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the second option (leased bases), considered earlier by Fearey, has already been introduced earlier in the chapter, and option C (bases for use in a Four-Power security guarantee for Japan) was never really seriously considered, Cargo's examination of the advantages of an ordinary trusteeship will be introduced here.

Cargo had spent a good deal of his professional life at the State Department dealing with United Nations issues, and in particular the Trusteeship arrangements. (His own graduate study work and Ph.D. dissertation at the University of Michigan likewise had been on the Palestinian Mandate problem.¹⁷⁴) In fact it was he and another colleague, Elizabeth H. Armstrong, who wrote the feature article describing the Trusteeship System of the United Nations in the *Department of State Bulletin* in March 1947, the in-house journal published bi-weekly for State Department personnel and the general public.¹⁷⁵ Cargo, despite his youth (31), was thus perhaps one of the most knowledgeable, and therefore qualified, in the State Department to write on the advantages of an ordinary trusteeship versus a strategic trusteeship, at least regarding factual considerations and political problems with implementation.

Cargo noted that the most "important practical disadvantage" of a strategic trusteeship over the Ryukyus would be that it would require the approval of the Security Council, which, hosting the Soviet Union and China, would likely veto such an arrangement. Cargo likewise believed the United States could also "lose the sympathy with other countries due to the inherently provocative nature of a strategic trust arrangement for so populous and distant an area." The memorandum moreover argued that the

"commonly assumed advantage" of a U.S. strategic trusteeship for Okinawa, which lied in the possession of a veto in the Security Council, was "somewhat overemphasized" in view of American policy "to refrain, as far as possible, from using the veto." With the ordinary trusteeship however, Cargo explained that the ordinary trusteeship would not be subject to a veto. An ordinary trusteeship, moreover, Cargo felt would "arouse [the] least suspicion and political resistance from other states" out of all the other possible arrangements for an American base in the Ryukyus. Finally, while not addressing the security considerations in any detail, Cargo did explain precedents existed—all of the nine ordinary trusteeship agreements concluded to date contained clauses that allowed in essence the safeguarding of military control.¹⁷⁶ The phrase Cargo suggested the United States employ if it sought an ordinary trusteeship would be as follows: "Subject to a general agreement for the control of armaments including inspection, all bases or installations which may be established by the administering authority shall be regarded in the same manner, and made subject, as determined by the administering authority, to the same controls, as bases and installations established in its own territory." With this provision, the memorandum suggested, the United States "would have lost nothing militarily through the establishment of an ordinary instead of strategic trusteeship while the political disadvantages of the step would have been materially reduced." While not Cargo's fault, the only problem—in reality the fundamental problem—with the study on ordinary trusteeships was that it still essentially went against the desire and actual policy to date as formed in the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (and its predecessors) to see the Ryukyu Islands retained by Japan. In any case, the memorandum was clear in repeating that the United States should not attempt at this point to seek international recognition for the retention of facilities. After Rusk and Gerig reviewed the memorandum by Cargo and Yeomans, a revised draft (of similar contents) was completed on April 21.¹⁷⁷

Subsequently on May 21 at Butterworth's request, Borton called on Cargo's colleagues, Elizabeth Armstrong and Bill Yeomans, in the Division of Dependent Areas to explain that the Office of Far Eastern Affairs thought that a phrase suggesting the alternative to ordinary trusteeships (in other words a strategic trusteeship) should be retained in the recommendations because it had been originally recommended by the JCS and that it would be "unrealistic" not to include it in the paper.¹⁷⁸ Later that afternoon, Yeomans and Armstrong met with Rusk to explain Borton's request. According to Yeoman's account of the meeting, Borton had previously raised the very same problem to which Yeomans had responded that since the paper was a statement of the State Department's position, a phrase calling for a strategic trusteeship should not be included in the paper "unless the Department was fully prepared to accept such a solution." Rusk agreed that "at the present time strategic trusteeship seemed undesirable" and sug-

gested that the Division of Dependent Areas work out a compromise with the Office of Far Eastern Affairs using one of the following two formulas: 1) a statement calling for "trusteeship" without stating the type of trusteeship; or 2) a statement recommending ordinary trusteeship or the "less preferable strategic trusteeship," which would make clear its preference.

Both Yeomans and Armstrong next went to see Borton to seek a compromise along the lines of one of the formulas suggested by Rusk. They presented him first with the first compromise to which Borton reportedly agreed "without enthusiasm." Borton still felt, he explained, that the military would be reluctant to accept such a recommendation without specifying a "strategic trusteeship." Borton went on to explain that his office did not want to debate the problem with the JCS at this point and that was the reason why his office had sought to have ordinary and strategic trusteeships be listed on an equal basis among the alternatives. Armstrong and Yeomans pointed out however that by listing the strategic trusteeship alternative "on the same footing" with the ordinary trusteeship, it would be implied that such an option was "equally acceptable" to the State Department—which was not in fact the position of the Department. Thus, they warned, the State Department "might thereby find itself at a disadvantage in discussing this matter with the JCS" because the JCS "could point out that according to [our] position paper," a strategic trusteeship "was a distinct possibility." The second compromise was not even suggested, Yeoman's memorandum of conversation notes, because Borton agreed to try out the first compromise on Butterworth.

At the same time that report was being finished, Butterworth finished collecting the comments from other offices concerning Kennan's recommendations in PPS/28. The first set of comments to come back was from Charles E. Saltzman, the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas. Saltzman, who had experience in occupied Austria, admitted that while he "was in general agreement with the fundamental conclusions of the report," he pointed out some problems he had with Kennan's views on Okinawa.¹⁷⁹ Saltzman first notes that the problem of Okinawa had been under consideration "for some time" within the department. Kennan's recommendations "may be correct," Saltzman wrote, but the recommendations were "not supported by all the arguments advanced." Specifically, the Assistant Secretary commented that

The fact that they are utterly incapable of their own defense does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that we should volunteer it. It is not clear that only a U.S. trusteeship would give protection to the islanders. It is also not clear that the trusteeship must be strategic in nature in order to protect the islanders. It might be difficult to sustain the position that our responsibility to the inhabitants does not permit us to settle for anything less than a trusteeship. If we wish to keep the islands we should recognize that our decision is taken in the interest of the U.S., not of the islanders.

In any case Saltzman did agree that "long range plans" should be begun for putting the islands on "as close to a self-supporting basis as possible" — local governments established, education provided, an export industry begun, and travel restrictions removed. The State Department, he thus suggested, should support Army requests for funds for these purposes because "such a program does not imply permanent tenure," but it is "consistent with our duty and own interest."

Ernest A. Gross, the Legal Adviser to the State Department, also examined Kennan's recommendations." Gross noted the several options already contemplated by the United States. He also introduced the argument that America could assert its claim to Okinawa, or bases there, "by right of conquest and could take steps to annex the conquered territory" an idea which he admitted did not take into account the political considerations involved. In any case, Gross noted that "from the legal point of view...pending an effective international agreement concerning Okinawa—to which the consent of the United States would be necessary—the United States is entitled to continue its occupation of Okinawa." This was a view already accepted and being worked into formal policy.

Butterworth collected the various opinions and comments on Kennan's report and submitted to Under Secretary Lovett on April 16 a revised version of the recommendations section of that report." Butterworth suggested that upon Lovett's approval, the revised paper be presented as the State Department position to Under Secretary of War Draper for his information and consideration." Following the agreement of the War Department, Butterworth stated that the recommendations section of the Kennan report be submitted to the National Security Council as a State Department policy paper. It is to this debate that we now turn.

XIII. THE FORMULATION OF NSC 13

Following "comparatively minor" revisions to Kennan's paper (which was redesignated as PPS/28/2 on May 25), the PPS study was submitted on June 2 to NSC Executive Secretary Rear Admiral Sidney W. Souers. He in turn referred it to the NSC Staff "for consideration and the preparation of a report to the NSC later that same day." With this submission to the NSC as a reference material, PPS/28/2 was given the new designation of NSC 13 (without of course any changes in its contents)." In this new version, the phrase (Paragraph 3) regarding "The Ryukyu Islands"(instead of simply "Okinawa" as in the earlier PPS/28) read as follows:

The United States Government should make up its mind at this point that it intends to retain on a *long-term* basis the facilities at Oltinawa, and the base there should be developed accordingly. The United States Government agencies responsible for administering the islands should promptly formulate and carry out a program on a *long-term* basis for the economic and social well-being and, to the extent practicable, for the

eventual self-support of the natives. At the proper time, international sanction should be obtained by the means then most feasible for the United States *long-term* strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29 degrees N. (Italics by author.)'''

Of particular significance, as shown by the italicized words above, is the fact that PPS/28/2 did not call for the "permanent" retention of facilities or the "permanent strategic control" over the Ryukyu Islands, as PPS/28 did, but rather the retention of facilities on a "long-term basis" and of "long-term strategic control" over the islands. This important change in wording was brought about by the discussions in April and May on the Kennan Report.

Upon its submission to the NSC Staff in June, the State Department and the military entered into further discussions on the contents of the Ryukyu Islands paragraph. Okinawa's unclear legal status would present administrative and budgetary problems from the beginning. Of these budgetary problems, programs for base development and the economic welfare of the inhabitants were necessary to tackle.

As Kennan's paper was being prepared to be submitted to Souers, Allison and Fearey were being made aware of the economic situation in Okinawa. On May 28, they met with two Okinawa residents (then living in Hawaii) who were members of the Okinawa Relief and Rehabilitation Foundation, Inc. They explained that the Okinawans were in a "serious plight" and that overcrowding on limited arable land was a problem.¹⁸⁶ Fearey, the long time observer of the Okinawan political and economic situation was no doubt aware of the situation. The problem was how to release funds to pay for rehabilitation in Okinawa—still legally a part of Japan. Indeed, it was not only future funds for rehabilitation that were a problem, but the present occupation costs that needed attention. Particularly, MacArthur was aware of these problems and made a point of bringing attention to it in much of his correspondence with the Army Department and State. MacArthur essentially was critical of any arrangement that would continue to make Okinawa dependent on Japan financially. Indeed, as the head of the Allied Occupation, he was for a long time concerned about the economic drain (without reimbursement) on the Japanese economy that the occupation of the Ryukyu Islands was causing. MacArthur, happy over the NSC report relating to Okinawa, hoped that the each of the Armed Services and other government agencies would receive their funding for programs on Okinawa directly from Congress.¹⁸⁷

One of the steps taken by MacArthur, as Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command (based in Tokyo), to solve the problem of funding for the forces and rehabilitation in Okinawa in view of "the special status of the Ryukyus as occupied territory" (as well as "a changed logistical situation"), was to order on July 14, 1948 the separation of the Ryukyus Command from the Philippines-Ryukyus Command (PHILRYCOM) and the establishment of a

separate Army command in Okinawa to be known as RYCOM (effected on August 1) and placed RYCOM directly under his command as Commander in Chief, Far East.¹⁸⁸ Sebald, when reporting on this general order, noted that it was hoped by this arrangement that the establishment of a separate command (under the present commander, Major General William W. Eagles) and making it answerable to MacArthur directly "w[ould] facilitate solution of the complex strategic and economic problems of the Ryukyu Islands." It would—but only by highlighting more that these problems existed.

With the establishment of new command, MacArthur on September 6 (1948) also created the Ryukyus Military Government Section within the General Headquarters, Far East Command, to advise the Commander-in-Chief, Far East.¹⁸⁹ Brigadier General John Weckerling was asked to become the first chief of the section. Less than one week after assuming this position, Weckerling was already on his way (leaving September 11) to the Ryukyu Islands for two weeks to observe first-hand the situation regarding the military government and prospects for economic rehabilitation there.

Meanwhile, meeting at the Pentagon, State and Army representatives discussed the ability to get the necessary funds for the economic rehabilitation of the Ryukyus. In the FY 1949 Government and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA) request for Japan, a small, "separate rehabilitation program" was made for the Ryukyus. However GARIOA funds were limited. Likewise the Army representative doubted the legality of these expenditures—because the Ryukyu Islands were still technically a part of Japan.¹⁹⁰ The State Department representatives admitted here that, "while legally the Ryukyus were still an integral part of Japan current thinking is that they will probably be separated from Japan at the Peace Treaty."

State's acceptance of the separation of the Ryukyus seems, in any case, to be based on concerns for the decreasing appropriations for the Ryukyu's rehabilitation funds (cut to 15 percent, or only 2.4 million dollars, of what was originally requested), the rapidly worsening situation in the Ryukyus, and the overall inability to explain or defend the administration of the islands before the world. In a memorandum written the next day (July 27), Fearey, one of the four State Department participants at the Pentagon meeting, wrote his boss Allison that "In view of the more deplorable conditions in the Ryukyus than in Japan, and our near decision to remain there indefinitely with all the responsibilities that would entail, it would seem that the Ryukyu's appropriation should at least not be cut more than the other areas'...If we are going to get more money for the Ryukyus, in line with our recent discussions, now would seem to be the time to act, while there is still some chance of shifting some of the funds for the fiscal year back to the Ryukyus."¹⁹¹

Acting Secretary of State Lovett went ahead and requested the NSC Staff in late September to submit NSC 13 (now designated NSC 13/1) to the

NSC for its consideration at the request of Acting Secretary of State Lovett.'" On submitting NSC 1311, the Acting NSC Executive Secretary, James S. Lay, Jr., explained that the report was "a modification by the NSC Staff, with the advice and assistance of representatives of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and of the National Security Resources Board and the Central Intelligence Agency," of the original State Department paper.¹⁹³ The new version of the paper, now given the designation of NSC 1311, was taken up at the NSC's 22nd meeting held on September 30.¹⁹⁴ The day before, Admiral Leahy submitted a last-minute summation of a JCS memorandum on the report to Secretary of Defense Forrestal.¹⁹⁵ The summation stated that while the JCS argued that indeed Paragraph 5 (of NSC 1311) was consistent with the recommendations they had made in September 1947, the JCS also believed that Marcus Island and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan should be put under long-term strategic control (which they had argued at that time). In explaining this, it was pointed out that the JCS considered that "the developing world situation in the past year has lent additional weight to the reasoning in which all of these recommendations were based." Likewise the JCS recommend that U.S. control "in order that it may serve its purpose, be at least as explicit and firm as that which has been obtained under our strategic trusteeship for the ex-Japanese Mandates."

The NSC took up this question at its September 30 meeting and agreed to it, "subject to final concurrence by the Department of State."¹⁹⁶ Thus, final action was not taken immediately on this question (as well as on others, such as the Far East Commission and Japanese Reparations). The NSC took up the question of the Ryukyus at the next meeting, the 23rd Meeting, held on October 7.¹⁹⁷ Here, the NSC voted to accept NSC 1311 as NSC 1312 and recommended that "the President approve...the report and direct that it be implemented by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the [U.S.] government under the coordination of the Secretary of State."'" Importantly, reflecting the difficulty in reaching agreement on matters discussed below, the paragraph (now Paragraph 5) on the Ryukyu Islands was not included at this point in NSC 1312; these recommendations were submitted separately later.'" President Truman in any case gave his immediate approval to NSC 1312 on October 9.²⁰⁰

Lovett subsequently gave his concurrence to Souers in memorandum form on October 26.²⁰¹ In his memorandum, Lovett also explained that approval of Paragraph 5 regarding the Ryukyus was not given at the 23rd NSC meeting because the JCS recommendation to the Secretary of Defense (dated September 29) suggested that Marcus Island and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan should also be retained under long-term strategic control in addition to the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° North Latitude. Likewise Lovett related that the JCS had further recommended that U.S. control be "as explicit" as possible in the NSC paper. However, Lovett

explained to Souers that while the State Department agreed with the JCS request for provision to be made regarding long-term strategic control of Marcus Island and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan, it regarded the revised paragraph "as the firmest and most explicit statement that can be made at this time since no arrangements for the disposition of former Japanese territories can be final until the Peace Treaty."²⁰² With this, the revised paragraph (now given the title, "The Ryukyu, Nanpo and Marcus Islands") as forwarded by Lovett appeared as follows:

The United States should make up its mind at this point that it intends to retain on a long-term basis the facilities at Okinawa *and such other facilities as are deemed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be necessary in the Ryukyu Islands south of 29 °N., Marcus Island and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan. The base on Okinawa should be immediately developed.* The United States agencies responsible for administering the above-mentioned islands should promptly formulate and carry out a program on a long-term basis for the economic and social well-being, and to the extent practicable, for the eventual self-support of the natives. At the proper time, international sanction should be obtained by the means then most feasible for United States long-term strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29°N., *Marcus Island and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan.*²⁰ (Italics by author.)

Acting Secretary Lovett in any case wrote to Defense Secretary Forrestal (who had just arrived back from a visit to Europe) on December 2 to request, as directed by NSC 13/2, that the National Military Establishment assume responsibility for implementation of Paragraph 5.²⁰⁴ The State Department had been designated the "coordinating agency for implementation of NSC 1312" with its approval by the president on October 9 and thus it was up to Lovett, as Acting Secretary, to notify the various departments and agencies to be responsible for actually implementing the recommendations.²⁰⁵

Forrestal responded a week later on December 9 acknowledging his agreement "at least unless and until another administering agency is designated, that the National Military Establishment, as the present occupying authority, should be responsible for the formulation and carrying out of a program for the economic and social well-being and, to the extent practicable, for the eventual self-support of the natives of the Ryukyu, Nanpo and Marcus Islands."²⁰⁶ The Secretary of Defense did question however whether it was the intention of Lovett to have the NME be responsible for the last sentence of NSC 1312 (5) concerning the securing of international sanction—a role, Forrestal felt, was not for the NME—for U.S. long-term control of those areas. Lovett replied on December 17 that Forrestal was correct and then asked Forrestal to confirm "the belief that there also had been assigned within the NME responsibility for the determination of those

facilities, other than on Okinawa, which might be required and for the development of the base on Okinawa."²⁰⁷ Forrestal's affirmative response came shortly thereafter.

The State Department and the Army however had anticipated problems early on however. At a November 2 meeting between representatives of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (Bishop, Bond, Fearey, and Green) and Colonel Riggs from the Army's Civil Affairs Division and Lieutenant Colonels W. W. Milner and Vestal, Green observed that "considerable difficulty was foreseen in carrying out the recommendations on the Ryukyu Islands and on occupation costs."²⁰⁸ Specifically, Col. Riggs pointed out that the Army Comptroller's Office, responsible for the budget and financial matters, would be "very reluctant to authorize funds for constructing installations of a permanent character...until the U.S. had clear title." Riggs thus stated that he regarded it as "unfortunate that Paragraph 5 (of NSC 1312) was put forward as a statement of intention rather than as a mandatory provision." The participants concluded that the "the government could expect very little initiative or willingness on the part of SCAP to cut down occupation costs to the extent desired." Thus, as Colonel Vestal suggested, the "only practicable way to meet this problem" would be to require SCAP submit to the Japanese government (which was responsible for covering the occupation costs) an annual budget request (reviewed first by the Army Comptroller's Office) for those Japanese goods and services required by the Occupation forces.

The problem more specifically resided in the fact that Okinawa was still legally a part of Japan. The Army Department pointed out that the U.S. government could not pay for the economic rehabilitation of the Ryukyu Islands while it was still a part of Japan. Because of this, Secretary Royall proposed the following amendments (as shown italicized) to NSC 13/2 (5) in mid-December.

The United States intends to retain on a long-term basis the facilities at Oltinawa and such other facilities as are deemed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be necessary in the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° N., Marcus Island and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan. The military *bases at or near* Oltinawa should be developed accordingly. The United States agencies responsible for administering the above-mentioned islands should promptly formulate and carry out a program on a long-term basis for the economic and social well-being, and to the extent practicable, for the eventual reduction to a minimum of the deficit in the economy of the natives. At the proper time, international sanction should be obtained by the means then most feasible for United States long-term strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29°N. Marcus Island and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan.

The United States has determined that it is now in the United States national interest to alleviate the burden now borne by those of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° N. incident to their contribution to occupation costs, to the extent necessary to establish political and economic security. While it would not be in the interest of the United States to make a public announcement on this matter; and while it is not believed appropriate to obtain international sanction of this intent at this time, the United States national policy toward the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29°N. requires that the United States Armed Forces and other Government agencies stationed therein pay their way to the extent necessary and practical to carry out the above-mentioned program for the economic and social well-being and towards eventual reduction to a minimum of the deficit in the economy of the natives in this area beginning sixty days after this date, and that these Islands must then no longer be financially dependent upon or obligated to any other occupied area."

Lovett accepted the Army Department's proposed amendment on January 17 (1949) and subsequently President Truman gave his approval to the new Paragraph 5 two weeks later on February 1." On May 6, the amended version of NSC 1313 was adopted by the National Security Council at its 23rd meeting, almost two years after the initial review of Japan policy was begun, as seen in the following table.²¹¹

XIV. CONCLUSIONS

Over the coming months, discussions would move on to the more technical aspects of the military government Okinawa. One of the major problems was of course appropriations for the rehabilitation of the islands as well as the construction of military bases and other facilities there. On April 1 the military forces in the Ryukyus were placed on a "pay-as-you-go" basis, as per the amended Paragraph 5 (approved on February 1) which required such arrangements be initiated within sixty days.²¹² Also begun were discussions on the establishment of "self-government in the islands."²¹³

Attempts to review the economic and political situation in the Ryukyu Islands, particularly the state of military government there, reached an all-time height in 1949 as seen in the following table (Table 6-2), showing the visits of officials to Okinawa.

Table 6-1

Formation of NSC 13 (With Particular Reference to Okinawa)	
<i>Date</i>	<i>Study/Action</i>
5-Aug-47	Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan
14-Oct-47	PPS/10, Results of Planning Staff Study of Questions Involved in Staff Study
15-Oct-47	PPS/10/1, Special Recommendation on Ultimate Disposition of the Ryukyus
14-Mar-48	Kennan Letter to Marshall from Manila
25-Mar-48	PPS/28, Recommendations With Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan
5-Apr-47	Discussions held within State Department on the "Kennan Report"
26-May-48	PPS/28/2 (same title)
2-Jun-48	PPS/28/2 Referred to NSC for Consideration, Becoming NSC 13 (same title)
24-Sep-48	NSC 13/1 Introduced for Discussion by NSC
7-Oct-48	NSC 13/2 Agreed to by NSC with Exception of Paragraph 5 on Okinawa
26-Oct-48	NSC 13/2 (5) Agreed to by NSC
5-Nov-48	NSC 13/2 (5) Approved by President Truman
22-Dec-48	Army Amendment to NSC 13/2 (5) Introduced
17-Jan-49	Army Amendment to NSC 13/2 (5) Agreed to by Acting Secretary Lovett
1-Feb-49	Army Amendment to NSC 13/2 (5) Approved by President Truman
6-May-49	NSC 13/3 Approved in Full by President Truman

Table 6-2

Visits to Okinawa by Foreign Service Officers, State Department Officials, and Senior Military Personnel				
Date	Official	Agency	Purpose (Survey)	
December 1946	Overton	Yokohama C	State of Military Occupation in Ryukyus	
November 3-4, 1947	Sebald and Bond	POLAD/State	State of Military Occupation in Ryukyus	
March 11-12, 1948	Kennan and Schuyler	State/Army	Evaluation of Strategic Need	
April, 1948	Overton	Yokohama CG	Conditions on Okinawa	
September 11-25, 1948	Weckerling	Ryukyu MGS	State of Military Occupation in Ryukyus	
November 4-5, 1948	unknown (Overton)	POLAD	U.S. Policies in the Ryukyu Islands	
January, 1949	Pfeiffer	Yokohama CG	Present Status of Occupation of Okinawa	
February 14-18, 1949	Boehringer	POLAD	Latest Developments in the Ryukyus	
March, 1949	Craig	Army Inspect	Conditions on Okinawa	
March 21-26, 1949	Kline	Yokohama CG	Observations on Okinawa	
April, 1949	Dellinger	Army	Military Government in Okinawa	
May 13-24, 1949	Overton	Yokohama CG	Conditions on Okinawa	
June 1-2, 1949	Oliver	State (consult)	Conditions on Okinawa	
September 3-7, 1949	Voorhees	Army	State of Military Occupation in Ryukyus	
September, 1949	Vickery	Army	Agricultural Mission	
October 1949	Nold	Army/Air Force	Military Construction Requirements	
October 1949	Collins	Army	Military Government in Okinawa	
October 15-29, 1949	Magistretti	Yokohama CG	Conditions on Okinawa	
November, 1949	Martino/Norvell	Army	Economic Planning/Construction Projects	
January, 1950	Sebald and Jessup	POLAD/State	Present Status of Occupation of Okinawa	
January 1950	JCS	JCS	Conditions on Okinawa/Security Requirements	

The trip by Douglas L. Oliver, a Harvard anthropologist specializing on the Pacific Islands and Adviser to the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, to Japan and the Ryukyus in late May and early June for example symbolized the attention the State Department and the government were giving to the problems there.'" Oliver's report of his trip and observations formed the basis of a directive on a new occupation policy toward the Ryukyus, a draft that would later be used by the newly appointed Commanding General, Ryukyus Command, Major General Josef R. Sheetz to guide his reforms in the islands (and eventually would be approved by MacArthur with some minor changes on December 5, 1950).²¹⁵ Oliver also recommended (as per his instructions to consider the occupation goals and future forms of government by the U.S.) that "if U.S. strategic interests permit, the sovereignty and administration of the Ryukyus should be returned to Japan."²¹⁶ The reasons for this observation, Oliver records, is as follows:

The Ryukyans are thoroughly Japanese, and separate from Japan will always require large subsidies. An effective job of civil administration will be very difficult at best, and without a friendly and loyal population extraordinary policy measures will be necessary to guard against espionage and sabotage. Methods should therefore be fully explored of relying upon Japanese friendliness to the United States, with possibility of resuming direct control if developments made it necessary.

Oliver believed, in other words, that retention by Japan of the Ryukyu Islands was best. Indeed he believed that "the establishment of a separate Ryukyuan Culture [would be] based upon erroneous historical and ethnological assumptions and is out of the question." Oliver argued that "the wisest course therefore, if U.S. administration is to be continued, is to permit the Ryukyans to link their economic and cultural developments with Japan's. To do this while safeguarding our strategic interests will require great administrative skill applied in the form of wise, just and sympathetic rule." Oliver's recommendation that the NCS decision to "retain" the Ryukyus should undergo review (suggesting the possibility that the United States could secure its strategic interests while returning the islands to Japan) seems to have sounded alarms in Butterworth's head. Butterworth, who worked with Kennan and others from almost the very beginning on the review of Japan policy, noted in a memorandum to Deputy to the Assistant Secretary Robert W. West that Oliver's latter recommendation "call[ed] for careful consideration in view of its far reaching implications." Butterworth's cautiousness was likely due to a concern not to upset at this point the fragile balance struck with the JCS over Okinawa policy: immediate development of the bases and local economy (which would suit strategic needs) and delay of a final resolution of the politically and diplomatically difficult question disposition of the Ryukyu

Islands.'" This balance would necessarily begin to shake when the discussions for the peace treaty began as seen in the next chapter.

With the approval of NSC 1313, a consensus on Okinawa policy was temporarily reached within the U.S. government due to the realization that Japan's internal stability and safety and external security were vital to America's own security in the emerging Cold War. Okinawa was recognized as a strategically important in this calculation as a deterrent factor, as a base for military action were that necessary, and as a base and territory that had to be kept out of the hands of the Soviet Union and its soon-to-be-alliance partner, Communist China. The United States, it was decided, would develop military facilities in Okinawa as well as rehabilitate the local economy with the intention of retaining long-term use of the islands. Symbolizing the difficulty expected vis-a-vis the international community, the question of international recognition was left to be resolved at a later date—namely that of the still undetermined peace conference for Japan. In reality it was not only the question of international recognition and Japanese agreement that presented a problem—the ability to satisfy both the strategic requirements of the U.S. military and the political and diplomatic considerations of the State Department, as seen in the next chapter, would prove to be an equally challenging task.

NOTES

1. A shorter version of this chapter appeared as "Joji F. Kenan, PPS, to Oltinawa: Beikoku no Oltinawa Seisaku Kettei Katei (George F. Kennan, the Policy Planning Staff, and U.S. Policy-malting toward Oltinawa), 1947-1949," *Kokusai Seiji* (International Relations), No. 120 (February 1999), 28-56.

2. At the time, Secretary of State Byrnes was in Paris for the conference on the peace treaties for five of the former Axis countries. See "Memorandum of Conversation on Peace Treaty With Japan (August 23, 1946)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.0011 [Peace]/8-2346), RG 59.

3. Reischauer's memoirs note that the Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas was set up in February (actually April 8, 1946) to better coordinate U.S. Occupation policy in East Asia and Europe. Two secretariats, one for Germany-Austria and the other for Japan-Korea, were set up under the Assistant Secretary. Reischauer, because of his previous extensive Japan experience (including having been born in Japan) and knowledge of the country, was made chief of the latter secretariat (and much later, Ambassador to Japan from 1961 to 1966). See Reischauer, *op. cit.*, 108; and for organizational information, see United States Department of State, *Register of the Department of State* (December 1, 1946), (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1947), 5. Boston's memoirs from this time mention that at first he "had some apprehension lest a career army officer might look at diplomatic problems from a narrow point of view. It soon became apparent, however, that such was not to be the case with General Hilldring. Time and again, when a new problem arose in SWNCC, he would first ask the Office of Far Eastern

Affairs for its recommendations, which he invariably accepted. He also proved to be most effective in persuading his colleagues on SWNCC to adopt our suggestions." See *Borton Memoirs*, 268.

4. "Memorandum of Conversation (August 23, 1946)."

5. "Memorandum from Borton to Vincent on Research Preparations for Peace Treaty (August 27, 1946)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.0011-PW-Peace/8-2346), RG 59. Another enclosed memorandum ("Research Preparation for the Peace Settlement with Japan") is attached to it, directed to Borton from Warren S. Hunsberger, in the Division of Research for Far East, which outlines previous studies done within the division since the fall of 1945 on the peace settlement for Japan. Little progress was made however, according to the memorandum, due to "heavy pressure upon the limited research staff of other more urgent work...Consequently, no concerted effort has been possible in the direction of studies for the peace settlement with Japan."

6. "Peace Treaty with Japan (October 25, 1946)," Peace Treaty 1947 File, Eox 4, Records of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (hereafter ONA Records), RG 59; "Memorandum by Eorton on Drafting the Peace Treaty for Japan (June 25, 1948)," Untitled Folder, Eox 4, Records Relating to the Japanese Peace Treaty and Japanese Security Treaty, 1946-1952, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, RG 59.

7. *Borton Memoirs*, 289.

8. "Minutes of January 17, 1947 Meeting of Working Group on Japan Treaty," Eox 5, ONA Records, RG 59.

9. Emmerson, a career Foreign Service Officer, was, as mentioned above, special assistant in the Division of Japanese Affairs. Emmerson had extensive pre-war experience in Japan and was, according to his memoirs, after U. Alexis Johnson, the second American Foreign Service Officer to arrive in Japan once the occupation began in early September 1945. He left Japan to return to Washington in January 1946. In mid-1947, he was sent to Moscow to replace John P. Davies who came to work for the Policy Planning Staff of the State Department (see below). See John K. Emmerson, *The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978), 249-253, 273, 286.

10. "Memorandum from Penfield to Gross on Memorandum on the Disposition of the Ryukyus (March 18, 1947)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.0011 PW-Peace/3-1847), RG 59.

11. "Memorandum on the Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands (annotated as November 25, 1946), Roll 5, Microfilm C0044, ONA Records, RG 59. For an identical but later dated copy of the memorandum, see "Memorandum on the Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands (annotated as January 10, 1947)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.0011 PW-Peace/3-1847), RG 59. For praise of the memorandum, see "Memorandum from Penfield to Gross on Memorandum on the Disposition of the Ryukyus (March 18, 1947)," *op. cit.*

12. "Memorandum on the Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands (annotated as November 25_1946)."

13. "Memorandum from Penfield to Gross (March 18, 1947)."

14. "Memorandum from Gross to Penfield (March 24, 1947)," *Ibid.*
15. "Memorandum from Fearey to Vincent on Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands (April 7, 1947)," Ryukyus—Old Folder, Box 4, ONA Subject File 1945-1949 (Lot 56D527), RG 59. The reintroduction of the idea of joint U.S.-China ordinary trusteeship, although at one time more or less removed by the State Department as a possible choice, occurred due to the publication of the revised edition of Chiang Kai-shek's book, *China's Destiny & Chinese Economic Theory* (New York: Roy Publishers, 1947), in which Chiang belatedly reaffirms China's claim to the Ryukyu Islands and the strategic importance of the islands to China's defense. The first edition of the book, published in 1943, as noted in Chapter Three, interestingly did not make such a claim, an oversight noticed by not a few observers.
16. In July 1947, Fearey wrote a more detailed report entitled "The Economy of the Ryukyu Islands." See Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 1-A-8.
17. A memorandum written by a political economist in the Division of Chinese Affairs, Alexander Schnee, counters this argument by suggesting the possibility of a U.S. trusteeship for the Ryukyus with the islands operating "within the orbit of the Japanese economy, using either Japanese currency or a local currency closely tied in with the Japanese currency system." See "Memorandum from Schnee to Vincent on the Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands (May 12, 1947)," Central Decimal Files, 1945-1949, (890.0146/5-1247), RG 59. Miyazato uses this document to argue that the Chinese Affairs Division was against retention of the Ryukyus by Japan because Schnee calls for "a careful examination of the possibility of the transfer of sovereignty over these islands in trusteeship form to the U.S." See Miyazato, *op. cit.*, 215.
18. "Memorandum for the Chief of Staff on Okinawa (March 10, 1947)," Folder: Okinawa, Box 10, Secretary of Army Patterson, Project Decimal File, 1946-1947, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, RG 107, NA. Patterson explains somewhat derogatorily in his memorandum that because of the large population on Okinawa (or due to the repatriated back to there from mainland Japan, where many had been evacuated before the Battle of Okinawa, and other parts of the Pacific region to which they had emigrated), and because "they are very fast breeders" the population will quickly reach one million. "If we stay there," Patterson warns, "there will be demands for us to put in hospitals, schools and other facilities, and to raise the standard of living. The support of these people will be a responsibility that will run into large sums of money."
19. "Memorandum for the Secretary of War on Okinawa (March 15, 1947)," *Ibid.*
20. "Memorandum for the Chief of Staff on Okinawa (March 17, 1947)," *Ibid.*
21. "Memorandum from the Secretary of War on Okinawa (April 2, 1947)," *Ibid.*
22. Eorton, *op. cit.*, 289-290. Also see Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 31.

23. "Interview with Press Correspondents, Primarily Concerning Plan for United Nations Administration of Japan," in Government Section, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, ed., *Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1945 to September 1948*, Volume 2. (Washington, D.C. GPO, 1949; reprinted edition, Westport: Greenwood Press, 1970, 765-766). The record of the luncheon press conference incorrectly gives March 19 as the date on which it occurred. For the significance of this early call for a peace treaty; see Igarashi Takeshi, "Tainichi Kowa no Teisho to Tainichi Senryo Seisaku no Tenkan (The Calls for a Peace Treaty with Japan and Changes in Occupation Policy for Japan)," *Shiso* (Thought), October 1976, 21-43.

24. Borton states that MacArthur "was fully aware of its contents when he spoke to the press club" on March 17, calling for an early peace conference. See *Borton Memoirs*, 294. However, memoranda dated March 19 and March 20 (1947) on the draft treaty suggest that the first time MacArthur saw the draft may not have been until the latter date. See "Memorandum to Ambassador Acheson (from Bacon) with Attached copies of the following Draft Documents (March 19, 1947)," Folder: Drafts-Bacon, Box 1, ONA Records (Lot 56D527), RG 59; and "Memorandum for General MacArthur on Outline and Various Sections of Draft Treaty (March 20, 1947)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.0011 PW-Peace/3-2047), RG 59. Moreover, subsequently, Acheson sent a telegram Washington on March 21 denying accusations that he "had 'undoubtedly' informed General MacArthur...of the preparatory steps being taken for a Japanese Treaty." Acheson continued, "The last assertion is without any basis in fact. The General's interview with correspondents...occurred the day before he saw the 'committee draft'...In fact he issued no 'statement' and his answers to inquiries by correspondents were unpremeditated. He attended the luncheon on the prior understanding that no questions would be asked but on arrival was persuaded to be interviewed." See "The Political Adviser in Japan (Acheson) to the Secretary of State (March 21, 1947)," *FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6*, 452-453.

25. "Memorandum to Ambassador Acheson (from Bacon) with Attached copies of the following Draft Documents (March 19, 1947)." 1947.

26. "Memorandum for General MacArthur on Outline and Various Sections of Draft Treaty."

27. "Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan (August 5, 1947)," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3., microfiche 1-A-20. For explanations of the territorial clauses, see "Memorandum from Borton to Kennan on Sources for Clauses in Draft Treaty of Peace for Japan (August 19, 1947)," *Ibid.*, microfiche 1-A-19; "Memorandum from Borton to Davies on Background of Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty (January 30, 1948)," untitled folder, Box 4, Records Relating to Treaty of Peace, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, RG 59.

28. "Memorandum by Borton to Bohlen (August 6, 1947)," *FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6*, 478-479. A footnote provided in the *FRUS* volume notes that copies of the Borton memorandum were sent to Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, General Hilldring, Charles E. Saltzman, who was in the process of taking over for Hilldring, Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs Willard L. Thorp, Director of

the Office of Special Political Affairs Dean Rusk, W. Walton Eutterworth, about to assume the position of Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, the Legal Adviser Charles Fahy, Kennan, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations Rear Admiral E. T. Woolridge, Major General Daniel I. Noce, Chief, Civil Affairs Division, Brigadier General Cortlandt Van Rensselaer Schuyler Plans and Policy Group, Plans and Operations Division, and Warren S. Hunsberger of the Division of Research for Far East.

29. See for example "Memorandum for the Record on Japanese Peace Treaty (August 21, 1947)," 091 Japan Case 46-88, Eox 88, Decimal File, 1946-1948, Plans and Operations Division, Army Staff Division, RG 319; "Comments on the Draft Treaties with Japan," *Ibid.*; "Memorandum from Brigadier General A.W. Kissner to Chief, Plans and Policy Group, Plans and Operations Division Brigadier General Cortland V. R. Schuyler on Japanese Peace Treaty (August 29, 1947)," *Ibid.*

30. "Memorandum by Woolridge to Borton (August 18, 1947)," FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6, 495-496.

31. "Incoming Classified Message from GHQ/SCAP Tokyo to Joint Chiefs of Staff (for State Department), No. C 55205 (September 1, 1947)." On September 5, Eorton's group in turn undertook an in-depth analysis of MacArthur's comments and sent its conclusions first to the PPS and then on to Brigadier General Charles E. Saltzman, who had just succeeded Hilldring as Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas on August 15. The Working Group divided its critique in three parts, roughly corresponding with the comments MacArthur made. It stated that:

a) The Working Group's recommendation that the Ryukyus be retained by Japan was based on broad political considerations which took into account the military-strategic aspects of the problem. The JCS recommended in JCS 1619119 that the islands south of 29°N. Lat. be placed under a strategic trusteeship with the United States as sole administering authority but this is not necessarily their final position as they are now reviewing the entire problem. It is understood that Admiral [Raymond A.] Spruance [then President of the Naval War College in Annapolis, Maryland] and other high officers believe a Ryukyus base might be more of a military liability than an asset. The State Department's final judgment should take into consideration the JCS restudy of the problem; b) It is true that the Ryukyus are not an economic asset to Japan but this very fact suggests the burden that the administration and support of 800,000 poverty-stricken Ryukyu natives would impose on the U.S.; c) The important consideration is not Japanese but allied reaction, particularly that of the Soviet Union. We have a policy of containment of Russia but do not wish unnecessarily to antagonize the Soviets. Close observers of the Soviet Scene have stated that our possible retention of Okinawa is regarded with definite concern by the Soviet military.

See "Memorandum from Borton to Saltzman on General MacArthur's Comment on Japanese Peace Treaty Draft of August 5, 1947 (September 5, 1947)," in Iokibe, ed., Vol. 3., *op. cit.*, microfiche 1-A-2.3.

32. "JCS 1619124, Review of United States Control Needed Over the Japanese Islands (August 26, 1947)."

33. George F. Kennan (X), "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July 1947), 566-582.

34. "Introduction," in Nelson, *op. cit.*, xv.

35. Marshall interview with Forrest Pogue, November 20, 1956 (p. 525), cited in Wilson D. Miscamble, *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 6.

36. George F. Kennan, "Foreword," in Nelson, *op. cit.*, vii.

37. *Ibid.* Kennan added, "[T]here was no problem of American foreign policy to which we could not address ourselves indeed, to which it was not our duty to address ourselves if we found the problem serious enough and significant enough to warrant the effort. In this respect, our efforts were unique."

38. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-1959* (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), 150.

39. Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 313; Pogue, *op. cit.*, 150.

40. Acheson records in his memoirs: "The General conceived of the function of this [policy planning] group as being to look ahead, not into the distant future, but beyond the vision of the operating officers caught in the smoke and crises of current battle; far enough ahead to see the emerging form of things to come and outline what should be done to meet or anticipate them. In doing this, the staff should also do something else—constantly reappraise what was being done. General Marshall was acutely aware that policies acquired their own momentum and went on after the reasons that inspired them had ceased." See Dean Acheson, *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969 [1987]), 214.

41. *Ibid.*; Miscamble, *op. cit.*, 10-11. Marshall had met Kennan twice previously during the war and was apparently impressed by his knowledge and analysis of Soviet affairs. See Pogue, *op. cit.*, 202. Although Marshall was in Nanking, China at the time and may not have paid careful attention to it, one memorandum in particular written by Kennan, while he was *Charge d'Affaires* at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, in particular caught the attention of policy-makers in Washington. That was the 8,000-word "Long Telegram" of February 22, 1946, which sought to describe "the rules...designed to constitute, in their aggregate, a guide to the technique of dealing with...the Stalin regime." See Kennan, *op. cit.*, 291-292. Kennan himself notes that "The success of the long telegram from Moscow changed my life. My name was now known in Washington. I became qualified, in people's minds, as a candidate for a different order of position than the ones I had previously occupied." *Ibid.*, 298.

42. Kennan, in his memoirs, records of this experience: "It was likely, Me Acheson indicated, that I would be asked to head this new unit when my tour of duty at the War College was completed. I gained no very clear understanding of what was involved; I am not sure Mr. Acheson had gained a much clearer one from General Marshall. But that some such thing was in store for me, I understood." Kennan, *op. cit.*, 313.

43. *Ibid.*, 345.
44. George F. Kennan, "Foreword," in *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951), v.
45. Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 127-128.
46. Kennan, as is well known, however, did not participate in the drafting of the President's speech and was critical of "the sweeping nature of the commitments which [the language of the text] implied." *Ibid.*, 320-321. Also see Bohlen, *op. cit.*, 262-263.
47. Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 325.
48. *Ibid.*, 326. Kennan, on the same day, handed in a list of recommendations for the Planning Staff, including permanent and provisional personnel assignments. See "Memorandum to Me Acheson from Mr. Kennan on the Policy Planning Staff," April 29, 1947, in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, microfiche 3-H-2
49. "Press Release Announcing Establishment of Policy Planning Staff, May 7, 1947," in Nelson, *op. cit.*, 1-2. The departmental order, cited in the two-page press release, lists the purpose, function, and organization of the PPS, and thus warrants attention here. The purpose of the PPS, partly discussed above, was officially described in the departmental order as assuring, under the direction of the Under Secretary of State, "the development within the Department, of long range policy which will serve as a framework for program-planning and a guide for current policy decisions and operations." Likewise, in order to carry out this purpose, the PPS was required to advise and assist the Under Secretary in the following ways: (1) Formulating and developing for the consideration and approval of appropriate officials of the Department, long-term program for the achievement of American foreign policy objectives; (2) Anticipating problems which the Department may encounter in the discharge of its mission; (3) Undertaking studies and preparing reports on broad politico-military problems which the Department may submit for consideration by SWNCC, the Committee of Three, or other similar bodies; (4) Examining, independently or upon reference by the Secretary or Under Secretary, problems and developments affecting United States foreign policy in order to evaluate the adequacy of current policy and making advisory recommendations pertaining thereto; (5) Coordinating planning activities within the Department of State.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *FRUS, 1948, Vol. I, General; United Nations*, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), 509 fn.
52. See "Interview with Carlton Savage, September 30, 1970," Papers of C. Een Wright, George C. Marshall Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia, 1, 5-6.
53. Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 368.
54. "Minutes of the Policy Planning Staff, 39th Meeting (August 7, 1947)," Records of the Policy Planning Staff, RG 59. Davies replaced Joseph E. Johnson, who, in Miscamble's description, "departed for the groves of academe" and eventually the presidency of the Carnegie Foundation. See Miscamble, *op. cit.*, 70; Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 328.

55. "Memorandum by Davies to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff Kennan (August 11, 1947)," *FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6*, 485-486. Exactly one year before this memorandum was written, Davies sent off a memorandum whose contents were quite similar to the above memorandum to the Department from Moscow. In it, Davies argued that "Current Soviet policy toward Japan is designed to disrupt to the greatest possible degree the development of a healthy Japan oriented toward the United States...If we withdraw from Japan without having assured ourselves of a favored position there, Japan may in all probability sooner or later be captured by the Soviet Union. The tables will have been turned and we shall be confronted with Japan as a 'place d'armes' of the only other first-class power." See "Memorandum by the First Secretary of Embassy in the Soviet Union John P. Davies (August 10, 1946)," *FRUS, 1946, Vol. 8, The Far East* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1971), 285-286. For a critique of Davies' memorandum by Emmerson, the Assistant Chief of the Division of Japanese Affairs, who doubted the ability of the Soviet Union to gain control in Japan, see "Memorandum by Emmerson (October 9, 1946)," *Ibid.*, 337-339; also see Emmerson, *op. cit.*, 283-285.

56. Author's interview with George F. Kennan, September 15, 1997, Princeton, New Jersey.

57. "Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff Kennan to the Under Secretary of State Lovett (August 12, 1947)," *FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6*, 486-487. On Lovett's career and relationship with Marshall see Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men: Six Friends and the World They Made* (New York: Touchstone, 1986) and C. W. Eorklund, *Men of the Pentagon: From Forrestal to McNamara* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), particularly 118.

58. "Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff Kennan to the Under Secretary of State Lovett (August 12, 1947)," *FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6*, 486.

59. Author's interview with Kennan.

60. Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 311-312. When reminded by the author of this speech, Kennan, in the above-cited interview, explained that he attached great importance to the speech in developing his views on the strategic importance of overseas, island bases. Kennan said he "saw the function of bases in Japan and Okinawa vis-à-vis Asia like that of bases in Great Britain in relation to continental Europe."

61. "Memorandum by Eorton on Drafting the Peace Treaty for Japan (June 25, 1948)."

62. "Working Group on Japan Treat!; Notes of Meeting on Thursday, August 14, 1947," Folder: U.S. Policy Re Japanese Peace Treat!; Aug-Dec 1947, Records Relating to Japanese Peace Treaty and Japanese Security Treat!; 1946-1952, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, RG 59. Also in attendance were Dean Rusk from the Office of Special Political Affairs, Charles H. Bonesteel, from the Under Secretary's Office, Philander P. Claxton, from the Office of Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas, and Charles Fahy, with the Legal Adviser's Office.

63. "Memorandum from Penfield to Kennan on Urgency of a Peace Settlement with Japan (August 14, 1947)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.0011 PW-Peace 8-1447), RG 59.

64. For the meetings attended by Eorton and/or Penfield, see the "Minutes of the Policy Planning Staff," 42nd Meeting (August 18, 1947), 48th Meeting (August 25), 49th (August 26), 50th Meeting (August 29), 51st Meeting (September 2), 52nd Meeting (September 2), 56th Meeting (September 8), 57th Meeting (September 9), also attended by former Ambassador to Japan Joseph C. Grew, 58th Meeting (September 10), also attended by Joseph Ballantine, 59th Meeting (September 10), 60th Meeting (September 11), also attended by Eugene Dooman, 63rd Meeting (September 17), also attended by W. Walton Butterworth, the new Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (as of September 15) 65th Meeting (September 22), 73rd Meeting (October 13), Eox 32, Records of the Policy Planning Staff (hereafter PPS Records), RG 59.

65. "Memorandum from Kennan to General Norstad and Admiral Sherman," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, microfiche 3-H-7. At their direction, Rear Admiral Woolridge, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Politico-Military Affairs, Naval Captain Austin (of the same office), and Colonel Henry A. Eyroade, Chief of the Military Survey Branch of the Plans and Operations Division (and later Brigadier General Schuyler of the Army and Colonel C. B. Westover, of the Army, but also representing Air Force Department) were sent to the 50th, 52nd, 56th, 57th 59th, 60th meetings of the PPS.

66. "Attached Paper, Minutes of the 48th Meeting (August 25, 1947)," Eox 32, PPS Records, RG 59.

67. Following discussions on this draft, the first five pages were redrafted on August 28 in time for the meeting with representatives of the military. The redraft calls for the "retention by Japan of the Hakomai (sic), Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu islands which make up the Southern Kuriles given to the U.S.S.R. at the Yalta Conference." See "Untitled Attached Paper, Minutes of the 50th Meeting (August 29, 1947)," *Ibid.*

68. "United States Policy Toward a Peace Settlement with Japan (September 4, 1947) attached to Minutes of 54th Meeting (September 4, 1947)," *Ibid.*

69. "Minutes of the 56th Meeting (September 8, 1947)" *Ibid.* Miscamble notes that Kennan's trip to Paris "marked a new stage in his role" as PPS director in that "not only would he be involved integrally in the day-to-day formulation of policy in Washington but he would be called on directly to participate in its implementation overseas." See Miscamble, *op. cit.*, 64. The same could be said for Kennan's involvement in the review of Japan policy and his subsequent trip to the Far East described below.

70. "United States Policy Toward A Peace Settlement With Japan (September 8, 1947)," Box 32, PPS Records, RG 59.

71. Minutes of meetings (cited above) with Ballantine and Dooman to discuss the PPS paper show that these two men disagreed, "emphatically" in the case of Dooman, with the principles being developed by the PPS. It is likely this issue of

the Ryukyu Islands was one of those principles with which the two Japan-hands were in disagreement with PPS thinking.

72. "United States Policy Toward a Peace Settlement with Japan (September 17, 1947)," *Ibid.*

73. "Memorandum from Chief of Plans and Policy Group Schuyler to Kennan (September 24, 1947)," *Ibid.*

74. "Memorandum from Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Sherman to Kennan (September 24, 1947)," *Ibid.*

75. "Memorandum from Gerig to Rusk on the Ryukyu Islands (October 1, 1947)," Roll 5, Microfilm C0044, ONA Records, RG 59.

76. The day after receiving the draft peace treaty, Assistant Secretary Hilldring had Penfield prepare on August 7 a memorandum for Secretary Marshall on the U.S. position regarding the Ryukyus, which compared both the State Department's and military's views on the question. Hilldring asked Marshall for permission to reopen "informal conversations" with military representatives "with a view to obtaining their approval of our position." While Marshall approved of this request, whether in fact such meetings were held or not remains unclear (and in fact Hilldring resigned shortly thereafter to be replaced by Saltzman on August 15). However, considering the fact that Hilldring's memorandum was drafted by Penfield, Borton's immediate boss, the meeting called by Eorton described above may have in fact been what Hilldring had in mind. Marshall in any case had his own doubts about the State Department's position and believed that "stony realism" might require the "solution advocated" by the military. See "Memorandum by Hilldring to Secretary on United States Position Reference Ryukyu Islands (August 7, 1947)," Folder: Islands—Ryukyu and Bonin, Box 2, ONA Records, Records Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan (Lot 56D527), RG 59.

77. "PPS/10, Results of Planning Staff Study of Questions Involved in the Japanese Peace Settlement (October 14, 1947)," Nelson, *op. cit.*, 108-115; also see FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6, 536-543.

78. "PPS/10/1, Special Recommendation on the Ultimate Disposition of the Ryukyus (October 15, 1947)," Nelson, *op. cit.*, 116-117. A memorandum by Harold W. Moseley, the assistant to Assistant Secretary of State (Saltzman), to Eorton explains in a footnote fashion that Davies was the drafter of the PPS document. See "Moseley to Eorton on Subcommittee to Study the Ultimate Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands (October 21, 1947)," Roll 5, Microfilm C0044, ONA Records, RG 59. Although Davies, before his passing in 1999, could not recall being the only author of the document, Kennan confirmed that Davies was likely the drafter of it. (Letter from John P. Davies to author, November 20, 1997; Author's interview with Kennan.)

79. Researchers using Nelson's collection of PPS materials should be aware that PPS 10/1, as it appears in her book, has a mistype in the quoted passage. While the actual document states, "It has not seen, however, convincing evidence," the printed version has the word "not" incorrectly appearing as "now." Although the context of the sentence makes it clear that "not" is the correct word, a mistaken reading of the text would produce a very different outcome.

80. "Moseley to Borton on Subcommittee to Study the Ultimate Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands (October 21, 1947)," *op. cit.*; "Memorandum for Members of SXNACC on Additional Directive to and Change in Composition of an ad hoc Committee (October 20, 1947)," *Ibid.* The directive stated: "1. At the request of the Acting Secretary of State, the ad hoc committee designated to study and report on SWNCC 59/9 will: a) Consider the problem of what United States policy should be toward the ultimate disposition of the Ryukyu Islands south of Latitude 29°North; b) Prepare a thorough analysis of the several forms which U.S. control over the Southern Ryukyus might take; and c) Recommend a formula which would meet U.S. military needs and involve minimum disadvantages to this government. 2. In this connection the committee is requested to include in its report whether: a) The islands can attain a balanced economy, and b) if they can not, what the continuing cost to the U.S. for civil administration, both in funds and personnel, is likely to be."

81. "Memorandum from Ohly for the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) on Strategic Areas and Trusteeships in the Pacific (October 27, 1947)," in Iokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 1-C-73; "Memorandum from Secretaries to Secretary of Defense Forrestal (October 27, 1947)," *Ibid.*, microfiche 1-A-5; "Memorandum from Forrestal to Secretary of State Marshall (October 27)," *Ibid.*; "Memorandum on Joint Chiefs of Staff Review of United States Control Needed Over the Japanese Islands (undated)," *Ibid.*

82. "Memorandum from Eutterworth to Secretary of State Marshall on Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands (February 6, 1948)," Roll 5, Microfilm C0044, ONX Records, RG 59.

83. "Memorandum from Acting Political Adviser Sebald to the Secretary of State on Observations Concerning the Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands (November 10, 1947)," 800 Political Affairs General, 1947, Eox 22, RG 84 Files, NX. Sebald later visited Okinawa in January 1950. His impressions were much better than his earlier trip as seen by the notation in his diary, "Much has been done since I was last there and a new air of optimism and interest is prevalent." See entry for January 14, 1950, Sebald Diaries.

84. Telephone interview with Niles W. Bond, August 11, 1998.

85. *Ibid.* MacArthur's claim to ignorance was to some extent probably true; a complicated chain of command existed in Okinawa in which U.S. forces there were under the Philippines-Ryukyu Command (PHILRYCOM), based in Manila. Correspondence to and from Okinawa thus went through Manila. (See discussion below for the changes later incorporated.) At the same time, Courtney Whitney, MacArthur's friend and right-hand man, noted in his biography that MacArthur was quite aware that "postwar, noncombatant replacements" were generally of a lesser quality and would not conduct themselves with as much humility or restraint as would their combat veteran colleagues. See Courtney Whitney, *MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1956), 293.

86. *Ibid.*, Oral History Interview with Niles W. Bond (December 28, 1973, Washington, D.C.), Harry S. Truman Library, 25-26. Bond, who was Consul in Eern, Switzerland, had been ordered by his new boss, Walton W. Eutterworth, to

visit Japan and speak with MacArthur about region during his return to the United States. Bond said to the author in the above-cited telephone interview that this trip to Okinawa was not therefore a part of his original itinerary—Sebald asked him if he wanted to go along and Bond willingly accepted.

87. "Personal and Confidential Letter from Sebald to Penfield (November 13, 1947)," Box 22, Special Correspondence, 1947-1956, Sebald Papers.

88. The Treaty Working Group within the Office of Far Eastern Affairs had under Eorton's direction continued to work on the draft peace treaty to "incorporate the ideas advanced by Me Kennan" and to bring it up to date with the revisions being requested by the other concerned agencies in the government. For example, the November 7, 1947 draft stated that "The Territorial limits of Japan shall comprise the four principal Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku, and Hokkaido and all minor islands including...the Ryukyu Islands north of 29°N. Latitude...(Note:the question of the future disposition of the Ryukyu Islands south of 29°N. Latitude is reserved, pending decision on the relative desirability of a U.S. strategic trusteeship over these islands or a long-term lease of hase areas on Okinawa and possibly other of these islands with sovereignty remaining with Japan)." See "Draft of Treaty of Peace for Japan," Folder: Drafts (Ruth Eacon), Eox 1, ONA Records, RG 59; "Memorandum from Hugh Borton to Davies on Eackground of Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty (January 30, 1948)," Untitled Folder, Eox 4, Records Relating to the Japanese Treaty of Peace, Office of the Historian, Eureau of Public Affairs, RG 59.

89. "(General Marshall's Comments to) Hilldring Memorandum to Secretary of State (August 7, 1947)". Incidentally, the author located two versions of Hilldring's memorandum. The first one, found in Box 2, cited here includes the comments added to it by Marshall. The second one, found in the Ryukyus—Old folder in Eox 4, does not include this notation. The presentation that Marshall was specifically referring to is found with both documents. It was a one-page memorandum prepared by Fearey entitled "Political Arguments for Retention of the Ryukyu Islands by Japan."

90. "Memorandum from Eutterworth to Secretary of State Marshall on Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands (February 6, 1948)."

91. "Advantages and Disad~antagesof a United States Leased Ease Arrangement in the Ryukyu Islands (undated)," Roll 5, Microfilm C0044, ONA Records, RG 59. Although undated, this memorandum was found immediately after Eutterworth's memorandum to Marshall, cited above. Considering the context of the memorandum, it was written between October 1947 and February 1948. An early draft of a part of this memorandum appears on Octoher 29, 1947, drafted by Een Gerig of the Office of Dependent Affairs. This memorandum considers not only the leased hase arrangement, but various types of trusteeship agreements as well. See "Alternative Means of Establishing United States Control Over the Ryukyu Islands (South of 29°) and Some of the Political Advantages and Disadvantages of Each—draft (October 29, 1947)," Folder: Ryukyus—Old, Eox 4, ONA Records Relating to the Peace Treaty with Japan, Lot 56D527, RG 59.

92. Fearey's memorandum importantly also notes that compensation should go to those who would be removed from the leased land area—a proposal relatively benevolent and forward-looking at the time. Considering that island-wide protests would develop in the early to mid-1950s over the forced removal of occupants from land required for bases without nearly any compensation, it is unfortunate that the military authorities did not pay more attention to this study

93. Whether Fearey drew up this list independently, or had done so after conducting informal discussions with military representatives is unclear. However, the fact that Fearey follows the first point immediately with counterpoints suggests that he had already had the input of the military and thus felt the need to refute their arguments.

94. "Letter from Marshall to Secretary of Defense Forrestal (February 20, 1948)."

95. Gruenther was appointed Director, Joint Staff on August 25, 1947. The Joint Staff officially into being with the signing of the National Security Act by President Truman on July 26, 1947. It physically came into being on October 26, 1947 when the JCS approved a reorganization plan submitted by Gruenther (on September 26).

96. "Memorandum from John H. Ohly to Secretary of Defense Forrestal (March 6, 1948)," in Iokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 1-C-71.

97. "Letter from Forrestal to Secretary of State Marshall (March 5, 1948)," *Ibid.*

98. Eero Atkinson, "America's Global Planner," *New York Times Magazine* (July 13, 1947), 9, 32-33.

99. "Memorandum from Kennan to Lovett (February 17, 1947)," in Iokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 3-H-13.

100. "Memorandum from Kennan to Lovett (October 14, 1947)."

101. "Memorandum from Director, Executive Secretariat, Office of the Secretary (Carlisle H. Humelsine) to Armour (October 29, 1947)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.0011 PW-Peace/10-2947), RG 59.

102. "Memorandum from Kennan to Lovett (January 27, 1948)," Box 29a, PPS Records, RG 59. Kennan and Butterworth had worked together before—interestingly in securing base rights in the Azores—in Portugal when Kennan was there as *charge d'affaires* and Eutterworth was Director General of the United States Commercial Corporation. On their relationship, see Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 145-147; Author's interview with Kennan.

103. "Memorandum from Eutterworth to Marshall on U.S. Position on the Japanese Peace Treaty (January 29, 1949)," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 1-A-4.3. Heer explains in more detail the attempts made by Eutterworth and Kennan to seek Marshall's early approval for the trip, noting that Eutterworth seems to have been the leading candidate to go to Tokyo to speak with MacArthur. See Heer, *op. cit.*, 141-144. Heer notes that Kennan "did not have himself 'particularly in mind' when he originally proposed the Tokyo mission in PPS 10 (sic)." In the author's interview with Kennan, he confirmed this as true. Author's interview with Kennan, *op. cit.* Miscamble notes that early on Lovett considered sending

Eutterworth to Japan because both Kennan and Bohlen were unavailable. Handwritten comments by Lovett on Kennan's memorandum transmitting PPS/10, October 14, 1947, Box 33, PPS Records, quoted in Miscamble, *op. cit.*, 254.

104. "Memorandum from Humelsine to Kennan (February 9, 1948)," Box 29a, PPS Records, RG 59.

105. "Personal (Telegram) for MacXrthur From Marshall (February 12, 1948)," *Ibid.* Kennan actually was not able to depart Washington until February 26, arriving in Tokyo, Japan on March 1.

106. "Memorandum from Humelsine to Kennan (February 9, 1948)."

107. "Memorandum from Kennan to Eutterworth (February 10, 1948)," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 3-H-12.

108. *Ibid.*

109. *Ibid.* On Kennan's excellent relationship with Gruenther, see Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 305-307.

110. "Memorandum for the Files by John H. Ohly (February 10, 1948)," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 1-C-92; "Memorandum to Schuyler from Secretary Forrestal on Military Representation at CINCFE Conference with State Department Representatives (February 23, 1948)," *Ibid.*

111. Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 382-383. Kennan, in his memoirs, writes of this time: "The War Department was, I suspect, both alarmed and intrigued at the prospect of my undertaking. Some people there were also aware of the need for a revision of the concepts and directives under which we were operating in Japan; but even more than the people in the State Department they were intimidated by MacArthur, and I think they licked their lips as they watched a civilian David prepare to call upon this military Goliath. Realizing that their own interests were involved, they provided me with a military companion to keep them currently informed. This fortunate!; turned out to be...Schuyler."

112. Miscamble, *op. cit.*, 258.

113. Telephone interview with Marshall Green (September 14, 1997); Author's interview with Marshall Green, Washington, D.C. (February 1, 1998). Known for his humor, Green described himself in an interview with another scholar as serving as Kennan's "amanuensis." Quoted in Miscamble, *op. cit.*, 258.

114. "Memorandum from Kennan to Penfield on Suggestions for Message to Sebald in Tokyo (February 17, 1948)," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 3-H-13.

115. Author's interview with Green. Also see Marshall Green, *Pacific Encounters: Reflections and Humor* (Bethesda: Dacor Press, 1997), 5-28.

116. Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 383; Author's interview with Kennan.

117. "Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary Marshall on Forthcoming Discussions with General MacXrthur (February 19, 1948)," Box 29a, Records of the PPS, RG 59.

118. "Memorandum by Green to Kennan (February 24, 1948)," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 1-A-16; "List of Questions to be discussed by Me Kennan with General MacXrthur (undated)," Box 29a, PPS Records, RG 59. The author of the latter memorandum is uncertain, but it was likely written by Green

with the probable assistance of Fearey since he had worked on these issues before and the two were colleagues and close friends.

119. These studies included the JCS review of the Ryukyus and Fearey's November 1946 memorandum on the Ryukyus, both quite representative of the views of the military and State at the time.

120. "PPS/23, Review of Current Trends of U.S. Foreign Policy (February 24, 1948)," in Nelson, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2 (1948), 103-134; also see FRUS, 1948, Vol. 1, 509-529.

121. *Ibid.*, 123. Presumably here Kennan was including the Ryukyu Islands in his use of "Japan."

122. Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 383. Miscamhle quotes Marshall Green in a 1978 interview as having said that on the long 30-hour last leg of the flight, Kennan was engrossed in reading a book written in 1891 by his uncle and namesake, George Kennan, a Russian specialist himself, entitled *Siberia and the Exile System*, and thus "arrived in Japan 'from Vladivostok'." See Miscamble, *op. cit.*, 259-260; also see Heel; *op. cit.*, 148.

123. Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 383.

124. *Ibid.*, 384.

125. *Ibid.* Also see "Engagement book of William J. Sebald," Box 44, Sebald Papers, *op. cit.*

126. Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 384-385; "Letter from Kennan to MacArthur (March 2, 1948)," Box 32, RG 5, MacArthur Archives, Norfolk, Virginia; "Memorandum from Kennan to MacArthur (March 5, 1948)," Box 29a, PPS Records, RG 59.

127. Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 385.

128. According to Kennan's account of the luncheon, MacArthur stated that "the Communists were no menace in Japan." *Ibid.*, 384. This, despite the fact that there were constant strikes and work stoppages amidst the worsening economy during Kennan's trip to Japan. See, for example, "Strike Wave Hits Japan As Unions Press Demands," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, March 17, 1948. The full text of their luncheon conversation appears as "General MacArthur's Remarks at Lunch (March 1, 1948)," FRUS, 1948, Volume 6, The Far East and Australasia (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1974), 697-699. On the environment in occupied Tokyo at the time, Green remembers,

the problem was...how to get [Kennan's] views through to SCAP Headquarters on the broad international issues. Now here you was a man who was our leading expert on Russia and he understood the world scene. This was, really not a backwash—it was a very important post, but nevertheless the mentality was so totally focused on Japan that they were not even thinking about the future and [Japan's] relations with what countries and what kind of regime [Japan] should have in the future. MacArthur talked kind of vaguely about being a Switzerland of the Far East and similar things. These were the kinds of things being that were being said. Here you have this world figure suddenly appear on the scene in Tokyo, sees

this rather restrictive view of world affairs on the part of representatives, the top representatives in a country that was...going to be...a major power in the world. These kinds of things shocked Kennan." Author's interview with Green.

129. Miscamhle, based on an interview with Green, believes that Willoughby spoke with Kennan after his talk, rather than before it, despite Kennan's recollection in his memoirs that the speech followed Willoughby's visit. Green explained in his interview to Miscamhle that he arranged with a former colleague, Colonel C. Stanton Bahcock, a military attaché in prewar Tokyo (and later a member of John Foster Dulles' peace treaty preparation team as a military liaison), to have Kennan make the presentation. (Miscamhle, *op. cit.*, 261-262.) Herr, in his dissertation, agrees with Miscamhle, suggesting that "Kennan's memory is probably faulty, and that Willoughby's call on Kennan more likely was a response to the Soviet briefing, rather than its inspiration." (Herr, *op. cit.*, 150n.) The presently available evidence suggests, however, that Kennan's original explanation may be correct as far as the sequence of events, particularly that Willoughby's visit was prior to the presentation on Soviet affairs. This is not to say that Green, in conjunction with Babcock (who was on MacArthur's staff for a total of four years), did not play a vital role in arranging the presentation to SCAP personnel. On that point, this author is in agreement with Miscamhle and Herr.

130. Green, *op. cit.*, 27. Green adds to that description by saying in the author's interview with him "Kennan doesn't make much...about this extraordinary speech he made in Tokyo about the origins of Soviet conduct. He dismisses it as a briefing for MacArthur's headquarters. But it was not that. It was a brilliant speech."

131. Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 385.

132. Green, *op. cit.*, 27. Green explained to the author that Kennan "very cleverly co-opted MacArthur and Willoughby...his cleverness in talking [their] language without conceding on principle. He talked in a way that immediately made him different [in the eyes of SCXP] from others in the State Department. Here was a guy who saw reality...They saw in him a supporter. Kennan was, is, a great diplomat. We know he was a master of words, of phraseology. But he was also a master of tactics and human spirit." (Author's interview with Green.)

133. Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 385.

134. "Conversation Between General of the Army MacArthur and Me George F. Kennan (March 5, 1948)," FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, *op. cit.*, 700.

135. On the Navy's decreasing interest in Okinawa, Kennan recorded MacArthur as saying that "he realized that the Navy did not like the prospect of making Okinawa its advance base, principally because the island was swept by typhoons and did not provide adequate protection, not to mention the absence of usual port development. He felt, however, that these difficulties could be overcome. It would be possible to build a breakwater which would give better protection to vessels lying there; and it would always be possible for them to stand out to sea if necessary, under typhoon conditions."

136. On this point, MacArthur expanded his discussion later by stating that "he did not believe it would be feasible for [the United States] to retain bases anywhere in Japan after the conclusion of a treaty of peace. For us to do so would be to admit the equally legitimate claim of others to do likewise. He could assure me that the others would be only too anxious to take advantage of this. Not only the Russians but the other Allies would want some sort of base on Japanese territory. The only way to prevent this was for us to keep out." Others would disagree with MacArthur. Eventually, the worsening environment in 1950 (and Japan's offer to request a continued U.S. presence during the Ikeda mission to Washington [see below]) would convince MacArthur as well that bases in Japan would be necessary.

137. In the first of two briefing books that Green had put together for Kennan (introduced above), MacArthur's comments of September were included.

138. Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 385-386.

139. Author's interview with Marshall Green. A copy of a memorandum of conversation between General Eichelberger and Kennan can be found in General Eichelberger's diary, as well as his own comments on the meeting. See Eichelberger Diary (March 10, 1948 entry), Box 1 (Diaries), Eichelberger Papers.

140. "Telegram No. 57 from Sebald (Kennan) to Secretary of State (for Lovett), (March 10, 1948)," Eox 29a, PPS Records, RG 59. Heer writes that Kennan left for a side trip to Okinawa and the Philippines on this day (March 10), but Kennan in fact left the following day, March 11.

141. Just when in fact this trip was originally scheduled into Kennan's itinerary remains unclear.

142. "Telegram No. 57 from Sebald (Kennan) to Secretary of State (for Lovett), (March 10, 1948)." In a Departmental telegram of March 4, it was suggested to Kennan that he might include a visit to China in his trip. (Kennan's trip was to be extended because of the expected arrival in the latter part of March of Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall.) Kennan responded that "a preponderance of considerations mitigate against [a side trip there]...I certainly would not wish to be drawn into discussions with [the Chinese government] at this moment on matters of U.S. policy, and am afraid that for me to come having nothing to offer would be more resented than not to come at all." (*Ibid.*) Kennan's disinterest in China was well known, as was his dislike for Chiang's administration. In spite of this, Kennan writes that Marshall had suggested to him as early as their February 19 meeting that "in my [Kennan's] position, I ought to have had a glimpse of the Chinese picture, before I proceed to do any more work on Chinese matters...The Secretary felt that I should give consideration to making a trip to Nanking although I might not wish to make the final decision until I had arrived in Tokyo." The truth is, Kennan had likely already made up his mind not to go, telling the Secretary that "I had not wished to make this situation any more complicated or to give rise to the impression that I was repeating the Wedemeyer mission." See "Memorandum of Conversation with Secretary Marshall on Forthcoming Discussions with General MacArthur (February 19, 1948)."

143. "Eigaiiko Komon Kenan Shi Ga Raito (U.S. Foreign Policy Adviser, Kennan, Comes to Island)," *Uruma Shimpō* (Uruma Daily News), March 19, 1948;

Fisch, *op. cit.*, 109. Also see Diary entry for March 11-12, 1948, *Shikiya Koshin Renraku Jiko Biboroku* (Daily Notes of Governor Shikiya Koshin), unpublished notes in possession of author courtesy of Kayo Yasuharu and Kayo Yasuaki. Kennan would develop duodenal ulcers (again) during his hard schedule in Japan and be hospitalized upon his return to Washington. According to Green's interview with Miscamble, Kennan became so ill during his trip to Japan that he had to dictate much of the draft of his final report while laying down. See Miscamble, *op. cit.*, 264. This was confirmed by Kennan's personal secretary, Dorothy M. Hessman in an interview in 1970. See "Interview With Dorothy Hessman," Papers of C. Ben Wright, George C. Marshall Library., 5, 20-21.

144. "Senryakuchi to shite no Okinawa, Iojima Bei ha Tandoku Shintaku Yokyu (Okinawa as Strategic Area, U.S. Wants Sole Trusteeship)," *Uruma Shimpo*, December 12, 1947. Kennan's diary is presently closed to researchers so it is not possible to ascertain what he recorded about Okinawa and the conversations he had there in his personal notes. Unfortunately, Shikiya's diary, cited above, does not go into any detail of the meeting other than to note that the Kennan group was led into the Governor's Office and they "stood around talking." Likewise, unfortunately, a hook in Japanese on Shikiya and the period of the Okinawa Civil Administration, based on Shikiya's diary, does not mention Kennan's visit. Kayo Yasuharu, *Okinawa Minseifu* (Okinawa Civil Administration), Tokyo: Kume Shoho, 1986. On Shikiya, see Shikiya Koshin Sensei Itoku Kensho Jigyo Kiseikai, ed., *Shifu Shikiya Koshin* (Teacher and Father Shikiya Koshin), Naha: Shikiya Koshin Sensei Itoku Kensho Jigyo Kiseikai, 1980.

145. "Telegram No. 406 from (Ambassador Emmet) O'Neal to Secretary of State (for Butterworth) from Kennan (March 13, 1948)," Box 29a, PPS Records, RG 59.

146. "Memorandum from Kennan to Secretary Marshall (March 14, 1948)," *Ibid*; *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. 1, 531-538. In a letter two days later to Butterworth, Kennan explained that because the memorandum was "written in one day, without benefit of files or advice from anyone else, it is necessarily a sketchy job; but I had a feeling that it might be useful for me to get before the Secretary; prior to my return to Washington, a rough outline of the way in which my own thoughts are shaping up with respect to our general policy in the western Pacific area." See "Letter from Kennan to Butterworth (March 16, 1948)," *Ibid*.

147. "Report on SCAP-State Department-Military Establishment Conferences in Tokyo, A Report for the Secretary of Defense (undated)," Plans and Operations Decimal File, 1946-1948, Records of the Army Staff, RG 319 It is unclear whether Schuyler actually accompanied Kennan as far as Okinawa or not. In fact, Kennan in correspondence with the author said that "it was highly unlikely that he did." (September 18, 1998). However, the context of the passages of the memorandum, as well as the corresponding dates of travel, suggest very strongly that Schuyler (or some of his aides) went with Kennan. For example, Schuyler notes that he was with Kennan "in Tokyo, 1 March to 11 March inclusive." After that the report notes that "P&O representatives spent one and half-days at Okinawa," which corresponds with the length of time Kennan was in Okinawa. From March

13 to March 20, Schuyler went on to Shanghai (probably from Okinawa) and the report notes "on 20 March, I was recalled to Tokyo from Shanghai." From this context, the author suggests that, in contrast to Kennan's recollection, Schuyler (or certainly one of his aides) was probably with Kennan or in Okinawa at the same time. Indeed, Schuyler's accompanying Kennan to Okinawa would be entirely called for since he had traveled to occupied Japan as Kennan's military liaison. In any case, being a report on Okinawa from the same time period, it is instructive in learning more about the situation there and views on the islands.

148. A related memorandum written for the files in mid-April states that the "shortages of personnel in...Okinawa and lack of housing for dependents...was described as serious...Presence of dependents in FECOM (Far Eastern Command) areas considered of great value in current VD, crime and drunkenness rates among troops." See "Memorandum for Record by Colonel Paxson (April 19, 1948)," Eox 19, Plans and Operations Division Decimal File, 1946-1948, RG 319 Records of the Army Staff, NA.

149. According to Fisch's study, the lack of discipline among Philippine Scouts (44th Infantry Regiment) created a lot of problems in Okinawa after their arrival on January 23, 1947 (they were inactivated and departed finally in May 1949). The increase in violent crimes in early 1947 forced Governor Shikiya to urge that all the Filipino Scouts be removed from the island. This was therefore probably one of the reasons, if not the central one, that Hayden was enthusiastic about creating an Okinawan Scout unit to replace the Philippine unit. The friction between the Filipino servicemen and the local population proved to be a serious hindrance to orderly postwar reconstruction in Okinawa, Fisch notes. See Fisch, *op. cit.*, 84-87. Kennan in his letter to Marshall writes that he was in agreement with Hayden's suggestion and thought it was "desirable" to create an Okinawan Scout force. Kennan noted that such an auxiliary force "should reduce the logistical burden on our own forces stationed there."

150. Kennan in his letter to Marshall noted that "the Army planners are thinking about a scheme, I believe, under which our units would not be permanently stationed at Okinawa but would be rotated fairly frequently; and no dependents would be permitted. I think this would be highly desirable."

151. The author devotes special attention to this letter because it formed, as seen below, the basis for Kennan's comments on the Ryukyus in "Observations" on his trip and in PPS/28. See Nelson, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, 210-213.

152. Kennan emphasized this point with the author when he stated that "we (the PPS) felt that the problem of Okinawa should not be allowed to get ahead of Japan policy and vice-versa." Author's interview with Kennan.

153. Kennan deferentially added in parentheses a note to Marshall: "I apologize for being so bold, as a civilian, to offer suggestions on matters which are largely military; but it is essential that some over-all pattern including military as well as the political factors be evolved. The suggestions stem from the best advice I could get from a number of competent officers of the armed forces. I put them forward only tentatively; as something to be shot at by the experts when the proper time comes."

154. Of the Philippines, Kennan wrote, "We are following a line of conduct which seems to give us the worst of all possible worlds. We maintain bases just large enough to cause anxiety to the Filipinos, who think they would again serve as lightning-rods to attract military operations to the area in time of war, but not strong enough to give them a real sense of security from renewed invasion. We have a military assistance agreement; hut it is being only half-heartedly implemented; and the Filipinos are disgusted and discouraged with its operations." It is this uncertainty over the U.S. ability to stay in the Philippines, particularly in Kennan's view, that made Okinawa that much more important strategically.

155. Secretary of the Army Kenneth Royall was originally scheduled to visit Japan and thus the State Department requested that Kennan remain in Japan longer to meet with him. However on March 12 Royall had to ask Draper to go in his place in order to testify before Congress on the Universal Military Training bill, then under discussion. See Howard E. Schonberger, *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952* (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1989), 182.

156. "Conversation Between General of the Army MacArthur, Under Secretary of the Army Draper, and Me George F. Kennan (March 21, 1948, amended March 23, 1948)," *FRUS, 1948, Vol. VI, op. cit.*, 706-712.

157. "PPS/28, Recommendations With Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan (March 25, 1948)," *Ibid.*, 691-719 (revised as "PPS/28/2"). See Nelson, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, 175-243.

158. Concerning post-treaty security arrangements the PPS study said, "The United States tactical forces should be retained in Japan until the entrance into effect of a peace treaty. A final U.S. position concerning the post-treaty arrangements for Japanese military security should not be formulated until the peace negotiations are upon us. It should be then formulated in the light of the prevailing international situation and of the degree of internal stability achieved in Japan."

159. "Observations (March 25, 1948)," in Nelson, *op. cit.*, 211.

160. Miyazato, relying on the abbreviated version of "Observations" as published in *FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, 712-719*, mistakenly notes in Japanese to the effect that "Okinawa is not touched upon at all (in Kennan's report)." This is untrue. Kennan wrote at least four pages on his "Observations" of Okinawa, as can be seen in the original documents or in Nelson's edited version of the papers. See Miyazato (1981), *op. cit.*, 222.

161. This one paragraph does not appear in the "Observations" introduced in Nelson's edition. It is found in the "Discussion" section of an attachment to a memorandum of conversation in early April. See "Memorandum from William I. Cargo to Chief of Division of Dependent Area Affairs Gerig on the Disposition of Okinawa (April 5, 1948)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (890.014614-5481, RG 59).

162. "Memorandum from Kennan to Lovett (March 25, 1948)," Box 29a, PPS Records, RG 59. Marshall later agreed to the recommendation that the paper should form the basis of a government policy worked through the NSC. According to Forrestal's Diary entry for April 30, Marshall told his fellow Cabinet members

that Kennan's paper was "a very closely reasoned and persuasive document" and indicated that he planned to submit it to the NSC and then to the President. See Diary Entry, April 30, 1948, Eox 4, Forrestal Diaries, Forrestal Papers, cited in Miscamble, *op. cit.*, 265.

163. "Memorandum from Kennan to Lovett (March 25, 1948)."

164. "Memorandum from Humelsine to Butterworth (March 31, 1948)," Eox 29a, PPS Records, RG 59.

165. "Memorandum from Allison to Eutterworth on Comments on PPS 28, Recommendations with Respect to US Policy Toward Japan (March 29, 1948)," *Ibid.* Allison was later deeply involved with the preparations for the Treaty of Peace with Japan as Dulles' assistant. He became U.S. Ambassador to Japan in 1953. For his January 1948 trip to Japan and Korea, see John M. Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie or Allison Wonderland* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973), 122.

166. Allison, *op. cit.*, 119-121.

167. Allison was assigned to the Division of Japanese Affairs as Assistant Chief on October 28, 1946, and continued in that capacity until October 5, 1947, when he replaced Eorton as the Chief of the newly created Division of Northeast Asian Affairs. Allison continued in that capacity until he became Deputy Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs on November 1, 1948.

168. "Memorandum from Cargo to Gerig on the Disposition of Okinawa (April 5, 1948)."

169. On Rusk's education and background, see Rusk, *op. cit.* On Rusk's role in the State Department at this time, see, in addition to his memoirs, Warren I. Cohen, *Dean Rusk* (Totowa: Cooper Square Publishers, 1980), 5-32 and Schoenbaum, *op. cit.*, 125-236. According to Cohen, Rusk, who at this time was still in the War Department, encountered Ernest A. Gross, the State Department's Legal Adviser, at a SWNCC meeting in February 1947. Rusk explained that he was apprehensive about committing to a career in the Army to which Gross mentioned that the current director of the then-Office of Special Political Affairs (SPA), Alger Hiss, had resigned to accept the presidency of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Secretary Marshall would need someone to replace him. Rusk expressed interest in the suggestion and when subsequently offered the position by Marshall, joined the State Department on March 5. See Cohen, *op. cit.*, 5. SPA, created in January 1944, became the Office of United Nations Affairs (UNA) in January 1948.

170. Schoenbaum, *op. cit.*, 159.

171. *Ibid.*

172. Author's interview with William I. Cargo, February 5, 1998, Arlington, Virginia; Cargo, *op. cit.*, 178-181; "Memorandum by Cargo to Rusk on Attached Draft Memorandum Concerning Okinawa (April 7, 1948)," Roll 5, Microfilm C0044, ONA Records, RG 59.

173. "Memorandum from Gerig to Rusk on Attached Position Paper on the Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands (April 9, 1948)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (890.014614- 948), RG 59.

174. Author's interview with Cargo. Also see Cargo, *op. cit.*, 114-117.

175. Armstrong and Cargo, *op. cit.*; Cargo, *op. cit.*, 167-168.

176. At the time of Cargo's article in March 1947, he and his co-author refer to the following eight trusteeships: Cameroons (British), Tanganyika, and Togoland (British) put under the United Kingdom as Administering Authority, Cameroons (France) and Togoland (France) put under French control, New Guinea put under Australian control, Ruanda-Urundi under Belgium, and Western Samoa placed under the control of New Zealand. See Armstrong and Cargo, *op. cit.*, 520. The ninth one was the former Japanese Mandates placed under the United States as Administering Authority.

177. "Disposition of the Ryukyu Islands (April 21, 1948)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (890.0146/4-2148), RG 59.

178. "Yeoman's Memorandum for the Files on Paper Entitled Disposition of the Ryukyus Islands (May 24, 1948)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (890.0146/5-2448), RG 59. Miyazato suggests Eutterworth's request was at Kennan's insistence, but it does not offer documentation to support it. See Miyazato (1981, *op. cit.*, 227. As Borton later states in the memorandum, the Office of Far Eastern Affairs simply did not want to reopen the fight with the JCS at the moment and those elected to leave in the option for a strategic trusteeship.

179. "Oral History Interview with Charles E. Saltzman," New York, New York, June 28, 1974, Truman Library; "Memorandum from Saltzman to Eutterworth on Comments on Kennan's Report (April 9, 1948)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.00119 Control (Japan)/4-948), RG 59.

180. Gross notes in his memorandum to Lovett the fact that he was greatly bothered by Butterworth's asking for a separate consideration of legal issues—with these problems it was not possible Gross writes, "to set up rigid categories of 'economic', 'political', or 'legal' aspects. I believe that consideration of problems so basic to the national interest and security of the United States can not be held to lines as narrow as implied in Mr. Eutterworth's memorandum." See "Memorandum from Gross to Lovett (April 15, 1948)," Eox 29a, PPS Records, RG 59; "Memorandum from Gross to Lovett on U.S. Policy Toward Japan (April 14, 1948)," *Ibid.*

181. "Memorandum from Eutterworth to Lovett on Policy Recommendations for Japan (April 16, 1948)," in Iokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 1-A-44.

182. MacArthur's comments on PPS/28/2 were sent on June 12 from Tokyo. Unlike other sections where MacArthur expressed agreement or "no comment," MacArthur went out of his way to not only express agreement with the paragraph on the Ryukyu Islands, but also to argue for its rapid implementation. MacArthur writes: "There is no more important step in the development of a Western Pacific defensive frontier for the protection of the United States than is embodied in this proposed policy provision. The delay which heretofore has retarded the firm American resolution of this matter should give way at once to the positive statement of policy so excellently expressed in this provision and the vigorous implementation thereof." See "Telegram No. C 61433 from MacArthur to Draper (June

12, 19481," Box 3503, Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (711.9419-16481, RG 59. This telegram can also be found in *FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6*, 819-823. When Marshall Green reviewed MacArthur's telegram for Butterworth he noted (in an understatement almost) that "General MacArthur appears to support strongly the State Department's recommendations." See "Memorandum from Eutterworth to Kennan (June 29, 1948)," Box 29a, PPS Records, RG 59. According to Heer, MacArthur, later, never consulted with Sebald on NSC 13, who had not received a copy of PPS/28 as well as a copy of Green's memorandum analyzing MacArthur's response to NSC 13. As Heer also points out, Butterworth noted "the possibility that SCAP had not drafted the telegram of June 12 but had permitted the matter to be handled by his subordinates." See "Eutterworth to Acting Secretary of State on Comment by General MacArthur on State Department's Policy Statement on Japan," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (711.94/9-1648), RG 59; Heer, *op. cit.*, 180.

183. "PPS/28/2, Recommendations With Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan (May 25, 19481," in Iokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 3-F-10;"Memorandum from George H. Butler to Lovett and Marshall (May 26, 1948)," *Ibid.*, microfiche 3-H-23; "Memorandum from Lovett to Souers (June 1, 1948)," *Ibid.*, microfiche 3-H-24. Also see *FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6*, 775-781. According to the May 26 memorandum by Butler cited here, Kennan and Eutterworth sought to have PPS/28/2 introduced into the NSC the following day, May 27, in order for it to have the status of an NSC paper before Kennan started his talks on May 28 with Maherly Esler Dening, the assistant under secretary in the British Foreign Office (and one of the senior British officials responsible for Far Eastern policy) in Ottawa, Canada. For unknown reasons, this request was not granted immediately. However, by the first of June, the request was of course accepted and action taken, as described above. On the NSC and NSC Staff, see Christopher C. Shoemaker, *The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991), particularly 10-11. For a discussion on the NSC during the Truman Years, see Anna Kasten Nelson, "President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council," *Journal of American History*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (September 1985), 360-378.

184. See footnote 4, *FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6*, 776. Initially the NSC was made up of the President, the Secretaries of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board. In 1949, reflecting on his own experience as being a Vice President "out of the know," Truman brought in the Vice President as well since he was only "one heartbeat away from the presidency."

185. A related paragraph on the Navy followed the recommendations for the Ryukyu Islands. This paragraph read: "The Navy...should proceed to develop to the maximum the possibilities of Okinawa as an advance naval base and increasingly employ the facilities on Okinawa, on the assumption that we will remain there on a long-term basis."

186. "Memorandum of Conversation on the Problems of the Ryukyus (May 28, 1948)," Central Decimal Files, 1945-1949 (890.0146/5-2848), RG 59.

187. Fisch, *op. cit.*, 156-157.

188. "Press Release, Ryukyus Established as Separate Army Command (July 14, 1948)," Enclosure No. 2 to "Despatch No. 447, Acting Political Advisor in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State (July 16, 1948)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.00119 Control (Japan)/7-1648), RG 59. Sebald's memo (but not the press release) is also found in *FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6*, 830. Initially from 1945, U.S. military forces in Okinawa were not under the Far East Command (FEC) based in Tokyo, but rather were under the jurisdiction of the Philippine-Ryukyus Command based in Manila. This arrangement had come about due to the logistical situation at the end of the war; by combining the U.S. forces in the Philippines and the Ryukyus, it became logistically easier for the forces to dispose of surplus war materials that had been accumulated for the assault on Japan. While salvage, disposal, and other matters were thus facilitated in this way, a complicated chain of command existed, with directives having to go through Manila to reach Okinawa. The same confusing pattern existed for other types of communication as well. Moreover, while within the PHILRYCOM there was a Ryukyus Military Government Section, military government for the islands was not given any serious attention. As a result, with MacArthur not being able to give adequate attention to Okinawa due to his concentrating on the occupation of Japan, conditions worsened in Okinawa. Compounding this situation was the fact that officers and servicemen of lower quality were reportedly assigned there, Okinawa thus came to be known as a "dumping ground" and a "forgotten island." See Miyazato (1981, *op. cit.*, 228-229.

189. "Despatch No. 609, Acting Political Advisor in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State (September 14, 1948)," *FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6*, 844-845. According to Sebald's despatch, citing General Order 22 of September 6, the Ryukyus Military Government Section would be responsible for advising the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, on "matters pertaining to military government in the Ryukyu Islands." Likewise, according to Staff Memorandum No. 33 of September 8, also cited in Sebald's despatch, the Chief, Ryukyus Military Government Section would be responsible "at this Headquarters for coordination of non-military activities in these Islands."

190. "Memorandum of Conversation on Payment for Imports to Ryukus (sic) Islands from Japan (July 26, 1948)," Folder: Ryukyu—Current, Eox 4, ONA Records, RG 59.

191. "Memorandum from Fearey to Allison on Attached Cable (July 27, 1948)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (FW 890.014614-2481, RG 59.

192. "Note by James S. Lay, Jr. to the NSC (September 24, 1948)," *FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6*, 853. Forging a common policy on the reparations issue was also a major problem within the U.S. government, specifically between Draper's Army Department and the State Department. NSC 1311 reflected changes and additions to NSC 13 on the reparations issue.

193. At this time, the CIA had also prepared its own study on the importance of the Ryukyus entitled, "The Ryukyu Islands and Their Significance." The report's summary warned that the problem of the disposition of the Ryukyus could become "one of the most controversial issues in any settlement of the Far Eastern prob-

lems." It likewise explained that U.S. control over the islands would: 1) give the U.S. a base to allow it to defend an unarmed Japan; 2) eliminate the concern over the islands falling into hostile hands; 3) neutralize, "to some extent" Soviet forward positions in Korea, Manchuria, and the Kurile Islands; and 4) position the U.S. to prevent a "revival of military aggression" by Japan. See Central Intelligence Agency, ORE 24-48, "The Ryukyu Islands and Their Significance (August 6, 1948)," Truman Library

194. "Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army on Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan (October 5, 1948)," Entry 154, Eox 19, Plans and Operations Division, Decimal File, 1946-1948, Records of the Army Staff, RG 319, NA.

195. "Memorandum by Leahy for the Secretary of Defense on Recommendations with Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan (September 29, 1948)," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 3-E-2.

196. "Memorandum for the Secretary of the Army on Recommendations."

197. "Minutes of the 23rd Meeting of the National Security Council, October 7, 1948," National Security Council Documents, National Archives. In attendance at this meeting were Kennan, Secretary of Defense Forrestal, Lovett, Secretary of the Army Royall, Under Secretary of the Navy W. John Kenney, Secretary of the Air Force W. Stuart Symington, Arthur M. Hill, Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (who had replaced Forrest Sherman), and Robert Blum, from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

198. "Note by the NSC Executive Secretary Souers to President Truman (October 7, 1948)," FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6, 857-858. Truman explained in his memoirs the role of the NSC in relation to the President and policy making. He writes, "A 'vote' in the National Security Council is merely a procedural step. It never decides policy. That can be done only with the President's approval and expression of approval to make it an official policy of the United States. Even when the President sits as chairman in a meeting of the National Security Council and indicates agreement nothing is final until the Council formally submits a document to the President. The document states that the Council met and recommended such-and-such an action, 'which met with your approval.' When the President signs this document, the recommendation then becomes a part of the policy of the government." See Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs, Volume II: Years of Trial and Hope* (New York: Signet Books, 1965), 78.

199. "NSC 1312, Report by the National Security Council on Recommendations With Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan (October 7, 1948)," *Ibid.*, 858-865; specifically 859.

200. See Footnote 1 under "Note by the NSC Executive Secretary Souers to President Truman."

201. "Memorandum from Lovett to Souers (October 26, 1948)," *Ibid.*, 876-877. Lovett based his comments on a memorandum prepared for him by Marshall Green of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs. See "Memorandum, State Department Position on Attached Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense dated

September 29, 1948, from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (October 26, 1948),"Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.00119 Control (Japan)/10-2648), RG 59.

202. While not directly referring to the disposition of the Ryukyus, Eutterworth, in a memorandum to Lovett, writes that "many sections of NSC 13/2 to which this Department attaches great importance have been considerably watered down from the State Department's original proposals in the effort to obtain Army concurrence, and, as passed, represented the minimum which this Department could accept." See "Memorandum from Butterworth to Lovett on Implementation of NSC 1312 (October 27, 1948)," *FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6*, 878.

203. "Revised Paragraph 5 of NSC 13/1 (October 26, 1948)," *Ibid.*, 877-878; "NSC Action 138, Record of Action by the NSC by Memorandum Concurrence by the Department of State as of October 26, 1948," in Iokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 3-A-4. The italicized parts represent the changes that came about in the document. According to Footnote 2 on p. 877 of the FRUS memo, in a text of a memorandum of November 5, 1948 approved by President Truman, the sentence, "The base on Okinawa should be immediately developed," was revised to read "The base on Okinawa should be developed accordingly."

204. "Letter from Lovett to Secretary Forrestal (December 2, 1948)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.00119 Control (Japan)/12-248), RG 59; "Memorandum from Butterworth to Secretary on Implementation of NSC 13/2 (November 30, 1948)," *Ibid.*

205. "Memorandum for Record by Milner on Recommendations with Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan (November 3, 1948)," Roll 6, Microfilm C0044, ONA Records, RG 59. The State Department was also charged with ensuring that actions taken were coordinated, ensuring appropriate dissemination of the paper to other agencies in the government, and transmitting to the NSC progress reports on the implementation.

206. "Letter from Forrestal to Lovett (December 9, 1948)," *Ibid.* In Forrestal's December 9 reply, he noted that he was asking the Army, which was the agency currently responsible for the occupation, to implement NSC 1312 (5) in conjunction with the State Department. He stated he would designate an officer to act as a liaison with the State Department's representative. In the Army's case, Assistant Secretary of the Army Draper assigned Lieutenant Colonel W. W. Milner of the Plans and Operations Division of the General Staff (which was given responsibility for monitoring the implementation). The State Department assigned Max W. Eishop, Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, to assume that role. See "Letter from Draper to Lovett (December 14, 1948)," *Ibid.*; "Memorandum from Eutterworth to Lovett (December 20, 1948)," *FRUS, 1948, Vol. 6*, 933-934.

207. "Memorandum from Eutterworth to Lovett (December 20, 1948)," 934; "Memorandum from Eutterworth to Lovett (December 13, 1948)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.00119 Control (Japan)/12-948), RG 59; "Letter from Lovett to Forrestal (December 13, 1948)," *Ibid.* Specifically, the Plans and Operations Division within the Army Department was assigned monitoring the implementation of NSC 1315 for the military. The JCS was assigned the review of long-range Army, Navy, and Air Force deployments and the overall character of the

military facilities in the Ryukyu Islands. The Director of Logistics (one of the five divisions on the General Staff according to the November 11, 1948 reorganization of the Department of the Army) was to be responsible for developing the military facilities on the Ryukyu Islands in accordance with NSC 13/5. It would also be responsible for coordinating with the U.S. Comptroller General and to initiate the proceedings for legislation and appropriations by the Congress. (The Navy and Air Force would be requested to develop their facilities on the island as well separately.) Finally, the Chief of the Civil Affairs Division, Brigadier General George L. Eherle, was ordered to continue CAD's present responsibilities and carry out a program on a long-term basis in regard to the economic and social well-being of the inhabitants "including the economic separation of these islands from any other occupied area." Finally the Army Comptroller was asked to ensure that the Army and other government agencies pay their own way in carrying out their programs. See "Memorandum for the Record (January 4, 1949)," Eox 19, Decimal File, 1946-1948, Plans and Operations Division, RG 319.

208. "Memorandum of Conversation on Implementation of NSC 13/2 (November 2, 1948)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.0011 PW (Peace)/11-248), RG 59.

209. "Memorandum from Hugh D. Farley to Eishop and Colonel Riggs on Proposed Amendment to Paragraph 5 (December 22, 1948)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.0011 P.W. (Peace)/12-2248), RG 59.

210. "Memorandum for the Executive Secretary, National Security Council on Summary of Action on Implementation of NSC 13/2 (February 10, 1949)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (711.94/2-1049), RG 59; "Memorandum for the National Security Council on Recommendations With Respect to U.S. Policy Toward Japan (February 4, 1949), in Iokibe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 3-E-7. Souers asked the members of the NSC to substitute the amended version of Paragraph 5 for the original version, as approved by the president on November 5, 1948.

211. "NSC 1313, Report by the National Security Council on Recommendations With Respect to United States Policy Toward Japan (May 6, 1949)," FRUS, 1949, Volume 7, *The Far East and Australasia*, Part 2 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), 730-736.

212. "Memorandum by Fearey to Davies (May 2, 1949)," *Ibid.*, 724-727.

213. "Despatch No. 389, Huston to the Secretary of State," *Ibid.*, 777.

214. "Eutterworth to Robert R. West, Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army (July 29, 1949)," *Ibid.*, 815-816.

215. "Draft Directive from the JCS to the Commander-in-Chief, Far East for Military Government of the Ryukyu Islands (July 29, 1949)," *Ibid.*, 816-819. Oliver's recommendation spurred the Under Secretary of the Army Tracy S. Voorhees to visit Okinawa personally on an unannounced inspection trip, purportedly for the purpose of observing the damage that the two typhoons ("Della," which hit Okinawa in June 1949 and "Gloria," which struck shortly thereafter on July 22—indeed in 1948 and 1949, five powerful typhoons damaged Okinawa) but also to observe conditions in Okinawa under the military government. Voorhees

was unhappy with what he found and replaced Major General William W. Eagles with the more popular and energetic Sheetz. See Fisch, *op. cit.*, 87-88, 157-158.

216. "Letter from Eishop to Cloyce K. Huston (undated)," Eox 48, Foreign Service Posts, Tokyo Embassy, (hereafter Foreign Posts-Tokyo) Japan, RG 84 NA.; "Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations Made in Report on the Ryukyus by Mr. Douglas Oliver (undated)," Folder: Miscellaneous, 1945-1952, Eox 1, Records of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, RG 59.

217. Eond, as Acting Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, suggested in a memorandum to Eutterworth that as soon as action on the directive was concluded, a paper be prepared for the NSC on the question of the ultimate disposition of the Ryukyu Islands "which will presumably recommend either strategic trusteeship, ordinary trusteeship or return [of the islands] to Japan with a leased-base arrangement." Such an official paper does not seem to have been developed however and discussions on the future status of Okinawa would remain at the interdepartmental level. See "Memorandum from Bond to Eutterworth on New Directive for the Ryukyus (July 15, 1949)," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 3, microfiche 1-A-102.

The Treaty of Peace with Japan and Article 3:

U.S. Strategic Requirements, Japanese Territorial Desires, and the Problem of International Recognition, 1949-1951

I. INTRODUCTION

John M. Allison, assistant to John Foster Dulles during the preparations for the Japanese peace treaty, wrote that one of his boss' favorite expressions was "the perfect is the enemy of the good." Article 3, the Okinawa territorial clause of the Japanese Peace Treaty whose interpretation allowed the Japanese government to retain "residual sovereignty" while the United States was given "the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands," is a clear example of Dulles' realistic approach in working for a good treaty rather than for a perfect, yet perhaps unattainable, one. How Article 3 and the larger peace treaty, of which Dulles as President Harry S. Truman's special representative was the principal architect, was drafted, negotiated, and later interpreted is the focus of this chapter. Importantly, also examined are the movements of the Japanese government toward the peace treaty and specifically in relation to the territorial provisions, which show that Prime Minister Yoshida's initiatives were crucial in convincing the U.S. government not to permanently separate Okinawa from Japan.

II. MOVEMENTS TOWARD A PEACE TREATY AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENT: U.S. POLICY FOR JAPAN, 1949-1950

We are now definitely at a crossroads in the occupation of Japan; that it will require immediate, determined and forceful action by the highest authorities in Washington to bring about a change in the character of the occupation...and to accomplish within the next 12 to 18 months, the sort of relationship with Japan which will flow from a peace treaty.'

So recommended Max W. Bishop, a veteran Asia specialist and then-Chief of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, after he visited Japan in early

February 1949 to sound out MacArthur's views on East Asian affairs and to explain to him the State Department's policy toward Japan, Okinawa, and the region. Bishop's call for a change in the occupation leading to a peace treaty was based on the ever-worsening condition of the Far East and the declining economic-political situation in Japan. Regionally, Communist forces in the civil war in China were clearly routing Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Army. Indeed by the end of the 1949 the founding of the People's Republic of China was declared, followed shortly after (on February 14, 1950) with the signing of a treaty between the Soviet Union and the PRC. The Soviet Union in the meantime had also signed an economic treaty on March 17 (1949) with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea, the founding of which was proclaimed on September 9, 1948) and granted a large loan to the new country. The Soviet Union had also detonated its first nuclear weapon, thus ending America's unique position, and beginning an arms race that lasted the entire Cold War. Meanwhile, conditions in Japan, high inflation, a poorly performing economy, political instability, and, in general, a "tiredness of the occupation" among the Japanese people increasingly became causes of concern for the U.S. government and the State Department in particular. This restlessness among the Japanese was perhaps most clearly demonstrated to Bishop in the January 23, 1949 general elections which he called a "protest vote...against the occupation."³

In the wake of these events, the U.S. influence in, and commitment to, the region was increasingly being questioned. On February 6, 1949, one week after Communist forces entered Beijing without a struggle, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall reportedly stated in an off-the-record press conference at the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo that the United States had "no moral obligations towards Japan" and called for a withdrawal of American troops because Japan was "in fact a liability" in a war with the Soviet Union. William J. Sebald, the Political Adviser to MacArthur and the State Department's representative in Japan, angrily reported to Washington: "it would appear that no remarks could have been better designed to revive Japanese interest in the possibility or desirability of an orientation towards the Soviets, particularly in the light of recent events on the continent of Asia." In response to press reports on Royall's speech, Secretary of State Acheson was forced to tell America's Allies in Europe and the Asian region that "the U.S. has no intention of relinquishing these military responsibilities or of shirking them in any degree. Neither has it any intention of abdicating the responsibility and leadership which it accepted from the outset for the relief and reform of Japan." Coming from Acheson, who had called as early as May 1947 for Japan to become again the "great workshop...of Asia" in his Cleveland, Mississippi speech, it was a convincing rebuttal to his Army counterpart."

However, as the situation in the Far East worsened and it became increasingly clear that the Japanese were unhappy with the Occupation, the State Department began to seriously reconsider the need for a peace treaty. Acting Secretary of State James E. Webb (Acheson was in Europe for the Foreign Ministers meeting in Paris) sent a memorandum to the National Security Council suggesting the need to examine "the present adequacy of NSC 1313." Although NSC 1313 had been approved only two weeks before on May 6, 1949 as seen in the last chapter, it had taken two years to forge this domestic policy consensus. Indeed it was in many ways more or less a reaffirmation of the underlying commitment found in PPS/28 and NSC 1312 not to "press for a treaty...at this time" due to Japan's internal weaknesses, "the serious international situation created by the Soviet Union's policy of aggressive Communist expansion," and "differences which have developed among the interested countries." In other words, the State Department was now reconsidering the need to move in the direction of a peace treaty just as the opposite recommendations found in NSC 1313 were being reaffirmed in its final form. Drafted by Bishop, Webb's memo warned that there would be increasing pressure either from friendly Allies, the Soviet Union, or the Japanese people themselves for a peace treaty. "It would be most desirable," the memo stated that the United States "should avoid being placed in the position of yielding to pressure from the Japanese people to effect changes in the occupation or of negotiating for a peace settlement on the basis of proposals brought forward by some other power." State asked the Defense Department the following week to undertake a study of U.S. security needs in Japan as a first step in preparing for a peace settlement.'

In response, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their "Strategic Evaluation of United States Security Needs in Japan" (approved May 15, 1949 as NSC 49) argued that, on the contrary, "from the military point of view...a peace treaty would, at the present time be premature" due to the fact that "the continuing Soviet policy of aggressive communist expansion makes it essential that Japan's democracy and western orientation first be established beyond all question, and since global developments are still in such a state of flux that measures leading to the risk of loss of control of any area might seriously affect our national security.'" The Joint Chiefs elaborated in their report the strategic importance of Japan to U.S. security interests in the region, giving the following four reasons: Japan's geographic location with respect to trade routes, the control of sea passages, as a base used by the Soviet Union against U.S. bases in the Pacific, and as staging areas to be used by the United States to "project [its] military power to the Asiatic mainland and to the USSR islands." The JCS then stated that peace negotiations had to include the "following safeguards" to protect America's security interests and "in order that...the communistic expansion

plans of the Soviets may be held in check at least as far as Japan is concerned." These conditions were:

- a. There should be prior assurance of Japan's economic, psychological, and political stability; and of her democracy and western obligation;
- b. Japan's internal security forces must be adequate not only for maintenance of order but for protection against sabotage of vital installations. This may involve stronger internal security forces than were thought to be essential prior to the current overrunning of China;
- c. Since there can be no guarantee in the present world situation of the sovereignty of a defenseless Japan, there should be plans, as previously recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for limited Japanese armed forces for self-defense to be effectuated in war emergency, and in any case, unless the general situation makes it clearly unnecessary, prior to departure of occupation forces from Japan; and
- d. No definite time should be set in the peace treaty for withdrawal of occupation forces. Rather, they should be phased out gradually and occupation should be terminated only after it has been determined and agreed that conditions are sufficiently satisfactory to justify termination."

Setting these conditions as the JCS did frustrated State which believed that it could best guarantee Japan's orientation toward the United States through a peace treaty; a continued occupation, as called for by the military, was in fact endangering precisely this. Acheson, in a letter to MacArthur (who also called for an early peace treaty) in early September, explained it succinctly by writing, "It seems to me that...there is not a dichotomy between a peace treaty and occupation. Both might well be used to accomplish the same purpose (of) find[ing] the true path of progress toward a Japan firmly attached to American interests in peace, security and freedom from Communist domination in the Far East.""" This reasoning was later followed in the State Department's review of NSC 49, completed in late September under the early direction of the head of the Policy Planning Staff, George F. Kennan.¹¹ These views—later forwarded to the NSC on October 4 (becoming NSC 4911)—argued that "the only hope for the preservation and advancement of such democracy and western orientation as now exist in Japan lies in the early conclusion of a peace settlement.""

Immediately prior to the conclusion of this report, State Department officials met on September 9 with British Assistant Under Secretary for the Far East, Maberly E. Dening, and officials from the British Embassy in Washington shortly before a meeting scheduled between Acheson and the strongly anti-Communist British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. Dening criticized the American side for not placing more emphasis on the Far East and not moving toward an early peace treaty with Japan. Director of the

Office of Far Eastern Affairs W. Walton Butterworth explained to his counterpart that a procedure for a peace conference had yet to be found. Moreover, Butterworth continued, the Communist victories in East Asia had changed the situation. America was concerned whether a peace treaty would compromise U.S. security interests in the area and whether the Soviet Union and China participate in such a conference. In response, Denning argued that it was necessary to proceed without the Soviets because they would not agree to the terms of a peace treaty set by the United States. Regarding the security question, Denning suggested that U.S. security interests could be guaranteed by a bilateral pact between Japan and the United States in which Japan would provide bases to the America in exchange for protection. "Such an arrangement," Denning added, "would seem acceptable to the Japanese who want protection as much as they do a peace settlement." Denning also suggested that the United States might want to have a trusteeship over the Ryukyu Islands as a further safeguard of its security interests in the Western Pacific." Acheson and Bevin confirmed in their meeting four days later that the United States, the United Kingdom, and the British Commonwealth countries should begin "advance preparation" and seek "prior agreement among us on all the principal provisions." They also agreed that Acheson would report the views of the United States on a Japanese peace treaty in time for the next Commonwealth meeting set for January in Colombo.¹⁴

At the end of the week, Acheson met with President Truman and Deputy Secretary of Defense Stephen T. Early after a Cabinet meeting to explain that the State Department would soon solicit the views of the JCS on its essential security requirements based on the assumption that a peace settlement would be negotiated in the near future." This request was officially made on October 3, 1949 in a letter from Under Secretary Webb to Secretary of Defense Johnson, in which Webb explained that the two departments should reach agreement by mid-November to allow time for discussion and approval of the draft by the NSC and the President before its presentation to the British in December.¹⁶ In the meantime, Acheson on September 29 designated the Under Secretary's office to prepare a new treaty draft and by October 13, this new draft was ready. However, reflecting the fact that the security problem was the key to the treaty, security provisions were not included in the draft and were to be inserted after discussions with the Defense Department."

The JCS response to Acheson's request for the military's views of its security requirements (NSC 60, "Japanese Peace Treaty") came late however and only reconfirmed its earlier opinion (seen in NSC 49) that negotiations for a treaty were still premature.¹⁸ On the morning of December 24, one day after receipt of the JCS memo, Acheson asked Bradley and Major General J. H. Burns (representing Under Secretary of Defense Early) to meet with him and State Department officials to discuss the military's views

in the memorandum. Acheson, following State's practice of allowing the military to decide things directly related to the military or U.S. security interests, began by expressing understanding of the military requirements for the continued presence of U.S. forces and bases in the area, a policy with which State was in agreement for the most part. Acheson explained that he was critical however of the JCS' requirement that both the Soviet Union and the de facto government of China must also be signatories to a peace treaty with Japan. "In view of these two considerations, the view expressed by the JCS that negotiations leading toward a peace treaty with Japan are premature represents...a masterpiece of understatement."¹⁹ He then read an informal memorandum (he had prepared to give the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks, later that same day) to the JCS for their concurrence. In this memo, Acheson admitted that while on several points "tentative conclusions" had been reached, but on the "very important matter of security," the United States had not been able "to find satisfactory answers to certain basic problems confronting us." Acheson's memo noted that the "basic problem underlying a treaty is security; that is, to avoid any peace settlement which would weaken the United States security position in the western Pacific and therefore the security of all other like-minded powers in that area. The United States also appreciates that security clauses in the treaty must be dual in purpose: security against renewed Japanese aggression and security for Japan against Soviet-Communist aggression. The two aggressive threats appear closely related, however, for in its present state of complete disarmament Japan can be realistically regarded as a future threat only if allied or in cooperation with Soviet military might...The United States therefore believes Soviet potentialities toward Japan must be given the most serious consideration and that, however much a treaty may be desirable, one which fails to give Japan adequate protection against Communist aggression, outright or subversive, may well be worse than no treaty at all." Thus, Acheson noted, the United States would not be able to "meet the contemplated schedule" as decided by he and Bevin in September²⁰ However Acheson sought a two-track approach; continuing discussions with Allies while working to gain the agreement of the interested departments and agencies in the government. Truman gave his consent to this approach at a December 29 NSC meeting when he recognized that "the United States and the United Kingdom could negotiate a peace treaty with Japan whether the USSR participated or not."²¹

In early 1950 as seen in [Table 6-2](#) in the previous chapter, both the State Department and the Defense Department sent representatives to Japan for further study. For the State Department, Philip C. Jessup went to Japan (and thirteen other nations in the region), on a three-month tour ending on March 15. In Japan, Jessup found MacArthur in "emphatic and enthusiastic agreement" with his proposition that "one of the ways we could meet the communist menace in Asia was by the conclusion of the Japanese Peace

Treaty, which would prove that we were not imperialist but were ready to satisfy the legitimate desires of the people.”²² The JCS, on the other hand, were in Japan from January 29 to February 5 and upon their return, reaffirmed their earlier views that the time was not right for a peace treaty with Japan.

The State Department in the meantime continued to study the type of security arrangements to be brought about as well as the overall need to conclude an early peace treaty with Japan. Its "Position of the Department of State on United States Policy Toward a Japanese Peace and Security Settlement," completed on March 9, argued again for the early conclusion of a treaty and called for a "Pacific collective security arrangement," consistent with the U.N. Charter, as a way to provide for U.S. security interests in the area.²³ Two weeks later, on March 23, at the request of Secretary Johnson, Under Secretary of the Army Tracy S. Vorhees met with Acheson to explain his department's views on the peace treaty. Following the JCS visit to Japan originally undertaken at Vorhees request, the military reexamined its approach to the peace treaty, but in effect came to the same conclusions reached earlier: if the United States unilaterally ended the occupation with a peace treaty, the Russians would not be bound by it and technically could occupy Japan as per the original surrender terms. Acheson however rejected this line of thinking as "unduly stress[ing] the extent to which such grounds...would motivate the Soviet Union in its actions." Another meeting would be needed Acheson stated.²⁴

Exactly one month later on April 24, Acheson called a meeting of Pentagon and State officials to try to bring their views on a treaty into closer agreement.²⁵ Actually, Acheson was seeking to reason with the military and get them to support an early peace treaty with Japan. Specifically, Acheson drew attention to the earlier statement by Johnson that the treaty was "premature" and to the JCS requirements that American forces had to remain in Japan while at the same time the Soviet Union and de facto Chinese government had to be parties to the signature of the treaty. Acheson said these conditions made "conclusion of a treaty impossible." Thus, in place of that, Acheson argued again that an early, non-punitive treaty should be concluded while a multilateral Pacific collective security arrangement (with the FEC countries and Japan) would be entered into at the same time. In this arrangement, "Japan would grant whatever bases and rights might be determined as necessary to defend Japan against aggression." A political and economic treaty for Japan, while leaving the occupation forces in place, as proposed earlier by Vorhees, was unrealistic, Acheson said, warning, "the situation in Japan was not stationary." Acheson emphasized that "the choice with which the United States was faced was not a choice between the situation we now have and an alternative, but rather a choice between a deteriorating situation and an alternative...It does not solve the political problem simply to decide to do

nothing." General Omar N. Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed, stating that a peace treaty was in fact still "premature," particularly "in light of recent developments and the uncertainties in the changing situation in the Far East." Bradley added as well that he was "against a peace treaty for the sake of a peace treaty"(a charge thrown at State which Acheson had denied already earlier in the meeting). Admiral Sherman agreed with Bradley's assessment and argued that "the crux of the problem from the military standpoint was that a decision was required as to whether our power position should be based on the periphery of islands formed by Japan, Okinawa, and the Philippines or whether the United States should abandon its position in Japan and Okinawa and draw back to Guam and the Philippines, a position held by us before the last war." Sherman added that were U.S. forces to withdraw from Japan, "Okinawa would be untenable." Therefore, he warned, he "saw no middle position between the two alternatives." Sherman's comments are particularly curious because he seems to have completely disregarded Acheson's ideas for a security arrangement while at the same time not offering a serious rebuttal.

Acheson, the skilled lawyer and negotiator, recognized the Defense Department's pre-eminent role in military planning, including regarding the size and positioning of American forces in Japan, and here re-emphasized State's traditional position that "whatever military requirements were essential to U.S. security were for the U.S. military to determine." Acheson added that State continued to look to the Defense Department for "advice on this point." Acheson said that State's primary concern, however, was "in making sure that the United States did not ask for more bases and rights than it would actually need in the long run because this would simply give rise to unnecessary difficulties in negotiations and unnecessarily adverse political consequences." Defense officials, while reiterating that they felt "a peace treaty under present conditions was premature for at least the next six months (at which time the situation would be looked at again)," agreed that if the Secretary of State "for political reasons should say that the situation was deteriorating so fast that the United States could not wait as long as six months, then the Joint Chiefs would have to reassess the situation at once." Acheson however did not seem satisfied with this response. He stated that "no one can say at just what time the situation will have deteriorated to the extent indicated," and continued by arguing that "a military occupation run anywhere, however ably conducted, begins after a certain time to run downhill and a point is eventually reached where one has to peg one's military requirements through the conclusion of a new arrangement and one must be willing to pay the price for this." The military seemed to agree with this line of argument, but Secretary Johnson asked that any decisions be put off until after they return from an inspection trip of the Pacific bases.²⁶ In this way, a final decision on the necessity of proceeding with a peace treaty was delayed again. This meeting in particular

demonstrated just how difficult it was to separate political problems from military considerations. No matter how much each tried to limit the scope, they were in fact linked. Acheson decided in the meantime to continue at least with the department's preparations for the treaty.

III. PREPARATIONS: DULLES AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT BRIEFINGS, SPRING 1950

It was against this background that Dulles, a lawyer with more than 40 years experience in international affairs, began his work.¹ In addition to the stalemate between the State and Defense departments, the Truman Administration's entire Asian policy was being aggressively criticized by the opposition Republican Party, in what Acheson called the "attack of the primitives."²⁸ Thus, in the spirit of bipartisanship, as well as in recognition of the practical necessity for it, Dulles, the foreign policy spokesman of the Republican Party, was appointed as Consultant to the Secretary of State on April 6, 1950, after a series of discussions and correspondence between Dulles, Rusk, Acheson, and the ailing Republican leader Arthur Vandenberg in late March 1950.²⁹

W. Walton Butterworth, who by this point had been replaced by Dean Rusk as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and was now working for Secretary of State Acheson as his assistant on the Japanese peace treaty, was due to leave for his posting as ambassador to Sweden and thus would not be able to continue in his work.³⁰ Recognizing the delicate political and military nature of a future peace treaty as well as the complicated domestic political situation, Butterworth believed that a career Foreign Service Officer would have great difficulty in successfully negotiating (and seeing ratified) a treaty. He thus recommended his fellow Princetonian, Dulles, to take over his position as assistant in the Japanese peace treaty preparations." Acheson and Truman eventually agreed.

One would have thought that given his connections with the Republican Party, Dulles' role would be that of a liaison for the Department with Congress. However, Dulles' status was bigger than that, as were his interests. His desire was to work on the Japanese Peace Treaty problem, which he let be known at every occasion.³² In fact his interest in the peace treaty was demonstrated the very day he was appointed. Dulles reportedly told Acheson that the administration would "never get anything done unless you select someone in whom you have confidence, give him the job to do, and then hold him to results. Look at the Japanese Peace Treaty—the Department has been discussing it for four years without result. Why don't you give someone one year in which to get action, with the understanding that if he can't do it, he fails? Give him a target and enough authority to get there."³³ Dulles then requested that he be briefed on the Japanese treaty preparations. Acheson agreed, sending his Special Assistant, John B. Howard, a lawyer, and Butterworth to New York the following day to meet

with Dulles before he began a short holiday to Canada." Their meeting lasted more than four hours, during which Butterworth and Howard explained the background of the treaty preparations and the ideas on security arrangements. Importantly, the subject of Okinawa appeared often.³⁵

Butterworth was first to speak, briefing Dulles on the background to the Far Eastern situation and the preparations for a peace treaty and security arrangements, including the failed attempts to bring about a peace conference in 1947, Kennan's trip to Japan in 1948, the development of NSC 13, Japan's rearmament, and the military requirements of the JCS "as they had so far inadequately been revealed to us" for bases in Japan and Okinawa. Howard next explained each of the principal security arrangements that was being considered for Japan, including: Japan's neutralization, a U.S.-Japan base agreement, a Pacific Pact, an agreement for both the defense of Japan and defense from Japan, and a "limited political and economic treaty with SCAP's powers remaining unchanged in the security field."

After their briefing, Dulles was asked his views. The new adviser concentrated for the most part to commenting on each of the security arrangements that had been introduced. He began by dismissing plans for the neutralization of Japan, stating "Neutrality had no meaning for the Russians," a position similar to that of Acheson. Dulles moreover was critical to varying degrees of the other arrangements, such as a Pacific Pact and the one for a limited treaty, although he did seem "favorably disposed toward" a multilateral agreement "whereby Japan would be defended against attack and the participating countries would defend one another against attack by Japan," spending the most time on discussions of it. Concerning a base agreement, in which the Japanese government would provide bases for U.S. forces, Dulles was non-committal.³⁶ According to the memorandum of conversation on the meeting, Dulles "seemed unaware of the JCS interest in having bases" in Japan and Okinawa, showing "no indication that he had any predisposition as to the necessity for bases." He did say that he "appreciate[d] the usefulness of bases spread out over a considerable area" as the United States had in the United Kingdom and that "bases on Japan proper might be comparable to these." Dulles cautioned however that "nevertheless bases in a hostile country would be useless and the Japanese must be willing, as were the British as in the case of the U.K., to request the United States to establish bases on Japan." (This too was a position held by the State Department and would prove to be a fundamental element of Dulles' thinking.) In any case, Dulles admitted, the question over the establishment of bases on Japan was a "technical military problem." While he was "prepared to envisage an arrangement either with or without bases on Japan proper," regarding Okinawa, Dulles' "views were the same as those of the (State) Department's position regarding a trusteeship, namely that an ordinary trusteeship would be as satisfactory as a strategic trusteeship."³⁷

On May 18, Dulles was officially given responsibility for handling negotiations for the Japanese peace treaty at a press conference held by Truman. Here, the President announced as well that the peace treaty would be the responsibility of State Department and that the treaty was, he hoped, not too far off, thus implying that the Secretary would have his support in any conflict with the Department of Defense regarding a peace settlement.³⁸ Shortly after receiving his assignment as chief negotiator for Japan, Dulles agreed to make a trip to Japan." In preparation for his work and the upcoming trip, Dulles invited those in the State Department involved in Japan policy to his office to discuss his new assignment. It was in these sessions in late May that Dulles received his second set of briefings, in the form of thirteen background papers on more detailed aspects of U.S. policy toward Japan and their implementation.

The last briefing paper, of interest here, was a five-page discussion on the Ryukyu Islands, which set forth earlier policy and identified current problems." This paper was drafted by Noel Hemmendinger of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and revised by that office's Deputy Director, U. Alexis Johnson, a career diplomat who had returned to Washington in the late summer of 1949 after almost four years of continuous service as Consul (and then Consul General) in Yokohama, Japan.⁴¹ While in Yokohama, Johnson had a great deal of experience with Okinawa. Although it seems that he himself did not visit Okinawa during this time, he did learn of conditions there through, as seen in [Table 6-2](#), the dispatching of several younger Foreign Service Officers to report on the military government and the social, economic, and political situation in Okinawa whose reports he would read before forwarding them to Washington.⁴² It would thus be no exaggeration to say that he was one of the most knowledgeable officials regarding Okinawa in State at the time.

Johnson and Hemmendinger began by giving an overview of American policy toward Okinawa making clear that their Northeast Asian Affairs Office, as seen in State Department policy to date, believed "the Ryukyu Islands were not taken by the Japanese by violence and were under Japanese sovereignty long before 1914. Accordingly, while Japan may be required to relinquish sovereignty over them, such sovereignty has not been relinquished and the declarations of Allied policy do not clearly contemplate that it should be relinquished." Importantly, the paper then explains the political background of Okinawan policy, and essentially overturns former assumptions about Okinawa, based on five years of occupation experience, observations, and political reporting. "Politically and culturally, the Ryukyus are essentially Japanese, and have a cultural level comparable with the poorer areas of Japan proper. Early U.S. directives based on the premise that the Ryukyus had a separate tradition and culture from that of Japan were unrealistic." Johnson and Hemmendinger were in effect emphasizing that the military's attempts to make separation of the Ryukyu

Islands from Japan more acceptable by portraying the islands as having a completely different identity was based on an incorrect understanding of the history and desire of the people. Importantly, as well, the briefing paper, in its last section, "Current Problems," attempts to set forth the problems that Dulles faced regarding Okinawa's international status and the areas to be encompassed. The arguments are looked at below in detail.

Firstly, the paper explains that a plan for Okinawa to be put under a strategic trusteeship "which would give to the United States all powers which the military consider essential is out of the question for the foreseeable future" because of the Soviet veto in the U. N. Security Council. On the other hand, the paper continues with the explanation concerning an ordinary trusteeship, which could more easily be obtained a vote in the U. N. General Assembly. However, the question as to whether the supervision by the U. N. Trusteeship Council would be "compatible with U.S. strategic requirements" had yet it was noted to be discussed in detail with the military. Finally, the paper analyzes the option of an arrangement in which Japan would retain sovereignty over the Ryukyus with the provision for American bases there. Assuming that retention by Japan would be "consistent with United States strategic interests," the paper argued "it would have (at least two) definite advantages." The first advantage was that the United States would be spared the problems and some of the expenses of the administration of "an area whose population can be expected to make ever-increasing demands as their present low standard of living is improved." Moreover, the second advantage would be that America would not be exposed to the "charges of colonial expansion" which were already affecting American policy in Asia.

Johnson, well aware of the difficulty State was having in convincing the military, added a warning to Dulles in a later draft of this paper that was incorporated into the final briefing paper, "Army thinking is rigidly along the lines of continued separation from Japan and absolute control by the United States."⁴³ How correct he was. American policy regarding Okinawa's territorial status to date had been basically divided between military and political considerations. The State Department, conscious of the commitments made in the Atlantic Charter, had as we have seen, traditionally sought the return of sovereignty to Japan with base rights being guaranteed. The military on the other hand was against such a formula and wanted absolute strategic control over the islands. A theoretical compromise solution was the formula for an ordinary trusteeship, although the State Department was not fully in agreement with it, nor was the military, as is seen later in this chapter. Before arrangements could be finalized for Okinawa however, the big question was whether or not to go ahead with the treaty at this point, and would take Dulles and his assistants to Japan in an effort to bring about a decision.

IV. DULLES' EARLY WORK AND PREPARATIONS FOR HIS FIRST TRIP TO JAPAN

After receiving his assignment, Dulles chose Allison, introduced above, the then-Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (NA) as "his personal associate and advisor" for preparing the peace treaty. Allison was a career diplomat with extensive prewar experience in Japan (and China), and had first worked with Dulles the year before while Allison was serving as Far Eastern Advisor to the American delegation of the United Nations . Dulles apparently liked Allison's writing ability and his conviction, shared by Dulles, that Japan should be given a "liberal treaty that would encourage the Japanese and make them, of their own volition and not by force, to be decent members of the family of nations." Allison was impressed with Dulles' "indefatigable" work habits.⁴⁴ It was a pace he would continue to keep throughout the peace treaty preparations.

Their first order of business was to get ready for their trip to Japan to meet with MacArthur and Japanese leaders for discussions on the possibility of a peace treaty. For Allison this meant first removing himself from his duties as Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs and then reviewing what had been done relating to the peace treaty with Japan, as well as learning about the various views of the Defense Department, the Far Eastern Commission, and other offices within State." For Robert A. Fearey, formerly charged as Allison's special assistant in charge of Japanese Peace Treaty planning in the same office, it meant updating Allison and Dulles on the planning already done. For Dulles, in addition to this in-depth studying, it meant working with Congress to "secure" bipartisan support for U.S. policy and working at a consensus on various issues between the State Department and the military.⁴⁶ By June 7 he had a memorandum already prepared. According to Fearey, one evening Dulles took the department's 30-page treaty draft home and the next morning returned with a one-page "statement of principles." Dulles apparently did not want to submit a full treaty text at this point to the Allies. "His concept," Fearey explains, "was to start only with a few basic principles, to seek our Allies and Japan's agreement on them, to get each country to feel it was an active participant in building the treaty from the beginning."⁴⁷ In it, Dulles argued that in the case of Japan, the "long-range, overall objective" was:

A Japanese people who will be peacefully inclined;
effectively respect fundamental human rights;
be part of the free world;
be friendly to the United States;
be capable of developing their own well-being and self-respect without
dependence on outside charity;
be able by their conduct and example to exhibit to the peoples of Asia and
the Pacific Islands the advantages of the free way of life and thereby help
in the effort to resist and throw back communism in this part of the world.

Dulles expanded on these themes in attachments to the memorandum, but did not go into any detail of the security arrangements or of the disposition of Okinawa because of the need to clarify the views of the Defense Department before proceeding.⁴⁸

Exactly one week after completing this memorandum, Dulles and Allison departed Washington on June 14 for Tokyo." Aware that his trip coincided with that of high-ranking military officials including Secretary Johnson and JCS Chairman Bradley, Dulles put his thoughts down on the peace treaty: "Much depends on whether the JCS want to use Japan generally as a major advanced offensive airbase. That decision if adopted as U.S. policy, would have many consequences in terms of relations with, and responsibilities for, the Japanese. The alternative," the memorandum continues, "[wa]s some form of defensive guarantee, stiffened by a continuing presence of some skeleton U.S. forces.""" Dulles found MacArthur equally concerned over the delayed treaty due to differences between the State Department and Pentagon. Indeed, (as described in an earlier chapter) MacArthur had in March 1947 called for a peace treaty saying that Japan had already been demilitarized and democratized and only a treaty would allow Japan to economically recover by joining the community of nations again. By 1950, MacArthur was clearly frustrated with the impasse and no longer hid his low opinion of the JCS (with the exception of Admiral Sherman), dismissing their lack of understanding of Japan and the peace treaty as "not at all understand[ing] the problem here." (The hostility between MacArthur and the JCS was in fact mutual.) He likewise suggested to his Political Advisor, William J. Sebald, and Ambassador-at-Large Jessup, during the latter's visit to Japan in early January (1950), that State simply "overrule the JCS" because negotiation of a peace treaty "was not a decision which should be left to the JCS."⁵¹ Sebald felt the same way. In his diary on the eve of Dulles' June trip, he recorded that there was a "danger of allowing the military not only to influence foreign policy, but actually to make it, as is being done in the case of the peace treaty discussions *re[garding]* Japan. It appears to me that the State Dep[artmen]t should lay down the specifications—once it has decided that we should have a treaty for reasons of foreign policy—and that the Defense Dep[artmen]t. should then conform, by decision of the President, if necessary. It now appears to

be just the opposite."'' It would be MacArthur, working with Dulles during the latter's visit to Japan, who would bring about an arrangement that both the military and State could accept.

V. THE FIRST DULLES TRIP AND THE MACARTHUR COMPROMISE, JUNE 1950

Dulles and his party of five (his wife, deputy Allison, secretary Dorothy Doyle, and two newspaper correspondents) arrived in Tokyo in the early morning of June 17 for a two-hour layover before traveling on to Korea. Sebald met Dulles at Haneda Airport where, during breakfast, they went over the details for Dulles' longer stay in Japan set to begin on June 21.⁵³

Almost immediately after the Dulles group departed, Sebald was back again at Haneda in order to welcome the Johnson-Bradley mission of military officials, who in the words of the Political Advisor to SCAP was, along with the Dulles group, "carr[ying] the State-Defense impasse to the front lines."'' The first shot of this battle was fired by Secretary Johnson at SCAP headquarters in the Dai Ichi Life Insurance Building during the briefing that visiting dignitaries usually received upon their arrival in Japan. Johnson, according to Sebald's report, attacked "the State Department crowd" and its plans to proceed with a treaty. Johnson also attacked Dulles personally by characterizing him as "an impractical man who approached the world's problems with a religious, moral, and pacifist attitude."'' In his memoirs, Sebald described the whole session as "a particularly unpleasant and...unjustified episode."'' Sebald's disgust is more apparent in his diary: "The whole thing was smelly and nauseating," he recorded?

While Dulles and his group were touring pre-hostilities Korea, Johnson and Bradley sought to dissuade MacArthur from supporting a peace treaty with Japan. That MacArthur had been calling for a peace treaty for more than three years did not seem to discourage them; indeed it may have been out of desperation that they sought to convince MacArthur. Expecting exactly this, MacArthur had prepared a long memorandum regarding a peace treaty, as well as a second one on Formosa prior to their arrival.⁵⁸ It is the first one which primarily concerns us here.

The fundamental problem of whether to proceed with a treaty of peace or not concerned the question of securing base rights in Japan. The State Department, basing its actions on primarily political considerations, wanted to proceed at any rate with the peace treaty; the military did not even want to consider a peace treaty until its strategic requirements were met. The dilemma was in finding, as MacArthur wrote in this memorandum, "a solution...which will serve the one without doing violence to the other."⁵⁹ MacArthur, who had been hesitant to accept bases in mainland Japan all along, was critical of the two alternative security arrangements which had been tossed around that year.⁶⁰ Specifically, these were a collective security arrangement (both for and against Japan) that would go into

effect with the conclusion of a peace treaty and a partial peace with the retention of the present regime of control, i.e. military occupation. MacArthur warned that the first arrangement would be "interpreted as dictated by primary American security arrangements—with accent upon the defense of the United States rather than the defense of Japan" and would "arouse a wave of intense nationalistic opposition within Japanese political circles...fanned by Communist propaganda that the reservation of such military bases to the United States would be a move toward the 'colonization' of Japan and an aggressive threat against the mainland of Asia."⁶¹ MacArthur, who prided himself on knowing the Japanese people and "the Asian mind," likewise noted that while such an arrangement was possible to secure legally, "its value to the United States would be limited by the bitterness and resentments which would thereafter dominate the Japanese mind." MacArthur more or less dismissed the second alternative security arrangement as "worse than the status quo" commenting that "its easily discernible weakness would lie not only in its failure to accord the Japanese full political autonomy, but even more in its patent effort to mask the continued occupancy of military bases behind the pretended need for indefinite extension of the existing regime of Allied control." In place of these two arrangements, MacArthur introduced his own suggestion, which he called "Alternative Security Arrangement III." MacArthur had actually been considering this arrangement for some time it seems, sharing his ideas with Sebald in a meeting between the two on the night of May 24 telling him that "he would try to break the impasse which ha[d] arisen between State [and] Defense."" MacArthur argued that the clauses of the Potsdam Declaration (6, 7, and 12) provided "a legal basis for security reservations in a peace treaty." This legal basis would be founded on a broad interpretation. Specifically, MacArthur noted that clause 6, stating that "a new order of peace, security, and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world," had been traditionally and "narrowly" interpreted to mean vis-à-vis Japan. However, it could, in MacArthur's reasoning, also be interpreted to include other countries as well, specifically the Soviet Union and China, which might threaten Japan's "peacefully inclined and responsible government." As a result, MacArthur's full recommendation took the following form:

That a normal treaty be consummated embodying, however, a security reservation to the effect that so long as "irresponsible militarism" exists in the world as a threat to peace, security; and justice in Japan, the pertinent security conditions of the Potsdam Declaration shall be deemed unfulfilled and, in view of the attendant threat to unarmed Japan's "new order of peace, security, and justice," points in Japanese continue to be garrisoned by the Allied Powers signatory thereto through United States forces; that when such threat from "irresponsible militarism" ceases to exist, all pro-

visions of the surrender terms shall be deemed fulfilled and all Allied garrisons shall be permanently withdrawn from Japan.

According to Sebald's account of their May 24 discussions, MacArthur suggested that the treaty should contain a provision that certain bases would be reserved for the use of U.S. troops "for the purpose of securing the achievement of the basic objectives set forth in the Potsdam Proclamation." The Japanese moreover would be given the opportunity to vote on the treaty, according to MacArthur's plan; however, if the results of the nationwide plebiscite were against the treaty of peace containing the base provision, the "regime of control" would continue without a peace treaty.

MacArthur gave this memorandum calling for an early peace to Johnson and Bradley sometime on or after June 18." Sebald speculated in any case that Johnson "must have been upset when later he was given [the] memorandum prepared by General MacArthur." Indeed, he was when he realized that MacArthur was set against delaying a treaty any longer, as the latter's memorandum made clear:

The Japanese people have faithfully fulfilled the obligations they assumed under the instrument of surrender and have every moral and legal right to the restoration of peace. On this point, as before stated all of the Allied Powers are in full accord and publicly committed and their failure to protect Japan in this right would be a foul blemish upon modern civilization. For this reason and irrespective of the issues joined and ultimate policy objectives, we should not allow ourselves to be deterred from moving invincibly forward along a course which we ourselves and the entire world recognize to be morally and legally right...Thereby Japan and all of Asia would witness the resurgence of our moral leadership and renewal of our initiative in the conduct of Asian affairs."

Dulles was obviously more receptive to MacArthur's memorandum than the military, which wanted to continue absolute control over Japan by delaying the peace treaty. Following his return from Korea in the late morning of June 21, and lunch with Sebald and the MacArthurs at the General's embassy residence, Dulles was given a copy of MacArthur's memorandum from Sebald. Working at Sebald's office in the Mitsui Building at Nihonbashi in central Tokyo, the two went over the memorandum until late in the evening." The following morning, Dulles and Sebald called on MacArthur to discuss it. Dulles, encouraged by MacArthur's strong desire to go ahead with the peace treaty, suggested that MacArthur should expand on his discussion of security arrangements with Japan.⁶⁸ In response to Dulles' request, and perhaps at the prompting of Johnson and Bradley as well, MacArthur produced another memorandum dated June 23 entitled "Concept Governing Security in Post-War Japan."⁶⁹ MacArthur seems to have given this memorandum to Dulles at their private meeting on the

morning of June 24.⁷⁰ In this follow-up memorandum, MacArthur essentially contradicts his earlier recommendation that "*points* in Japanese territory continue to be garrisoned" by writing "the concept that the defense of a land area necessitates only *reservation of predetermined points* for air, ground and naval concentrations *has been outmoded* by the accelerated speed and power of modern war. In place thereof," MacArthur continued, "the entire land mass must be regarded as a potential area for maneuver with adequate provision made to insure complete freedom of strategic planning and tactical disposition to meet any change in the requirements for successful defense." (Italics by author.) Essentially he was freely expanding on his definition of garrison "points." MacArthur explained in his memorandum that the situation meant that in regard to Japan, "the entire area of Japan must be regarded as a potential base for defensive maneuver with unrestricted freedom reserved to the United States as the protecting power." Ever concerned about the Japanese feelings and political repercussions, MacArthur noted that "by avoiding emphasis upon any specific points to be reserved as 'bases' for use of the security forces...the distasteful connotation given the term 'bases', as legitimate spoils of war, may be avoided."⁷² Somewhat ahead of his time, he also called here for prior consultation between the American Military Commander and the Japanese government, no authority to intervene in the internal affairs of Japan, "pay-as-you-go" leasing arrangement, full responsibility to handle claims for damage to property or injury, as well as the strengthening of the Japanese police forces "to a size and character adequate for internal security."⁷³ The JCS were not willing to go that far at this point however.

MacArthur's views, particularly those of an early peace and a workable arrangement for "international security" that would be acceptable to Japan, were essentially in line with the ideas of Dulles and State. By accepting the idea of maintaining U.S. troops and facilities in Japan and of strengthening Japan's internal security, MacArthur's views were also accommodating of the security requirements of the military, and in the words of Sebald, "an ingenious compromise to what appeared an insoluble problem."⁷⁴ However, despite MacArthur's attempts to seek a compromise, Johnson and Bradley were still opposed to a treaty when they left Japan on June 23.⁷⁵ Dulles and the JCS would have to take up discussions on their individual findings back in Washington.

VI. A STATE-DEFENSE CONSENSUS ON A TREATY AND PREPARATION OF A DRAFT

Two days before Dulles' scheduled departure, North Korean forces crossed the 38th Parallel and invaded South Korea to start the still-unresolved Korean War. Sebald, realizing that MacArthur's delicate compromise would look more fragile than ever and that the military would likely resist even more strongly attempts at a peace settlement, sent the Secretary of

State a telegram immediately after Dulles departed. Despite being written in the middle of a "situation rapidly deteriorating in Korea," Sebald argued that in fact a peace treaty was still in fact necessary: "Visits of Secretary Johnson, General Bradley and Dulles have aroused in Japan a truly astounding amount of enthusiasm and speculation regarding possible peace treaty in the near future...As a matter of timing...it appears to me that a serious psychological let-down would result from further inordinate delays in arriving at some definite course of action designed to restore sovereignty to Japan either by treaty or other means."⁷⁶ Although Acheson did not need convincing, Dulles wrote to Acheson following his return to Washington suggesting in a confidential memorandum that the President "should come to a decision as to what, if anything, to do about Japan and a treaty" and warning him that "if matters drift because of total preoccupation with the Korean war, we may lose in Japan more than we can gain in Korea."⁷⁷ Dulles explained that it was his "impression that the Korean attack makes it more important, rather than less important, to act. The Japanese people have been in somewhat of a postwar stupor. The Korean attack is awakening them and I think that their mood for a long time may be determined by whether we can take advantage of this awakening to bring them an insight into the possibilities of the free world and their responsibility as a member of it."⁷⁸

During the summer months, Dulles and Allison worked to secure the understanding of the military on issues of strengthening the Japanese internal security establishment and use of military facilities in Japan." On July 25, a draft of a prospective articles to be used a treaty with Japan entitled "International Peace and Security" was ready after having been cleared by "the various Department officials who would be interested" and having received several revisions." This four-article draft, meant apparently to be one chapter of the treaty, was based on a memorandum that Dulles had prepared for MacArthur (likely in response to MacArthur's memorandum of June 14) during his talks with the General, in which Dulles sought an approach where "any arrangements about security with Japan should be cast in the mold of overall international peace and security rather than in terms of any special advantage to the United States at the expense of Japan."" Dulles also incorporated the ideas of MacArthur, found in his June 23 memorandum, which sought both to make the treaty as "inoffensive as possible to the Japanese" and give the United States "the broad power...to place military forces wherever in Japan the United States may determine to be desirable from the standpoint of [the] maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area."" Dulles recommended to Acheson that the memorandum, having been based on MacArthur's views and reviewed by the related officials in the State Department, be forwarded to Secretary Johnson for the Pentagon's approval, adding that he would also speak with Secretary Johnson about it. Acheson took Dulles' advice

and forwarded the draft to Johnson on August 1.⁸³ Two days later Dulles called Secretary Johnson and spoke with him over the telephone about it. At first Johnson said that "they had a war on and didn't have time to talk about it." Later he explained that he meant "they were not able to discuss the memorandum at the moment." Johnson, mistakenly, criticized Dulles' draft by stating that he had not taken into consideration the views of the JCS or MacArthur. Assuming that Dulles had not seen MacArthur's June 23 memorandum, Johnson said "it seemed that the State Department had proceeded on the basis of MacArthur's first memorandum but not the second." Dulles countered that not only had he in fact seen the memorandum but that he had of course spoken with MacArthur about it and as a result, the draft in Johnson's hand "was intended to, and I [Dulles] thought did, carry out the position expressed by General MacArthur in the second memorandum." Moreover, Dulles explained, "draft gave the United States the right to maintain in Japan as much force as we wanted, anywhere we wanted, for as long as we wanted, and I did not see very well how the Defense Establishment could want more than that." Johnson quickly came around, saying that if State intended to acquire such rights then "he thought we could get together and go places'." He asked Dulles for another week at which time the Pentagon would be ready to discuss the situation. Giving Dulles the green light, Johnson said that with the exception of the security issue, the other areas were "political" and thus the State Department could "go ahead on those without being held up in any way by the Defense Establishment."⁸⁶ Four days later, Dulles and Allison had a draft peace treaty ready for Japan which incorporated, for the time being, the same security clauses as found in Dulles' July 27 memorandum.⁸⁷ The JCS however, after their review of these security clauses, replied on August 22 that the State draft of "International Peace and Security" did not "adequately safeguard" the "security interests of the United States" and thus did "not meet the minimum security requirements of a treaty." General Bradley was particularly critical of "any formula which s[ought] to rest United States security interests on the United Nations alone"

Allison, as Dulles' deputy, undertook the review of the JCS memorandum while Dulles was away a two-week vacation at the end of the summer.⁹⁰ Dispassionately commenting in great detail on Bradley's memorandum, Allison explained that the State Department's draft security articles did not in fact "rest United States interests on the United Nations alone." Allison wrote, "While casting the security provisions in the words of the United Nations Charter and in a framework roughly equivalent to that which would prevail if the United Nations were working perfectly, in all cases the final determination of what shall be done and how and when it shall be done is reserved to the United States." Concluding his long memorandum, Allison argued that the State Department draft met the essential requirements that of the JCS and that there should be no further delay in

beginning discussions with the "friendly members" of the 11-nation Far Eastern Commission.

On August 28, Acheson telephoned Secretary Johnson to discuss the peace treaty. Acheson agreed to Johnson's request that further discussions would be necessary. Johnson appointed Major General Carter B. Magruder, Special Assistant for Occupied Areas and Acheson asked Allison to be the State representative.⁹² The following day on August 29, Allison called on Magruder to discuss the JCS review and Allison's comments on it as laid out in his August 23 memorandum.⁹³ Allison found that the Pentagon was in agreement on most points. However, according to Allison, Magruder feared that the security provisions of the State Department's plan would have to be relinquished once Japan was admitted to the United Nations, to which he explained that was in fact not the case. Magruder's other objections, Allison felt, were "apparently based upon a lack of understanding of the U.N. Charter." Magruder also raised concerns with the phraseology of State's plan, but Allison countered that while certain concerns could be accommodated, the State Department would have the "responsibility for devising language which would not only meet the necessary Defense conditions, but also be acceptable to our Allies and to the Japanese." Allison also emphasized the need for a quick and short treaty and explained to his Defense counterpart that the State Department desired to begin discussions with the Allies at the upcoming session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York. Implying agreement, Magruder first said he would still need as much as two weeks to discuss the plan fully with his colleagues, but finally agreed to see Allison again by the end of the week.

Allison received Magruder at his office on the morning of September 1 where the two representatives achieved "practically complete agreement...as to the desirability of proceeding with negotiations for a Japanese treaty" as well as other points related with the treaty." Allison and Magruder agreed that Allison would prepare a joint memorandum from the secretaries of State and Defense for the President outlining their agreement. This draft was completed by Allison over the weekend and given to Acheson on September 4, although a subsequent memorandum and not actually seems to have been included with the final memorandum." Later in the week (September 7), Acheson forwarded a memorandum "recommending how the President should proceed" to Secretary Johnson, who in turn, along with Acheson, forwarded it (now known as NSC 6011, "Japanese Peace Treaty") to the President later that day or the following day for his approval.⁹⁶ In any case, Truman gave his approval to it on September 8, and directed the Secretary of State to go ahead with its recommendations." In giving his approval, Truman allowed State to begin discussions on a peace treaty. Since Acheson intended to discuss the treaty with the Allies at the General Assembly, Dulles and Allison went to work

touching up the September 4 memorandum, which was later handed to the Allies and became known as "Seven Points of the Japanese Peace Treaty." The memorandum appeared as follows:

- 1) *Parties*. Any or all nations at war with Japan which are willing to make peace with Japan on the basis proposed.
- 2) *United Nations*. Membership to be contemplated.
- 3) *Territory*. Japan would (a) recognize the independence of Korea; (b) agree to U.N. trusteeship, with the U.S. as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands; and (c) accept the future decision of the U.K., U.S.S.R., China, and the U.S. with reference to Formosa, Pescadores, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. Moreover, special rights and interests in China would be renounced.
- 4) *Security*. Pending satisfactory alternative security arrangements such as the U.N. assuming effective authority, the treaty would assume the continuing cooperative responsibility between Japanese facilities and U.S. and perhaps other forces for the maintenance of international peace and security in the Japan area.
- 5) *Political and Commercial Arrangements*. Japan would agree to adhere to multilateral treaties. Prewar bilateral treaties could be revived by mutual agreement.
- 6) *Claims*. All parties would waive claims arising out of the war except that the Allied Powers would hold Japanese property within their territory and Japan would restore Allied property or if not restorable pay for it.
- 7) *Disputes*. Claims disputes would be settled by a neutral committee set up by the International Court of Justice. Other disputes would be handled by a diplomatic settlement or through the Internal Court of Justice.⁹⁸

The "Seven Points," or principles, were in effect based on the latest draft of the peace treaty also prepared by Dulles, which he recognized was still only a tentative study." With the treaty draft and statement of seven points in hand, Dulles and his assistants set off for New York to seek out the opinions of the Allied Powers. Following these discussions throughout the fall, Dulles and his group planned to go to Japan to discuss the treaty with the Japanese. Before we look at how those discussions went off, it is necessary to review how the territorial clause was formed during this time, and specifically how Dulles, MacArthur, and the JCS regarded Okinawa during the summer of 1950 and early fall of 1950 as the war in Korea raged nearby, and quite badly for the UN forces at first. Following this discussion in the next section, we will next look at State Department apprehensions regarding the views of the military. After that we will then look at the Japanese preparations for the peace treaty in relation to Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands, beginning with where we left off in Chapter Five.

VII. OKINAWA AND THE DRAFT TREATY

In the last chapter, the formation of National Security Council decision NSC 13, whose Paragraph 5 established that the United States would develop military facilities in the Ryukyu Islands on the assumption that the United States would retain long-term control of the islands, was traced in detail. It was the worsening international conditions in general, and specifically, Policy Planning Staff Director George F. Kennan, who was at the peak of his influence in the government, having taken a special interest in the security of Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, that brought the State Department to "accept the principle of U.S. control over the southern Ryukyus," as seen in PPS/10/1, a position the military had been pursuing strongly since 1945. The JCS, as we also saw in the last chapter, completed a study (JCS 1613124) in the summer of 1947 on the State Department's peace treaty draft. The treaty draft allowed for the retention of Okinawa by Japan—a position the JCS strongly attacked. The JCS forwarded their views to the State Department in the fall of 1947 and in the spring of 1948 had chosen not to amend their position. It was at that point that Kennan and his group left for Japan.

In the meantime, the JCS continued with its strategic planning, not only in the context of Okinawa, but of course for all of the strategically important regions of the world. On August 29, 1947 the Joint Staff Planners directed the Joint War Plans Committee to prepare a short-term strategic plan for hostilities that could break out in the following three years in the event of Soviet aggression. That plan, known as BROILER and completed in March 1948, recognized that the United States and its Allies would not be able to respond adequately with ground troops until roughly 10 months after the start of hostilities by the Soviet Union due to the "wide disparity" in ground forces between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. As a result, the plan considered the use of atomic weapons as necessary and listed the British Isles and Okinawa, along with Cairo-Suez (or Karachi as an alternative), as the three sites for bases outside the Western Hemisphere from which launch a strategic air offensive with atomic weapons.¹⁰⁰

The JCS eventually however came to doubt that the reliance on atomic weapons was a wise choice; indeed, suggesting this, JCS historian Kenneth W. Condit notes that Admiral Leahy's approval of BROILER on April 5, 1948 did not necessarily indicate his approval of their use.¹⁰¹ As a result, the JCS and their planners reviewed their thinking with regards to the "sole reliance" of atomic weapons since authorization for their use, to come only from the President, was not assured.¹⁰² The next stage of planning during the spring and summer of 1948 took the name of HALFMOON (later FLEETWOOD) and was the first joint emergency plan. It noted that the Soviet objectives would be to launch strategic offensives to destroy or neutralize all U.S. and Allied forces on the Eurasian land mass. Highlighting Okinawa's importance again (as well as the importance of air power in the

postwar), HALFMOON called for the launching of a strategic air offensive fifteen days after the initiation of hostilities by the Soviet Union from the three strategic sites designated in earlier planning. One year after the start of hostilities, HALFMOON envisioned, the U.S. strategic bombing force would grow to a total of 10 medium groups (with two located in Okinawa) and one heavy bombing group based in the United States.¹⁰³

Amid increasingly tight budget restrictions in fiscal year (FY) 1949 and (FY) 1950, the branches of the military were forced to compete even more among themselves. As a result, the planners reconsidered their war plans. They considered that the limited resources necessitated the United States to opt for the ability to launch, in the wake of hostilities, a strategic offensive in Western Eurasia with a defensive action in the Far East. In any case, the acting Chairman of the JCS, Dwight D. Eisenhower, implied in April 1949 that Okinawa was vital to U.S. security because the protection of lines of communication between it and the United States was a "must."¹⁰⁴ In November 1949, the emergency war plan OFFTACKLE reemphasized the idea of a "strategic defensive" in the Far East and the importance of Okinawa. OFFTACKLE noted, according to historian Condit, that the "strategic defensive in the Far East...would have as its major objectives the continued availability of Okinawa as a base for military operations and the defense of Japan. To attain these objectives would also require the retention of Formosa, the Philippines and the other Ryukyu Islands." These ideas formed the basis of Defense's position during its discussions with the State Department in 1949 and 1950. That the JCS considered both the retention of control over the Ryukyu, as well as military bases in Japan as absolutely necessary, and yet still would not agree to proceed with a peace treaty, was particularly irksome to the State Department. As looked at above, it took MacArthur's compromise suggestions to break the deadlock.

With the overcoming of the deadlock, the State Department was able to go ahead with its peace treaty planning. But it would not obviously be allowed to compromise U.S. security requirements in doing so. For example, in the September 7 agreement with respect to Japan between the Secretaries of State and Defense, which (after the President's approval) allowed the State Department to begin discussions with the Allies, the Defense Department cautioned that the "terms must secure to the United States exclusive strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° north, Marcus Island, and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan" as one of several "security requirements [that] should be regarded as vital."¹⁰⁶ As a result, Chapter IV (Territory) of the Draft Treaty developed by Dulles on September 11, 1950, stated that first Japan would accept "the action of the United Nations Security Council of April 2, 1947 extending the trusteeship system, with the United States as the administering authority, to the Pacific Islands formerly under mandate to Japan." Next, the draft chapter also stated that "The United States will also propose to the United Nations to

place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the administering authority, the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude, the Bonin Islands, including Rosario Island, the Volcano Islands, Parece Vela and Marcus Island, and pending affirmative action on such proposal the United States will have full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory of these islands.”¹⁰⁷ Likewise the September 11 corresponding memorandum on the seven principles (officially announced on September 14) explains the same point in a shorter way "(Japan would) agree to U.N. trusteeship, with the U.S. as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands.”¹⁰⁸

On September 14, one day before MacArthur's forces were to land at Inchon, in the northwestern part of South Korea, President Truman announced at a press conference that the State Department was authorized to begin informal discussions with the member states of the Far Eastern Commission.¹⁰⁹ The following day, September 15, saw Dulles (anonymously identified in press reports as "a responsible State Department official") explain the overall framework for the peace treaty that the U.S. government was considering.¹¹⁰ Shortly after that, Dulles and Allison began their discussions during the Fifth General Assembly at Lake Success, New York with the Allies and personally handed the seven-point memorandum to the representatives of the FEC nations as well as those of the Republics of Korea and Indonesia, which had become independent since the end of World War II in 1948 and 1949 respectively.¹¹¹

Allied Reactions to the Territorial Clause in the Draft Treaty

The U.S. draft immediately met the opposition of the Soviet Union on most points, including the territorial disposition of the Ryukyu Islands, as well as the criticism of India and China, again regarding Okinawa. In a meeting in New York on October 26 between Soviet Representative on the United Nations Security Council, Yakov A. Malik, Dulles, Allison, and Colonel Babcock, Malik questioned why the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands were not being considered "other small islands" that the Allied Powers had agreed to be considered a part of Japan in addition to the four main islands in the Terms of Surrender. Malik pointed out Taiwan and the Kurile and Pescadore Islands had already been agreed to by the United States and Soviet Union to be detached from Japan but that that was not the case in regards to the Ryukyus and Bonins. Dulles did not seem to counter Malik's argument, replying that the U.S. proposal for the disposition of the islands was set forth in the memorandum.¹¹²

The Soviet Union followed up Malik's argument in its *Aide-Memoire* of November 20, 1950.¹¹³ In Point 3 of its six-part memorandum, the Soviet government again noted that "Neither the Cairo Declaration nor the Potsdam Agreement mention that the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands should be taken out from under Japanese sovereignty; moreover, in signing those

agreements the states announced they 'had no thoughts of territorial expansion'. In this connection," the aide-memoire continued, "the question arises as to what is the basis for the proposal contained in the memorandum to the effect that the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands should be placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations with the United States as the administrative power." To this latter question, and regarding several other questions on other matters, Malik asked for a written reply. In the meantime his government published in Moscow the text of the September 11 seven principles and the Soviet *Aide-Memoire*.¹¹⁴ The United States was thus obliged to publish its memorandum and an unofficial translation of the Soviet document on November 24. On December 27 Dulles was finally able to oblige Malik's request for a written answer, releasing the text of the U.S. reply the following day." In this reply, "in order to dispel any possible misunderstanding," Dulles explained the American position regarding Okinawa in the following way:

The United States Government does not understand the reference by the Soviet Union to 'territorial expansion' in connection with the suggestion that the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands might be placed under the United Nations trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority. Article 77 of the United Nations Charter expressly contemplated the extension of the trusteeship to 'territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War' and certainly the trusteeship system is not to be equated with 'territorial expansion.' The Government of the United States also does not understand the suggestion of the Soviet Union that, because the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands are not mentioned in either the Cairo Declaration or the Potsdam Agreement, their consideration in the peace settlement is automatically excluded. The Government of the Soviet Union seems to have ignored the fact that the Potsdam Declaration provided that Japanese sovereignty should be limited to the four main islands, which were named, and 'such minor islands as we determine.' It is, therefore, strictly in accordance with the Potsdam Agreement that the peace settlement should determine the future status of these other islands.

It was clear that the United States was not going to accept the Soviet argument which Dulles dismissed as "Communist propaganda" in a letter to MacArthur two weeks after his conversation with Malik in New York.¹¹⁶

It was not only the Soviet Union, however, that raised the issue of the disposition of the Ryukyus. Newly independent India also voiced its concerns. On December 21, Indian Ambassador to the United States, Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, met with Dulles and Allison and left with them a statement of her country's views of the American proposals.¹¹⁷ In her memorandum, Pandit notes: "Regarding the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, where the U.S. has permanent military installations, India is apparently reconciled to the view that

these islands would be held by the U.S. as military bases under U.N. trusteeship. However, India feels that the question of returning these islands to Japan should be decided at the peace treaty."¹¹⁸ India would consistently adopt this, if not a stronger, stance.¹¹⁹

Despite Dulles' dismissing of the views of the Soviet Union as propaganda, the State Department was in any case forced to keep its eyes on international (and domestic opinion). State itself was never entirely happy with the idea of the removing Okinawa from Japanese sovereignty. It was during this time that it made one last attempt to allow Japan to retain sovereignty over Okinawa, a subject we turn to next.

VIII. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S CONCERNS, FALL-WINTER 1950

No sooner had the draft treaty and its points been compiled, announced, and discussions started, when Sebald and members of the State Department began to re-address their concerns over the political effects that the "loss of the Ryukyu Islands" would have on the Japanese. These concerns had existed, as this study has shown, for several years. But it was the rapid turn of events following the Korean War, particularly the writing of the peace treaty draft, and a despatch by Sebald from Tokyo that set off a reconsideration of the issue within the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

Sebald, in his despatch of October 26, 1950, provides a wealth of information on Japanese feelings on the peace treaty and territorial provisions by analyzing in great deal public opinion, government thinking, and statements by the various political parties as well as including four enclosures of different memorandums of conversations with key officials.¹²⁰ Sebald noted of the reactions of Japan to the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth which when the terms of the treaty became known in Tokyo "popular indignation ran so high as to lead to riots and mob violence." Sebald admitted that "while the analogy with the present situation is far from perfect," he warns that "the incident is illustrative of the capacity of the normally undemonstrative Japanese for the most forthright expressions of resentment when they consider themselves subject to gross injustice." He concluded his long despatch with the following recommendation:

The Mission regards the deep-seated and widespread opposition of the Japanese people to the cession of such outlying island possessions as the Ryukyus, Bonins, and Kuriles as a political factor of primary importance which cannot be overlooked in our approach to the problem of a Japanese peace treaty. More specifically, the Mission believes that the long-term importance of this factor imposes upon the United States and the nations associated with it an obligation at least carefully to explore the feasibility of territorial provisions which, while allowing the retention of effective control over such areas as may be directed by security consider-

ations, would avoid the appearance of an outright alienation of sovereignty from Japan, with a consequent rise of irredentism of considerable and possibly dangerous proportions.

Sebald's despatch caught the attention of Gerald Warner, who, as Officer in Charge of Japanese Affairs, had just returned from Tokyo where he was First Secretary and Consul under Sebald.¹²¹ Warner, one month earlier, had had the opportunity to speak with Wajima Eiji, Chief of the Bureau of Controls in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on problems relating to the Ryukyu Islands.¹²² Based on their discussions, Warner concluded in his memorandum to his supervisor (and brother-in-law), Alexis Johnson, that "Should it be possible to accomplish US security objectives with Japan in control of the Ryukyus, it might be worthwhile to examine the question of proposed US trusteeship vs. Japanese control in the light of its bearing on our other relations with Japan."¹²³ Exactly one week after receiving Sebald's October 28 despatch, Warner had his assistant Robert Fearey prepare a memorandum on November 14 in which Fearey questioned what he viewed as the military's demands regarding Okinawa:

The (StateDepartment) suggestion that the U.S. keep bases in the Ryukyus under the same arrangement as in the main islands has always been met by the military reply that we must be able to count on holding the Okinawa hase permanently. Even accepting this position, however, it has never as far as I know been satisfactorily explained why we must control the whole land area south of 29 degrees North latitude permanently. Admitting the need for radar stations and the like some distance from the main hase, why do we have to control the land and people in between! At most why should we require greater rights than the very broad military rights we will be acquiring in the main islands, where we have nevertheless not considered it necessary to take over the government of that country?¹²⁴

Fearey goes on to recommend that although the State Department would be charged by the military with "reopening an issue already decided by the President," it should "insist" that the military give "convincing reasons" why the United States should not seek either the same military rights in the Ryukyus as were expected to be acquired in the main islands (i.e., application of the future bilateral security treaty), except on a "permanent basis," or a "99 year lease" of the areas required in the Ryukyu Islands, with the rest of the areas left under "Japanese ownership and administration." It was, as we saw in Chapter Six, Fearey himself who had written the original study on leased bases in early 1947 at the suggestion of his boss James Penfield. Although Fearey had recognized sometime in late 1947 or early 1948 that negotiating a leased bases agreement would likely be as difficult to work out as a trusteeship agreement, Fearey seems not to have given up on the idea of leased bases. As Dulles' assistant in the treaty preparations,

Fearey was in an important position to offer his long-held opinions on the disposition of the Ryukyu Islands to his boss.

Warner passed Fearey's memorandum to Johnson, who held similar views. Earlier, for example, Johnson, in his cover letter to Allison enclosing Warner's October 13 memorandum, noted, "As you know, personally I feel that we should not necessarily consider the question of the Ryukyus to be entirely closed and that when we see the type of arrangement with Japan that develops, we should consider reopening the question with Defense at a suitably high level." Impressed with Sebald's "very interesting" despatch of October 26 and Fearey's strong analysis of it and recommendations, Johnson added his own comments in a November 17 memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Rusk.¹²⁶ Johnson suggested to Rusk that despite Acheson's speech at the Press Club in January (in which emphasized the importance of the U.S. line of defense in the chain of islands including the Ryukyu Archipelago and said that the United States would "at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations") and President Truman's September approval of the draft treaty, the State Department did not have to "consider the Ryukyus trusteeship question as entirely closed," adding that upon the "firm[ing] up" of the bilateral military agreement with Japan, the State Department might discuss with the Pentagon "the question as to whether its extension to the Ryukyus would not give them everything that they require."¹²⁷ Johnson, with his decade-long experience in Japanese affairs, closes by warning that "The bilateral military agreement is going to be a heavy shock to the Japanese, and this combined with the loss of the Ryukyus may well eventually constitute too heavy a strain on the present overwhelming pro-American sentiment in Japan."¹²⁸

Rusk, who himself believed that "our interests in the Far East turned crucially on Japan" and thus did not want to see U.S.-Japan relations damaged due to American retention of Okinawa, hoped as well to be able to allow Okinawa to be returned to Japan." Rusk, it seems, spoke with Acheson and Dulles shortly after that because on December 13 Acheson sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Marshall asking whether there were any objections from the military on "leaving the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands under Japanese sovereignty, subject to the provisions of the contemplated military security agreement which would presumably take special account of the position in Okinawa."¹³⁰ Acheson's letter to Marshall also included a memorandum of the same date on Japan prepared in the State." Acheson proposed sending Dulles as head of a Presidential Mission to Japan to discuss the peace treaty and the related security issues and explained the State Department's position regarding those issues. One of the important points Acheson addressed was the application of a bilateral security treaty to Okinawa, the idea explored by Fearey since April 1947.

The mission [to Japan] should have authority to discuss and develop ad referendum arrangements with Japan which would include...(h)a bilateral agreement between the United States and Japanese Governments, dealing with the garrisoning of United States forces in and about Japan, *including the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands*. The terms of this agreement would be along the lines of the draft agreement already discussed between the State and Defense Departments subject to such modifications acceptable to the United States Government as may be necessary to secure Japanese agreement. The possibility should be explored of making this agreement more acceptable to the Japanese and friendly Governments by bringing it within the purview of the United Nations Charter and of such United Nations machinery as envisioned in the Uniting for Peace Resolution. (*Italics by author.*)

As a result of this new approach by the State Department, Acheson included a revised version of the seven points regarding a treaty with Japan announced in September.¹³² Being a revised version of the original prepared by Dulles and his assistants, it is safe to assume that Dulles drafted or was familiar the new version as well. Concerning territorial issues and Okinawa, the new version stated that "the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands would be returned to Japan provided that the provisions of any military security arrangement apply to these territories in the same manner as to Japan proper." At the time, particularly in the middle of the Korean War and less than two months after Chinese "volunteers" entered that conflict in massive numbers, it may have seemed incredulous to the military that State would attempt to upset the agreement reached in NSC 1313 and again in the September draft treaty regarding the necessity to control Okinawa because of its strategic importance (as discussed earlier).

Acheson's request for the military's views was passed on to the JCS who in turn requested MacArthur's opinions on December 18.¹³³ In his response of December 28, MacArthur continued with his strong and unyielding calls for the retention of control of Okinawa arguing that

Leaving the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands under Japan's sovereignty is highly objectionable from a military point of view. The Japanese are fully resigned to the loss of these areas as a penalty for waging war. They form a vital segment of our lateral defense line and our control thereof is formally established and universally recognized. It would be unthinkable to surrender control and render our use of these areas, fortified at United States expense, subject to treaty arrangement under Japanese administration. It would but be to transform strength to weakness without the slightest moral or legal reason for so doing.¹³⁴

The JCS, upon receipt of MacArthur's telegram, responded later that same day to the State Department's request. In addition to being against a treaty at the moment, concerning the Ryukyus Islands, the JCS stated that they

strongly disagree to any relaxation of the terms of approved United States policy relating to these islands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff fail to perceive any reason for such a gratuitous concession. On the contrary; they consider that exclusive strategic control of those islands must be retained by the United States in order for us to be able to carry out our commitments, policies, and military plans in the Pacific in peace or war. In this connection, a military security agreement in perpetuity would be inconsistent with the concept of Japanese sovereignty. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, consider the proposed concession to be entirely unacceptable, and they firmly adhere to the minimum requirements of the pertinent approved United States policy as stated in NSC 6011 as follows: "Its terms must secure to the United States exclusive strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° north, Marcus Island, and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan."¹³⁵

It would be hard to imagine that the State Department was not anticipating such a response. Indeed, during a meeting on January 3, 1951 between General Bradley (who would emerge as a particularly strong advocate of U.S. control over Okinawa), the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Dulles, Rusk, and Allison, the JCS repeated their position that the islands should be kept under U.S. strategic control and Japanese sovereignty "not restored."¹³⁶ The State representatives were forced to reluctantly agree that "if this was [the] Defense [Department's] position it w[ou]ld do its part in achieving [this] objective." By agreeing in this way it was very likely that Dulles and State were seeking to buy time, as well as to remove the other objections that the JCS had against moving forward with a peace treaty, as is shown later in this chapter.¹³⁷ Following this meeting, Acheson immediately wired Sebald to tell him of the results and requested him to consult with MacArthur.¹³⁸ Sebald found himself in agreement with most of MacArthur's comments except, predictably, for the arrangements called for by MacArthur with regard to Okinawa. Basing his comments on his earlier October 26 despatch, Sebald wrote to Acheson that "while agreeing with specifications re[garding] necessary control over Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, I believe same objective might be accomplished without unduly antagonizing Japanese public opinion, or doing violence previous public commitments re[garding] no territorial acquisitions to resort to formula which, while allowing retention effective strategic control over Ryukyus and Bonins, would avoid appearances of outright and irrevocable alienations."¹³⁹

While Sebald went ahead with reporting on the political reactions and implications of the U.S. position regarding Okinawa, MacArthur continued to express his views on the American position toward the Ryukyu Islands to Sebald. MacArthur's ideas, as stated to the JCS, as well as on other numerous occasions would not in the end change or bend all. It would be up to Dulles to balance the views of MacArthur and the JCS regarding Okinawa with those of State on the one hand and the Japanese

government led by Yoshida on the other. It is those latter views, particularly in the context of the movement on the Japanese side toward a peace treaty since 1948, to which we turn next.

IX. JAPAN'S PEACE TREATY DESIRES FOR OKINAWA, 1948-1951

As we saw in Chapter Five, the Japanese Foreign Ministry began preparing for a peace treaty as early as November 1945, two months after the end of the war. In 1947 as the Allied Powers moved toward what was anticipated to be an early peace for Japan, the Japanese government, particularly its Foreign Minister, Ashida Hitoshi, attempted to express Japan's views of the treaty and its desires, despite Japan, under occupation, not technically possessing full diplomatic rights. By the end of 1947 it became clear that an early peace treaty conference would not be held due to differences among the Allied Powers regarding the proceedings and the contents of the treaty itself, as well as, more importantly the start of the Cold War. Moreover, in December 1947, the Japanese government was criticized for trying to express its views on a peace treaty and Vice Foreign Minister Okazaki Katsuo resigned to take responsibility for the "scoop" that appeared in World Report reporting on Japan's peace planning and desires.

In March 1948 in Japan, a new government was formed under Ashida who acted as his own Foreign Minister, a precedent started in the postwar by Yoshida Shigeru in his first term (May 1946-May 1947) and followed by Yoshida again in all of his later terms up through his departure for the San Francisco Peace Conference in September 1951. As a result however of the Ashida government being weak and scandal-ridden, it fell within six months. Yoshida, the former diplomat, Foreign Minister, and Prime Minister formed a new government in October and re-appointed Okazaki to his former position as Vice Minister on October 10.¹⁴⁰ Immediately after that, they began to give to the Diplomatic Section of SCAP many of the studies that had been completed to date, including several volumes relating to Japanese territory.¹⁴¹

Despite the initial embarrassment caused by the "scoop," the Foreign Ministry continued, albeit more quietly and cautiously, its studies of its position on the peace treaty within the Deliberation Staff.¹⁴² The staff found that, first of all, the name of its study "Our Desires," or *Wngnho no Kibo*, which had caused the problem with the Allies, was likely to create further misunderstanding and thus thought it to be an unacceptable name for their studies. Hence the staff changed the name to "The Expected Peace Treaty Draft" (*Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Sotei Taiko*).

The three main tasks of these deliberations were, according to a participant at the time: 1) to finish completing the explanatory materials and studies begun in the Foreign Ministry; 2) examine new problems that emerge; 3) reexamine positions based on international developments. These studies continued throughout the remainder of 1948 and 1949. In

November 1949, officials in the Foreign Ministry decided to speed up their studies and one month later, on December 28, their studies were completed and reviewed. However, the opportunity to actually use these new studies would not come until one year later in the fall of 1950 when the U.S. government decided to move ahead with a peace treaty.¹⁴³ In all of these studies, it should be pointed out, the territorial issue was addressed.

In the meantime, on May 30, 1950, three weeks before Dulles' first planned visit to Japan, Yoshida was handed a copy of the document, "Fundamental Positions With Regard to Peace Problems" (*Heiwa Mondni ni Knnsuru Kihonteki na Tachiba*), and numerous other position papers.¹⁴⁴ However, Yoshida returned them shortly saying that "more research and examination were needed."¹⁴⁵ One of the papers not accepted by Yoshida at the time was the one entitled "Fundamental Position Regarding the Territorial Problem" (*Ryodo Mondni ni Taisuru Kihonteki Tachiba*).¹⁴⁶ Yoshida may have felt that the wording, as seen below, was too weak or general.

This eight-page document begins by giving the background of the territorial problem in the context of the treaty of peace with Japan by discussing the Potsdam and Cairo declarations, as well as the Atlantic Charter. The paper explains that the Japanese government "does not want to make any complaints regarding the decision of the Allied Powers...nor does it want to make any criticisms." However, the paper continues, the government did wish to express its positions on the "areas, particularly the minor island...and the historic and other relations with them...in the hope that the Allied Powers when making their final decisions on Japanese territorial problems would give appropriate consideration to Japanese feelings and other necessary factors." Japan, it explained, was in full agreement with the Atlantic Charter and thus was prepared to cede all claims to Korea, Taiwan and other territories. It felt, as the following quotation shows, however that the Nansei Islands were in a different category and thus should be considered Japanese.

The fact that the people of the Nansei Islands, including Olzinawa, are racially Japanese has been proven archeologically and linguistically beyond a shadow of doubt.

While these islands have been a part of Japan's suzerainty since the 7th century; because these islands are geographically far and isolated, special regional characteristics have emerged, and the islands south of Amami enjoyed an autonomous status between the 12th or 13th centuries to the 16th century. However, in the 17th century; the islands became a part of the territory of the feudal lord of Kyushu, with only the islands to the south of the Olzinawa Islands being allowed any extensive freedom. Following the Meiji Restoration [in 1868], these southernmost islands were included in the formation of Olzinawa Prefecture, enjoying absolutely no differences in administration with the other prefectures. In their

daily lives, the people likewise experienced all of the same rights as the other prefectures.

The population of the Nansei Islands in 1940 was approximately 800,000. The people in general could read and write standard Japanese and speak it in public. Moreover, the sentence structure and vocabulary of the local dialect that they use in everyday conversation is rooted in the Japanese language. Moreover their religion, customs, and folkways bear close resemblance, if not being the same, to the Japanese mainland.

Since Okinawa and the other islands south of 30°[Latitude] have been placed under U.S. military occupation, the people [of the islands] have deeply feared the possibility that they will be permanently separated from Japan. They strongly desire that the upcoming peace treaty will reaffirm that their islands are a part of Japanese territory. They believe that the Allied Powers are now already aware of their feelings. A popular vote to establish the feelings of the local residents is no longer possible for the islands of Chishima and Ogasawara, where they have already been removed, but would be probably be easy to do in the Nansei Islands.

The Nansei Islands are dependent upon the mainland for their main foods and other necessary items. On the other hand, the Nansei Islands are an important source of tropical fruits, including refined sugar, as well as other agricultural products. Japan is of course fully prepared to do its very best to restore the islands after the ravages of war and to maintain the standard of living of [the residents of] the Nansei Islands.

Although Yoshida ended up rejecting the papers, calling for more study, his exact views or comments on it paper regarding Okinawa are unfortunately unknown. By looking at other papers he commented on later, we may conclude that he was in agreement with the general thrust of the paper. Yet, to him, the paper did not address the likely core of the problem—how to balance Japan's desires to see the islands retained under their sovereignty while balancing the strategic needs of America.¹⁴⁷ With Dulles coming three weeks later for general talks, Yoshida may have preferred not to adopt a final stance until feeling out what the U.S. government was considering for a peace treaty and what it was planning for the disposition of Okinawa. In the end, it appears however that Dulles and Yoshida did not discuss the problem of Okinawa during Dulles' visit.¹⁴⁸

Yoshida, interestingly, and characteristic of his "one-man" style of leadership—which made him respected by some, disliked by many—did not wait in one respect for the Dulles mission to arrive. In late April, prior to the completion of the above studies on a peace treaty, Yoshida sent one of his "disciples," Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato, who would later become prime minister (1960-1964), a close confidante, Shirasu Jiro, and a young finance expert Miyazawa Kiichi, himself also later to become prime minister (1991-1993) to Washington to meet with Joseph M. Dodge, MacArthur's special assistant in charge of Japanese financial affairs, for

talks nominally about the state of the Japanese economy.¹⁴⁹ Yoshida however had another reason for arranging the talks. In an effort to break the stalemate in Washington over a peace treaty and to bring an early end to the occupation, it seems that he not only bypassed MacArthur but also bypassed his Foreign Ministry to directly relay a message that Japan was prepared to offer the United States bases in Japan and thus align Japan politically and security-wise with America.¹⁵⁰ In relaying this message, Yoshida may very well have also been concerned, as evidence suggests, about Okinawa's fate were U.S. bases to be found only in Okinawa and not on the mainland, as implied in the earlier Second Ashida Memo.¹⁵¹

This was actually not the first time that the subject of bases in Japan was discussed however. We saw earlier that Ashida and the Foreign Ministry considered in September 1947 that it would be necessary for the United States to use bases in times of "emergency" in Japan to protect Japan. The U.S. government was apparently not prepared to accept any offers from Japan at that time which was viewed still as an enemy state rather than an ally. Moreover, on April 7, 1950, Yoshida had broached the subject of bases in post-treaty Japan during a dinner party at his house with Cloyce K. Huston, the Counselor of the Mission, during Sebald's absence on a long-weekend trip to Kansai.¹⁵² Yoshida, according to Huston, spoke "quite volubly...avoiding any specific commitments, but always allowing the inference that he would be favorably disposed toward whatever practical arrangements the United States might consider necessary in order to assist Japan in the maintenance of her security in the post-treaty period." Huston noted that Yoshida "definitely avoided any flat statement, however, that he would favor American military bases in Japan after the treaty."¹⁵³ Yoshida's positive, but vague, references to "practical arrangements" was likely a way to satisfy the U.S. military's concerns over whether they could have base rights in Japan and thus to speed up movements for a peace treaty.¹⁵⁴ Whether MacArthur's June acceptance of bases in Japan was directly related to Yoshida's announcement is unknown, but the author believes that it was very likely, as MacArthur had set for himself as a condition just such a request from the Japanese.¹⁵⁵ In any case, with the compromise suggested by MacArthur allowing for the establishment of U.S. bases in post-treaty Japan, the State and Defense departments could move ahead toward a peace treaty.

In September, following Dulles' trip to Japan, the Japanese learned from President Truman's September 14 press conference that the U.S. government had drafted its general principles regarding a peace treaty and that discussions with the Allies were soon to begin.¹⁵⁶ As looked at earlier, it was not until November before the full contents of the "seven points" were made known to the public. In the meantime, Foreign Ministry officials attempted to gather from all the news reports an outline of what the recent U.S. version of a peace treaty was going to look like. On September 26, this

initial report, known as the "Operation A," or *A Sagyo*, was compiled and explained to Prime Minister Yoshida. A special group was quickly formed to prepare a report dealing with the following four parts: 1) general observations of the problems of the peace treaty; 2) the U.S. conception of the peace treaty; 3) policy regarding Japanese desires; and 4) requests to be made in writing to the United States. This report calling for a total peace (i.e., with the participation of the Communist countries and a resolution by the U.N. General Assembly endorsing the presence of U.S. forces in Japan) was completed on October 4, and handed to Yoshida the following day."

The draft was returned by Yoshida the following week (October 11) with the criticism that he "regret[ed] that [he] could not find any statesman-like good sense in it."" Shocked, Director of the Treaty Bureau Nishimura and his assistants, Ando Yoshimitsu, Fujisaki Masato, and Treaty Bureau Deputy Director Takahashi Michitoshi were told in no uncertain terms that they had to rework the entire draft." A revised version, known as "Operation D," or *D Sagyo*, which called for Japan's alignment with America and Western states (i.e., the signatures of the communist states on the peace treaty would not be necessary), was ready by December 27 and submitted to Yoshida on the following day, December 28.¹⁶⁰ Yoshida reviewed the "Operation D" documents and revisions were made to them on January 5 (and again on January 19). Yoshida also asked veteran diplomat Hotta Masaaki, who served as a liaison between Nishimura's working group in the Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister's office, to look over the drafts as well.¹⁶¹ The discussion below will focus on the debate in these documents relating to Okinawa and the territorial provisions.

Among the documents brought to Yoshida on December 28, and subsequently looked at by him, Foreign Ministry officials viewed the territorial problem in the following way:

According to point 3 [of the so-called Seven Points], the Okinawa and Ogasawara islands are proposed to be placed under a U.S. trusteeship. We understand the military requirements of the United States and are prepared to meet the requests [of the United States] in any manner. However, the separation of these islands would be hard for the sentiments of the [Japanese] people to bear. We hope that this point will be reconsidered. This is a point to consider in order that both countries are able to build a close relationship in the future. How this problem [may or may not be] solved will likely be used by the Communist camp as a pretext to prevent the establishment of good relations. With this in mind, it should be made clear at the earliest possible opportunity that points 3 and 4 [of the U.S. draft] are not intended to ignore the ideas of the Japanese people when deciding the stationing troops in Japan and the disposition of the Okinawa and Ogasawara Islands.""

Yoshida, concerned about Japan's sovereign status and the future of the residents, made important revisions to the paper which eventually the Japanese side presented (in an expanded form) to the U.S. delegation. On January 5, Yoshida's revisions on the above version (with the additional part italicized by the author) were incorporated into the Treaty Bureau's new draft in the following way:

According to point 3 [of the so-called Seven Points], the Okinawa and Ogasawara islands are proposed to be placed under a U.S. trusteeship. We understand the military requirements of the United States and are prepared to meet the requests [of the U.S.] in any manner. However, the separation of these islands would be hard for the sentiments of the [Japanese] people to bear. We hope that this point will be reconsidered. (*If it can not be helped that the islands are to be placed under a trusteeship, we desire that the areas necessary for military purposes are limited to the greatest extent possible, that Japan can be a joint administrator, and that it is made clear that when the situation that necessitates a trusteeship no longer exists that these islands are to be returned to Japan.*) This is a point to consider in order that both countries are able to build a close relationship in the future. How this problem [may or may not be] solved will likely be used by the Communist camp as a pretext to prevent the establishment of good relations. With this in mind, it should be made clear at the earliest possible opportunity that points 3 and 4 [of the U.S. draft] are not intended to ignore the ideas of the Japanese people when deciding the stationing of troops in Japan and the disposition of the Okinawa and Ogasawara Islands.¹⁶³

Yoshida's revisions remained as they were through the final version of the papers for Operation D.¹⁶⁴ However, it became necessary to expand upon these points.

The document entitled "Measures to Be Taken in the Case of U.S. Insistence on Trusteeships for Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands," completed on January 26, a few days before Yoshida was to have his first meeting with Dulles, represented these new considerations.¹⁶⁵ The document begins by stating the problem as "If Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands are placed under a trusteeship, the permanent loss of these islands would likely be the most irritating thing to the people [of Japan]. In order to lessen this problem," it continues, "the following measures are considered:

1. Limit the Duration of the Trusteeship.

As an example, the former colony of Italy, Somaliland, is to be placed under trusteeship for a period of 10 years. After that, it is to be granted independence. In this way, limiting the number of years for a trusteeship is most desirable.

If that is found to be difficult, the following phrase should be added: *These islands will be placed under trusteeship limited to the*

period which the situation requires.' When that situation disappears, the decision for the final status of the islands should be handled in accordance with Article 76 (listing the basic objectives of the trusteeship) and "the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned," as is clearly defined in the trusteeship agreement (Article 76 [b]). There are no legal problems expected with this proposal since it is consistent with the provisions of the [UN] Charter.

In addition, it would be prudent to secure a written understanding outside any agreement from the United States that these islands will be returned to Japan once the need for a trusteeship disappears.

2. Make Japan a Joint Authority.

An example where a joint authority system exists for a trusteeship area is the case of Nauru Island in which Great Britain, Australia, and New Zealand have joint authority. Moreover, Italy as an administering authority over Somaliland is an example where a former enemy state became [in 1950] an administrator. If Japan were to become joint administering authority with the United States, by being in an equal position with the United States, the sentiments of the [Japanese] people would be satisfied with regard to the [question of the eventual] reversion of the islands, the administration of the islands, the authority regarding the residents. (The idea for a joint authority was in fact mentioned by a State Department official.)

Moreover concerning the citizenship of the residents, according to the related parts of the Trusteeship System as established by the UN Charter, the residents would fall in a special situation. They would not receive citizenship of the administering country or countries, they would not receive United Nations citizenship, nor would they retain the citizenship of the country that the trust territory once belonged to [in this case Japan]. (According to precedent, they would have the citizenship of the trust territory.) It is stated that the administering authority would be responsible for diplomatic and other protection when the inhabitants of the trust territory travel outside the territorial limits. Therefore, it will be difficult to request that the inhabitants of the islands be allowed to retain their Japanese citizenship.

In addition to the two points listed above, we should request that the following points be considered concerning a trusteeship.

1. The relationship between these islands and the Japanese mainland should be allowed to continue as usual to the greatest extent possible. Above all, the people of both areas [the mainland and the islands] should be allowed to travel back and forth freely, and for customs purposes, the islands should be considered a part of Japan.

2. The people of the islands of Ogasawara and Iwojima, brought to the mainland during the war by Japan and after the war by the U.S., should be allowed to return to their home islands.

Yoshida would adopt these ideas in a memorandum (introduced below) that he later passed to Dulles, part of his attempt the author calls the "Yoshida Initiative" to get Dulles and the U.S. government to allow Japan to retain the Ryukyu Islands

The Yoshida Initiative, January 1951

Based on the work of the Foreign Ministry to date, Yoshida launched a diplomatic campaign to seek the understanding of the United States and international community, and to prove Japan's loyalty. In the January 1951 edition of *Foreign Affairs*, Yoshida wrote that "Japan awaits a peace treaty. We do not know what will be the conditions of peace. This is a treaty Japan will conclude as a defeated nation for the first time in her history, and it is likely to prove a bitter pill for us to swallow. But we are prepared to take our punishment."¹⁶⁶ Meanwhile, Yoshida expressed to his Cabinet at a meeting in early January — around the time that the first revisions were made to the "D Operation" — the "hope that the Ryukyu Islands eventually would be restored to Japanese sovereignty...[moreover] the Japanese Government would favorably consider leasing the Islands to the United States in preference to having them placed under United States trusteeship."¹⁶⁷ It was also reported, according to a despatch drafted by a young, but well connected, Foreign Service Officer, William N. Stokes, and sent on to Washington by Acting Counselor of Mission Niles W. Bond, that "the Prime Minister stressed that the Islands had not been obtained by conquest or aggression, are inhabited by Japanese, and have the closest historical ties to Japan."¹⁶⁸

On the evening of January 19, the same day that revisions were made to the paper on territorial problems for the "D Operation," Yoshida spoke this time directly but informally with Sebald at a dinner party and inquired as to "whether it would be possible for Ryukyans to retain Japanese nationality under any trustee arrangement that might be entered into."¹⁶⁹ Sebald felt Yoshida's question important enough to note it in his diary and to highlight it several years later in preparation for the writing of his memoirs.¹⁷⁰ Sebald also felt it important enough to telegram its contents "prioritarily" to Dulles the next morning.¹⁷¹ Sebald cited Yoshida's request to retain Japanese nationality for the "Ryukyuan people" and expanded on what he had written in his diary by telling Dulles that "[Yoshida] indicated that while trusteeship of some kind over [the] Ryukyus might be acceptable, [the] Japanese people desire [to] preserve some vestige [of] their sovereignty regardless [of] how tenuous [it may be]." Sebald told Yoshida that the "matter [was] beyond [his] province but...[that] he might wish [to] discuss [it] with Dulles."¹⁷² Yoshida, no doubt, was expecting that reply — however

his mission was in many ways accomplished. His speaking to Sebald was probably as much an inquiry as it was an attempt to relay to Dulles through Sebald Japanese thinking on the Okinawa question."

Yoshida quickly realized how difficult the territorial issue was likely to become. Shortly after his "informal" talk with Sebald, Yoshida visited MacArthur to express Japan's desire to see the islands retained under Japanese sovereignty. To say that Yoshida's move was a bold one would be an understatement; MacArthur's views desiring complete, absolute, and permanent control over Okinawa, which were held since at least 1947, were well known to the Japanese government as seen in an earlier chapter. Nonetheless, Yoshida it seems attempted to impress upon MacArthur the importance of the issue. Despite the very good relationship between the General and Yoshida, MacArthur said the "answer to this [the return of the Ryukyus] would be an unequivocal 'no'."¹⁷⁴ Moreover, MacArthur "flatly told Prime Minister Yoshida that he...would be unalterably opposed to any arrangement which does not divorce Japan completely from these islands." This rejection may have led Yoshida to concentrate his efforts on Dulles instead to convince the U.S. government to allow the islands to be returned to Japan. This was a wise decision on Yoshida's part, since MacArthur himself later indicated to members of the Dulles group shortly after this conversation that he did not "wish to play an active part in the Mission's work but only to be brought in if difficulties arose."

Immediately prior to the arrival of Dulles, Yoshida thus attempted to relay another message to Dulles and his assistants when he sent his aide and close confidante Shirasu to Sebald's office on January 23 to meet with Robert Fearey, who arrived early that morning ahead of the full Dulles party to finalize local arrangements.¹⁷⁷ Fearey took Shirasu's visit and comments seriously, noting that "while many Americans have reservations about Shirasu personally, he has long been a close friend and advisor to Yoshida."¹⁷⁸ Shirasu warned Fearey that "transfer[ing] title" of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands from Japan "would be a serious mistake, greatly reducing the benefits which may otherwise be derived from a treaty." Shirasu added that because Japan was "prepared to give the U.S. all required military rights there for as long as necessary," the people of Japan would not "understand why these peacefully acquired islands, populated, as they consider, by people as Japanese as other, should be taken from them. Such action would be a continual source of bitterness, a bitterness shared by himself and other educated Japanese no less than by the masses." Upon his arrival shortly after, Dulles would have to take into consideration precisely this problem.

X. THE DULLES MISSION'S SECOND TRIP TO JAPAN, JANUARY–FEBRUARY 1951 AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

On January 11, Dulles was appointed President Truman's Special Representative, with the personal rank of Ambassador. Two weeks later on the evening of January 25, Dulles' group arrived in Tokyo to start what he called "consultations," but in many ways were "negotiations" that did not end even after the signing of the peace treaty later that year in September because Yoshida was not about to give up on the territorial issue (or other issues such as rearmament for that matter as well).¹⁹

After being met by MacArthur and Sebald at Haneda Airport, followed by a late dinner party with all the Chiefs of Mission at Sir Alvary Gascoigne's residence, the Dulles group began their first staff meeting the following morning, January 26. "During the course of discussions between Sebald and the Dulles group, Dulles explained his concepts of the peace treaty and stressed the "importance he attached to a broad basis of political support for the understandings achieved." Sebald suggested that in order for Yoshida to be better prepared for his meeting with Dulles, he and Allison be allowed to visit Yoshida with a copy of the seven-point statement of principles enunciated in September and a copy of a tentative agenda prepared by Dulles and his staff on the airplane.

Sebald and Allison subsequently called on Yoshida at his residence in Meguro at 4:00 later that afternoon. "The second of the documents, entitled "Suggested Agenda," handed to Yoshida numbered 13 points." The very first point was "Territorial [considerations]." It suggested as the topic of the discussion on this question, "How to carry out the Surrender Terms that 'Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we may determine'." Allison explained to Yoshida that Japan was "to be treated as an equal and not as a vanquished enemy and that [the mission] hoped to have full discussions with the Japanese on these matters," as had been stated at a press conference by Dulles upon his arrival to Japan. Sebald and Allison likely pointed out to Yoshida that Dulles, as he had stated at the staff's morning meeting, would welcome the prime minister's own proposals, but "if they were inadequate Mr. Dulles would tell Mr. Yoshida so and an effort would be made to evolve better ones." With that, Yoshida immediately had his staff, centered on Nishimura, get to work on a response; they finally finished at 2:00 a.m., only to have to revise their draft again the next day.¹⁸⁴

In the meantime, Dulles' group met the following day (January 27) for what would become their regular 10:00 a.m. staff meeting (later changed to 9:30 a.m.). Dulles made his concerns felt over recent comments in the press by Japanese leaders and government officials calling for the return of

the Ryukyus.¹⁸⁵ Drawing on his prior experiences at the Paris Peace Conference and his familiarity of post-World War I affairs, Dulles stated:

The Versailles Treaty stigmatized the socialist government which signed it and provided the reactionaries with a platform on which they were able to climb to power. The U.S. draft looks like a liberal treaty but there are already rumblings against certain of the territorial provisions. We do not want to crucify the party that makes the treaty. Perhaps we should inform Yoshida that we are unwilling to negotiate unless he creates a coalition group with whom we can deal on a genuinely non-partisan basis and whose participation will guarantee, as far as anything can, that the treaty will stick...If the opposition parties do not like the treaty let them say so now.¹⁸⁶

Not only the opposition parties, but Yoshida himself would make those pleas for the return of the Ryukyu Islands.¹⁸⁷

Dulles had other viewpoints to take into consideration as well however. Immediately after the staff meeting finished, Dulles and his group paid a visit to MacArthur at 11:00 (for what turned out to be a three-hour meeting) to discuss with him their ideas and plans for the mission.'" After a half-hour long discussion of the situation and strategy in Korea, MacArthur gave his views on questions concerning Japanese security and other matters. MacArthur, noting that he had "spoken at some length on behalf of Japan...now wished to present the other side of the coin," proceeded to voice "his strong impatience with Japanese pleas that the Ryukyu Islands be left with Japan."¹⁸⁹ The general felt that the Japanese were being unreasonable; "*When all that the United States asked in n treaty, in every other respect a model of generosity, was n chain of islands* which had always been an economic drain on Japan and whose population was not Japanese, he believed the Japanese [government] should be prepared to grant the request...It would be intolerable," MacArthur continued, "for the United States to spend hundreds of millions of dollars transforming Okinawa into a great defensive base without assurance, which title can alone give, that the Japanese may not later require us to give the islands up." (Italics by author.) He recommended that Dulles tell Yoshida the question of the territorial disposition of the Ryukyu Islands "simply was not open for discussion." As we will see, the Dulles group, while disagreeing with MacArthur's arguments, would adopt his recommendation.'"

During the first meeting between Dulles and Yoshida two days later, Dulles made the point of impressing upon Yoshida the importance of having broad popular and political support for the treaty and that "no treaty would be successful or long lasting which was not understood by and substantially approved by a large majority of the Japanese people."¹⁹¹ Yoshida seemed less inclined to agree but in any case said that he had no objections to Dulles' party meeting with opposition leaders. Being their first meeting,

Dulles and Yoshida did not go into any details on the treaty although Dulles sought to get Yoshida to speak on Japan's commitments and contributions to collective security. Yoshida explained at the end of their meeting that the Foreign Ministry was preparing written comments on Dulles' "seven principles" statement and the suggested agenda of topics for discussion, which would be brought to Sebald's office the next day, January 30. Overall, Yoshida was evasive on the question of rearmament and collective security (which he thought would prevent Japan from working on its economy recovery due to unnecessary defense spending—a position since termed the "Yoshida Doctrine"), frustrating, if not near angering, Dulles and his associates. The following day Dulles "expressed great pessimism" regarding Yoshida's attitude and described the meeting as a "puff ball performance.""" Sebald was also bothered by Yoshida's curious attitude, calling the conversation "most inane, naive, and unrealistic," and stated that he got the impression that "Yoshida was throwing out bargaining hints but was totally unprepared to discuss even broad principles."¹⁹³ Nevertheless, he "counseled patience" in dealing with Yoshida and the Japanese counterparts.¹⁹⁴ Sebald at the same time spoke with Chief Cabinet Secretary Okazaki to tell him to request Yoshida "stop stalling and get to work, in view of the short time available.""" As a result, later that evening (at 7:00 p.m.), the Japanese side presented their written comments, as promised by Yoshida the day before.¹⁹⁶ Likewise, the Second Dulles-Yoshida meeting the next day (January 31) went "much more smoothly" when discussions were held on the Japanese government's paper.¹⁹⁷

The paper, submitted with the name "Suggested Agenda" in English, was actually entitled Wagnho *Kenkai*, or "Our Views," in Japanese.¹⁹⁸ The section on territorial issues meanwhile was based on "Operation D" and specifically the paper entitled "Measures to be Taken in the Case of U.S. Insistence on Trusteeships for Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands.""" While undated, it had been completed immediately before its delivery. According to one of the participants at the time, the rough version, completed on January 26, was reexamined and corrected on the following day, and then brought to Yoshida's private home in Oiso, Kanagawa Prefecture, southwest of Tokyo. There Yoshida went over the draft and by the time Yoshida's first meeting took place with Dulles on January 29, a near complete version had been made. The final version was forwarded to the U.S. side on January 30, and took the following form²⁰⁰:

- 1) It is proposed that the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands be placed under U.N. Trusteeship with the United States as administering authority. While Japan is ready to meet in any manner American military requirements, and even to agree to a lease under the Bermuda formula, we solicit reconsideration of this proposal in the interest of lasting friendly relations between Japan and the United States.²⁰¹

- 2) We ask that the following points be considered in the interest of the lasting American-Japanese friendship.
 - A) It is desired that these islands will be returned to Japan as soon as the need of trusteeship disappears.
 - B) They be allowed to retain Japanese nationality.
 - C) Japan will be made a joint authority together with the United States.
 - D) Those inhabitants of the Bonin Islands and Iwojima who were evacuated to Japan proper, either during the war by Japanese authorities, or after the war's end by U.S. authorities, who number about 8,000, will be permitted to return to their respective home islands.²⁰²

Prior to Dulles' second meeting with Yoshida on January 31, his group had their regular staff meeting in the morning after going over Yoshida's paper.²⁰³ In participating in these staff meetings, Sebald observed in his memoirs that Dulles "goes over every move to be made during the day."²⁰⁴ The same was very true for this day as well. After speaking about his press conference later that day and the points he was going to make, Dulles entered into a long discussion of his views on the Ryukyu Islands.

He began by explaining that while the U.S. government might reexamine the question of the disposition of the Ryukyus, "it would do so for its own reasons;" the Japanese government on the other hand would not "be allowed to re-open the issue since [it] agreed in the surrender terms to the limitation of their territories to the four main islands and such other islands as the Allies might determine." Dulles stated therefore that he planned to tell Yoshida that the "Ryukyus were not open to discussion" and that it would be "up to the Allies to decide how they wish the islands disposed of and administered."

Dulles, himself, like his State Department colleagues, was not convinced that the Ryukyus should be placed under a U.S. trusteeship. In his talk, he elaborated on the possible necessity of reexamining the question, noting that

There were aspects of the Ryukyus question in addition to its purely military aspects which needed to be considered. The United States should not lightly assume responsibility for nearly a million alien people thousands of miles from its shores. We do not want another Puerto Rico. It is possible that the civilian aspects of the matter, such as the questions of cost, customs and immigration, may not have been given sufficient consideration.

In response, Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl Johnson stated that he "believe[d] there had been a lack of appreciation of certain aspects of the Ryukyus question at the top levels of the United States Government and that the matter would require further high level consideration."²⁰⁶ Dulles agreed, saying that they "should take up the question at home and not per-

mit the Japanese to build a fire under us." As a result, Dulles would have to adopt a hard line vis-à-vis Yoshida on the Okinawa question—although Dulles and his colleagues in fact wanted to avoid having to force Japan to give up its sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands. Indeed, Dulles felt that the United States should "give back what [it] c[ould]." ²⁰⁷ As long as it did not become a political issue in Japan, the problem, Dulles likely thought, could be handled stateside—between the State Department and the military, as well as between the Allies.

Yoshida and the new Vice Foreign Minister, Iguchi, arrived at 2:00 on the afternoon of January 31 for Yoshida's second meeting with Dulles. ²⁰⁸ Yoshida and Dulles went over the "suggested agenda" that the prime minister had submitted the day before. Dulles, according to the description he told his colleagues afterwards, "emphasized to Mr. Yoshida the undesirability of allowing a campaign about the Ryukyus to get under way." ²⁰⁹ Dulles in effect was telling Yoshida that the question of the Ryukyu Islands was not on the table and not open for discussions. Yoshida, again according to Dulles, "seemed to accept this position." ²¹⁰ While this may be true, another account however paints in fact a more distressed Japanese side. "'

Nishimura, Director of the Treaty Bureau, wrote several years later (shortly after Dulles' passing in May 1959) that Dulles "looked rather displeased" when Yoshida presented the request for that the United States not proceed with a trusteeship over the Ryukyu Islands. ²¹² When Dulles spoke, he stated that it was "undesirable" for Japan to bring up the territorial issue. ²¹³ Immediately after the meeting with Yoshida, Dulles held a press conference at 4:30 p.m. in which he reemphasized his decision not to consider addressing the Ryukyu question while in Japan or in the future, stating "Neither our present consultations nor future decisions can be expected to reopen specific questions already made and accepted by surrender terms." ²¹⁴ Dulles' "not showing any interest whatsoever in the resolute decision by Yoshida to bring up the problem because of his concern that the failure to leave the Ryukyu Islands under Japanese sovereignty would cause the people ill-feelings and endanger the building of permanent friendly relations between the U.S. and Japan" came as a great shock to the Japanese side, Nishimura recalled. "' Indeed Nishimura, upset, recorded later that he spent a "sleepless night that evening." ²¹⁶

The former diplomat Yoshida, himself a veteran of the Versailles Peace Conference, did not "show any reaction on the surface or change in attitude" at the meeting, the Director of the Treaty Bureau later wrote (which may ironically have led Dulles to believe that Yoshida was in agreement). ²¹⁷ However, when Yoshida returned to his residence in Meguro he was apparently quite bothered by what had happened, fearing, again, that the territorial issue might enflame the feelings of the people and thus damage the still fragile relationship. ²¹⁸ Yoshida, when he finally went to sleep that evening—if indeed he did go to sleep—probably thought that his govern-

ment would have to wait until Dulles spoke with the other Allies and his home government before seeking another opportunity in the future to convince Dulles to allow Japan to retain sovereignty over the Ryukyu and other islands.

To Foreign Ministry officials, the first sign that their appeals may have had some effect came shortly after however on the morning of February 5, when a new draft version of the treaty, prepared on February 3 and called by Dulles a "treaty paraphrase," was handed to Vice Minister Iguchi by Dulles.²¹⁹ Although the territorial section of the new draft was basically identical to the draft of September 1950 (not seen by or known to the Japanese), Nishimura and the Foreign Ministry officials were encouraged the Nansei Islands were defined at 29°North Latitude, rather than the 30° North Latitude that the Occupation had been conducted along since January 29, 1946.²²⁰ Overall they were somewhat satisfied with the U.S. memorandum and on February 7, Yoshida, Iguchi, and Nishimura called on Dulles to say that they had received it "with profound gratification and gratitude."²²¹ Yoshida did say that they had some technical comments to make on the U.S. draft, but the Japanese officials carefully avoided antagonizing Dulles it seems by not discussing the territorial issue, with which they still had numerous concerns, because the territorial provisions were no longer allowed on the table for discussion. It was in this way that the discussions ended for the peace treaty. Other parallel discussions continued on the security arrangements for what was to become the U.S.-Japan security treaty allowing for the stationing of American forces in Japan. Okinawa was not dealt with per se, it seems; thus the discussion here will not include the talks on the security treaty. Dulles and his group left Japan on February 11, following a dinner party by Yoshida, a call on the Emperor, and a farewell reception at the Imperial Hotel.

Despite his busy schedule and his early dismissal of Yoshida's requests for the return of Okinawa, Dulles often thought about the appeal by the Japanese government and the public opinion polls taken at the time (see below). Allison, Dulles' principal deputy, wrote, "We were deeply impressed by the Japanese plea for the restoration of the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands. While we could not grant their wishes at the time, I believe it was then that Dulles conceived the idea, which he later announced at the San Francisco Peace Conference, the Japan should retain residual sovereignty over the islands but that they would be administered by the United States."²²² Allison's recollections above are not verifiable per se, but there is no doubt that Dulles did not fail to recognize the desire of the Japanese to see Okinawa returned. Dulles departed from Haneda for the Philippines still wondering how to balance those requests with the requirements of the U.S. military and the demands of the anti-Japanese Allies.

XI. DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ALLIES, WASHINGTON, AND THE FOLLOW-UP VISIT TO JAPAN

Earlier in this chapter we saw that when Dulles proposed the seven points or principles for a peace treaty, several countries, specifically the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and India, expressed their opposition to the territorial clauses which would have Japan agree to a U.N. trusteeship of the Ryukyus with the United States as the administering authority. In any case, Dulles continued to keep those countries informed throughout the consultation process. Meanwhile, several other of America's Allies, such as Nationalist China, Great Britain, Australia, the Philippines, and New Zealand expressed their satisfaction with, if not strong desire for, a U.S. trusteeship. When Dulles left Japan, he visited these latter countries which strongly desired a physical American presence in, if not trusteeship over, Okinawa—as a buffer to Japan and its potential rearmament-remilitarization.

In the morning of his first full day in Manila, Dulles emphasized to President Elpidio Quirino the importance of having a "healthy and stable Japan" which would "insure Japan's adherence to the cause of the free world."²²³ In Dulles' opinion, Japan was "one of the key areas desired by the Communists" and thus if Japan's industrial production and the manpower resources were acquired by nearby China and the Soviet Union, "the Philippines would be in grave danger." Quirino was more concerned with Japan's future power. He expressed his hope to Dulles that "the United States would not be so interested in working for the rehabilitation of Japan that it would forget the needs and rights of the Philippines," emphasizing that the people of his country "believed that their interests were being neglected at the expense of Japan." Dulles assured him that was not the case and said that "our whole program for Japan was designed to bring about a situation where the Philippines would not again be subject to the dangers of aggression from any source." In the end the Philippines sought a bilateral treaty with the United States in order to back up this guarantee. The fact that America was proposing to place the Ryukyu Islands under a U.S. trusteeship—in line with the strong desire of the Philippines—made the security guarantee all the more palatable to the Philippine government.²²⁴

Dulles and his party left the Philippines a couple of days later for their next stops, Australia and New Zealand—two other countries with strong feelings of suspicion and distrust toward Japan—arriving in Darwin, Australia (en route to Canberra) on February 14, New Zealand on February 19 and eventually back in Washington on the 26th of the same month.²²⁵ (Allison noted that in Darwin, the Australians "were not slow to point out that Darwin had been bombed by the Japanese during the war. A more dismal spot would be difficult to find."²²⁶) Both Australia and New Zealand also sought strong guarantees for their security as a *quid pro quo*

for agreeing to a peace treaty with Japan.'" For this to be realized, the representatives of these countries, as well as those of their Commonwealth partner, the United Kingdom, considered it essential that America continue its control through a trusteeship over the Ryukyus.²²⁸ New Zealand later suggested that "Japan should be specifically required to renounce sovereignty over the Ryukyus, Bonins, and the Volcano and Marcus Islands."²²⁹

Upon Dulles's return to Washington on February 27, he paid a short visit on the President, followed by a meeting with Under Secretary James E. Webb and top officials (including the Assistant Secretaries) in the State Department where Dulles gave a briefing on his Far East trip.²³⁰ Dulles brought to the attention of those assembled the concerns he faced in Tokyo concerning Okinawa, stating "We encountered a rising tide of Japanese sentiment for regaining some interest in the Ryukyus, but we declined to discuss this problem, saying that it has been settled internationally."²³¹ Indicative of just how complex the problem in fact was, Dulles told his colleagues that a departmental group had since been established to study the problem.²³²

Dulles, his staff, and the departmental group with the help of Sebald, who was still in Washington, continued through March to work on the treaty and the territorial provisions. In early March, Dr. Ruth Bacon, a legal expert in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs who had been involved with preparations for the Japanese Peace Treaty since late 1946, responded to Allison's request to do a study on the obligations the United States would assume under a trusteeship for the Ryukyu and other islands.²³³ In this realistic and critical appraisal done after consultations with the divisions of United Nations Affairs, Northeast Asian Affairs, and Research for the Far East, as well as within her own bureau, Bacon notes the following ten problems associated with a trusteeship:

1. A Soviet veto of a strategic trusteeship for the Ryukyus could be expected.
2. In view of strategic requirements, obtaining approval of the UN General Assembly would likely be difficult.
3. The U.S. would be obligated to allow the UN Trusteeship Council to supervise the trusteeship, answer questions, and to implement the recommendations of the UN.
4. In view of the large amount of autonomy the Ryukyuan people have historically had under Japanese administration, they could be expected to be outspoken against any administrative system that would not allow for a large degree of self-government.
5. There is substantial feelings among the Ryukyuan people for return to Japan.
6. Pre-war trade of the Ryukyus was almost exclusively with Japan—if the Ryukyus were separated from Japan, their exports to Japan would be subject to customs regulations.

7. The U.S. would be financially responsible for improving the economic status of the islands progressively.
8. The Trusteeship Council would likely become involved if considerable amounts of the local land were taken from the inhabitants for administrative or security purposes.
9. The Trusteeship Council would show concern if discriminatory practices evolved in regard to housing and other facilities.
10. Application for trusteeship by the U.S. would be interpreted by some countries as "an effort by the U.S. to use the trusteeship system as a means of obtaining additional territory and military bases." The UN would become the forum for these critics and the U.S. would face constant obstacles in its efforts to administer the islands consistent with UN standards or the normal standards of the administration of dependent areas.

One other important problem that Bacon could have mentioned as well was the opinion of the Japanese public as well as the strong requests of the Japanese government and political parties. Concerning public opinion in Japan, the State Department received on or about March 5 a copy of an opinion poll (conducted from February 16 to February 18) by the *Mnichi*, immediately after Dulles departure from Japan. The question asked, "What do you think of the report that the United States will control the Ryukyus and Bonin Islands Under a United Nations Trusteeship?" Approximately 43% of the men and women polled answered "We hope they are returned to Japan," while another 42% answered that "It can't be helped [shikntn gn nni] but we hope they are returned to Japan after a certain period."²³⁴ This poll, showing a majority of the pollees in favor of the islands' return to Japan instead of a permanent U.S. trusteeship over the islands, was a demonstration of the public attitude on that issue with which the State Department clearly was familiar.

Bacon's report on the group seems to have convinced her colleagues of the difficulty of the trusteeship system as applied to Okinawa. In the Provisional Draft treaty, completed on March 12, the territorial provision states that the United States "may," rather than "will" (that was formerly used), propose a trusteeship for the Ryukyu Islands, as seen as follows:

The United States *may* propose to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the administering authority, the Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude, the Bonin Islands, including Rosario Island, the Volcano Islands, Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Japan will concur in any such proposal. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.'" (Italics by author.)

Bacon's superior, Allison, was also convinced of the difficulty of applying a trusteeship to Okinawa. During a trip to the United Kingdom to secure its approval for the draft, Allison told his counterparts that America "of course did not want to annex the islands...[but it] regarded a United Nations trusteeship as a headache."²³⁶ Allison expanded on this comment by explaining that the U.S. government thought that at "some time sovereignty might be returned to the Japanese" and thus "may" was introduced as the "suggested phraseology" in the treaty regarding a trusteeship. Undersecretary of the British Foreign Office, Robert H. Scott, demonstrating British and Allied distrust of Japan, cautioned Allison and his colleagues against "leaving points of friction with the Japanese...[or] trusting them too much."

Dulles nevertheless was content with the changes and introduced the March 12 draft to his colleagues at a March 21 Under Secretary's meeting.^{'''} As this and other meetings show, Dulles went out of his way not only to keep his superiors and colleagues abreast, but aware of the necessity of Congressional support (through his involvement as a member of Wilson's delegation to Paris after World War I as well as a member of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations meetings), Dulles carefully met with members of Congress on numerous occasions during the consulting and drafting stages to explain his work on the treaty.^{'''} One such example came on March 19, two days before the Under Secretary's meeting, when Dulles, Fearey, Colonel Babcock, and Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Jack K. McFall, met with the Far East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to explain to the provisional draft of the Japanese peace treaty.^{'''} Dulles stated that he believed the treaty "should give the United States the right to apply for a trusteeship if it desired...The United States should not commit itself in the treaty but should simply obtain an option to seek a trusteeship if it desired," adding that "what we should ultimately do with the Ryukyus...should be made the subject of a special inquiry." New Jersey Senator H. Alexander Smith (Republican), an old friend of Dulles and fellow Princetonian, pointed out that since the draft would permit America to indefinitely retain control of the Ryukyus the United States would be vulnerable "to charges of imperialism." When Dulles suggested that the draft would have to be left as is until the opinions of the Allies were ascertained, Alabama Senator John J. Sparkman (Democrat), another ranking member of the Committee, questioned the need for a trusteeship at all, stating that "the least we could do would let Japan retain the Ryukyus, with the United States receiving the same military rights that it will in Japan proper." Sparkman's comment hit the nail on the head—would it be possible to apply the security treaty to the Ryukyu Islands and return them to Japanese sovereignty, as the State Department had hoped? Dulles, who seems to have favored this option, would have to explore it more.^{'''}

On April 11, the same day that General MacArthur was relieved for insubordination as Commander-in-Chief of the United Nations Command (as well as Commander-in-Chief, Far East, and Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan), Dulles and several State Department colleagues met with members of the JCS and National Security Council, amid rumors that the JCS no longer were willing to go ahead with a treaty, to discuss the implications that MacArthur's relief would have on U.S. policy toward the Pacific as well as toward progress on the peace treaty.²⁴¹

Bradley reemphasized the two primary concerns of the JCS. First, Bradley noted, was their concern as to "necessity of [having] a free hand in the Ryukyus," which, according to the memorandum of conversation, the JCS "felt the State Department was depending too heavily on the Japanese government in this matter." Secondly, Bradley noted, was the "need" to defer the peace treaty until the conclusion of the Korean War "so as to permit freedom to operate during the period the fighting continues." Dulles, in response, while noting their concerns, emphasized that the United States should go ahead with a peace treaty without delay. Dulles was flexible and said that he would change some of the phraseology to meet the concerns of the JCS. However, regarding the Ryukyu Islands Dulles felt that "the draft treaty and agreements met the JCS view 100%." The JCS were only partly satisfied however and would make further comments regarding the treaty drafts, as is discussed below. Dulles, who was away in Japan again, would find this memorandum waiting for him when he returned.

Upon hearing the news of MacArthur's relief, Dulles felt that he should immediately leave for Tokyo to give "some reassurance" to the Japanese that it would not effect the progress on the peace treaty nor "mean a weakening of the determination of the United States to stand strong against communism in Asia and to hold the off-shore island chain" which of course included Okinawa.²⁴² Truman supported Dulles' idea to reassure Japanese leaders and to confer with MacArthur's replacement, General Matthew B. Ridgway, "very strongly." As a result, Dulles, Fearey, Col. Babcock, and Assistant Secretary of the Army Johnson were back in Tokyo less than 10 weeks after their earlier visit, arriving later the same day as MacArthur's departure.²⁴³ Dulles, not wanting to raise the Okinawa problem, nor have it raised, seems not to have addressed the issue during his group's one week stay in Japan.²⁴⁴

In the meantime, on April 7, the British government had begun to circulate a longer draft version to other British Commonwealth governments. Technical experts from the British government subsequently arrived in Washington on April 25 to work, under the chairmanship of Allison, on combining the American and British drafts, the latter of which "though not an agreed Commonwealth document, was in large degree the product of overall Commonwealth thinking." Reflecting the British desire

for clearer phraseology from the United States on the Ryukyu Islands, the territorial clause appearing in the joint U.S.-U.K. draft stated:

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude, the Bonin Islands, including Rosario Island, the Volcano Islands, Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.²⁴⁶

However, while the United States agreed to the phraseology proposed by the British, differences still remained over whether it was necessary for Japan to renounce sovereignty over the islands, as it was expected to do in the case of Korea, Taiwan, Manchuria, the former Mandated Islands, the Kurile Islands, and other territories.²⁴⁷

The Japanese government was quick to note that the earlier March 12 U.S. draft, Dulles' explanatory speech at Whittier College (see above), as well as what was to become the joint U.S.-U.K. draft "did not require that Japan renounce sovereignty over Okinawa," a point that one of the participants at the time (Nishimura) claims someone from the American side (perhaps Dulles during his April visit) observed was of very significant meaning.²⁴⁸ But there was one concern held by the Japanese demonstrated in early April, that of a clearer definition of the "Ryukyu Islands."

On March 27, following his arrival back in Japan from Washington, Sebald proceeded to give Prime Minister Yoshida a copy of the treaty draft.²⁴⁹ One week later on the morning of April 4, Vice Minister Iguchi called on Sebald with his government's comments (approved by Yoshida the day before).²⁵⁰ The Japanese government, according to a memorandum handed Sebald, requested that the phrase "The Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude" (appearing in Chapter III, part 4, lines 3-4 of the draft) be replaced by "Nansei Islands south of 29° north latitude."²⁵¹ The explanation given by Iguchi for this was as follows: "The Amami island group, which belongs not to the Ryukyu Islands but to the Satsunan Islands, lies south of 29° north latitude, while the Nansei (Southwestern) Islands include both [the] Satsunan and Ryukyu groups, that is, all the islands between Kyushu and Formosa." Sebald agreed to forward this request to the State Department, which he did by telegram in the afternoon.²⁵² Sebald added his comment that the Japanese government's suggestion "appears historically correct according Jap[anese] usage 'Ryukyu Islands' not co-extensive with 'Nansei Islands', former term applying only to those islands formerly included within Okinawa prefecture (Okinawa and Sakishima sub-groups, including Daito and Sento Islands)." Upon receipt of Sebald's

telegram, Fearey consulted the same day with Samuel S. Boggs, the Special Adviser on Geography in the Office of the Special Assistant for Intelligence and Research in the State Department since 1946, on the question. Boggs responded that indeed "'Nansei' was the more accurate term and should be used."²⁵³ Fearey pointed out that "'Ryukyu' was a much more familiar name" and that the Japanese government probably had suggested "'Nansei' because it was a Japanese word" as opposed to the Chinese-sounding "Ryukyu."²⁵⁴ "Nevertheless," Boggs replied, supporting the Japanese government's argument, "'Nansei' was technically more accurate." Although this suggestion was not at first accepted by Dulles and the State Department, likely because such changes probably would open up a whole new round of discussions with and objections by the military, it was later adopted, as the final version of Article 3 would show.

In early June, after other governments had finished submitting their comments during April and May, Dulles left for London to go over those comments as well as to work on revisions of the joint treaty draft. In addition to these difficult tasks, which included the question of compensation and Chinese representation, Dulles sought the agreement of the United Kingdom on the interpretation of the clause for Okinawa, which had emerged as a problem between the two governments at the time of the preparation of the joint draft treaty. To him, the agreement of the Allies was essential on both major and minor points was important to the overall success of the treaty and Japan's reintegration into the international community."

British feelings on the necessity of Japan's renouncing sovereignty over the Ryukyus were still quite strong when Dulles, Allison, and Babcock arrived in London on June 2 with the U.S. "working draft" of the treaty in hand.²⁵⁵ However, Britain's Foreign Minister, Herbert Morrison, found it was necessary to cooperate with the United States on some issues in order to secure America's agreement on the points that it felt to be more important. One of the points to which Morrison agreed to commit the United Kingdom was recognition of Japanese sovereignty over Okinawa, as seen in his May 23 (1951) paper submitted to the British Cabinet on May 29, which argued that "problem of the recognition of Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands essentially is an American one."²⁵⁶ With Cabinet acceptance of this position on the May 29, Morrison was thus freed up to compromise with Dulles, who argued about the need to recognize Japan's sovereignty over the islands because of Japan's historic and economic relations with the Ryukyus during their discussions on June 7.²⁵⁷ Prior to Dulles' departure from London on June 14, a revised joint U.S.-U.K. version of treaty draft was ready.'" The territorial clause regarding Okinawa

* On June 2, the day Dulles arrived in London, both houses of the Japanese Diet passed resolutions calling for the return of Japan's territories.

remained unchanged; only the U.S. interpretation that Japan was allowed to keep sovereignty was affirmed. When Dulles arrived back in Washington on June 15, his next job regarding the territorial clause was to devise a formula to allow for Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyus.

XII. THE RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY FORMULA

Japan's Attempt to Secure Nationality for the Inhabitants

When talks in London finished, Allison left immediately for Tokyo via Pakistan, India, and the Philippines, before arriving in Tokyo on June 24.²⁵⁹ During the next day, June 25, Allison discussed in great detail the meetings in London and Paris with Iguchi and Nishimura and explained that the new version was based on the U.S. version with some British suggestions added.²⁶⁰ Both Iguchi and Nishimura were expecting this—Sebald had spoken with Yoshida on June 15 after the London Conference was over telling him that Dulles "had 'stood firm and successfully' for a non-restrictive, non-punitive, and liberal treaty."²⁶¹ Yoshida, according to Sebald, was "visibly pleased."

Yoshida, along with Iguchi and Nishimura, met Allison on June 28 after returning from a four-day trip to the Kansai region.²⁶² Immediately prior to Yoshida's departure on June 22, Foreign Ministry officials had prepared several papers on topics likely to be discussed during Allison's visit. Among them, the very first one was of course the peace treaty draft; other equally important topics included the security treaty arrangements, which Allison was empowered to negotiate. During Yoshida's very first meeting with Allison (and Sebald), the Prime Minister raised the question concerning the nationality of the inhabitants of the Ryukyus if trusteeship were obtained, stating that he would like to see them retain Japanese nationality.²⁶³ Yoshida also expressed his interest in seeing that the islands "retain close econ[omic] connection[s] with Japan...[and] in econ[omic] matters to give them nat[iona]l treatment."²⁶⁴ Allison replied that while the question of the disposition of the Ryukyus was, as pointed out by Dulles in February, "only for Allied consideration," the U.S. government "w[ou]ld be willing [to] receive" their opinions "regarding practical details."²⁶⁵ Allison added that he would be willing to receive any comments that the Japanese government had. Yoshida quickly responded that he would be able to furnish a memorandum prior to Allison's departure.²⁶⁶

The memorandum concerning this point handed to Allison on July 2 had actually been considered and prepared ahead of time. Nishimura explained that when Yoshida was returning from his trip to western Japan on the evening of June 27, Vice Minister Iguchi joined the Prime Minister on the train at Atami, a well-known hot spring resort about 100 kilometers southwest of Tokyo, in order to plan with him the following day's discus-

sions with Allison.²⁶⁷ During the two-hour train ride, Yoshida told Iguchi that "he wanted to see the nationality of Japanese in the trusteeship areas (namely, the Nansei and Nampo Islands) be kept the way it is (e.g., that they be allowed to retain Japanese citizenship)" and told Iguchi to prepare a memorandum to pass to Allison. Iguchi, Nishimura, and their staff immediately went to work revising an earlier memorandum prepared for Dulles visit in May (but apparently not delivered) and on July 1st showed it to Yoshida, who added some minor changes to it.²⁶⁸ The contents of the Foreign Ministry's memorandum was not published in the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series and thus will be introduced here below in full.

This is not intended as a request for modification of the principles stipulated in the peace treaty. Only in the hope that those principles may be put in force as smoothly as possible for desiderate of the Japanese government are submitted hereinunder for the consideration of the American government. The Nansei Archipelago, the Bonins and other islands have always been Japanese territory, inseparably tied to Japan proper; and their inhabitants are Japanese, the same in every respect as those of Japan proper. These islands in this regard differ fundamentally in character from the other areas placed under trusteeship following World War II. It is therefore desired that this special nature of the islands will be born in mind, and that in establishing a trusteeship the American government will avoid incorporating in the basic instruments, including the trusteeship agreement, any provision that might preclude the realization in future of the Japanese aspirations.

(1) Status of the Inhabitants

The Japanese having their homes on these islands today number some 900,000. Practically all of them want to retain their Japanese nationality. And Japan desires to continue to treat these people as Japanese nationals. Actually, there are about 300,000 people from these islands, who reside in Japan proper; and of whom 100,000 are domiciled therein. These 300,000 people have stayed, without availing themselves of the opportunity offered them to return to their home islands following the war's end, simply because they want to remain as Japanese.

There are also some 50,000 people from these islands, who are living in third countries. They have gone out as Japanese, and a great majority of them desire to remain Japanese.

(2) Economic Relations

It is desired that the economic bonds that have subsisted hitherto between Japan proper and these islands will not be arbitrarily cut off. Accordingly, it is desired that the trade between Japan proper and these islands be allowed to go on as 'frontier trade' (*kokkyo boekiteki no mono*) free of all custom duties on either side. As far as Japan is concerned, this is the arrangement currently in force under the Law in effect as from May 1,

1951. (See Note.) It is hoped that it will be made a principle not to impose any trade restrictions, and a free movement of capital be permitted as far as possible. It is also desired that the freedom of coastal fishing and the use of coastal fishery bases be mutually recognized, as well as the freedom, in principle, of travel and movements of ships either way.

Note: Supplementary Provision No. 4 of the Law relating to Partial Revision of the Customs Tariff.

"Commodities produced in the Nansei Islands, to which a certificate of origin, as provided for by Cabinet Order, is attached, shall be exempted from import duties for the time being. In the present case, 'Nansei Islands' means the Nansei islands south of 30 degrees North Longitude, which are considered foreign territory under Article 12 of the Customs Tariff Law."

(3) Cultural Relations

At present these islands are permitted to carry on the education of children according [to] the Japanese school system and curricula with a view to enabling them to enter high schools in Japan proper. It is desired that this education policy be continued after the establishment of trusteeship, and that Japan proper and these islands be allowed to recognize mutually corresponding study courses, graduation qualifications, and public examinations of various kinds in connection with advancing to higher institutions or obtaining employment.

(4) Bonins and Iwojima Resettlement

Some 8,000 inhabitants of the Bonins and Iwojima were forced to evacuate to Japan proper during and after the war. These people have not yet been permitted to return to their home islands. In view of their ardent desire to go back to their native islands, the American government is requested to consider their resettlement at the earliest possible date.

In a telegram that evening to Washington, Allison acknowledged receipt of this two-page memorandum after his meeting with Iguchi and noted for Dulles' consideration that the Japanese government "request us to consider [it] but which is stated specifically is 'not intended as a request nor modification of the principles stipulated in the peace treaty'."²⁶⁹ Yoshida, Nishimura, and Iguchi understood probably more than anyone that forcing their views on Dulles, particularly on the question of territories, would not be wise and might endanger the process of consensus for recognition of Japan's sovereignty that Dulles was trying to build back in Washington.

The Dulles Memorandum on "Residual Sovereignty"

When Dulles returned from his trip to Japan in mid-April, he found waiting for him comments by the JCS on the provisional treaty draft of March 12. The JCS, as we saw above, was still hesitant about accepting provisions for the disposition of the Ryukyus. As a result, the JCS responded that they "from a military point of view, must insist that the terms of a Japanese

Peace Treaty 'must secure to the United States exclusive strategic control of the Ryukyu Islands south of latitude 29° north, Marcus Island, and the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan,' as directed by the President on 8 September 1950."²⁷⁰ These views were forwarded to the State Department by General Marshall who added that the final views of the Defense Department on a peace settlement would be submitted later "when the drafting of these documents has reached the stage of completion."²⁷¹

As promised, Marshall, noting his "general concurrence," forwarded the comments of the JCS on the joint U.S.-U.K. peace treaty draft on June 28, about ten days after the JCS had received the draft treaty.²⁷² The JCS suggested two specific changes to the wording of the territorial clause that had appeared in the joint draft. The two changes are italicized below in the JCS' version:

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude, *the Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan*, the Bonin Islands including Rosario Island, the Volcano Islands, Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the making of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.²⁷³

The JCS reemphasized their strategic interests in the islands by stating that "for reasons of national security the United States must retain absolute control of the former Japanese islands...at least until favorable action is taken by the United Nations on the United States request for a strategic trusteeship." The JCS next explained their reasoning for the changes desired. Concerning the inclusion of "sole" for the administering authority, the JCS wrote argued that it was necessary that it be "made certain that no other nation will share or lawfully interfere with United States strategic control of these islands." By including "sole" in this article, the JCS not only effectively prevented other Allies from participating in the administration of the related islands, the JCS was also seeking to block Japan from being a "joint administrator" as the Japanese government had desired. The second correction that the JCS included was a particular reference to the Nanpo Shoto, which the JCS said "should be included in order to be consistent with the directive of the President of 8 September 1950." It was also in line with their long-held desire to keep strategic control of the islands, a desire which was adopted into national policy with the approval of NSC 13/3 (as discussed in the previous chapter).


At the same time the JCS finished its memorandum to Secretary Marshall, Dulles was in his office at the State Department facing the difficult task of putting to paper an interpretation of the territorial provision

that would allow Japan to keep sovereignty over the islands (if not more) while securing U.S. strategic requirements. The interpretive phrase he came up with was "residual sovereignty," a term that "was arrived at very informally" and appears not to have existed technically before in international law.²⁷⁴ Sometime on or prior to that day (June 27), Dulles, Fearey, Allison, and Babcock, were, according to Fearey, "simply having a working session in Dulles' office and he had his yellow pad out. We were talking about the problem of to how achieve what we needed militarily, security-wise without terrible political consequences and Dulles stated that we should work out a formula which would provide for residual sovereignty...Dulles was the one who originated it." Fearey added, "It appealed to us sitting there with him and it took off from there." The memorandum Dulles drafted with Fearey's help was prepared for Dulles' afternoon meeting on June 27 with Secretary Marshall, and provides an interesting insight into the thinking of this international lawyer when he was devising the "residual sovereignty" formula regarding the Ryukyu Islands by balancing the different demands placed upon him (as seen in [Figure 7-1](#) below) and thus will be introduced here."

Dulles began by stating that the United States "does not itself desire to acquire sovereignty," in line with the August 1941 Atlantic Charter policy of "no aggrandizement, territorial or other." However, Dulles explained, if Japan were made to renounce sovereignty, without a receiving country being designated, "a chaotic international situation" would be created, particularly if the United Nations did not approve any proposal for trusteeship that the U.S. proposed. Dulles explained that the result would be that one of the following four claims might be made against the United States: 1) sovereignty resides with the inhabitants who could ask, or force, with United Nations support, the United States to leave; 2) the victors in the war against Japan, including the Soviet Union, would have an inherent right to the islands if they were renounced by Japan; 3) the United Nations is entitled to handle the issue; 4) the United States has actually acquired sovereignty "by a subterfuge." As a result, Dulles argued that it was important that it be understood Japan was to keep sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands. In order to convince the JCS that the arrangement would meet their security requirements, Dulles pointed out that the guarantee that until the United Nations took action on an American proposal for trusteeship the United States would have the right to "exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction" over the islands "complies with the provision...that the treaty 'should secure to the United States exclusive strategic control'." Dulles next notes that "exclusive strategic control is entirely compatible with residual sovereignty elsewhere" and noted that the Panama Canal Zone was an example of such, a region, incidentally that Dulles was unusually familiar with since his younger days due to his law firm's dealings there.²⁷⁷ Dulles returned next to an earlier point that if Japan were to renounce sovereignty, the "grant by Japan to the

Figure 7-1

Article 3 as a Product of Compromise:
The Numerous Pressures John Foster **Dulles** Faced in
Negotiating the Territorial Provisions
for the Nansei (Ryukyu) Islands



United States of continuing full powers over the islands might...be impaired...We would have a grantor which, itself, had no title.""" Finally, Dulles pointed out that the draft provision and interpretation has been a continuous consensus-building process and had already been explained to and agreed by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Any changes would necessarily have to be explained to the Committee and the allies and as a result of the possible delays, "the presently negotiated positions...may collapse both as regards Japan and as regards the other Allied Powers."

After explaining the contents of the memorandum later that day to Marshall, Marshall shared with him the comments of the JCS. Dulles apparently was found to be amenable to those minor changes. The following day, Marshall told Secretary Acheson that it was his "understanding, based on a conference with Mr. Dulles, that the recommendations made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been under discussion between our two Departments and will present no difficulty for incorporation into the treaty."²⁷⁹ With the exception of one more change suggested by the Japanese side, that would in fact remain the case. With Dulles having been able to secure the understanding of both the Allies and the military, he was now able to give more of his attention to Japan.

Yoshida's August Speech to the Diet on "Residual Japanese Sovereignty"

On July 9, the joint draft version of the peace treaty was officially circulated to the concerned governments, with the exception of the two Chinas (a result of political fighting on the American domestic front).²⁸⁰ Two days prior to that on July 7, the Japanese government had already received their copy, a reflection of the importance Dulles placed on gaining the understanding of Japan.²⁸¹ Iguchi and Nishimura and their staffs spent that entire Sunday working on the translation of the draft into Japanese and, following discussions of it on July 9 and a drafting of their comments, brought it on July 10 to the attention of Prime Minister Yoshida, who was vacationing in Hakone near Mt. Fuji.²⁸² With Yoshida's approval, they completed the drafting of what became the Japanese government's "Observations on the Draft of the Treaty."²⁸³ On July 12, Iguchi and Nishimura brought a copy of their "Observations" to the Diplomatic Section and passed it to Richard B. Finn, a third secretary there.²⁸⁴ In the memorandum, the Japanese government brought attention to the phrase "the Ryukyu Islands," which they felt was unclear and inaccurate, suggesting instead "the Nansei Islands," a comment that the Japanese government had earlier made in April." Upon receiving the telegram from Tokyo, Fearey spoke again with Samuel Boggs, the State Department's Special Advisor on Geography, who agreed with the Japanese government (as he had done earlier).²⁸⁶ Boggs explained that introducing the term "Nansei Shoto" would be "analogous to the 'Nanpo Shoto' in the succeeding clause, and it is consistent with Japanese usage." Boggs added that he felt that if the "Nansei

Shoto" phrase was suggested to the JCS, "they would readily agree when we explain that it means in our minds exactly the same as the present wording, and is certainly clearer to the Japanese and to many people of the general public."²⁸⁷ After discussing it with his assistants, Dulles accepted Boggs' recommendation to adopt the Japanese government's suggestion and on July 18, Dulles sent out a priority telegram to all U.S. embassies in the countries that had received copies of the July 3 draft advising them to make immediate changes to the earlier draft and to advise the respective governments.²⁸⁸ As a result, the phrase "Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands)" was substituted for the "Ryukyu Islands south of 29° north latitude," as desired by the Japanese government (since April), with this version of the territorial phrase becoming the one appearing in the "Treaty of Peace With Japan" introduced below.

In the meantime, the draft treaty had been published in the newspapers on the evening of July 10 (and officially by the Japanese government on July 13).²⁸⁹ Immediately public opinion in Japan, as well as that of the political parties, began to question the territorial provisions. Shortly after the publication of the draft treaty, the Foreign Ministry began preparing a draft of a foreign policy speech Yoshida was expected to make at the 11th Extraordinary Diet session scheduled to begin August 16 (and run for three days).²⁹⁰

Sebald and Dulles grew to be increasingly concerned about the wavering support of the political parties for the treaty. Dulles and Sebald both called for non-partisanship and the creation of a truly representative delegation to the signing to ensure that the treaty would be ratified. (Sebald confided to his diary that "These politicians are like a bunch of children and are playing politics with the treaty."²⁹¹) They viewed in particular with concern the Japanese unhappiness with the territorial provisions.

On August 2, Dulles sent a "priority and confidential" telegram to Sebald for him to explain to the Japanese government that flexible arrangements and interpretations were possible regarding the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, writing that "the [territorial] provisions...were accepted when Jap[an] accepted the surrender terms and except for Ryukyu and Bonin situation [they] are beyond [the] realm of practical discussion."²⁹² Dulles also explained to Sebald that regarding the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the draft "treaty grants Yoshida[s] plea to me that Jap[anese] sovereignty should not be renounced." Moreover, Dulles added, the question of the final arrangements for the islands would be for later consideration by the United States based on a study of the islands and administration, likely to be conducted between the signing of the peace treaty and ratification. Sebald called Iguchi in to his office on the morning of August 4 after receiving Dulles' telegram.²⁹³ Sebald relayed Dulles' message that indeed "Yoshida's pleas had been heard" and thus Japan "would not have to renounce sovereignty

over Okinawa.""" Sebald at the same time expressed his and Dulles' concerns about the fact that voices of opposition were still being heard and "stressed the need for Japanese solidarity."²⁹⁵

Having heard Dulles' comments in his telegram, as well as in light of the fact that the final version of the treaty draft was to be announced shortly, officials in the Foreign Ministry decided to draft a second version of Yoshida's Diet speech and include in it some reference to the disposition of the Nansei Islands because the government position was still being attacked with regard to the territorial question (as well as other points).²⁹⁶ In order to calm the fears (and anger) that Okinawa would be stripped from Japan, Yoshida and his advisors wondered if Dulles would allow him to state directly in his address the fact that Japan would not be surrendering sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands."" After discussing the draft of the Diet speech with Yoshida on August 7, Foreign Ministry officials translated and submitted it to Finn on August 8.²⁹⁸ The draft took the following form:

In Chapter II there are provisions concerning the disposition of certain territories. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that, while Japan is to renounce all right, title and claim to the territories listed in Article 2, it is not specifically so stated in Article 3 which provides for the disposition of the Nansei Islands and other southern islands. This difference in wording between Article 2 and Article 3 is deemed not without significance. It leaves room for us to hope that some practicable arrangements might be worked out to meet the desires of the inhabitants of these islands.

(or).. to hope that these islands might continue to be treated as if they remained under the sovereignty of Japan and some practicable arrangements might be worked out to meet the desires of the inhabitants of these islands concerning intercourse with the homeland of Japan and these islands, nationality status of inhabitants and other matters.

Sebald immediately notified Dulles about the Foreign Ministry's request. On the afternoon of August 10, having received Dulles' reply, Sebald handed Iguchi his copy of the draft back with Dulles' comments added to it: "The wording of Article 3 is deemed not without significance in that residual Japanese sovereignty remains."²⁹⁹ (The final text version of Yoshida's speech is found below which incorporated Dulles' comments.) Yoshida was thus free to explain this interpretation to his compatriots later the following week, with hope held by both Yoshida and Dulles, as well as their diplomatic colleagues, that Japanese public opinion and the political parties would accept it.

On August 16, the same day that the final text of the proposed peace treaty was released by its joint sponsors, the United States and the United Kingdom, Yoshida addressed the 11th Extraordinary Diet session to explain the treaty, the process of negotiations, and the government's views.

In his address, Yoshida stated that the Allies were not seeking a punitive peace and thus Japan found it both fair and generous. Yoshida went on to explain the territorial provision in the following manner incorporating Dulles' comments.

In Chapter II there are provisions concerning the disposition of certain territories. In this connection we must bear in mind that Japan unconditionally accepted the surrender terms which provided that Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the four main islands 'and such minor islands as we determine'. There is, therefore, no room for Japan to seek a change in these terms. However, I would like to draw your attention to the fact that, while Japan is to renounce all right, title and claim to the territories listed in Article 2, it is not specifically so stated in Article 3 which provides for the disposition of the Nansei Islands and other southern islands. This wording of Article 3 is deemed not without significance in that residual Japanese sovereignty remains. The flexible provisions of Article 3 leave room for us to hope that subject to strategic control by the United States in the interest of international peace and security some practicable arrangements might be worked out to meet the desires of the inhabitants of these islands concerning intercourse with the homeland of Japan, nationality status of inhabitants and other matters.³⁰⁰

Despite the explanation in the speech however, public opinion and the attitudes of the political parties were still strongly against the territorial provisions, to Yoshida's (and more so, Dulles') consternation. Washington continued to receive petitions from residents in the Ryukyu and Ainami Islands, as well as in Japan proper, to allow the islands to be not only nominally a part of Japan, but actually as well. In one instance, 139,348 people in the Ainami Islands signed a petition requesting that their islands "be returned to Japan."³⁰¹ Shortly after that on the eve of the Peace Treaty Conference in San Francisco, hunger strikes in the Ainami Islands began, to protest the fact that those islands, as well as the remainder of the Nansei Islands, were not included under Japan's administrative control.

XIII. THE PEACE TREATY CONFERENCE, DULLES' FORMAL RECOGNITION OF "RESIDUAL SOVEREIGNTY," AND YOSHIDA'S ACCEPTANCE SPEECH

With the six-member delegation (and five alternates) to be headed by the Prime Minister finally chosen, Yoshida and his group departed on the last day of August from Haneda Airport for San Francisco, which had been chosen on July 6 as the site of the peace treaty conference.³⁰² Shortly after Yoshida's arrival in San Francisco on September 2, Yoshida paid a courtesy call on Secretary Acheson, who was chairman of the 10-person U.S. delegation and who was to act as the President of the Conference, and Dulles.³⁰³

Yoshida expressed his gratitude for the treaty and conference and spoke on some of the issues of the treaty, including the question of reparations.

Early in their conversation Dulles, bothered by news of the hunger strike and public unhappiness with the disposition of the Nansei Islands, brought up the problem of public acceptance of the territorial provisions with Yoshida.³⁰⁴ According to Nishimura's account of the conversation, Dulles stated that "with the peace conference approaching, the one thing he regretted was the attitude of the Japanese people.""" Dulles, whose delegation had been bombarded with last-minute petitions, "felt that it was shocking (*shingai*) that there is a hunger strike when it has already been said that the islands would be considered as a part of Japanese territory. America is to administer the Nansei Islands because of their strategic necessity—they are not to become our territory. It is exactly as I have often told you" he explained to Yoshida.³⁰⁶ Dulles then gave some hints about the future as well. "It is clear," he continued,

that not only sovereignty will be left with Japan but other arrangements as well [can be worked out]. We want to think more about how it will be possible to realize the desires and requests you have made concerning allowing the inhabitants to keep their Japanese nationality. The demonstrative movements (*jii undo*) like the hunger strike puts the United States in a very difficult position. America is not going to take your wealth. The United States did not place any restrictions on Japan's maritime transportation or other economic relations [with the islands]. "-

Dulles ended with a plea, and a warning about the future of U.S.-Japan relations. "The United States," he said, "has taken into considerations many other things on behalf of Japan. The American people will not accept nor understand the demonstrations by the Japanese people. We hope for some self-restraint by the Japanese now." Yoshida explained that he felt that the Diet members had understood and accepted the provisions of the treaty."" Interestingly, not only the Japanese people as a whole, but one of Yoshida's own advisors, would have to be told to exercise restraint on the matter as described below.

In the meantime, the conference opened on the evening of September 4 at the Opera House with a speech by President Truman in which he called for the participants to "be free of malice and hate, to the end that from here on there shall be neither victors nor vanquished, but only equals in the partnership of peace."³⁰⁹ The following day on September 5 the main work of the gathering began with the approval of the Rules of Approval, remarks by Acheson, and an explanation of the treaty by Dulles. It is here, in these explanatory remarks, that Dulles first publicly uses the words "residual sovereignty" in interpreting the territorial clause (Article 3) on the Ryukyu Islands. ([Map 2-1](#) provides a look at the territorial disposition of Japan in the peace treaty.)

Dulles began his late morning explanation by describing that the treaty with Japan was meant to be "a step toward breaking the vicious cycle of war—victory—peace—war. The nations will here make a peace of justice, not a peace of vengeance." Clearly Dulles, in saying these words, was reflecting the feelings of many of the more enlightened participants at the treaty conference who remembered the costs of the peace lost at the conference in Paris 30 years before. It was in this way that Dulles explained Article 3, stating that "Several of the Allied Powers urged that the treaty should require Japan to renounce its sovereignty of these islands in favor of United States sovereignty." Others, Dulles noted, had suggested that the Ryukyu Islands should be returned to Japan. "In the face of this division of Allied opinion," Dulles continued, "the United States felt that the best formula would be to permit Japan to retain residual sovereignty, while making it possible for these islands to be brought into the U.N. trusteeship system, with the United States as administering authority." Although Dulles himself was perhaps no longer seriously entertaining the option, he explained that Article 77 of the Charter of the United Nations allowed for the extension of trusteeship to "territories which may be detached from enemy states as a result of the Second World War." Continuing, he stated that "the future trusteeship agreement will, no doubt, determine the future civil status of the inhabitants in relation to Japan while affording the administering authority the possibility of carrying out Article 84 of the Charter" of the United Nations which states that "It shall be the duty of the administering authority to ensure that the trust territory shall play its part in the maintenance of international peace and security."

The briefing materials provided to the U.S. delegation go a little further in illuminating American thinking on the question of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. The briefing paper explains that the treaty requires Japan to concur in the proposal to place the islands under a U.S. trusteeship, but does not require it to renounce sovereignty over the islands, "thereby preserving a desirable degree of flexibility in the arrangement."³¹¹ Concerning the trusteeship, the paper states that "it is anticipated that the terms of the trusteeship when eventually worked out and submitted to the United Nations for approval would permit continued close economic and other interrelationships between the island populations and Japan, thereby rendering the arrangement more acceptable to those populations and to Japan." This was to be in "sharp contrast," the paper pointed out, to the Soviet Union's proposals for the Kuriles and other islands held through the "complete extinguishment of Japan's sovereignty and without acceptance of the applicability of Article 77 of the [UN] Charter."

Because Dulles' explanation recognized sovereignty for the time being but not did clearly define in what ways or when Japan would exercise its administrative rights, Yoshida's outspoken confidante Shirasu was greatly disappointed.³¹² Following Dulles' speech later that same day, Yoshida

asked Shirasu if he had seen the copy of Yoshida's speech and when Shirasu said that he had not, Yoshida told him to look it over.³¹³ When Shirasu read it, he found that it did not state strongly enough the desire of Japan for the islands to be returned and thus argued that there should be "a call for the return of Okinawa (*Okinawn kaese*)" in the speech and told the Foreign Ministry officials that Yoshida should include it in his acceptance speech."³¹⁴ Shirasu had the translator, Obata Kunryo, rewrite the draft putting more emphasis in the Japanese version.³¹⁵ Nishimura and others from the Foreign Ministry resisted the suggestion but it seems that Yoshida accepted Shirasu's advice on territorial issues, albeit in a more moderate form.³¹⁶

Shirasu it turns out was not the only one who had problems with Yoshida's speech. Sebald found the English translation "very poor" when it was brought to him by Yoshida's secretary Matsui Akira on the morning of September 7—the same day Yoshida was expected to deliver his speech."³¹⁷ Sebald also found that the "portions of it would unwittingly have undone much of the good will which had already been engendered by the conference, especially among some of the Asian countries."³¹⁸ Sebald consulted Dulles and Acheson who "decided something had to be done about it."³¹⁹ Sebald, Dulles, and several of their colleagues worked on the speech and gave it to Matsui in the afternoon and suggested to him that Yoshida make his address not in English but in Japanese."³²⁰ Yoshida and the Japanese delegation approved the draft and had it translated into Japanese just in time for his acceptance speech at 8:00 p.m. Shimanouchi, the Japanese Delegation's interpreter, read the English version to "resounding applause."³²¹

Regarding the territorial issue, Yoshida told the audience gathered at the Opera House that:

During these past few days in this very conference hall criticisms and complaints have been voiced by some delegations against this treaty. It is impossible that anyone can be completely satisfied with a multi-lateral peace settlement of this kind. Even we Japanese, who are happy to accept the treat!; find in it certain points which cause us pain and anxiety. I speak of this with diffidence, bearing in mind the treaty's fairness and magnanimity unparalleled in history and the position of Japan. But I would be remiss in my obligation to my own people if I failed to call your attention to these points. In the first place, there is the matter of territorial disposition. As regards the Ryukyu archipelago and the Bonins which may be placed under United Nations trusteeship, I welcome in the name of the Japanese nation the statements by the American and British delegates on the residual sovereignty over the islands south of the 29th Degree, North Longitude [sic]. I cannot but hope that the administration of these islands will be put back into Japanese hands in the not distant future with the reestablishment of world security—especially the security of Asia.³²²

Following Yoshida's acceptance speech, the delegates gathered the following morning to begin signing the treaty of peace. Eventually of the 52 states in attendance, 49 signed the treaty; only the Soviet Union, Poland, and Czechoslovakia refused; India and the "two Chinas" did not attend. The final version of Article 3, relating to the territorial provisions regarding Okinawa, took the following form:

Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto south of 29° north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands), Nanpo Shoto south of Sofu Gan (including the Bonin Islands, Rosario Island and the Volcano Islands) and Parece Vela and Marcus Island. Pending the malting of such a proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration, legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of these islands, including their territorial waters.

It was in this way that Okinawa would continue to remain under U.S. administration for the next 21 years.

Despite the long time that elapsed before the United States returned Okinawa (at the risk of dangerously weakening U.S.-Japan relations), it is probably necessary to appraise Article 3, whose interpretation allowed Japan to keep sovereignty over the islands, favorably in light of the extremely difficult pressures Dulles was facing in negotiating the Treaty of Peace against a former enemy, within the U.S. government and between the Allies. The debate shown in this chapter, indeed throughout this entire study, is the desire of the State Department to allow Japan to retain Okinawa was strong and thus the "residual sovereignty" formula was not something simple to "mollify the Japanese and certain critics elsewhere," as some have written, but rather an extension of this desire of the State Department to prevent both the loss of Okinawa and the U.S. practicing of "territorial aggrandizement."³²³ If Dulles, in conjunction with his State Department colleagues, had not been able to secure Japanese sovereignty over the Ryukyu Islands as seen in the interpretation of Article 3, the islands were sure to have been separated permanently by the trusteeship arrangement (or annexation) that the U.S. military had been demanding for more than five years. Okinawa could have been occupied longer, or may still be, had a formula, however imperfect, such as "residual sovereignty" not been worked out by Dulles and his State Department colleagues and assistants. It was not the ideal, or "the perfect," by any means; but it did prevent the "worst" from happening—Okinawa's complete and permanent separation from Japan.

In addition to these pressures, Dulles was faced with the voices of the military, MacArthur, and the Allies demanding a strict peace vis-a-vis Japan

that sought to strip Japan of Okinawa. Dulles was forced to take these views into consideration as well. Likewise, Dulles had to keep an eye on those nominal Allies who sought to embarrass the United States over the territorial provisions of the treaty. It was indeed all of these pressures on Dulles which brought about his formula for Article 3. While not perfect, it was the best to be hoped for at the time because it left room for the State Department to seek an arrangement less offensive to the Japanese.

In this, the role of the Japanese government, particularly Yoshida Shigeru, a stubborn, determined, and skilled negotiator and his close associates can not be overlooked. Had he and his government not continuously and earnestly sought the return of the Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands, making numerous appeals and preparing several memorandum on the matter over the years, Dulles and the State Department, despite their wishes to the contrary, were sure to have been put under unbearable pressure by the JCS to actually place the islands under some sort of trusteeship arrangement. It was therefore, the Japanese government's efforts, despite the fact that Japan was still technically a defeated, enemy nation having in actuality no diplomatic rights, which, along with strong voices in the Far Eastern Bureau of State and in the Diplomatic Section of SCAP, and public opinion in Japan and Okinawa, which kept the pressure on an already sympathetic Dulles to work out a compromise and create the window of opportunity that "residual sovereignty" and "practicable arrangements" offered.

Before the peace treaty would go into effect, the State Department would make one last effort to work out an arrangement which while securing base rights would allow Japan to keep not only "residual sovereignty" over the islands, but administrative rights as well. However as the title of the next chapter suggests, it would prove to be an "elusive search," to the disappointment of the Japanese, Okinawans, and the State Department alike. It is to that search to which we turn next.

NOTES

1. Allison, *op. cit.*, 168. Allison, later Ambassador to Japan from 1953 to 1957, writes, "We all had our own ideas of how [the draft of the peace treaty] could have been improved, but we all agreed it was a good treaty if not perfect. One of Dulles's favorite axioms was 'The perfect is the enemy of the good.' The Japanese Peace Treaty was an example. If we had waited to get a perfect treat; we would have never had a treaty, and so we were content with a good one."

2. "Memorandum on Initial Report of Impressions Gathered on My Brief Visit to Japan (February 18, 1949)," *FRUS*, 1949, Vol. 7, 662.

3. *Ibid.*, 660. While it was described as a "smashing conservative victory" by the Acting Political Advisor in Japan, William J. Sebald, the Communist Party made large gains, from 4 seats to 35. "The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State (January 26, 1949)," *Ibid.*, 629. This dramatic increase in representation so alarmed Washington that W. Walton Butterworth warned his

superiors that "the Communist threat in Japan is a real one." See "Memorandum on Situation in Japan and Japan Policy Problems by the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs (Butterworth) to the Under Secretary of State Webb (May 19, 1949)," *Ibid*, 752.

4. "The Acting Political Adviser in Japan (Sebald) to the Secretary of State (February 12, 1949)," *FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7*, 648-649. Sebald noted in the same secret airgram that "from personal knowledge" he knew MacArthur was not in agreement with the comments attributed to Royall: "he feels strongly that the Pacific island chain from Kamchatka southward, to and including the Philippines, must by all means be held as the westernmost line of defense of the United States. He feels that any breach of this island harrier by a hostile power would result in the front line of United States defense being swept back to our west coast." Sebald did not mention Okinawa here but that omission probably was made because MacArthur's high assessment of the strategic importance of Okinawa was already well known. On March 1 for example, MacArthur explained in an interview his own views of the U.S. line of defense: "It starts from the Philippines and continues through the Ryukyu Archipelago, which includes its main bastion, Okinawa. Then it bends back through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska." See "MacArthur Pledges Defense of Japan," *New York Times*, March 2, 1949.

5. "The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices (February 19, 1949)," *FRUS 1949, Vol. 7*, 664.

6. For the Mississippi speech, see Acheson, *op. cit.*, 227-230.

7. "Request for Current Strategic Evaluation of U.S. Security Needs in Japan (May 19, 1949)" ; "Letter from Acting Secretary of State to Secretary of Defense Johnson, (May 23, 1949)," Folder: NSC 49, 1949, Eox 2, Miscellaneous Records Relating to Japan and Korea, 1945-1953, Roll 7, Microfilm C0044, RG 59.

8. "Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (June 9, 1949)," *FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7*, 774. General Omar N. Bradley, the first Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (from 1949 to 1953), discusses this study and the difference of opinion with the State Department in his memoirs. See Omar N. Bradley and Clay Blair, *A General's Life: An Autobiography* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), 525-526.

9. "Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (June 9, 1949)."

10. "The Secretary of State to General of the Army MacArthur (September 9, 1949)," *Ibid.*, 852.

11. Kennan and the PPS began their review of NSC 49 on June 28 (1949). Kennan argued that the JCS' proposal to retain forces in Japan after a peace treaty "would run counter to the objective of assuring Japan's political stability." At the same time, Kennan also agreed that Allied forces should not be withdrawn from Japan until political stability and adequate internal defense was assured. Kennan thus initially reaffirmed his belief that negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty should be postponed until Japan was internally strong and stable enough. See Kennan's Draft Paper, June 28, 1949, Box 33, PPS Records, cited in Miscamble, *op. cit.*, 271. How Kennan came around in the summer to accept the view that a peace treaty was now necessary remains unclear. Heer notes Kennan himself was not able

to recall what had brought about the decision to seek a peace treaty. Heer cites Kennan's diary (as found in his memoirs) entry after attending a meeting of the Far Eastern "Consultants"(see below) in which Kennan wrote "It is ironic that our principal reason for wanting a treaty of peace [with Japan] at this time is that it appears to be the only way of solving internal administrative difficulties within our own government." Kennan goes on to write that his diary entry probably "strongly impl[ied] that the renewal of the quest for a peace treaty was forced upon us not by the needs of the objective situation we had before us but rather by the inability of our government to use the cumbersome occupational machinery, with its heavy involvement of the military side of the Washington bureaucracy, as an effective instrument of policy." See Kennan (1967), *op. cit.*, 394-395. Also see Heel; *op. cit.*, 201-202.

12. "Department of State Comments on NSC 49 (June 15, 1949), September 30, 1949," FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7, 870-873. State argued that "From the political point of view, the achievement of our objectives with respect to Japan are now less likely to be thwarted by proceeding promptly to a peace treaty than by continuance of the occupation regime, provided that essential U.S. military needs in Japan are assured in the treaty or other concurrent arrangements." It also cautioned the Defense Department that the "orientation of any people toward a foreign country is a subjective political-psychological condition. It is the product of domestic political, economic and social factors, together with the nature and quality of a nation's relations with foreign countries. This being the case, the U.S. can neither impose nor enforce a pro-western orientation on any foreign people, including the Japanese."

13. "Memorandum of Conversation by Marshall Green of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs (September 9, 1949)," *Ibid.*, 853-854.

14. "Memorandum of Conversation with Bevin on the Far East by the Secretary of State (September 13, 1949)," *Ibid.*, 858-859.

15. "Memorandum of Discussion with the President by the Secretary of State (September 16, 1949)," *Ibid.*, 860.

16. Letter cited in footnote 3, *Ibid.*

17. Dunn, *op. cit.*, 83-86; "Memorandum with Attached Treaty Draft by Fearey to Allison (October 14, 1949)," Central Decimal File, 1945-1949 (740.0011 PW PEACE/10-1449), RG 59.

18. "Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense Johnson (December 22, 1949)," FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7, 922-923. While not so shown in FRUS, this document was designated as NSC 60 on December 27, 1949. See also Box 29a, PPS Records, RG 59.

19. "Memorandum of Conversation, by Ambassador Maxwell M. Hamilton of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (December 24, 1949)," FRUS, 1949, Vol. 7, 924-926. Acheson had organized on July 18, 1949 a group of Far Eastern Consultants, comprised of his close friend Philip C. Jessup and two non-State people, Everett Case, president of Colgate University (from 1942-1962), and Raymond Fosdick, former president (1936-1948) of the Rockefeller Foundation, to devise an overall U.S. policy for Asia (in competition with the Defense Department). They

completed their report, "Outline of Far Eastern and Asian Policy for Review with the President," on November 14, and forwarded their conclusions to Acheson on November 16. Regarding Japan, the report recommended taking "rapid steps towards a peace treaty," but at the same time, warning that a treaty with Japan should not prevent the retention of U.S. military bases under a bilateral agreement. See "Memorandum by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State (November 16, 1949)," *Ibid.* 1209-1214.

20. "Informal Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Franks), December 24, 1949," *Ibid.*, 927-928. Acheson stated in the same memo that "neutrality (for Japan) is illusory in the context of East-West tensions," thus dismissing both MacArthur and Kennan's ideas.

21. "Memorandum by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Rusk), January 24, 1950," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6, East Asia and the Pacific* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), 1131.

22. "Memorandum of Conversation with MacArthur by the Ambassador at Large Jessup (January 9, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1109-1110.

23. "Memorandum on a Japanese Peace and Security Settlement by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Eutterworth (March 9, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1138-1149.

24. "Memorandum on Vorhees Suggested Approach to Japanese Peace Treaty Problem by the Special Assistant to the Secretary (Howard) to the Ambassador at Large Jessup (March 24, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1150-1153.

25. "Memorandum of Conversation on Japanese Peace Treaty by the Special Assistant to the Secretary J.E. Howard (April 24, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1175-1176.

26. *Ibid.* Acheson later described this meeting as "not entirely a failure" but one nonetheless "taken up by dreary repetition" of the military's opposition to a peace treaty. See Acheson, *op. cit.*, 430-431.

27. There are numerous studies on Dulles. See for example, John Robinson Eal, *John Foster Dztiles, 1888-1959* (New York: Harper and Erothers Publishers, 1959); Townsend Hoopes, *The Devil and John Foster Dulles: The Diplomacy of the Eisenhower Era* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1973); Ronald W. Pruessen, *John Foster Dztiles: The Road to Power* (New York: The Free Press, 1982); and Richard H. Immerman, ed., *John Foster Dztiles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).

28. Acheson, *op. cit.*, 354.

29. Pruessen, *op. cit.*, 435-436. In April 1950, as Dulles was assuming his position as Consultant, his book *War or Peace* was published. In it he argued, "Little can be accomplished without bipartisanship with respect to Far Eastern policies. So far there has been none, and none has been sought. The Administration has kept its own counsel as regards this part of the world, and although the Japanese surrendered in 1945 the public still has no inkling as to what may be contemplated with respect to a Japanese peace treaty." John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York: Macmillan, 1950), 232.

30. As Assistant Secretary; Eutterworth had been under attack by critics of the Truman Administration's China policy. To protect Butterworth's career,

Acheson had him appointed as Ambassador to Sweden. Rusk, who had experience during World War II on General Joseph Stilwell's staff in the China-Eurina-India theater, offered to take Eutterworth's place, which would amount to a "voluntary demotion" since Rusk was at the time Deputy Under Secretary. For a discussion of this personnel change, see Acheson, *op. cit.*, 431-432 and Rusk, *op. cit.*, 138-139.

31. "(Dulles Oral History) Transcript of W. Walton Butterworth," The John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, 5-8. Schoenbaum in his study of Rusk notes Rusk's influence in getting Dulles appointed. See Schoenbaum, *op. cit.*, 199-200. Rusk, likewise, claims that it was at his strong urging that Dulles he brought in as a "special adviser to help build a bipartisan Asian policy." See Rusk, *op. cit.*, 139 A Dulles biographer, Ronald W. Pruessen, suggests that it was more Dulles' own desire and legwork, including meetings with Acheson and Rusk and calls for more bipartisanship, that got him "hack into active and important cooperation with the State Department." See Pruessen, *op. cit.*, 434-436. Perhaps all are correct.

32. Pruessen, *op. cit.*, 436-437.

33. Eal, *op. cit.*, 116. Some forty years later, Robert A. Fearey, who worked directly under Dulles on the peace treaty, had this to tell: "Mr. Dulles was ideally equipped for the treaty task. He had legal experience, international experience, (and) had been at Versailles. (He was) not a Far East expert, but he knew quite a lot about the Far East. A Republican working in a Democratic Administration, he was the ideal person to bring Republican as well as Democratic Senators and Congressmen along on the Treaty." Robert A. Fearey, "Remarks at Dulles Memorial Conference, February 26, 1988," Personal papers of Robert A. Fearey (courtesy of Fearey) in the possession of the author.

34. Eutterworth himself had just recently attended a meeting at the State Department in late March where Ambassador-at-Large Dr. Philip C. Jessup, Policy Information Officer, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs gave an oral presentation on his three-month, 14-nation fact-finding tour of Asia. Of note, Jessup visited Okinawa with POLAD William J. Sebald in mid-January following his trip to Korea. In his report, Jessup stressed that "our forces in Japan and Okinawa...are...assets in the area." See "Oral Report by Ambassador-at-Large Philip C. Jessup Upon his Return from the East," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 72; Sebald's diary from this time confirms this view, adding "Much has been done (to improve Okinawa) since I was last there (in 1947) and a new air of optimism and interest is prevalent." See entry for January 14, 1950, *Siebold Diaries*.

35. "Transcript of W. Walton Eutterworth," 10; "Memorandum of Conversation on Japanese Peace Settlement, April 7, 1950," Box 29a, PPS Papers, RG 59. Also see *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1162-1163.

36. Earlier that month, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru had sent Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato to consult with U.S. officials on Occupation financial policy. Ikeda had also been given a second secret mission—to relay an offer by the Japanese government for U.S. forces to use bases in Japan following the peace treaty (see discussion below). For a detailed study on this mission, see Robert D. Eldridge and Ayako Kusunoki, "To Ease or Not to Ease? Yoshida Shigeru, the 1950

Ikeda Mission, and Post-Treaty Japanese Security Conceptions," *Kobe University Law Review*, No. 33 (1999), 97-126.

37. "Memorandum of Conversation on Japanese Peace Settlement, April 7, 1950." Dulles's use above of the words "Japan proper" instead of "Japan" is illustrative of the government's views on the separation of Okinawa from Japan. In other words, here "Japan proper" was certainly used to mean the four main islands of Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and Hokkaido, while "Okinawa," under U.S. military government, was used for the Ryukyu Islands south of 29 degrees North Latitude, although the territory under occupation actually included up to 30 degrees North Latitude.

38. Dunn, *op. cit.*, 98; Acheson, *op. cit.*, 432.

39. Acheson, *op. cit.*, 432. Acheson found out about Secretary of Defense Johnson's planned trip to Japan with the JCS Chairman General Eradley during the April 24 meeting at the State Department. Acheson notes in his memoirs that by sending Dulles and Allison to Japan, he wanted to warn the JCS and Johnson that "discussion of a peace treaty was no longer 'premature'."

40. "Memorandum by Hemmendinger on the Ryukyu Islands (May 16-22, 1950)," in Roll 5, Microfilm C0044, ONA Records, RG 59.

41. On Johnson's early Foreign Service experiences, and his time in Japan in the late 1940s, see U. Alexis Johnson with Jef Olivarius McAllister, *The Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an American Diplomat* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984), particularly 82-90.

42. "Oral History Interview with U. Alexis Johnson," June 19, 1975, Truman Library, 22-23; "The Reminiscences of Douglas W. Overton," October 18, 1960, New York, Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, New York, New York. Johnson's early experience with Okinawa were influential throughout the 1950s and 1960s regarding his thinking on Okinawa's reversion to Japan.

43. Specifically, the paper notes, the Department of Defense had stated that the group of islands south of 29 degrees North Latitude were required for strategic reasons. Although "it may be that this position has (already)foreclosed the question, but if not," the paper suggests, "there would be political advantage to allowing the northern group of islands, which were formerly administered under Kagoshima Prefecture and are more Japanese in sentiment than the others, to remain Japanese."

44. Allison, *op. cit.*, 145-146.

45. *Ibid.*, 146.

46. "Chronology of Events Concerning Public Opinion and Congress," Dulles Materials, Folder: United States Policy Regarding Japanese Peace Treaty, Eox 4, Records Relating to Japanese Peace Treaty and Japanese Security Treaty, Eureau of Public Affairs, RG 59.

47. Feare; *op. cit.* "Dulles was fond of saying later on," Fearey explained, "that almost every nation represented at San Francisco could point to some provision of the treaty for which it was responsible, or to which it had contributed."

48. "Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles) to the Secretary of State (June 6, 1950)," *FRUS*, 1950, Vol. 6, 1207-1212.

49. Dulles and his group arrived in Japan on the morning of June 17, hut continued on to Korea after a two-hour stopover at Haneda Airport near Tokyo. They were set to begin their Japan visit on June 21, staying in Tokyo and Kyoto until June 27. Meanwhile, Secretary Johnson, General Bradley, and their staffs arrived later on the 17th and stayed until the 23rd.

50. "Memorandum by Dulles to Acheson (June 15, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1222-1223. In the April 24 meeting between State and Defense, Eutterworth had tried to pin down exactly this point of Okinawa as an offensive base. In response to his inquiry "whether bases in Japan were desired for Far Eastern defensive purposes or for the purpose of offensive operations against the Soviets in the event war should break out in Europe," Admiral Sherman stated that "just as he could not separate Okinawa from Japan in their relation to the U.S. power position in the Far East, similarly he could not separate the U.S. position in Japan from possible hostilities in Europe...hostilities in one area could not be separated from hostilities in the other, nor could the defensive and offensive aspects of military operations be easily separated." See "Memorandum of Conversation on Japanese Peace Treaty by the Special Assistant to the Secretary J. B. Howard (April 24, 1950)," *op. cit.*

51. "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large Jessup (January 9, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1109-1114; "The Ambassador at Large (Jessup) to the Secretary of State (Acheson), January 10, 1950," *Ibid.*, 1114-1116. This comment was repeated again the following week, January 15, when Sebald and Jessup reported on their trip to Korea and Okinawa to MacArthur. See Diary entry for January 15, 1950, *Sebald Diaries*. Also see Sebald, *op. cit.*, 248.

52. Diary entry for June 15, 1950, *Sebald Diaries*.

53. Diary entry for June 17, 1950, *Ibid.*; Sebald, *op. cit.*, 250-252.

54. Sebald, *op. cit.*, 250.

55. *Ibid.*, 252-253.

56. *Ibid.*, 253; "The Reminiscences of William J. Sebald," Interview No. 8, 602-603, Special Collections Division, Nimitz Library.

57. Diary entry for June 18, *Sebald Diaries*.

58. "Memorandum by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on the Peace Treaty Problem (June 14, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1213-1221; "Memorandum on Formosa, by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (June 14, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, Korea* (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1976), 161-165. The memorandum on Formosa described its strategic importance in relation to Japan, Okinawa, the Philippines—in essence, the entire offshore island chain.

59. "Memorandum by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers."

60. "Easis for Discussion by the Secretary of State With the Foreign Ministers of the United Kingdom and Possibly France Concerning a Peace Treaty With Japan (May 5, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1189-1191.

61. "Memorandum by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on the Peace Treaty Problem (June 14, 1950)."

62. "The Acting Political Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State (May 25, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1205-1207; Diary entry for May 24, 1950, *Sebald Diaries*.

63. "The Acting Political Adviser to the Assistant Secretary of State (May 25, 1950)," *op. cit.*, 1206.

64. None of the related scholarship discussing this meeting makes clear when MacArthur's memorandum was actually handed to the Secretary of Defense. It will thus be assumed here that the memorandum was given to Johnson on June 18.

65. Sehdal, *op. cit.*, 253.

66. "Memorandum by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on the Peace Treaty Problem (June 14, 1950)."

67. Diary entry for June 21, *Sehdal Diaries*.

68. Diary entry for June 22, *Ibid.*; "Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (June 30, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6, 1229-1230*.

69. Johnson later told Dulles on the telephone that MacArthur's views had changed "as a result of the talks that he and Bradley had had with him." See "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation on Japanese Peace Treaty with Johnson by Dulles (August 3, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1264.

70. "Memorandum by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on Concept Governing Security in Post-War Japan (June 23, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6, 1227-1228*. The date of the memorandum here is sometimes assumed in related scholarship to have been that of the meeting, perhaps because Dulles' memorandum does not make it clear. See for example Seigen Miyasato, "John Foster Dulles and the Peace Settlement with Japan," in Immerman, *op. cit.*, 198. However, Sehdal's diary does not note any meeting between Dulles and MacArthur as having taken place on June 23. Richard B. Finn, a young Foreign Service Officer working under Sehdal who later became an historian, believes that the memorandum was taken up at "their second meeting" on June 26. See Finn, *op. cit.*, 255. We do know however from Sehdal's diary that overall, Dulles appears to have met MacArthur seven times during his one-week stay in Japan and thus his meeting with MacArthur on June 26 was his next to last meeting, not his second. Taking place after the start of hostilities, the meeting on June 26 likely was spent on discussions concerning the situation in Korea rather than primarily on MacArthur's follow-up memorandum. Sehdal records that Dulles meeting alone with MacArthur on June 24 prior to his departure for a sightseeing trip to Kyoto with Mrs. Dulles, secretary Doyle, and Dr. Charles Nelson Spinks, a 44-year-old Foreign Service Officer (recently appointed) with extensive prewar academic experience in Japan and attached to GHQ since 1946 and POLXD since 1948. The author believes that June 24 thus was the likely date that MacArthur's memorandum was discussed in detail, although any discussions of it after the start of hostilities obviously added a new dimension to it. Diary entry for June 24, 1950, *Sehdal Diaries*.

71. "Memorandum by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on Concept Governing Security in Post-War Japan (June 23, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6, 1227*. Johnson, in the telephone conversation with Dulles cited above, explained that "MacArthur had reversed his position." See "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation on Japanese Peace Treaty with Johnson," *op. cit.*, 1264.

72. "Memorandum by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on Concept Governing Security in Post-War Japan (June 23, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1227-1228.

73. *Ibid.*, 1228. MacArthur expanded on the point of Japanese security by writing, "In any study of the Japanese problem, it must be understood that despite Japan's constitutional renunciation of war its right to self defense in case of predatory attack is implicit and inalienable. In such a situation Japan would muster all of its available human and material sources in support of the security forces committed to its defense."

74. MacArthur's "conversion" to accepting the idea of U.S. bases in Japan after a peace treaty is all the more dramatic considering that as early as two months prior to Dulles' visit, MacArthur explained to Sehdal on April 5 his views on bases in Japan in the following way: "the maintenance of American bases in Japan would act like a lightning rod to attract opposition to this concept from all quarters, including the Japanese...95% of the Japanese people are opposed to American bases in Japan and that unless a wholehearted request for American troops and bases is made by the Japanese, the entire proposition should be abandoned." See "Memorandum of Conversation on American Bases in Japan (April 6, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1170; Sehdal, *op. cit.*, 256. What likely allowed MacArthur to change his views regarding bases in post-treaty Japan was Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru's offer of base rights to the U.S. government through an emissary in late April. See Eldridge and Kusunoki, *op. cit.*

75. Michael Schaller, *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 278.

76. Diary entry for June 27, 1950, *Sehdal Diaries*; "The Acting Political Adviser for Japan to the Secretary of State (June 27, 1950)," FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6, 1229. Sehdal later sent a despatch with an enclosed 19-page report, "Reference Notes on Peace Treaty and Base Question," which was compiled before Dulles' visit and argued that an early peace was desirable. Dulles in report of his visit, noted that after the North Korean invasion, within Japan there "was more open admission than had previously been obtained of the continuing need of United States military forces' remaining in Japan." Likewise Dulles recorded the *Jiji Shimpō* as having stated editorially in its June 26 edition that "...if Japan wants herself defended by the United States, she should voluntarily offer the strategic parts of her territory as American military bases." See "Summary Report by the Consultant to the Secretary (July 3, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1231.

77. "Memorandum by Dulles to the Secretary of State (July 19, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1243. Allison records in his memoirs that the outbreak of the Korean War did in fact initially cause the Dulles group concern. "The Korean war broke out while we were in Tokyo," Allison wrote, "and at first we wondered whether or not this would delay our work on a treaty. However, by the time we left Tokyo Me Dulles was convinced that, if anything, the work on the treaty should be expedited. We...received support for this position from General MacArthur and Bill Sehdal." See Allison, *op. cit.*, 149.

78. Acheson wrote a handwritten note on the margin of the memorandum stating that he agreed with it and that a meeting would be called for July 21. The

editors of the FRUS volume, in which this description appears, note however that no minutes of the meeting were found in the State Department files. In any case, Acheson sent Dulles a memorandum on July 24 of the following week saying that he had spoken with President and that Truman said that "it was important to get on with this matter." See "Memorandum of Conversation on Japanese Peace Treaty by the Secretary of State (July 24, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1255.

79. See for example, "Memorandum of Conversation on Japanese Police Establishment by Allison (July 24, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1250-1254; "Memorandum on International Peace and Security (July 25, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1260-1261.

80. "Memorandum on International Peace and Security (July 25, 1950)"; "Memorandum by Dulles to the Secretary of State (July 27, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1259-1260.

81. See the attachment to "Memorandum by the Consultant to the Secretary (June 30, 1950)."

82. "Memorandum by Dulles to the Secretary of State (July 27, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1259.

83. See footnote 1, *Ibid.*, 1228; Also footnote 1, *Ibid.*, 1264.

84. "Memorandum of Telephone Conversation"

85. *Ibid.*, 1264-1265. Not having all the facts at hand was apparently typical of Johnson, as a biographer has written. See Borkland, *op. cit.*, 66-67.

86. Johnson, perhaps reflecting the views of the JCS, expressed at an NSC meeting on August 17 that while "there was no disagreement between the two Departments as to what we wished to do...the language prepared by Mr. Dulles did not state the thing clearly and in terms which would not be misunderstood from a military standpoint." See "Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Executive Secretariat William J. Sheppard to Windsor G. Hackler of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs (August 21, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1276.

87. "Draft Peace Treaty (August 7, 1950)," Peace Treaty Folder, Box 3, Records of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs Relating to the Treaty of Peace With Japan, RG 59; also cited in *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1267-1270.

88. "Memorandum by Bradley for the Secretary of Defense on the Proposed Japanese Peace Treaty (August 22, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1278-1282.

89. *Ibid.*, 1282. Bradley phrased this more strongly later when he wrote, "...the Joint Chiefs of Staff feel strongly that the United Nations now and in the foreseeable future must, under no circumstances, be the sole instrumentality for any of the essential security interests of the United States."

90. See footnote 1, *Ibid.*, 1282. The exact dates of his vacation are unknown but the editors of the FRUS volume note that Allison prepared a summary of developments from August 22 to September 4 for Dulles during his absence. See Footnote 1, *Ibid.*, 1293.

91. "Attachment to Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs Allison to the Secretary of State (August 24, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1287.

92. "Letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (September 7, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1293; Allison, *op. cit.*, 149-150. Allison described

Magruder, someone he had worked on and off with for more than one year, as "hav[ing] a good, if slow moving, mind...he was extremely hard to convince, hut once his agreement had been obtained he lired up to it wholeheartedly."

93. "Memorandum by Allison to the Secretary of State on Japanese Peace Treaty (August 29, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1288

94. "Memorandum by Allison to the Secretary of State (September 4, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1290. Magruder brought Colonel C. Stanton Eabcock, who had just recently returned from several years in Japan at MacArthur's headquarters, with him to the meeting. Magruder requested that Babcock be allowed to "sit in" on the preliminary negotiations since in Tokyo Eahcock had been with rarious problems related to the peace treaty. Allison strongly recommended that Acheson and Dulles approve the arrangement, having known Bahcock for more than ten years. Allison wrote, "I believe it would he of real adrantage to the State Department to have Colonel Eahcock associated with the preliminary negotiations and that his presence would make possible expeditious handling of the various problems between our two Departments." *Ibid.*, 1291. Eahcock recalls a slightly different version of how he became involved. Dulles, according to Babcock's account more than a decade later, called Babcock to the State Department to meet with him. Dulles said that he had asked General MacArthur to recommend someone with whom he could work on the Japanese peace treaty and MacArthur had recommended Babcock. Dulles hoped that Bahcock would he able to represent the "Pentagon views"—a task Eabcock doubted was possible for the Pentagon, notorious for its inter-service rivalry. Babcock joked that the only thing on which the riews of the Pentagon coincided was in opposing MacArthur. See "Transcript of a Recorded Interriew with Major General C. Stanton Eabcock," July 23, 1964, The John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Seeley G. Mudd Library, Princeton University.

95. "Tab A (enclosure to Memorandum by Allison to the Secretary of State [September 4, 1950])," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1292-1293; also see footnote 2, *Ibid.*, 1292.

96. "The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Septemher 7, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1293; "Memorandum for the President (September 7, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1293-1296; "NSC 6011, Japanese Peace Treaty (September 8, 1950)," Eox 29, PPS Papers, *op. cit.*

97. See footnote 5, *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1296.

98. "Unsigned Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State (September 11, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1296-1297.

99. "Memorandum from Dulles to Rusk and others (September 11, 1950)," Peace Treaty Folder, Eox 3, ONX Records, *op. cit.* For the draft, see "Draft of a Peace Treaty With Japan (September 11, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1297-1303.

100. Kenneth W. Condit, *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Vol. 2, 1947-1949* (Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1979), 283-286. The plan known as FROLIC of about the same period replaced Cairo-Suez with Karachi.

101. *Ibid.*, 286.

102. *Ibid.*, 286-289.

103. *Ibid.*, 290.
104. *Ibid.*, 296.
105. *Ibid.*, 302.
106. "Memorandum for the President (September 7, 1950)."
107. "Draft of a Peace Treaty with Japan (September 11, 1950)."
108. "Unsigned Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State."
109. Dunn, *op. cit.*, 107.
110. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 64-65.
111. Allison, *op. cit.*, 150.
112. "Memorandum of Conversation by Col. Stanton Babcock on the Japanese Peace Treaty (October 26-27, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1334.
113. "Aide-Memoire From the U.S.S.R Dated Noveinber 20, 1950 (Unofficial Translation)," *The Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 23, No. 596 (December 4, 1950), 881-882. Chou En-lai, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, announced on December 4, 1950 his country's comments on the Japanese peace treaty draft. Regarding the Ryukyu Islands, Chou stated: "Neither the Cairo declaration nor the Potsdam agreement mention that the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands should be taken out from under Japanese sovereignty; moreover, in signing those agreements the states announced that they 'no thoughts of territorial expansion.' In this connection the question arises as to what is the basis for the proposal contained in the memorandum to the effect that the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands should be placed under the trusteeship of the United Nations, with the United States as the administrative power." Cited in "'Seven Principles' Proposal on Japanese Peace Treaty Made by U.S., Russian Reply and Chou En-lai Statement, December 1950," Flash Number 1, Microfilm Reel Number B'-0009, *Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei Junbi Sagyo Kankei* (Materials Relating to the Preparations for the Treaty of Peace with Japan), DRO-MOFA, 0101. The Chinese Nationalist government on Taiwan incidentally, despite its earlier, often contradictory claims to the Ryukyu Islands, came to embrace the concept of a U.S. trusteeship over the islands. See "Memorandum by Fearey on Japanese Peace Settlement (January 16, 1951)," in *Miscellaneous, 1947-1951, Eox 1, Miscellaneous Records Relating to Japan and Korea, 1945-1953*, RG 59.
114. See footnote 2, *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1352.
115. "Answer to Soviet Questions on Principles for Japanese Treaty (Released to the Press on December 28)," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 24, No. 601 (January 8, 1951), 65-66.
116. "Personal and Confidential Letter from the Consultant to the Secretary (Dulles) to the Commander in Chief of the United Nations Forces (November 15, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1350. Dulles writes "[Malik] questioned the U.S. right to 'trustee' the *Ryukyus* in our favor, saying that, whereas the Yalta agreement had dealt with the Kuriles, nothing had been said about the *Ryukyus*. He suggested that the *Ryukyus* were the 'small islands' which would be left with Japan. Also he said that if we continued on at Okinawa and had the right to garrison forces in Japan that would 'leave the situation no different from what exists at present'. I have no doubt hut what Communist propaganda in Japan will emphasize the Soviet

desire to restore the Ryukyus to Japan.”(Italics in original.) Likewise, Dunn explains the Soviet actions in terms of its attempts at disrupting the plans for a treaty of peace with Japan, in the following way:

Without any embarrassing commitment, and merely by queries, it assumed the appealing posture of champion of Japanese aspirations to independence and welfare. At the same time, while insinuating that the trusteeship of the Bonin and Ryukyu Islands would be merely a disguise for the usurpation of sovereignty by the United States and thus a violation of the principle of non-territorial expansion, it carefully safeguarded its own expansion in Sakhalin and the Kuriles. The quiet assumption that the righteousness of its own acquisitions was beyond question, while any made by its erstwhile allies would be highly reprehensible, was of course not peculiar to Soviet diplomacy. What was perhaps new was the nakedness of this effort to make the best of two worlds.

See Dunn, *op. cit.*, 112.

117. "Memorandum of Conversation by Allison on Japanese Peace Treaty (December 21, 1950)," FRUS 1950, Vol. 6, 1379-1382.

118. India would adopt a stronger attitude the following year, after a provisional memorandum on the peace treaty was prepared by Dulles after his visit to Japan in January-February 1951. "The Government of India," the aide-memoire stated, "feel that Japan has strong sentiments attached to the Ryuku [sic] and the Bonin Islands which are inhabited by the Japanese. The Government of India think accordingly that these islands should continue to remain under Japanese sovereignty." See "Aide-Memoire," Folder: Allied Attitudes Regarding Japanese Peace Treaty (Except UK)—Duplicates 1/51-9/51, Box 2, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, RG 59.

119. Chester Bowles, the U.S. Ambassador to India from October 1951 to March 1953 (and again from July 1963 to April 1969), noted that Indians and in particular Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru were angry about not having been directly consulted by Dulles on the treaty. See Chester Bowles, *Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969* (New York: Harper Books, 1971), 490.

120. "Despatch No. 628, Territorial Provisions of Japanese Peace Treaty (October 26, 1950)," Central Decimal File, 1950-1954 (694.001/10-2650), RG 59.

121. Warner served in Tokyo from April 1948 until August 1950. Later he would become the Political Adviser to Lieutenant General Paul W. Caraway from November 1961 to January 1964 and then Civil Administrator of the U.S. Civil Administration for the Ryukyu Islands from February 1964 to July 1967.

122. Wajima, according to Warner's memorandum, was one of three Japanese officials who were visiting the United States as unofficial observers of the hearings on prisoner of war repatriation issues before the UN General Assembly. See "Memorandum by Warner to Johnson on Problem Concerning Ryukyus and Okinawans and Bonin Islanders in Japan (October 13, 1950)," Central Decimal File, 1950-1954 (694.001/10-1350), RG 59.

123. According to Warner's memorandum of conversation, during their discussion in which Marshall Green was also in attendance, Wajima stated, "top officials in the Japanese Government feel very strongly that the United States would not require trusteeship over the Ryukyus in order to secure bases, any more than it would require trusteeship over Japan in order to obtain bases there, and that if the US should do so it would certainly create ill-will in Japan, which the US might wish to avoid. Accordingly, if the obtaining of bases is the main purpose of having a trusteeship...the Japanese Government would prefer to resume sovereignty over the Ryukyus, inasmuch as the great majority of the 600,000 inhabitants of these islands are Japanese, and then make arrangements for bases on the same basis as would apply in Japan itself."

124. "Memorandum on Territorial Provisions of a Japanese Peace Treaty by Feare!; November 14, 1950," Folder: 1/50-12/50, Intra DS Memos, Box 3, Records Relating to Japanese Peace Treaty and Security Treaty, 1946-1952, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, NA.

125. See "Memorandum from Johnson to Allison (October 13, 1950)," Central Decimal File, 1950-1954 (694.001/10-1350), RG 59.

126. "Memorandum from Johnson to Rusk on Territorial Provisions of a Japanese Peace Treaty (November 17, 1950)," Central Decimal File, 1950-1954 (694.001/10-2650), RG 59. Also cited in Footnote 3, *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1348.

127. "Memorandum from Johnson to Rusk on Territorial Provisions." The full text of Acheson's January 12, 1950 remarks, "Crisis in Asia—an Examination of U.S. Policy," is found in the *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 22, No. 551 (January 23, 1950), 111-118. Concerning the section cited above, Acheson stated that "This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold these important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold. In the interest of the population of the Ryukyu Islands, we will at an appropriate time offer to hold these islands under trusteeship of the United Nations. But they are essential parts of the defensive perimeter of the Pacific, and they must and will be held."

128. "Memorandum from Johnson to Rusk on Territorial Provisions of a Japanese Peace Treaty (November 17, 1950)."

129. "Oral History with Dean Rusk, January 2, 1970," Lyndon B. Johnson Oral History Collection, Interview 3, Tape 1, 17, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library. The transcripts of this oral history are now available on the library's homepage at <www.lbjlib.utexas.edu> .

130. "Letter from the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (December 13, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1363-1364.

131. "Enclosure on Japan (December 13, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1364-1367.

132. "Annex A," *Ibid.*, 1367.

133. "The Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur) to the Department of the Army (December 28, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1383-1385.

134. *Ibid.*, 1384.

135. "JCS 218012, Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on United States Policy Toward Japan (December 28, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1391.

136. "The Secretary of State to Sebald (January 3, 1951)," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6, Asia and the Pacific* (Part 1), (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1977), 778-779.

137. The following week on January 8, Secretary Acheson met with Defense Secretary Marshall at the Pentagon to discuss the peace treaty. Since no records apparently exist in the State Department files on the contents of their talks, we are only left to speculate about their discussions. Acheson may have asked Marshall about Defense's position on Okinawa. Marshall in any case, as we saw in the last chapter, had approached the issue of Okinawa as one that had to be looked at with "stony realism." Moreover, other matters, such as base rights in the mainland and Japanese rearmament, became more pressing. See footnote 2, *Ibid.*, 784.

138. *Ibid.*, 778-779.

139. "The U.S. POLAD (Sebald) to the Secretary of State (January 6, 1951)," *Ibid.*, 786.

140. Okazaki was later replaced by Ota Ichiro on December 7, 1948 in order, it seems, for Okazaki to run in the January 1949 general elections.

141. Yoshida, *op. cit.*, 247-248.

142. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 48.

143. *Ibid.*, 48-50.

144. Footnote 2, *Ibid.*, 52.

145. *Ibid.*

146. "Ryodo Mondai ni Taisuru Kihonteki Tachiba (Fundamental Position Regarding the Territorial Problem), May 30, 1950," Flash Number 6, Microfilm Reel Number B'-0008, *Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei Junbi Kenkyu Kankei, Dai Rokkan* (Materials Relating to the Preparations for the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sixth Roll), DRO-MOFA, 0290-0298.

147. Curiously, the section dealing with Iwo Jima and Ogasawara Islands suggests that Japan was willing to work out an arrangement "for their special use." However no such arrangement, i.e. base rights, was mentioned in the section on the Ryukyus Islands.

148. The record of conversations in Dulles' notes from his trip do not note any conversation regarding Okinawa. See "Summary Report by the Consultant to the Secretary (July 3, 1950)."

149. The trip, ostensibly for discussions on financial matters, but actually to relay the secret "Yoshida Message," as Miyazawa calls it, is described in his book, *Tokyo-Washington no Mitsudan* (Secret Talks Between Tokyo and Washington), (Tokyo: Jitsugyo No Nihonsha, 1956), 39-80. Also see Eldridge and Kusunoki, *op. cit.*, which includes an interview with Miyazawa.

150. "Discussion of Japanese Peace Treaty with Mr. Ikeda (May 2, 1950)," attachment to "Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army Ralph W. E. Reid to the Assistant Secretary of State Butterworth (May 10, 1950)," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6*, 1194-1198.

151. Nishimura Kumao, "San Furanshisuko Heiwa Joyaku ni Tsuite (On the San Francisco Peace Treaty)," *Kasumigaseki Kaiho* (Kasumigaseki Association Newsletter), May 1979, 26.

152. "Memorandum of Conversation on American Military Bases in Japan by the Counselor of the Mission in Japan Huston (April 8, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1166-1167. Diary entries for April 6 to April 10, *Sebald Diaries*.

153. "Memorandum of Conversation on American Military Bases in Japan by the Counselor of the Mission in Japan Huston (April 8, 1950)," *Ibid.*, 1167.

154. Typical of the erasive style of Yoshida that drove Dulles crazy; Dulles inquired about Yoshida's offer of bases or arrangements during his June trip to Japan, but Yoshida "was vague as to what exact role he envisioned for Japan and did not commit himself on post-treaty security arrangements. He implied that satisfactory arrangements could be concluded, but could not be tied down as to exactly what he meant." See "Summary Report by the Consultant to the Secretary (July 3, 1950)."

155. "Memorandum of Conversation with General MacArthur on American Eases in Japan (April 6, 1950)," FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6, 1170.

156. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 63-64. Nishiinura notes that Cabinet Secretary Okazaki Katsuo welcomed President Truman's statement in a press conference on the following day, September 15 stating that it had been the "hope for a long time that a peace treaty would be made."

157. *Ibid.*, 80-81. Chihiro Hosoya, "Japan's Response to U.S. Policy on the Japanese Peace Treaty: The Dulles-Yoshida Talks of January-February 1951," *Hitotsztabashi Journal of Law and Politics*, Vol. 10 (December 1981), 17-18. Yoshitsu explains that the director of the Treaty Bureau, Nishimura, and his colleagues viewed with sympathy the calls by the opposition parties for participation of the Communist countries in the peace treaty conference. They were also supporters of the "anti-military spirit of the new Constitution that permeated the entire country. And though they expected U.S. forces to remain in Japan for a while, they felt United Nations troops would eventually replace them as defenders of peace." See Yoshitsu, *op. cit.*, 43.

158. "10/5 Kantei Shukai Eihoroku (Memorandum on the October 5 Meeting at the Prime Minister's Residence), October 6, 1950," Furoku (Appendix) 5, Gaimusho Joyaku Kyoku Hokika (Division of Laws and Regulations, Treaty Bureau, Foreign Ministry), Heiwa Joyaku no Teiketsu ni Kansuru Chosho (Report on the Conclusion of the Peace Treaty), Vol. III, 1966, 122-125. These materials focusing on Japanese security issues are part of the collection of the former *Yomiuri Shimbun* reporter Doba Hajime which are now in the possession of the Research Institute for Peace and Security (RIPS) in Tokyo, but were housed at the International Politics and Business Department at Aoyama Gakuin University in Tokyo at the time this study was written. Hereafter, these documents are called the *Doba Papers*. Also see Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 81; Hosoya, *op. cit.*, 18-19; Yoshitsu, *op. cit.*, 43. Yoshitsu cites a 1977 interview with Nishimura in which Nishimura describes the confrontation with Yoshida: "His [the prime minister's] face turned bright red when he saw what we were proposing...Yoshida [then] raked

me over the coals for supporting the bankrupt position of the opposition parties, and told me to come up with a more realistic draft." *Ibid.* Yoshitsu also cites an interview with Fujisaki in which Fujisaki said Yoshida "could be a very frightening, very persuasive individual." *Ibid.*

159. The contents of the A *Sagyo* study on the territorial problem are found in "Beikoku no Tainichi Heiwa Joyakuan no Koso ni Taio Suru Wagaho Hoshin [An] (The Direction of Our Response to The U.S. Conception of a Peace Treaty [Draft])," Flash Nuinber 1, Microfilm Reel Numher B'-0009, *Tainichi Hciwa Joyaku Kankci Junbi Sagyo Kankei* (Materials Relating to the Preparations for the Treaty of Peace with Japan), 0017-0048.

160. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 81-84; Hosoya, *op. cit.*, 19; Yoshitsu, *op. cit.*, 44.

161. Hosoya, *op. cit.*, 19.

162. "D Sagyo Dares shi Honichi ni Kansuru Ken (Operation D—Concerning the Dulles Trip to Japan), December 27, 1950," Appendix 26, *Doba Papers*, 294. This document can also be found in the DRO-MOFA, Flash Number 1, Microfilm Reel Number B'-0009, *Tainichi Hciwa Joyaku Kankci Junbi Sagyo Kankei*, 0158-0180. Also see Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 84-85; Hosoya, *op. cit.*, 19.

163. "D Sagyo (Kaiseiban) Dares shi Honichi ni Kansuru Ken (Operation D [Revised Version])—Concerning the Dulles Trip to Japan), January 5, 1951," Appendix 27, *Doba Papers*, 301. This document can also be found in the DRO-MOFA, Flash Number 1, Microfilm Reel Number B'-0009, *Tainichi Hciwa Joyaku Kankei Junbi Sagyo Kankci*, 0182-0217; Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 85.

164. "D Sagyo (Kaiseiban) (Operation D [Revised Version]), January 19, 1951," Appendix 28, *Doba Papers*, 308. This document can also be found in the DRO-MOFA, Flash Number 1, Microfilm Reel Number B'-0009, *Tainichi Hciwa Joyaku Kankei Junbi Sagyo Kankci*, 0218-0231.

165. "Beikoku ga Okinawa, Ogasawara Shoto no Shintaku Tochi o Koshitsu Suru Baai no Sochi (Measures to Be Taken in the Case of U.S. Insistence on Trusteeship for Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands), January 26, 1951," Appendix 30, *Doba Papers*, 311-312. This document can also be found in the DRO-MOFA, Flash Number 1, Microfilm Reel Number B'-0009, *Tainichi Hciwa Joyaku Kankci Junbi Sagyo Kankci*, 0232-0240.

166. Yoshida Shigeru, "Japan and the Crisis in Asia," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (January 1951), 181.

167. "Despatch 936, Territorial Provisions of the Japanese Peace Treaty (January 15, 1951)," Central Decimal File, 1950-1954 (694.001/1-1551), RG 59.

168. *Ibid.* See "Letter From William N. Stokes to Author, March 22, 2000." Since this message was a despatch—usually taking approximately 10 days to two weeks to reach the designated office or officer at the Department of State in Washington, D.C., and in this case reaching the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs on January 29—Dulles could not have seen it before he left Washington for his second visit to Japan. He may very well however have seen a copy of it while in Tokyo because he mentions in a discussion on January 27 after his arrival that "there were

already rumblings against certain of the territorial provisions." See footnote 3, *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 812-813.

169. Diary entry for January 19, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.

170. *Ibid.* On the Sebald diaries, and their use for the preparation for his manuscript, see Koichi Okamoto, "William J. Sebald: The United States Political Adviser for Japan," *Waseda Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 19 (1997).

171. "Telegram No. 1405 from Sebald to Secretary of State (January 20, 1951)," Central Decimal File, 1950-1954 (694.001/1-2051), RG 59. Kono suggests that Yoshida "paid a visit" to Sebald to relay the message, but we know from Sebald's diary that the conversation actually took place at a dinner party the evening before.

172. *Ibid.* Sebald warned the State Department that Japanese opinion was hardening on the question of the disposition of the territories, including the Ryukyus, Kuriles, Bonins, and Iwo Jima.

173. Miyazato asserts that Yoshida met with MacArthur and appealed that the feelings of the Japanese people would be offended if the Ryukyu Islands "were stolen from Japanese sovereignty." In response, MacArthur turned down Yoshida's appeal. The documentation Miyazato cites however is unrelated to this discussion and does not mention such a conversation having ever taken place. See Miyazato (1981), *op. cit.*, 250. Miyazato probably should have cited a discussion introduced below instead.

174. Footnote 3, *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 822.

175. *Ibid.* Also see diary entry for January 23, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.

176. "Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting, January 26, 1951, 10:00 a.m.," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 811. Symbolic of Yoshida's good relationship with MacArthur, Yoshida reportedly met with him a total of 75 times during the Occupation, the most of any Japanese by far, and outnumbered only by Sebald and British representative Sir Alvaro D. Gascoigne, who met with MacArthur 138 and 128 times respectively. See D. Clayton James, *The Years of MacArthur, Vol. 3: Triumph and Disaster, 1945-1964* (Easton: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), 693-694. On the question of rearmament, MacArthur sided with Yoshida (against Dulles), but on the question of Okinawa, it was Dulles who would side with Yoshida, and not MacArthur.

177. "Memorandum by Fearey for Dulles and Allison (January 25, 1951)," *Ibid.*, 810-811. For some reason, both Miyazato and Kono write that Shirasu was sent to Washington to meet with Fearey. However the memorandum of conversation clearly shows that the conversation took place in Tokyo; moreover, Fearey's early arrival was reported in the local press. See Miyazato (1981), *op. cit.*, 250, and Kono, *op. cit.*, 45.

178. "Memorandum by Fearey for Dulles and Allison (January 25, 1951)."

179. Dulles' overall party included John M. Allison, as Minister, Robert A. Fearey; Dulles' secretary Doris A. Doyle, Assistant Secretary of the Army Earl D. Johnson, Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, Col. C. Stanton Eahcock, and to handle cultural affairs, John D. Rockefeller III. Dulles' wife also accompanied the group.

180. "Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting, January 26, 1951, 10:00 a.m."

181. "Memorandum of Conversation (January 26, 1951)," Folder: Duplicates, Dulles Files, Box 2, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, RG 59; Diary entry for January 26, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*; Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 86.

182. "Undated Suggested Agenda Handed the Prime Minister of Japan Yoshida Shigeru," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 816.

183. "Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting, January 26, 1951, 10:00 a.m."

184. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 87; Inoki Masamichi, *Hyoden Yoshida Shigeru* (Yoshida Shigeru: A Biography), (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1981), Vol. 3, 399.

185. For a review of the positions of the parties, see "Despatch 936". On the attention the territorial issue was receiving in the press, see "Islands Seen Delicate Point in Treaty Work," *Pacific Stars and Stripes*, January 23, 1951.

186. See Footnote 3, *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 812-813.

187. Representatives of the opposition parties (with the exception of the Communist Party of Japan) all met with Dulles to express their views orally and in memorandum form on the peace treaty. For their opinions on the Okinawa issue, see Akio Watanabe, *The Okinawa Problem: A Chapter in Japan-U.S. Relations* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1970), 109-119. As Watanabe notes, the Democratic Party, the more nationalistic party in Japan at the time, "expressed the most articulate opinion on territorial questions." The January 1951 Party Convention for example endorsed the following paragraph regarding the territorial problem: "In light of the spirit of the Atlantic Charter, Japan should be allowed to retain those areas which are recognized as her territories upon the principle of nationality and from the historical point of view, such as Chishima, Ryukyu, Amami Oshima, Iwo-Jima, etc." Cited in *Ibid.*, 111-112. These views were made known to Dulles at his meeting with representatives of the Democratic Party on January 31. Other parties expressed similar views in fact. For example, representatives of the Socialist Party the following day (February 1) handed Dulles a memorandum that stated the following in regard to the territorial issue:

It is considered inevitable to separate Korea from Japan, to restore Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Pescadores to China and to abandon the mandatory islands in the Southseas Area as stipulated under the Cairo Declaration. When the Allied Powers according to the Potsdam Declaration, it is desirable that the ownership will be determined definitely in respect to the Southern Part of Saghalien, the Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islands, Shikotan Island, the South-western Islands including Okinawa, the Bonins, the Iwo Islands, Daito Island, and the Tori Islands with due respect for the principles for the principles clarified in the joint Declaration made by the Allied Powers on January 1, 1942. The principles meant here are those of non-territorial expansion and of making no

territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned. The Japanese ownership of the above-mentioned islands is sine qua non for the peaceful living of the Japanese nation. We desire the Japanese sovereignty upon these islands on the basis of the historical relations and close economical ties between Japan proper and these places."

See "Urgent Desire of the Socialist Party With Regard to the Tenor of the Japanese Peace Treaty;" Reel Number 8, Microfilm C-0043, Japanese Peace Treaty Files of John Foster Dulles, RG 59. In addition to political parties, petitions arrived from numerous organizations, including those of Okinawa residents, Amami residents and former Ogasawara islanders. See for example "Memorandum from Johnson to Rusk on Petition for Return of Amami Gunto to Japan (August 10, 1951)," RoH Number 6, Microfilm C-0044, Records of the Director of the Office of the Northeast Asian Affairs (V. Alexis Johnson files), 1945-1953, RG 59.

188. "Memorandum of Conversation by Fearey (January 27, 1951)," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 818-822; Diary entry for January 27, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.

189. "Memorandum of Conversation by Fearey (January 27, 1951)," *op. cit.*

190. Sebald recording his disappointment with MacArthur's attitude about Okinawa wrote in his diary that "[MacArthur] is still adamant re[garding] Ryukyu and Bonins." See Diary entry for January 27, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.

191. "Memorandum of Conversation by Allison (January 29, 1951)," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 828. Yoshida and Dulles met in Sebald's office. For the Japanese side's account of the meeting, see "Daresu Misshon Kaidan Rokushu (Memoranda of Conversations of Dulles Mission), 1/29 (1951)4:00 p.m.," Flash Number 3, Reel Number B'0009, *Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei, Daiichiji Daresu Raiho Kankei (Daiichijikosho), Dainikan* (Second Roll), DRO-MOFA, 0075-0089.

192. "Memorandum of Conversation by Allison (January 29, 1951)." "Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting, January 30, 10 AM," *Ibid.*, 832; Diary entry for January 30, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.

193. Diary entry for January 29, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*. Sebald's "Evaluation" of the meeting, written the following day, was particularly critical: "It is my view that the Prime Minister came to yesterday's conference totally unprepared to discuss detailed provisions and that his remarks were more in the nature of feelers rather than any effort to come to grips with the real problems. The Japanese position will, I believe, be partly disclosed in its memorandum based upon the 'seven points' and the 'agenda' left with the Prime Minister on January 26." See footnote 2, *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 830.

194. Diary entry for January 30, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.

195. *Ibid.*; Sebald, *op. cit.*, 262. Sebald notes here that after this conversation, Iguchi Sadao was named to replace Ota Ichiro as Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of peace treaty negotiations, writing in his memoirs that "the choice was excellent, for Iguchi had a clear mind and a broad understanding of the problems involved."

196. Diary entry for January 30, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*. Nishimura records the time that the document was delivered as 6:30 p.m. A copy of the document was also delivered to MacArthur through his aide Colonel Laurence E. Eunker that evening as well. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 89.

197. Diary entry for January 31, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.

198. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 89; "Wagaho Kenkai" Eibun—Genan—('Our Views' English Version—Draft], January 30, 1951," Flash Number 2, Microfilm Reel Number B'-0009, *Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei Daiichiji Dareszt Raiho Kankei (Daiichiji Kosho)*, *Daiikkan* (Materials Relating to the Treaty of Peace with Japan, Relating to the First Dulles Visit [First Round of Negotiations] Reel 1), 0037-0057. In keeping with the tradition of the Japanese government, as seen for example in the Second Ashida memorandum, Yoshida noted at the top of the document that he was "setting forth below my private views, on which the cabinet is yet to be consulted. They do not, therefore, represent necessarily the official and final opinion of the government. S[higeru]. Y[oshida]." See footnote 1, *Ibid*. Concerning at least the territorial issue, we know that Yoshida's qualification was not true—he had in fact told the Cabinet at an earlier stage his plans and the draft had been prepared within the Foreign Ministry over a number of weeks.

199. "Undated Memorandum on Suggested Agenda by the Prime Minister of Japan," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 833-835.

200. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 86-89.

201. The reference here to the "Bermuda formula" is the arrangement between the United States and the United Kingdom in which destroyers were exchanged for naval and air bases in Eermuda, as allowed for in an exchange of notes at Washington, D.C. on September 2, 1940, and formalized in an 99-year-lease agreement signed in London on March 27, 1941. See footnote 2, *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 833.

202. "Undated Memorandum on Suggested Agenda."

203. "Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting January 31, 1951 10:00 AM," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 835-838.

204. Diary entry for January 29, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.

205. "Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting January 31, 1951 10:00 AM."

206. *Ibid*. Miyazato incorrectly records these comments being made by U. Alexis Johnson, who was not a member of the mission. Actually it was Earl Johnson. See Miyazato (1981), *op. cit.*, 251.

207. "Oral History Interview with John M. Allison, April 20, 1969," Dulles Oral History Project, 33.

208. "Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting February 1, 10:00 AM," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 838-840; Diary entry for January 31, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.

209. "Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting February 1, 10:00 AM."

210. *Ibid*. Later in the year, Yoshida responded to questions by Chiba Sahujo of the Democratic Party in the following way during an interpellations on his May 9 speech on diplomatic problems in the House of Representatives: "It was also asked, I think, whether I had agreed to trusteeship on the Ryukyu Islands and others. There is, however, no question about the matter. It had been definitely settled

by the Potsdam Declaration. How to enforce the decision is the problem of the Allied Powers." See "Minutes of the Proceedings in the House of Representatives, No. 33, May 10, 1951 (English translation)," Japanese Peace Treaty Files of John Foster Dulles, Reel Number 16, Microfilm C0043, Lot 54D423, NA.

211. Unfortunately, for reasons unclear, the Japanese version of the memorandum of conversation is incomplete, and seems to cover only the latter half of the meeting. See "Dainiji Kaidan Memo (Memorandum of Conversation of Second Meeting), 1/31 (1951), 2:00 p.m.," Flash Number 3, Reel Number B'0009, *Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei*, Daiichiji Dareszt Raiho *Kankei* (Daiichijikoshō), *Dainikan*, 0090-0094.

212. Nishimura Kumao, "Okinawa Kizoku no Kimaru Made—Motomeru ni Isoideatta Nihon no Seron (Until the Reversion of Okinawa is Decided—Public Opinion [Demanding the Return of the Islands] Too Early)," *Asahi Jaanaru* (Asahi Journal), Vol. 1, No. 15 (June 21, 1959), 19.

213. Ibid. This was confirmed by Fearey. Author's interview with Robert A. Fearey; Eethesda, Maryland, February 8, 1998.

214. Diary entry for January 31, 1951, Sebald Diaries; Footnote 4, FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6, 841. Included in the footnote is a description of the purpose of that statement: "[The] purpose [of] this statement was to stop growing inclination on part [of] Japanese [to] raise Ryukyus and Bonin Islands question and to obviate further discussions with Japanese on this point at this time."

215. Nishimura (1959), *op. cit.*, 19; Nishiinura (1971), *op. cit.*, 89-90

216. Nishimura (1959), *op. cit.*, 19.

217. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 90.

218. Nishimura (1959), *op. cit.*, 19.

219. Diary entry for February 5, 1951, Sebald *Diaries*; "Provisional Memorandum Prepared by the Dulles Mission (February 3, 1951)," FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6, 849-850; "Minutes—Dulles Mission Staff Meeting February 6, 9:30 AM," Ibid., 861. Also see "Daigoji Kaidan (Memorandum of Conversation of the 5th Meeting), 2/5 (1951), 10:30 a.m.," Flash Number 3, Reel Number B'0009, *Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei*, Daiichiji Dareszt Raiho *Kankei* (Daiichijikoshō), *Dainikan*, 0123-0124.

220. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 92-93. The territorial clause stated that "Japan would renounce all rights and titles to Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores, and accept a United Nations trusteeship with the United States as administering authority over the Ryukyu Islands, south of 29° north latitude, the Bonin Islands, including Rosario Island, the Volcano Islands, Parece Vela and Marcus Island. The United States would retain control of these islands pending approval by the United Nations of the trusteeship agreement or agreements. Japan would further renounce all rights, titles and claims deriving from the mandate system and from the activities of Japanese nationals in the Antarctic area." See "Provisional Memorandum Prepared by the Dulles Mission."

221. Diary entry for February 7, 1951, Sebald *Diaries*; "Unsigned Japanese Government Memorandum on Provisional Memorandum (February 6, 1951),"

FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6, 860-861; "Memorandum of Conversation by Fearey Between Dulles, Yoshida, and Their Staffs (February 7, 1951)," *Ibid.*, 866-869.

222. Allison, *op. cit.*, 157. Allison would be forced to deal with the Okinawa problem, which became especially "hot" during his time as U.S. Ambassador to Japan in the mid-1950s.

223. "Memorandum of Conversation by Allison at the Malacanang Palace, 10:45 a.m. (February 12, 1951)," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6, 881.*

224. For earlier general views of the Philippine government, see "Memorandum of Conversation by Babcock on Preliminary Consideration of Japanese Peace Treaty," *FRUS, 1950, Vol. 6, 1308-1311.*

225. Footnote 1 (in *Ibid*) incorrectly states that the Dulles party left the Philippines later that same day. Sebald joined up with the Dulles party on the evening February 22 in Hawaii and traveled with them back to Washington. Sebald returned to Japan on March 21. See related diary entries, *Sebald Diaries*. Footnote 2 in the *FRUS* volume (page 903) is incorrect in that Sebald did not return to Tokyo on March 27.

226. Allison, *op. cit.*, 159.

227. "Memorandum by Dulles to the Minister for External Affairs and Island Territories of New Zealand, F. W. Doidge (February 18, 1951)," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6, 175.*

228. See "Aide-Memoire of the British Embassy (March 12, 1951)," *Ibid.*, 910. Early Commonwealth attitudes supporting the U.S. plan to place Okinawa under a U.S.-administered UN trusteeship can be seen in "Oral Communication from British Embassy to Department of State on Canberra Meeting (October 9, 1947)," *FRUS, 1947, Vol. 6, 533.*

229. "Japanese Peace Treaty: Working Draft and Commentary Prepared in the Department of State (June 1, 1951)," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6, 1062.*

230. See Footnote 1, *Ibid.*, 895-896. Also see Diary entry for February 28, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.

231. "Minutes of the Under Secretary's Meetings, Memorandum for the File Under Secretary's Meeting, February 28, 1951," in Iokihe, ed., *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, microfiche, 5-D-20.

232. *Ibid.* While the membership of this group is unclear, we can assume that the issues involving legal, political, economic, geographical and military affairs were studied, thus involving Ruth Bacon, Fearey; Allison, Johnson, Hemmendinger, Warner, and Douglas Overton.

233. "Obligations Assumed by the US Under Trusteeships for the Ryukyus and for the Bonin, Volcano and Marcus Islands (March 7, 1951)," Folder: Islands—Ryukyu and Bonin, Box 2, ONA Records, RG 59.

234. "Majority of Japanese Favor Rearming, Want US Troops Stay (Results of Public Opinion Poll)," *The Mainichi*, March 5, 1951, located in Folder: Information Relating to Japanese Views and Attitudes, Box 2, Records Relating to the Peace and Security Treaties, 1945-1952, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, RG 59.

235. Provisional Draft of a Japanese Peace Treaty (March 12, 1951)," Folder: Japan: Treaty Drafts, 1950-1951, Box 1, Miscellaneous Records Relating to Japan and Korea, 1945-1953, Lot File 56D 225, RG 59. This provisional draft was constantly updated. The same version of this clause appears in "Provisional United States Draft of a Japanese Peace Treaty (Suggestive Only), March 23, 1951," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 945.

236. "Memorandum of Conversation on the Japanese Peace Treaty by the Second Secretary of the Embassy in the United Kingdom David K. Marvin (March 21, 1951)," *Ibid.*, 941.

237. "Memorandum of the Under Secretary's Meeting, Prepared in the Department of State (March 21, 1951," *Ibid.*, 942.

238. For a list on Dulles' efforts to seek public and congressional support prepared from Dulles' files, see "Chronology of Events Concerning Public Opinion and Congress," Folder: United States Policy Regarding a Japanese Peace Treaty; Box 4, Records Relating to a Japanese Peace Treaty and Japanese Security Treaty; Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, RG 59.

239. "Memorandum by Fearey on Meeting with Far East Sub-Committee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee Regarding a Japanese Peace Treaty (March 19, 1951)," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 932-935.

240. At the end of the month, Dulles gave a dinner speech at Whittier College, about 20 miles southeast of Los Angeles, California. Entitled "Peace in the Pacific" it was built up to be a major speech on U.S. policy with regard to the Japanese peace treaty. In his address, carried nationwide over the radio, Dulles described the draft treaty as "a simple document, limited to the essentials of peace." He went on to talk about the territorial provisions in the following way:

The treaty proper would prescribe the territory over which the Japanese will hereafter be sovereign. It is contemplated, generally speaking, that Japan's sovereignty should be limited in accordance with the agreed surrender terms. That would mean sovereignty over the four home islands and minor adjacent islands. There would be a renunciation by Japan of all rights, titles and claims to Korea, Formosa, the Pescadores and the Antarctic area. Also the treaty might contemplate that in the Ryukyu and Bonin islands there could be United Nations trusteeship and continuing United States administrative responsibility.

Dulles concluded his speech by stating that "The major objective of any Japanese peace treaty is to bring the Japanese people hereafter to live with others as good neighbors. That does not require that the Japanese people should be pampered. It does mean that the victors should not take advantage of Japan's present helpless state to impose, for the future, unequal conditions. It means that the peace settlement should restore the vanquished to a position of dignity and equality among the nations." See "Address by the Honorable John Foster Dulles at the Fiftieth Anniversary Dinner of Whittier College, Los Angeles, California, Saturday, March 31, 1951," Folder: Letters and Instructions Regarding Japanese Peace Treaty, Box 4, Office of the Legal Advisor, Japanese Peace Treaty Files, 1946-1960, RG 59.

241. "Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting (April 11, 1951)," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 969-971.
242. "Memorandum by Dulles (April 12, 1951)," *Ibid.*, 974.
243. The Dulles party arrived in Tokyo on April 16 and stayed until April 23, arriving back in Washington on April 24.
244. One account, described below, suggests that the issue may have been raised however.
245. See "Editorial Note," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 1021.
246. "Joint United States-United Kingdom Draft Peace Treaty (May 3, 1951)," *Ibid.*, 1025-1026.
247. Kono, *op. cit.*, 52-53.
248. Nishimura (1959), *op. cit.*, 19.
249. Diary entry for March 27, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*. Nishimura mistakenly records (or there simply was a typing mistake) that Sebald visited Yoshida on February 27, but the actual date was March 27. See Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 102.
250. Diary entry for April 4, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.
251. "1951 Nen 4 Gatsu 4 Nichi Iguchi Jikan Kara Shiihorudo Taishi ni Kofu shita Heiwa Joyaku Soan ni Taisuru Wagaho Ikensho [Eibun] (Memorandum of Our Opinions on Peace Treaty Passed to Ambassador Sebald from Vice Minister Iguchi on April 4, 1951 [English Version])," Flash Number 4, Reel Number B'0009, *Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei, Dareszt Rinichi Yori Dainiji Kosho Made no Katei* (Files Relating to the Peace Treaty With Japan, The Process from Dulles' Departure from Japan to the Second Stage of Negotiations), DRO-MOFA.
252. "The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Secretary of State (April 4, 1951)," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 960-961.
253. "Memorandum from Fearey to Allison on Nansei Shoto," Folder: Ryukyus—Old, Box 4, ONA Records, RG 59. This discussion is also cited in footnote 2, *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 961.
254. Footnote 2, *Ibid.*, 961.
255. Negotiations continued in London and Paris from June 4 to June 14. Dulles departed London later on June 14, after discussions in Paris for a few days.
256. Hosoya Chihiro, *San Furanshisuko Kowa e no Michi* (The Road to the San Francisco Peace Treaty), (Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1984), 233-234.
257. *Ibid.*, 238.
258. See "Editorial Note," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 1118; "Revised United States-United Kingdom Draft of a Japanese Peace Treaty (June 14, 1951)," *Ibid.*, 1119-1133.
259. Footnote 1, *Ibid.*, 1143. Allison, *op. cit.*, 166-167; The Japanese had originally expected Allison to arrive around June 20, one former participant recalled; however being that it was necessary to seek the understanding of the Allies, particularly the Philippines, Allison's arrival was delayed. See Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 145.
260. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 145-146.
261. Diary entry for June 15, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.

262. Nishimura (19711, *op. cit.*, 145-146.
263. "Telegram No. 2261 from Sebald [Allison] to Secretary of State [for Dulles] (June 28, 1951)," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 1163. Also see "1951 Nen 6 Gatsu 28 Nichi Gogo no Sori Arison Koshi Kaidanroku (Memorandum of Conversation between Prime Minister and Envoy Allison, June 28, 1951)," Appendix 22, Vol. 6 (May 1951-August 1951), *Doba Papers*, 340. Also see Yoshida, *op. cit.*, 253.
264. "Telegram No. 2261 from Sebald."
265. *Ibid.* Allison's telegram and the Japanese record of conversation cited above give slightly different versions of Allison's response. Allison's version is noted above. According to the Japanese version, Allison responded that the United States "had not studied the issue enough. Japan's suggestions would be welcomed for consideration." See "1951 Nen 6 Gatsu 28 Nichi Gogo no Sori Arison Koshi Kaidanroku."; Nishimura (19711, *op. cit.*, 147.
266. "Telegram No. 2261 from Sebald."
267. Nishimura (19711, *op. cit.*, 156.
268. *Ibid.* "Shintaku Tochi ni Kansuru Yosei (Request Concerning the Islands to be Placed under Trusteeship), July 2, 1951," Flash Number 6, Reel Number B'0009, *Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei, Daisanji Kosho Kankei* (Daiikkan), DRO-MOFA, 0097-0108.
269. "Telegram No. 14 from Sebald [Allison] to Secretary of State [for Dulles] (July 2, 1951)," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 1173.
270. "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense on the Japanese Peace Treaty (April 17, 1951)," *Ibid.*, 991.
271. "The Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State (April 19, 1951)," *Ibid.*, 989-990.
272. "The Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State (June 28, 1951)," *Ibid.*, 1155.
273. "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense on the Japanese Peace Treaty (June 26, 1951)," *Ibid.*, 1157.
274. Author's interview with Fearey.
275. *Ibid.* In our interview, Fearey was not sure as to the exact date when this discussion took place. He recalled Allison being present, but as we saw above, Allison was in Japan at this time (the last week of June and the first week of July, 1951). Either Fearey was mistaken about Allison's presence or the meeting took place several weeks before the phrase "residual sovereignty" actually appeared in memorandum form.
276. Footnote 1, *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 1152; "Memorandum Re Ryukyus by the Consultant to the Secretary Dulles (June 27, 1951)," *Ibid.*
277. *Ibid.*; Eal, *op. cit.*, 56-57.
278. "Memorandum Re Ryukyus (June 27, 1951)."
279. "The Secretary of Defense to the Secretary of State (June 28, 1951)."
280. Sebald, *op. cit.*, 267-268.
281. Diary entry for July 7, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*. Nishimura notes that Japan received its copy on July 17 but from the context of the passage, it is clear that the 17th was a typing mistake. See Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 162.

282. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 164.

283. "Observations on the Draft of the Peace Treaty (July 12, 1951)," Flash Number 7, Reel Number B'0009, *Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Kankei, Daisanji Kosho Kankei (Dainikan)*, (Files Relating to the Peace Treaty With Japan, The Third Stage of Negotiations, Vol. 2), DRO-MOFA, 0233. Also see "Telegram No. 123, The United States Political Advisor to SCAP to the Secretary of State [Dulles] (July 15, 1951)," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 1196-1198.

284. Finn would later become the Country Director for Japan during the critical time of the negotiations (1969) for the reversion of Okinawa to Japan (realized in 1972). Unfortunately, Finn passed away in August 1998 before we could discuss the importance of the above-cited memorandum and exchange.

285. "Telegram No. 123 (July 15, 1951)."

286. "Memorandum from Eggs to Fearey on Daito Islands and the Draft Japanese Peace Treaty," Folder: Ryukyus—Old, Eox 4, ONA Records, RG 59.

287. *Ibid.* Citing the same document, this explanation is given in footnote 3, *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 1200.

288. "Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices (July 18, 1951)," *Ibid.*, 1199-1200.

289. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 164-165.

290. "Heiwa Joyaku An Daisanjo (Nansei Shoto Nado no Shintaku Tochi) no Igi ni Kansuru Ofuku (Exchanges Relating to the Meaning of Article 3 of the Peace Treaty [Trusteeship for the Nansei and other islands])," *Doba Papers*, Vol. 6, 207-208.

291. Diary entry for July 28, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.

292. "Secretary of State [Dulles] to the United States Political Adviser to SCAP (August 2, 1951)," *FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6*, 1235.

293. Diary entry for August 4, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*; "Heiwa Joyaku An Daisanjo."

294. Nishimura (1959), *op. cit.*, 20.

295. *Ibid.*; Diary entry for August 4, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*. According to the Japanese memorandum of conversation appearing in the Doba Papers cited above, Sebald told Iguchi that Dulles thought it was "regrettable that there would be voices of opposition coming from within Japan in spite of all the work [he] did on behalf of Japan. It was also shocking that despite taking into consideration the Prime Minister's requests to allow Japan not to have to renounce sovereignty over Okinawa, there is an increasing tendency for opposition voices to appear. Between the signing of the treaty and its implementation, we are hoping to send someone to Okinawa to study the situation there." See "Heiwa Joyaku An Daisanjo." The description of this conversation is very similar to the conversation held between Yoshida, Dulles, and Acheson on September 2 after Yoshida's arrival in San Francisco (see below).

296. "Heiwa Joyaku An Daisanjo."

297. Nishimura (1959), *op. cit.*, 20.

298. "(Draft of) Prime Minister's Address (August 7, 1951)," Flash Number 8, Reel Number B'0009, *Tainichi Heiwa Joyaku Oyobi Nichibei Anzen Hoshō*

Joyaku Teiketsu Kosho Kankci (Files Relating to the Negotiations on the Conclusion of a Treaty of Peace With Japan and the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty), DRO-MOFA, 0095.

299. *Ibid.*, 0097. The wording in Japanese appeared as "waga shuken ga zansuru suru." See *Ibid.*, 0099-0100. Also see Nishimura (1959), *op. cit.*, 20.

300. "(Draft of) Prime Minister's Address (August 7, 1951)."

301. "Memorandum from Johnson to Rusk on the Petition For the Return of Amami Gunto to Japan (August 10, 1951)."

302. Nishimura (1971, *op. cit.*, 162, 182. The six delegates of the Japanese Delegation included Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru as Chairman of the Delegation, Finance Minister Ikeda Hayato, Ichimada Hisato, Governor of the Bank of Japan, Tomabechi Gizo, Chairman of the Democratic Part; Hoshijima Niro, Secretary General of the Liberal Part; and Tokugawa Muneyoshi, member of the House of Councilors. Also trading with the group as advisors were Nishimura, Takeuchi Ryuji, who was the Chief of the Japanese government Overseas Agency in Washington, Uyama Atsushi, and Shimanouchi Toshiro from the Foreign Ministry, Yoshida's personal secretary Matsui Akira and Yoshida's confidante, Shirasu Jiro, and Miyazawa Kiichi as Ikeda's assistant, both introduced earlier.

303. *Ibid.*, 188-189. The U.S. delegation was composed of Acheson, Dulles, and senators Tom Connally and Alexander Wiley as the regular delegates, with senators John J. Sparkinan, H. Alexander Smith, Walter F. George, and E. B. F. Hickenlooper as well as congressmen James P. Richards and John M. Vorys in attendance as alternate delegates.

304. *Ibid.*, 190-191. A memorandum of this conversation is also produced in the Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Records Office. See "Yoshida Sori, Acheson Kokumu Chokan, Dares Tokushi Kaidanroku (Memorandum of Conversation Between Prime Minister Yoshida, Secretary of State Acheson, and Special Representative Dulles), September 2, 1951," Flash Number 1, Reel Number B'0010, Sanfuranshisuko Tainichi Kowa Kaigi (San Francisco Conference on the Treaty of Peace With Japan), DRO-MOFA, 0004-0015. Incidentally; the memorandum of this conversation appearing in FRUS is improperly dated and does not mention the discussion on the territorial problem and Japanese public opinion. See "Memorandum of Conversation by Sebald (September 3, 1951)," FRUS, 1951, Vol. 6, 1315-1317. As a result of the misdating, Yoshitsu mistakenly cites September 3 as the date the conversation took place, and also writes incorrectly that Dulles and Acheson paid a courtesy call on Yoshida. See Yoshitsu, *op. cit.*, 70.

305. Nishimura (1971, *op. cit.*, 190.

306. *Ibid.*, 190-191. Nishimura, in his 1959 article on Dulles, uses the word "shocking" in *katakana* for *shingai* in his description of these events. See Nishimura (1959), *op. cit.*, 20. Throughout 1951, Dulles, SCAP, the Allied Council of Japan, the Far Eastern Commission, and the Japanese government itself, had received numerous petitions and "expressions of views" from individuals, associations, and political parties. Watanabe suggests in his study of the Japanese side of the Okinawa problem that the Japanese government, particularly the Foreign Ministry, in some cases early on encouraged such activities. See Watanabe, *op. cit.*, 135-139.

307. Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 191.
308. Yoshida's reply appears in the Foreign Ministry's original memorandum of conversation.
309. "Opening Address by President Truman at the San Francisco Conference for the Conclusion and Signature of the Peace Treaty With Japan (September 4, 1951)," *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 25, No. 638 (September 17, 1951), 450.
310. "Statement by John Foster Dulles (September 5, 1951)," *Ibid.*, 453.
311. "Ryukyu and Bonin Islands (Briefing Material for Delegation of the United States of America to the Conference for Conclusion and Signature of Treaty of Peace With Japan), September 1951," Folder: Ryukyus — Old, ONA records, RG 59.
312. "(Interview with Shirasu Jiro) Kowa Joyaku e no Michi (The Road to the Peace Treaty)," in Ando Yoshio, *Showa Keizaishi e no Shogen* (Testimony to the Economic History of the Showa Period), Vol. 2, (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1966), 409-410.
313. *Ibid.*, 409. Shirasu's relations with the Foreign Ministry; which probably viewed his relationship with Yoshida as interference or a usurpation of power, were extremely poor. He explained in an interview that he believed the Foreign Ministry officials purposely kept the speech from him because they would be criticized by him for allowing the tone of the speech to be ingratiating. When he confronted officials and they still refused to turn the speech over he reportedly screamed in English "Give it to me!"—earning the British-educated Shirasu the reputation of screaming in English when angry. See Aoyanagi Keisuke, *Kaze no Otoko* (Man of the Wind: Shirasu Jiro), (Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1997), 176.
314. "(Interview with Shirasu Jiro) Kowa Joyaku e no Michi," *op. cit.*, 409.
315. *Ibid.*; Aoyanagi, *op. cit.*, 176.
316. Aoyanagi, *op. cit.*, 176. For a related description of this episode, see Nakamura Masanori, "Senryoka no Songen—Sengo Nihon to Shirasu Jiro (Dignity During the Occupation: Postwar Japan and Shirasu Jiro)," *Taiyo* (The Sun), No. 453 (July 1998), 67.
317. Sehal, *op. cit.*, 278-279; Diary entry for September 7, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.
318. Sehal, *op. cit.*, 279. It is safe to assume that Shirasu's added changes were probably the portions to which Sebald was referring.
319. Diary entry for September 7, 1951, *Sebald Diaries*.
320. *Ibid.*; Sebald, *op. cit.*, 279. "Although Yoshida had an excellent knowledge of English," Sebald told readers in his memoirs, "his enunciation like that of many Japanese was poor and at times was difficult to understand, particularly when unfamiliar phraseology was involved. I shuddered at the thought of a badly written speech being delivered in a strange tongue, with poor pronunciation."
321. Sehal, *op. cit.*, 279. Shimanouchi was a childhood classmate of U. Alexis Johnson, having had gone to school in Southern California. He was also known as "Henry."
322. "Address to the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference by his Excellency Shigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Japan and Chief of the

Japanese Delegation, September 7, 1951," Flash Number 1, Reel Number B'0010. The relative part of the corresponding Japanese phrase for the last sentence read "Korera no shoto ga ichinichi mo hayaku nihon no gyosei no moto ni modoru koto o kitai suru mono de arimasu (I look forward to these islands being placed back under Japanese administration as soon as possible; *literally*, one day sooner)." The statement of the British delegate (Kenneth G. Younger) was as follows: "As regards the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, the treaty does not remove these from Japanese sovereignty; it provides for a continuance of United States administration over the Ryukyu Islands south of 29 north latitude; that is to say that those islands nearest to Japan itself are to remain not only under Japanese sovereignty; hut under Japanese administration as well." See FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, *China and Japan, Part 2* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GPO, 1985), 1090-1091.

323. See Higa, *op. cit.*, 11.

Conclusion

The Limits of Article 3: Ratification and the Elusive Search for a "Practicable Arrangement"

I. RATIFICATION AND THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETING ARTICLE 3

Olcott H. Deming, U.S. Consul General to Okinawa from 1957 to 1959, said that then-Secretary of State Dulles once asked him "what problems" he was having there.¹ Deming responded that "biggest one was continually trying to explain what residual sovereignty means." Dulles answered, "it means exactly what it says. When we are through with [Okinawa], they get it back."

It was not only Deming who would have trouble explaining to his Japanese counterparts and the inhabitants of Okinawa what "residual sovereignty" actually meant. Yoshida Shigeru and his colleagues would have to attempt to explain Article 3 to their countrymen and try to put the best face on the fact that Okinawa effectively might continue under occupation for an indefinite time period. It is to this debate, seen in the ratification hearings of the Diet, that we turn here.

The Ashida-Yoshida Exchange

With the acceptance of the Allies and Japan of the terms of the Treaty of Peace, the treaty went up for ratification in the respective countries and would go into effect upon the ratification of a majority of the principal signatories (as per Article 23 of the treaty). In Japan the process of ratification began immediately with hearings in the House of Representatives Special Committee for the Peace Treaty and Security Treaty (*Shugiin Heiwn Joyaku Anpo Joyнку Tokubetsu Inkai*). This questioning and answering session provides an excellent look at the difficulty Yoshida encountered in trying to explain Article 3 of the Peace Treaty to the main opposition party and rival, and will thus be introduced below in full.

On the afternoon of October 18, former Foreign Minister and Premier and leader of the Democratic Party, Ashida Hitoshi, whose views on the desire for the return of Okinawa were discussed in Chapter Five, began questioning Yoshida on the contents of the two treaties.' Regarding the territorial provisions of the peace treaty, Ashida asked the Prime Minister to clarify those contents, to which Yoshida responded:

As you know America has absolutely no territorial ambitions with regard to Ogasawara and the Ryukyu Islands. However, those militarily important islands have to unfortunately be occupied by another country (the United States) because in the event that if there were a threat to Japan's safety; Japan does not have any ability at all to defend those islands. Because a vacuum would be created (by Japan's inability to defend itself or the islands) the United States will hold on to the islands for the time being. However, sovereignty over these islands remains with Japan. Regarding a trusteeship, a system that has been in existence since World War I and dealt with, as you know, the disposition of Germany's former territories, the idea is not to annex any territory. It seems that the Ogasawara and Ryukyu Islands are to be placed under a trusteeship. I do not know what the U.S. decision is however at this point. I can only guess, but I think perhaps the trusteeship will be proposed.

Ashida: I don't intend to cross-examine you concerning the intentions of the Allied Powers so I won't ask you about that. However I would like to ask the Government one or two questions concerning the international trusteeship system that you just mentioned now. According to the provisions of the treaty just accepted at the recent peace conference, the so-called Nansei Islands including Amami Oshima, Kikaishima, the Ryukyu Group, and the Ogasawara Group are to be proposed by the United States for a trusteeship. Until that time, it is provided that the U.S. government is to administer these islands itself. In that case, the question as to what the status of the islands will be is a big concern of the people of this country as you know.

Concerning the Nansei Islands south of 29° North latitude, in Article 3 of the Peace Treaty, it is not written that Japan is renouncing its rights. The United States and the United Kingdom say as well that sovereignty resides with Japan. The Government as well merrily lays down this smolzescreen, that sovereignty over these islands resides with Japan. However, in this situation, what shape exactly does this form of sovereignty take? Where sovereignty for the trusteeship areas, just like the former mandates, ultimately resides is a question that has not fully been resolved by scholars. Japan, for example, held the mandate over the islands in the south Pacific but Japan did not hold sovereignty over them. There is no one opinion among scholars on just what country held sovereignty. The explanation that Japan holds sovereignty over the Nansei Islands is fine for academics, but it is of no practical use. The Diet and the

Government should not give a false hope to the simple and honest people of the country.

If it is to be a trusteeship in any case, where will the details of the contents of the trusteeship system be worked out? It is just as Prime Minister Yoshida said—it will be decided by the conclusion of promise in the name of a trusteeship between the countries involved with direct interests. I do not know myself if Japan will be included as one of these countries or not. The Government may know that. The trusteeship agreement reached by these countries may indeed make it clear that sovereignty will in fact reside with Japan. However even if such an agreement does make it clear that Japan holds sovereignty over these islands, it is obvious that the contents of such sovereignty is no more than in name only. Why is this? From the end of World War II until today, several trusteeship agreements have been signed for trusteeships that are in effect. You can see by just looking at the politics of the trusteeship areas. Moreover, although I won't go into great detail, according to Part E of Article 77 of the United Nations Charter, the Nansei Islands would fall in the category of being "territory detached from enemy states." The fact that detachment from Japan is written as such in the United Nations Charter is something that we need to pay attention to. The international trusteeship system allows for a system of administration and management through the individual agreements for the territories to be placed under trusteeship. If that is the case, then the separation of the Nansei Islands from Japan only to exist under the administration and management of the country that receives the trusteeship is just an empty principle. I can imagine what the type of sovereignty Japan would have in this situation. It would be like taking all the candy out of a wrapper and just leaving the paper [*literally, taking the rice out of a bamboo wrapping*]*—or even worse.* These are more or less my thoughts on the matter, but the Government thinks differently. The Government views the situation more optimistically. I would like to ask about this point.

Yoshida: The explanation I just gave was that the U.S. government did not have any territorial ambitions and that Dulles and [Kenneth] Younger both stated that sovereignty resided in Japan. In a sense, it was a political explanation. Concerning what will happen to the trusteeship—will it be entrusted to the United States or not entrusted—it is in any case written in the peace treaty that a trusteeship is a possibility. I think we just have to wait until an agreement is reached between the United Nations and the United States to see what form that trusteeship will take.

Ashida: Your answer is not necessarily wrong. I do not think your answer is wrong because just as I said before, the type of administration of the trusteeship areas will be decided in a trusteeship agreement by the countries directly interested. In the answers that you, Prime Minister Yoshida, have given to others, the trusteeship over the Nansei Islands is to be done because military reasons make it necessary for America to administer the

islands and when that military necessity disappears, you have said you are certain that the islands will be returned to the Japan. Priine Minister Yoshida, I would like to ask you if your statement as to this certainty is the result or not of any extra-treaty document in any form?

Yoshida: I will answer this. I have said this based on the conclusions arriving from talks with Dulles and other American authorities. My conclusions, as they are, are not based on any documents exchanged.

Ashida: Ultimately, then, Prime Minister Yoshida, the basis for your thinking that when military necessity no longer requires a trusteeship, the Nansei Islands will be returned to Japan came from opportunities you had to speak with Dulles and others who led you to believe so. And if indeed these islands are returned, I don't disagree as a citizen that you should not be congratulated. However, in which situations do the islands hold military importance? If America and Japan consider the Nansei Islands a base from which to confront Communist forces, I do not consider such reasoning entirely justified. The reason is that the United States already has strong military positions in the Philippines and on the four islands of mainland Japan. While Okinawa and the Ogasawara Islands are probably important as secondary bases, as long as [American] military bases are maintained in the Philippines and Japan, it is not necessary to also place Ogasawara and the Ryukyu Islands under trusteeship. As one with military knowledge, it is hard to imagine that Okinawa or the Ogasawara Islands in the Pacific are very important as military bases in confronting communist forces. One thing that the Ogasawara and Ryukyu Islands may be important for is to keep an eye out on Japan. If that is the reason for putting the islands under a trusteeship then, well, I guess I can understand. However, if the bases in the islands are for the same purposes as the bases in mainland Japan and the Philippines, I just can not understand why the islands have to be placed under a trusteeship. The Allied Powers themselves have said that the Peace Treaty was one of peace and trust. Japan, who was a signatory of this treaty of peace and trust, should be told that Ogasawara and Ryukyu Islands do not have to be placed under trusteeship. The natural course of events is for the islands to be returned to Japan at the same time the peace treaty goes into effect. As the prime minister himself said just before, he spoke with Dulles and others informally—something for which while I feel greatly reassured, I still wish the Government will do its utmost.

Yoshida: I can't go into a great discussion on the contents of the negotiations, but I mentioned in my speech at the San Francisco Conference the national feelings of the people of Japan and my strong regrets, as a Japanese, we would have to part with the territory.

Ashida: Regrettably; I do not believe that the hundreds of thousands of inhabitants of the islands will be satisfied with your reply.

Yoshida, not known for his love of undergoing questioning in the Diet, obviously had difficulty in answering the questions posed by Ashida and

others. In this instance, it was not that he was being evasive, as so often was the case. The problem was that the formula for residual sovereignty was both in theory and practice difficult to define, more so because the decision on how to implement Article 3 rested not with Yoshida but with the U.S. government. It was in fact even more complicated than that because a consensus had not been reached on the U.S. side nor had Dulles decided on a definite "practicable arrangement" to be worked out.

Nevertheless, the Peace Treaty was overwhelmingly ratified on October 26 by the House of Representatives (307 to 47) and 174 to 45 in the House of Councilors on November 18, with the Liberals (Yoshida's Party) voting overwhelmingly in favor and the Democrats opposing.³ The Socialists (Left and Right) and the Communists abstained. Symbolically, only two of the 10 Representatives (9 Liberals and 1 Democrat) from the prefecture closest to Okinawa, Kagoshima Prefecture (of which the Amami Islands were a part), voted for the Peace Treaty.⁴ In any case, with the problem of ratification out of the way, Yoshida sought to follow up on the window of opportunity created by Article 3 and residual sovereignty.

II. YOSHIDA'S MEMORANDUM ON A " 'PRACTICABLE ARRANGEMENT' FOR THE SOUTHERN ISLANDS"

It does not seem that initially Yoshida and officials in the Foreign Ministry lost hope that the islands would immediately be restored to Japan (or if indeed they ever lost hope). It is clear however that around this time they actively sought to obtain some sort of "practicable arrangement" for the islands in the hope that the islands could be returned, or at a minimum, that relations could be restored to normal in case the islands were not immediately returned.

With the expected arrival of Dulles, who was (correctly) seen to be in favor of seeking a workable solution, and a delegation of senators and other officials in mid-December, the Foreign Ministry set out to prepare its own proposal for a "practicable arrangement."⁶ On December 10, the same day Dulles landed in Tokyo, the Foreign Ministry completed its memorandum on the above proposal and on December 13, Vice Minister Iguchi presented it to Sebald for Dulles' attention- In submitting the memorandum, the Japanese government also attached a two-point, one-page introductory statement in which it was written that Japan was "most grateful that the Peace Treaty leaves the Nansei Islands as Japanese territory and their inhabitants as Japanese nationals. We understand that the reason America wants to administer these islands lies in the military necessity for safeguarding the peace and security of the Far East. We earnestly hope that as far as this military necessity permits, the desire of the inhabitants will be considered" in the final disposition of the islands."

According to the complementary and more detailed December 10 memorandum, the Japanese government sought the "sympathetic consideration

by the United States Government" with regard to a "practicable arrangement" on the following six points:

1. The U.S. confirms that the Southern Islands remain under Japanese sovereignty and thus the inhabitants remain Japanese nationals.
2. The U.S. agrees to restoring the previous relationship between Japan proper and the Southern Islands as far as military requirements allow; in particular, the U.S. recognizes that the islands will be treated as a part of Japan with regard to moving and travelling between Japan proper and the islands, trade (no custom or duty imposed), financial transactions, fishing, monetary (the Japanese yen is to be the legal tender in the Southern Islands).
3. The U.S. admits that the Southern Islands are to be treated by Japan as a part of its territory in any economic, social, and cultural agreements or treaties the Japanese Government enters into. Japan will exercise its protective authority over the inhabitants of the islands who reside abroad or are to travel abroad and issue passports for them.
4. The U.S. declares its intention to permit self-rule of the inhabitants in matters of civil administration and to allow complete self rule in educational matters and juridical jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases among the inhabitants themselves.
5. The U.S. recognizes the property rights in those islands which belong to Japanese nationals in Japan proper and will facilitate the resumption of their business activities.
6. The U.S. abstains in favor of Japan from exercising administrative, legislative, or juridical powers over the inhabitants of islands which it does not presently see any military necessity to administer.

Dulles apparently welcomed receiving it, implying he would give it his consideration.' Indeed, Dulles, in his speech the following day (December 14) at the Union Club for a joint meeting of the American Chamber of Commerce and Japanese Chamber of Commerce reemphasized his hope to work out a fair arrangement:

Residual sovereignty in the islands was left with Japan due to the strong desire of Japan. We hope and believe that a future administration of these islands can be worked out in a friendly way which will combine the natural desires of the inhabitants with the requirements of international peace and security.¹⁰

Just what shape that arrangement would take would remain undecided until for quite some time while the China question and Administrative Agreement were worked out (in order to expedite the ratification of the

treaty in the Senate), and would have to wait until Dulles returned to Washington and had a chance to consult his colleagues.

Sebald's assistant and soon-to-be successor, Niles W. Bond, sent the Foreign Ministry memorandum off to Washington on January 17, 1952, describing it as "further evidence of the strong pressure in Japan for action which will clarify the relation of the Nansei and Nanpo Islands to Japan and clear the way for eventual restoration of the islands to Japan." Bond recommended that the United States should take actions along the lines of the Japanese government's memorandum. Bond argued, as seen in the following paragraph, that politically, economically, and even strategically, that action on the Japanese government's suggestion was wise.

The Mission is of the opinion that close relations between Japan and the Nansei and Nanpo Islands along the lines of the enclosed memorandum should be encouraged and facilitated by the United States. Politically, this objective is lent cogency by the intense feelings of the Japanese and the islanders arising out of separation of the islands from Japan and the consequent possibility of friction in United States relations with Japan. Economically; the experience of six years of United States administration would seem to indicate that so long as they are cut off from Japan the Nansei Islands in particular are an expensive and unrewarding proposition and that the economic capabilities of all these islands will offer greater hope if they are developed in conjunction with Japan. From the point of view of the strategic requirements of the situation—the need to obtain secure bases for protection of United States interests in the western Pacific—it is understood to be the opinion of CINCPAC, as transmitted to the Joint Chiefs in a recent staff study [see below], that this protection can be adequately obtained by arrangements similar to those embodied in the Security Treaty with Japan without involvement in any form of exclusive control by the United States."

The State Department found the Japanese government's memorandum "to be of great interest."¹³ Importantly, Bond's memorandum reached Washington just as the government was considering what to do with the territorial provision for the islands.

III. CONTINUED DIVISIONS WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

As debate on the territorial provisions and ratification continued in Japan, the U.S. government began again to explore the different choices it had concerning the administration of the islands which was purposely left vague in the treaty. The State Department still hoped that the islands could be returned to Japan through some sort of arrangement without having to apply for a trusteeship. The military, particularly the JCS, was strictly opposed to that. Importantly however, MacArthur's successor, Ridgway, accepted the conclusions of a report by his staff which argued that the

islands could in fact be returned to Japan without damaging U. S. strategic interests.¹⁴ Ridgway was sympathetic to conditions and local feelings in Okinawa and, even more importantly, strongly aware that retention of the Ryukyu Islands could potentially damage U.S.-Japan relations. It is this line of thinking that the FEC report adopted and to which we turn first.

The Far Eastern Command noted in its report that the United States was faced with three tasks: 1) securing long-term use of the facilities on Okinawa and other islands; 2) obtaining international sanction for U.S. long-term strategic control of the islands; and 3) formulating a program for the economic and social well-being of the islanders. The tasks were of course those designated in NSC 13, as seen in the last chapter.

Ridgway's staff argued that the return of the Ryukyu Islands to Japanese control would not "under the current and projected U.S.-Japanese common objectives in the Far East" present a "threat to U.S. security." On the other hand, the report pointed out, the "effectuation of permanent political control" over the Ryukyu Islands would be not only an economic burden to the U.S. government but would also present the United States with international political problems through accusations that it was denying the principal of self-determination. Furthermore, the report warned that the problem of the Ryukyu Islands could later develop into "an irritant to the Japanese" which would contribute to "a breakdown in U.S.-Japanese mutual confidence and friendship." The report thus concluded that were there an "adequate agreement" concluded between the United States and Japan, as in the case of the Philippines base agreement or the Peace Treaty with Japan, securing the "exclusive control" of military facilities, the Ryukyu Islands could in fact be returned. Such a U.S. sponsored movement for the return of control over the Ryukyu Islands to Japan," the report concluded, "would constitute an additional step toward the cementing of the already interlocked U.S.-Japanese security objectives."

The Office of Far Eastern Affairs in the State Department became privy to Ridgway's report early on when Bond in the POLAD office in Tokyo sent Alexis Johnson two copies of it in mid-November.¹⁵ Upon receipt of the report in Washington, Dulles was immediately given a copy and found it "excellent."¹⁶ Johnson likewise was "delighted" with the report's conclusions and told Bond that his "only regret is that [the conclusions] were not arrived at before negotiation of the Treaty, thus requiring us to incur the political disabilities of the Treaty position on the Ryukyus when it now appears (as we all along suspected) that there was no real necessity therefor."¹⁷ Describing the paper as "carefully done and soundly reasoned" and suggesting that Bond and Sebald "might discreetly pass on to the authors our congratulations on a really statesmanlike approach of a kind all too seldom seen from a military headquarters," Johnson optimistically noted to Bond that "it seems to me impossible for [the JCS] to arrive at any conclusion other than that given in the study." Johnson's boss Allison informed

the Secretary's office that the report was in "complete accord with the views of [the Office of] F[ar] E[astern Affairs] concerning this matter," while at the same time cautioning that his office had "no information to date as to the attitude of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the problem but we do know that this [report] is in direct variance with their earlier views."¹⁸ Allison's cautious estimate would prove correct." Despite the convincing arguments of Ridgway's staff's report, and the long-term view he took in approving it, the JCS did not accept its conclusions.

Upon receipt of the report, the JCS had the JSSC study Ridgway's proposal.²⁰ The JSSC in its January 14 examining, as expected, disagreed strongly with Ridgway's conclusions for the following reasons:

1. Strategic control of the Nansei Shoto and Nanpo Shoto has been and continues to be vital to the security interests of the United States;
2. The necessity for such strategic control is greater now than ever before;
3. The security interests of the United States would be seriously jeopardized were we to permit the strategically vital U.S. position along the Offshore Island Chain in the Western Pacific to be breached;
4. The economic cost of administering the area is trivial when balanced against the cost in blood and treasure required to conquer the islands from Japan, their importance to U.S. security, and the expenditure of lives and equipment which might be necessary should the islands be given up and, subsequently, military necessity demand their recapture;
5. Because of the vital nature of the foregoing strategic considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would not concur in action to return these islands to Japan;
6. There has been no deviation and no sound military justification for deviation from the policy of U.S. retention of control of these islands since first recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II;
7. Current United States policy with respect to the Nansei Shoto, Nanpo Shoto, Marcus Island, and Parece Vela is sound; and
8. No change in United States policy in regard to these islands should be contemplated until a condition of stability has been firmly established throughout the Far East.

A January 29 message from the Department of the Army informed Ridgway of the JCS decision "that action with respect to the recommendations in your study should not be taken now or in the foreseeable future," thus frustrating his staff's plans to seek the return of the islands.²¹

However, it seems that Ridgway and his staff did not give up, for shortly after receiving the JCS reply, Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Doyle O.

Hickey had the G-3 section of GHQ prepare for Ridgway's consideration a memorandum on "alternatives" for the administration of the Ryukyus (and Bonins).²² Despite having been rejected once before, G-3 re-listed a base leasing agreement as an "alternative." It also requested comments from Sebald's office, which responded by describing base leasing as "the most desirable solution from every standpoint" and suggested that "the JCS may have overlooked the compelling political advantages of this plan."'''

In the meantime, although it was busy concentrating on the question of Japan's entering into relations with Taiwan/China as well as the negotiation of the Administrative Agreement, the State Department was also following closely the Okinawa territorial problem and specifically the question as to how to implement Article 3. The conclusions of its studies were reached in January 1952.²⁴ The memorandum forwarded to Secretary Acheson on January 25 explained that Article 3 "was worded in such a manner as not to bind the United States to any specific course of action...the article does not deprive Japan of sovereignty over the islands, nor does it require the United States to seek a trusteeship." At the same time, the memorandum warned that numerous political problems relating to the "assumption by the United States of a trusteeship" over the Nansei and other islands would "seriously affect the position of the United States in the Pacific." The problems that Overton, who had almost 15 years experience with Japan, cite in his memorandum include: 1) the strong feelings of the residents of the Nansei Islands in favor of returning the islands to Japan; 2) the strong feelings of the people of mainland Japan who felt that the territorial provision was "contrary to the spirit of reconciliation and mutual trust inherent in the rest of the treaty," which would persist as irredentist sentiment; 3) the difficulties arising from U.N. supervision of the trusteeship; 4) the economic liability of the islands; 5) the international criticism of the anti-colonial bloc who would "regard [trusteeship] as a device to perpetuate Western imperialism" and who would, in the United Nations, "seek to assure that any trusteeship proposal submitted by the United States not subordinate the welfare of the native population to security considerations." Overton and Cowen thus recommended to Acheson that the State Department should "take the position that the United States should not exercise its option of seeking a trusteeship over the Ryukyus and Bonins," but instead should seek to make bilateral arrangements with Japan for access and control of military facilities seen essential to the JCS on the islands while returning them to Japan. Acheson, who as we saw in the last chapter was quite sympathetic to the Far Eastern office's position, immediately approved the recommendation, authorizing discussions with the Defense Department."

Prior to the beginning of these meetings however, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee took up its discussions on the peace treaty on January

21 in the Caucus Room of the Senate Office Building with statements by General Bradley (by now, in MacArthur's absence, the strongest advocate for absolute control over Okinawa), representing the JCS, who predictably argued that trusteeship was the most satisfactory arrangement for the islands from a military perspective, and Dulles, representing the State Department.²⁶ Dulles' having carefully kept Congress informed of the negotiations over the last 18 months, "reaped an early harvest of good will, soft words, and amiable questions," according to a scholar on this period.²⁷ Senator Smith, recalling that during his visit to Japan in December, the Japanese government had "impressed on us their desire for an ultimate return of sovereignty of the Ryukyus and Bonins to the Japanese people," asked Dulles about the ultimate disposition of the islands." Dulles began by explaining that there had been "no final crystallization of thought within the United States Government as to how to exercise the rights and privileges given us by Article 3," adding, "Article 3, you might say, gives the United States an option on that position." Dulles, without stating his preference, then went on to add that:

Now, how we exercise it is...a matter to be determined in the light of a number of factors, one of which is strategic because the position does have a high strategic value. Also there are human elements to be taken into account—sentimental and historic factors. All of those need to be weighed and appraised and brought within some formula as what will be the best all around. There has been no effort yet made to reach any final decision on that matter. I suppose it will not be gone into in any exhaustive way until after the treaty come into force.

But even if there is a United Nations trusteeship, the terms of such trusteeship lend themselves to very great flexibility and there is no rigid pattern of trusteeship. We are not obligated even to apply for trusteeship. It says if we do apply for trusteeship Japan will concur. There is a provision, pending application for a trusteeship the United States may exercise any and all rights that it wants. Just what rights we would select to exercise is a matter which, as I say, has not yet been finally determined by the United States. So that position is at the moment fluid and is one of the situations which will have to be explored more fully by the departments of the Government which are principally concerned.

National defense will have an important voice in those decisions but there are other considerations also which we all agree would have to be taken into account. I would not want to hazard a guess as to what the future work-out of that position will be."

Dulles was perhaps wise in not trying to "hazard a guess" as to what the government would eventually decide. In a sense, his job of negotiating the treaty with the Japanese was done. He had negotiated the Peace Treaty itself, as well as much of the Security Treaty and related Administrative

Agreement, although the details of the treaties were worked out by State Department officials such as John Allison and Dean Rusk. Moreover, through his painstaking efforts to secure Congressional approval for the agreements, he prevented the treaty from becoming a political issue in the United States. At the same time, the author would argue that Dulles sought to leave a free hand for the U.S. government as a whole, particularly the State Department, to work out arrangements for Okinawa, including a bilateral base-leasing agreement, that would allow Okinawa to be returned to Japan perhaps by at the time the Treaty of Peace went into effect. These remaining parts of the agreements, such as the provisions for Okinawa, would necessarily be left to State and the military to work out.

IV. FINAL STATE-DEFENSE DISCUSSIONS BEFORE THE PEACE TREATY WENT INTO EFFECT

Through Sebald's excellent reporting in Tokyo and an unidentified ally in G-3 of Ridgway's staff who was providing Bond and Sebald with copies of staff studies and exchanges between the JCS, Department of the Army, and the FEC, the State Department became aware (as discussed above) that the JCS had strongly rejected Ridgway's recommendation to return the islands upon securing a base leasing agreement (State's position). Sebald's office, in a March 8 despatch to the State Department, argued that "the unfavorable action by the JCS should not foreclose the possibility of achieving a favorable top level policy decision on the original plan for the return of these islands to Japan" and warned that "it is only too apparent that so long as the Ryukyu problem remains unsolved, it offers an impediment to the consolidation of relations" between America and Japan.³⁰ Thus it was recommended that State's "policy for disposition of the Ryukyus by return of political and economic control to Japan, coupled with the execution of a military bases agreement, would not only provide the most practicable solution of the Ryukyu problem but would also deprive the various critics of United States policy of the opportunity to exploit this issue."

Shortly after receiving these recommendations, Secretary Acheson on March 24 requested Allison, who had been recently promoted to Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (replacing Dean Rusk), to do a survey within the department to confirm that the interested offices were still in support of the department's position not to seek a trusteeship over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands and to make bilateral arrangements with Japan for military facilities." In his response, dated March 31, Allison confirmed that it was still the desire of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs to proceed with such a policy.³² Indeed, Allison explained to Acheson that

Such an arrangement with regard to the Ryukyus and Bonins would not only remove a potential major irritant in United States-Japanese relations but would also relieve the United States of a burden of administrative and financial responsibility for an area and population historically tied to

Japan and wholly Japanese in outlook. At the same time, the arrangement would safeguard United States strategic interests in the islands by providing for the retention of military, naval and air installations and areas on a long-term basis. Our intention would be negotiate with the Japanese a special agreement dealing with the bases in the Ryukyus. The term would be specified rather than left indefinite as in the United States-Japan Security Treat¹; and any special arrangements with the Japanese made necessary by the peculiarly strategic nature of these bases would be specifically included.

Allison, notifying Acheson that a conference had been arranged with the JCS at the Pentagon for April 2, recommended that in these talks, the State Department "maintain its position that the United States not exercise its option to seek a trusteeship over the Ryukyus and Bonins, but return the islands to Japanese control, provided arrangements are made for the United States to retain control over such military facilities in the islands as are deemed essential by the JCS" and that "discussion be directed in part toward securing [the JCS'] concurrence to immediate commencement of joint State-Defense efforts to mutually satisfactory draft of an agreement with Japan with respect to bases in the Ryukyus and Bonins."

On the same day Allison wrote to Acheson, U.S. Ambassador-to-Japan-designate Robert D. Murphy sent Allison a memorandum on the question of the "eventual return to Japan of the Ryukyu Islands."³³ Murphy, who would face pressure from Japan for the return of the islands in his new assignment, conducted "informal talks" with several officials from the Defense Department, including Secretary of the Army Frank Pace, Assistant Secretary Earl Johnson, Major General Carter Magruder, and Brigadier General A. L. Hamblen and found that the "Defense [Department] is split on the question [of the eventual return of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands]."> Murphy was told that before deciding the question of the eventual return of the islands, a "trial period" of perhaps one year would be necessary in order to "determine the effectiveness of our arrangements" on the main Japanese islands. "If such a concession were made regarding the Ryukyus now and then a little later we were faced with [the] failure of our arrangements for the main islands," Hamblen warned, "we would be subject to double criticism for having yielded prematurely regarding the Ryukyus. The importance strategically of the latter islands to our defense establishment is too great to experiment with lightly." Upon reading Murphy's memorandum of conversation, the Deputy Director of the Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, Robert J. G. McClurkin, recorded in an attached hand-written note, that "the approach to the Department of Defense was delayed while the Administrative Agreement was being worked out and the Peace Treaty ratified," and recommended that the State Department "should resume the battle promptly now."³⁵

This battle, the last major one before Japan's return to the international community of nations on April 28, would be lost by the State Department as well. The conference held on April 2 at the Pentagon "talk over the Ryukyus problem" produced little understanding or agreement, other than to set up a joint working group.³⁶ Indeed, the memorandum of conversation suggests the views of the JCS and State Department were as far apart as ever, as seen in General Bradley's statement: "if we are going to stay in Okinawa, we should stay there permanently." The working group in fact did not begin to meet until late September, almost five months after Japan regained its independence and the post-treaty U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship would begin to be tested by the so-called "Okinawa problem." Although the Amami Islands would be returned to Japan in 1953 through the application of the Security Treaty and Administrative Agreement (along the lines of the State Department's recommendations), the remainder of the Nansei Islands, including Okinawa, as well as the Ogasawara Islands would not be returned for another 20 years."

V. CONCLUSIONS: THE ORIGINS OF THE BILATERAL OKINAWA PROBLEM

The territorial clause regarding Okinawa in the Treaty of Peace with Japan signed at the San Francisco Peace Conference on September 8, 1951 was, as Watanabe and others have written, not the end but the beginning of the "Okinawa Problem" between the United States and Japan.³⁸ Based on the history of the 1945-1952 period examined in the preceding chapters, the author concurs in this opinion.

Many in the Nansei (Ryukyu) Islands, not to mention the 7000 former residents of the Ogasawara Islands, were understandably disappointed, if not outraged, with the outcome of the Peace Treaty consultations and conference as numerous petitions with hundreds and thousands of signatures would show.³⁹ Some called April 28, the date Japan regained its independence, a "national day of shame" (*kutsujoku no hi*) and were angry at what they felt was Japan's betrayal in "permitting" America to maintain administrative rights over the islands, which in effect, allowed the military-led government to continue and only limited self-government. Indeed, reflecting this feeling, the newly established Ryukyu Legislature voted 27 to 2 in favor of reversion on April 29, 1952 at its first session.⁴⁰

Following the end of the occupation of Japan, the United States did initially liberalize trading arrangements and economic relations between the Nansei Islands and Japan proper; however, it subsequently began to pursue more hard-line policies regarding self-rule, base development and land expropriation, and other matters. The drive for reversion to Japan within the islands would gain strength at this point, and would continue to build over the years as U.S. military authorities pursued similar policies favoring military needs over the wishes of local inhabitants. Japanese public opinion

would become angered by American actions in the Ryukyu Islands, islands which the Japanese government was recognized as having "residual sovereignty" over. Without any administrative ability to enforce its desires vis-à-vis the islands, political opinion in the mainland became more and more agitated, with even the pro-U.S. prime minister Sato Eisaku making his well known statement in August 1965 (during the first-ever visit to Okinawa by a Japanese prime minister) that "the postwar would not be considered over until Okinawa was returned to Japan." It would take another seven years before Okinawa was finally reverted to Japanese administrative control on May 15, 1972 (Ogasawara was reverted on June 26, 1968). Indeed in many respects, the bilateral "Okinawa Problem" continues today, with the United States maintaining a large military presence in Okinawa against the wishes of a not insignificant number of people in Okinawa (although opinion is clearly divided now as well, as the author's recent articles introduced in the preface show).

The territorial provisions of Article 3 of the Treaty of Peace with Japan was, as seen in [Figure 7-1](#) in the previous chapter, in every way the product of compromise—U.S. strategic requirements, Japanese territorial desires, a variety of Allied demands and expectations, and last but not least the State Department desire to see the goals of the Atlantic Charter realized and cooperative and friendly relations continue with Japan. Like any compromise it did not contain everything that everyone wanted; it was not a one-hundred percent satisfactory arrangement. However, it did prevent the dismemberment of Japan, which would have fatally damaged postwar U.S.-Japan relations—a relationship that had started anew after Japan's defeat in World War II. In this sense, Article 3 and the role of John Foster Dulles, his State Department colleagues, as well as their Japanese counterparts, perhaps deserve a new, more positive evaluation. That the window of opportunity created by Article 3 to return Okinawa (with Japan having both sovereignty and administrative rights, and the United States retaining bases in Okinawa under the 1951 Security Treaty and accompanying Administrative Agreement) was closed all too soon by the military does not mean that the work that went into preventing Okinawa's separation in Article 3 and its "residual sovereignty" formula should be disparaged.

The State Department at the time felt that route was the best way to go for political and diplomatic considerations. The author, with the benefit of hindsight, believes the argument for retention by Japan that the State Department and its Office (Bureau) of Far Eastern Affairs pursued since 1943 would have been the correct one at the time for the following reasons. First of all, it would have acted to gain the trust of the Japanese people (Okinawans, of course, included) that the United States did not desire that territory and prevent a nationalist, irredentist movement in the country and islands. Secondly, it would have limited any serious basis for criticism internationally, since Japan, as a sovereign state, would have granted the United

States the use of bases in Okinawa, such as allowed for in the "Okazaki Memo" and the "Tenno Message" of 1947, as seen in Chapter Six, as well as offers by the Yoshida government, as discussed in Chapter Seven. Thirdly, the early return of Okinawa would have allowed Okinawa to socially and economically develop along with, or at least proportionately to, Japan's phenomenal economic growth throughout the postwar period. Instead, at the time of reversion to Japan in 1972, Okinawa had great difficulty "catching up" to Japan. (In fact Okinawa never made it—average per capita income in Okinawa, while still high internationally, is 75 percent of a Tokyo resident; likewise, its unemployment rate [8 to 9 percent] is double the mainland standard.) Fourthly, were retention by Japan realized, it is also likely that with a shared postwar experience, relations between the mainland Japan and Okinawa might have turned out better, or at least stronger and more trusting, than they did. Finally, it is likely that retention of the islands by Japan would have made the Japanese government more responsible for its own defense, or at least, expanding the area to which the future Japanese Self Defense Forces (eventually established in 1954) would be responsible for guaranteeing the safety of, in conjunction with the American forces stationed in Japan. (Indeed, the failure of Japan to assume more responsibility for its own defense as well as contributions to regional security was one of the reasons used for not returning Okinawa throughout the 1950s and 1960s.)

Instead, in the desire to use Okinawa freely—in effect "separating it" from Japan proper—the JCS and the military pursued the realization of their strategic requirements with, it seems, little concern for the long-term political effects on Japan, which was emerging as an ally of the United States in its return to the community of nations. Only luck and a long-term commonality of interests between the two countries prevented the Japanese (Okinawans included) people from becoming more embittered than they did. The military was fortunate that its occupation of Okinawa until 1972 did not destroy the very strategic environment, namely good (or non-hostile) relations with Japan, that it had in fact wanted to preserve.

The U.S. government was lucky that the political ramifications of its inability and subsequent lack of initiative to improve upon the window of opportunity that Article 3 made were kept manageable in the context of what Watanabe calls "an intra-alliance conflict," and, despite the frustrations created over the years on both sides of the Pacific by the continued possession of the islands, did not permanently damage the U.S.-Japan relationship. Had that happened, the United States would not only have lost an ally, but would have gained a potential political and military rival, if not enemy, whose military and industrial power would have been welcomed by the Communist camp. The strategic requirements that the JCS had desired since the time immediately after the attack on Pearl Harbor—long before

the start of the Cold War, but obviously reinforced by it — would have been endangered once again, but more seriously.

In the end, the debate between the military and political considerations of the Okinawa problem continued right up until the reversion of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. In many ways the debates continue now as the strategic necessity of a military presence in still unstable Northeast Asia is weighed against the political problems in Japan and specifically in Okinawa of this same continued large U.S. presence. It is in this, the dilemma of military/strategic versus political/diplomatic considerations, that the "bilateral Okinawa Problem" originated as this study has shown. It is in this context that the "bilateral Okinawa Problem" will also likely continue. One hopes that in the crises and problems that emerge in the bilateral relationship in the future, the long-term diplomatic and political considerations will be given equal, rather than less, weight to the strategic evaluations and requirements, and that military policies do not always override local concerns.

NOTES

1. Author's interview with Ambassador Olcott H. Deming, February 1, 1998, Georgetown, Washington, D.C.

2. "Shugiin Heiwa Joyaku Anpo Joyaku Tokubetsu Inlzhai ni Okeru Ashida Hitoshi Daigishi Shitsumon (Questions by Representative Ashida Hitoshi at the House of Representatives Special Committee on the Peace Treaty and Security Treaty)," *Nihon Gaiko Shuyo Bunsho Nenpyo*, 450-452.

3. *Ibid.*, 144.

4. Watanabe, *op. cit.*, fn. 3, 187. For voting on the treaties in the Lower House, see page 98 of Watanabe.

5. The phrase "practicable arrangement" appears in Yoshida's speech to the Diet, for which the State Department, as was discussed above, had a hand in drafting (concerning the territorial provision for the Nansei Islands). It was phrased as "jissaiteki sochi" in Japanese.

6. Nishimura (1959), *op. cit.*, 21. Dulles, in a memorandum to himself on the eve of his departure, notes that "Arrangements for Ryukyus, Bonin Islands, etc., under Article 3" had the highest priority of unresolved issues with regard to the overall peace treaty. See "Note of Open Major Matters With the Japanese (December 6, 1951)," Chronological File JFD November, December 1951 (3), Box 3, JFD-JMA Chronological Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951-1959, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library (hereafter Eisenhower Library), Abilene, Kansas. This was Dulles' fourth trip to Japan after assuming the responsibility for negotiating the peace treaty. It was a trip primarily made out of U.S. domestic conditions in order to secure from Yoshida an agreement that Japan would not recognize mainland China (the People's Republic of China). The agreement reached became known as the "Yoshida Letter," although the contents were in fact drafted by Dulles.

7. "Memorandum Submitted by the Japanese Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs to the United States Political Adviser for Japan on a 'Practicable Arrangement' for the Southern Islands," Roll 7, Microfilm C0043, ONA Records, 1943-1956, RG 59. Also see "Nanpo Shoto ni Kansuru Jissaiteki Sochi Dures e no Teishutsu (Practicable Arrangements for the Southern Islands), December 10, 1951," Flash Number 9, Reel Number B'0009, Daisanji Dares Raiho Kankei (Documents Relating to Dulles' Third Visit), DRO-MOFA, 0029-0041 (It was in fact Dulles' fourth visit; the first one in June 1950 not being for negotiations per se but more in the nature of a fact-finding mission). The memorandum labels the islands under question the Nanpo Shoto, or "Southern Islands;" however from the context of the memorandum, as well as a clarifying paragraph, it is clear that the Ryukyu/Nansei Islands are included in the discussion.

8. "Nanpo Shoto ni Kansuru Jissaiteki Sochi Dures e no Teishutsu."

9. Nishimura (1959), *op. cit.*, 21.

10. "Letter from Dulles to Horo Izumi (December 18, 1951)," Chronological JFD November, December 1951 (3), Box 3, JFD-JMA Chronological Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951-1959, *op. cit.*; Nishimura (1971), *op. cit.*, 322; Diary entry for December 14, 1951, Sebald Diaries. Izunmi was leader of the reversion movement in Amami.

11. "Despatch No. 1021 from the USPOLAD to SCAP (Sehald) to the Department of State (January 17, 1952)," FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, 1089. The author is unsure why there was a delay of more than five weeks following its initial receipt in transmission of this memorandum. Nishimura wrote of "expressing their desires [as seen in the above memorandum] to Dulles" and following up on that "with another detailed memorandum" when a State Department official (Kenneth T. Young) visited Japan and Okinawa on Far Eastern fact-finding mission in the early part of 1952. See Nishimura (1959), *op. cit.*, 21. Young confirms meeting with Nishimura and writes that "Nishimura...took particular pains to emphasize the Japanese point of view on Okinawa more than he did on any single subject he raised with me. He said that United States-Japanese relations would receive a very great shock if the United States proposed a trusteeship for Japan. At the same time he strongly indicated that the Japanese Government would not stand in the way of the United States exercising the power of administration and jurisdiction permitted by the Peace Treaty with respect to Okinawa." See "Memorandum by Young to Allison on the Department Position Regarding the Ryukyus (April 1, 1952)," Roll 7, Microfilm C0044, ONA Records, 1943-1956, RG 59. The author was unable to locate the latter document referred to by Nishimura in either the Japanese Foreign Ministry archives or the U.S. National Archives, although Young summarizes the conversation in his memorandum and suggests a formula (which may have been the memorandum suggested by Nishimura).

12. "Despatch No. 1021."

13. "The Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs ([Robert J. G.] McClurkin) to Sehald (February 20, 1952)," *Ibid.*, 1184. It seems that the Office of Far Eastern Affairs was uncertain as to whether it could "budge the JCS from their position at this time," but believed that if it could not succeed in "our

present objectives of returning general control of the islands to Japan in the near future," it would "concentrate [its] efforts on liberalizing the present JCS Directive for U.S. Civil Administration...to permit a greater degree of self-government for the inhabitants and encourage closer ties with Japan."

14. "Staff Study on United States Long Term Objectives with Respect to the Ryukyu Islands by the General Headquarters, Far East Command (October 17, 1951)," Box 1, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (John M. Allison), 1950-1952, Lot Files 55D 282, RG 59; also see Roll 7, Microfilm C0044, ONA Records, 1943-1956, RG 59. This report was primarily written by Dr. Justin Williams, Sr. and Alfred C. Oppler, a legal specialist and former judge from Germany, in response to a request from General Ridgway's chief of staff, Lieutenant General Doyle O. Hickey. "Letter from Justin Williams, Sr. to Author (November 22, 1999)"; Author's interview with Justin Williams, July 7, 2000, Venice, Florida.

15. "Letter from Niles W. Bond to U. Alexis Johnson With Enclosures (November 16, 1951)," Roll 7, Microfilm C0044, ONA Records, 1943-1956, RG 59.

16. "Memorandum from Allison to Ambassador [Myron M.] Cowen, Consultant to the Secretary (December 7, 1951)," *Ibid.*

17. "Letter from Johnson to Bond (November 28, 1951)," Central Decimal File, 1950-1954 (794.0221/11-2851), RG 59. Johnson wrote that the office had "not previously seen nor heard of the study and it was therefore particularly appreciated." As late as March 1952, the Defense Department would keep up the façade of not informing the State Department of the study.

18. "Memorandum from Allison to Ambassador Cowen."

19. According to a hand-written notation on a January 25, 1952 memorandum (see below), the State Department found out "informally" sometime later through the POLAD office in Tokyo that the JCS "rejected Ridgway's position."

20. "JCS 1380/135, Report by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee (January 14, 1952)," CCS 383.21 Japan (3-13-45), Sec. 28, RG 218.

21. "Letter from Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, Operations, Department of Army Major General Reuben E. Jenkins to Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, Tokyo (January 29, 1952)," Central Decimal File, 1950-1954 (794c.0221/2-2752), RG 59. Seheld became aware of the JCS rejection on February 26, at which time he informed the State Department. See "Telegram No. 1787 from Seheld to Secretary of State on Disposition of Ryukyus and Bonins (February 26, 1952)," Central Decimal File, 1950-1954 (794c.0221/2-2652), RG 59.

22. "Despatch No. 1238 from US POLAD to Department of State on Ultimate Disposition of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands (March 8, 1952)," Central Decimal File, 1950-1954 (794c.0221/3-852), RG 59.

23. "Enclosure to Despatch No. 1238, Memorandum for Chief of Staff, Far East Command on Staff Study on U.S. Long-Term Objectives With Respect to the Ryukyu Islands," *Ibid.*

24. "Memorandum by Consultant to the Secretary of State Myron M. Cowen to the Secretary of State (January 25, 1952)," FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14,

1116-1120. This memorandum was drafted by Overton who had been assigned by the State Department in 1950 to follow the Okinawa problem. Overton explained that the reason for this assignment was that "it was perfectly obvious to Me Dulles and to everybody working with the Japanese Treaty that [Okinawa] was going to be a thorn in U.S.-Japan relations. We fully recognized the fact that, until Okinawa was returned to Japan, there would be a great deal of irredentism in Japan over Okinawa, the worst of it on the island of Amami Oshima. My job was to follow this issue because it was the feeling of the State Department that Okinawa should be given back to the Japanese." See "The Reminiscences of Douglas W. Overton, October 18, 1960," Oral History Collection of Columbia University, New York, 29.

25. "Memorandum by Cowen to the Secretary of State (January 25, 1952)." Acheson, in an attached brief handwritten message, asked Allison about the status of "Dulles' idea of a Presidential Commission on this subject." Apparently any response to that question was oral and not written since the editors of FRUS note that no reply had been located in the State Department files, nor has the author located a written response. The commission that Acheson asked about was brought up by Dulles with Truman in a meeting at the White House on October 17, 1951, which Dulles described as a "Congressional Commission on the Ryukyus." The President gave his approval to the proposal and said the State Department could go ahead with it. See "Memorandum by Lucius D. Battle for the Secretary of State (October 17, 1951)," White House Folder, Roll 16, Microfilm C0043, Japanese Peace Treaty Files of John Foster Dulles, RG 59. Dulles seems to have thought of this commission sometime that spring, as is discussed in a briefing Dulles gave to members of Congress in March 1951 (see Chapter Seven). Dulles subsequently referred to it during the summer in a telegram to Sehal: "For your personal INFO it is possible that after the Treaty is signed there will be a thorough study by a group including members of Congress as to the future of Ryukyus. Complete and exclusive control by US is not in question but other aspects fluid." See "Telegram from Dulles for Sehal (August 8, 1951)," Chronological JFD-JMA, August 1-15, 1951 (4), Eox 1, JFD-JMA Chronological Series, John Foster Dulles Papers, 1951-1959, Eisenhower Library.

26. "Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate Eighty-Second Congress Second Session on Japanese Peace Treaty and Other Treaties Relating to Security in the Pacific (January 21, 22, 23, and 25, 1952)," (Washington, D.C. GPO, 1952), 23. The Committee on Foreign Relations was headed by Thomas Connally (D-Texas), and comprised of Walter F. George (D-Georgia), Theodore F. Green (D-Rhode Island), Brien McMahon (D-Connecticut), J. William Fulbright (D-Arkansas), John J. Sparkman (D-Alabama), Guy M. Gillette (D-Iowa), Alexander Wiley (R-Wisconsin), H. Alexander Smith (R-New Jersey), Eourke E. Hickenlooper (R-Iowa), Henry Cahot Lodge, Jr. (R-Massachusetts), Charles W. Tobey (R-New Hampshire), and R. Owen Erewster (R-Maine). For voting on ratification of the peace treaty and security treati; see Eernard C. Cohen, *The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the*

Japanese Peace Settlement (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1957).

27. Cohen, *op. cit.*, 23.

28. "Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations."

29. *Ibid.*, 51-52. The treaty was approved by the Committee on February 5, after four days of hearings. The Senate began its five-day debate on the peace treaty and related security agreements on March 14, following the February 28 signing of the last remaining hurdle, the Administrative Agreement, which was negotiated by Dean Rusk. On March 20, the Senate voted for the peace treaty by a vote of 66 to 10 and 58 to 9 for the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

30. "Despatch No. 1238."

31. Footnote 2, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14*, 1224.

32. *Ibid.*

33. "Memorandum by the Ambassador-designate to Japan (Murphy) to Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Allison (March 31, 1952)," *FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14*, 1222-1223. Murphy, described by Dulles as "one of our very top diplomats," was a career diplomat with extensive European experience. He was nominated in January 1952 and after arriving in Japan on April 28, continued as ambassador there for exactly one year, until April 28, 1953. For Dulles' description, in a letter to Yoshida, see Murakawa Ichiro, *Dareszt to Yoshida Shigeru* (Dulles and Yoshida Shigeru), (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1991), 58.

34. "Memorandum by the Ambassador-designate." Cowen, perhaps frustrated by the standoff with the military suggested the following to Deputy Under Secretary H. Freeman Matthews: "I have learned that Ambassador Murphy and General Ridgway enjoy a close relationship with each other. That being the case, and considering the fact that [Ridgway's] staff are in accord with the Department's position on the return of the Ryukus (sic),...it might be best to delay any discussion with the Joint Chiefs until after Ambassador Murphy has gotten to Tokyo and has had an opportunity to explore the matter with General Ridgway." See "Ambassador Cowen to Matthews (March 24, 1952)," Central Decimal File, 1950-1954 (794c.0221/3-2452), RG 59.

35. Attachment to Murphy's memorandum to Allison, Roll 7, Microfilm C0044, ONA Records, RG 59.

36. "Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State-Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting (April 2, 1952)," *FRUS, 1952-1954, Vol. 14*, 1224-1227.

37. On December 5, 1951, the northernmost islands of the Nansei Islands were returned to Japan in conjunction with the understanding that Article 3 applied to the islands south of 29 degrees Northern Latitude. See [Map 1-1](#). The Ogasawara Islands were returned on June 26, 1968 after almost a year of discussions and negotiations.

38. See for example, Watanabe, *op. cit.*, 18.

39. The subject of "reversion," or *fukki*, was considered taboo for the first several years of the occupation and it was not until 1951 before any serious discussion or movement was seen in Okinawa on this important question. Indeed,

political parties in Okinawa were divided initially over both policy and tactics. For example, the Okinawa People's Party (Okinawa *Jinminto*), a Communist-led party founded on July 20, 1947, called for early reversion (as well as a "Full Peace," or *zenmen kowa*, including the Communist nations), as did the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party (Okinawa Shakai Taishuto), founded on October 31, 1950 (although its stance was moderate, and sought not to portray the movement as anti-American). On the other hand, the Socialist Party (Shakaito), founded on October 20, 1947 through a merger of two smaller socialist parties, supported trusteeship with the United States as administering authority, while the Republican Party (*Kyowato*), founded on October 28, 1950, sought independence. In an attempt to overcome these differences, four-party meetings were held at the urging of the Olzinawa People's Party in Naha on February 16 and 21, 1951. Despite these divergent views, the Okinawa Gunto Legislature passed the first-ever resolution shortly after that on March 19 by a vote of 15 to 3 calling for reversion to Japan (Nihon *Fukki Yosei Ketsugi*). Subsequently, the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party on April 29 founded a non-partisan "Association for the Promotion of the Reversion to Japan" (*Nihon Sokoku Fukki Sokushin Kiseikai*) in order to build momentum for the reversion movement and undertake a signature drive. The signature drive, launched officially on May 20, eventually collected more than 199,000 signatures, or 72.1% of the eligible Toters (over the age of 20) in Okinawa. The results were sent to Yoshida and Dulles by Taira Tatsuo, the *Gunto* (Island) Governor of Olzinawa on August 28. See Taira Tatsuo, *Sengo no Siekai: Rimenshi* [The Inside History of Postwar Political World], (Naha: Nanposha, 1963), 278. Following the peace treaty conference in San Francisco, divisions emerged within the movements and parties, with more extreme groups calling for the abrogation of Article 3 and more moderate groups calling for working within the framework of the treaty and a cooperative relationship with the United States. (Kanai Masao, originally from Amami, was representative of the latter group and exercised significant influence in the Amami reversion movement. For a recent study, see Robert D. Eldridge, "The Amami Reversion Movement: Its Origins, Meaning, and Impact," Paper presented at the Fourth Annual Asian Studies Conference Japan, June 25, 2000, Sophia University, Tokyo.) Despite these differences, reversion to Japan became the general goal of the parties in Okinawa and would build in strength over the coming years. For a discussion on Okinawan reactions to the Peace Treaty and local political movements, see in addition to Higa and Watanabe, Okinawaken Sokoku Fukki Kyogikai, ed., *Okinawaken Sokoku Fukki Undoshi* (A History of the of Olzinawa Prefecture Reversion Movement to the Fatherland), (Naha: Okinawa Jiji Shuppansha, 1964), 57-65; Okinawa Shakai Taishutoshii Hensan Iinkai, ed., *Okinawa Shakai Taishutoshii* (A History of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party), (Naha: Okinawa Shakai Taishuto, 1981), 21-25; Olzinawa Jinmintoshii Henshu Kankō Iinlzai, ed., *Okinawa Jinminto no Rekishi* (A History of the Olzinawa People's Party), (Naha: Nihon Kyosanto Okinawaken Iinlzai, 1985), 88-97; Nakachi, *op. cit.*, 55-56.


40. "Nihon Fukki no Seigan Ketsugi (Resolution Calling For Reversion to Japan)," *Ryukyu Shimpo*, April 30, 1952.

Appendix

Views on the Disposition of Okinawa Within the United States Government, 1942-1952

State Department
(*political considerations*)

U.S. Military
(*strategic considerations*)



Selected Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES

Government Documents, Manuscript Collections, Research Materials and Collections

Douglas MacArthur Memorial Archives and Library, Norfolk, Virginia

Records of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), 1945-1951

Records of the Far East Command, 1947-1951

Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas

Papers of John Foster Dulles

Gaimusho Gaiko Shiryokan (The Diplomatic Record Office of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Azabudai, Minato Ward, Tokyo

Records on the Treaty of Peace With Japan (7th Opening, 1982)

SCAP-IN Collection

Records on the Reversion of Amami Oshima (11th Opening, 1991)

George C. Marshall Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia

Papers of W. Walton Butterworth

Papers of George C. Marshall

Papers of Forrest C. Pogue

U.S. Department of the Army, Plans and Operations Division, Miscellaneous Papers on Japan (RG 319)

Papers of C. Ben Wright

Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence, Missouri

Papers of Dean G. Acheson

Papers of Clark M. Clifford

Papers of Robert L. Dennison

Papers of George M. Elsey

Papers of Sidney W. Souers

Papers of Harry S. Truman: Central Files

Papers of Harry S. Truman: Post-Presidential Files
 Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Official File
 Papers of Harry S. Truman: President's Secretary File
 Papers of Harry S. Truman: Records of the National Security Council
 Papers of Jaines E. Webb
 Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Stanford, California
 Papers of Joseph W. Ballantine
 Papers of John T. Caldwell
 Papers of Eugene H. Dooman
 Papers of John K. Emmerson
 Papers of Marshall Green
 Papers of Maxwell M. Hamilton
 Papers of Howard P. Jones
 Papers of George H. Kerr
 Papers on the Ryukyu Islands (1952-1957)
 Papers of Paul H. Skuse
 Papers of Joseph W. Stilwell
 Papers of Jaines T. Watkins, IV
 Kensei Shiryo Shitsu, Kokkai Toshokan (National Diet Library), Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo
 Occupation of Japan Materials (microfilm)
 Postwar Planning Materials (microfilm)
 Joint Chiefs of Staff Materials (microfilm)
 Ph.D. Dissertations on Japan Collection
 Kyodo Shiryo Shitsu (Local Materials Reading Room), Ryukyu Daigaku Fuzoku Toshokan (Ryukyu University Library), Nishihara-cho, Okinawa
 Ph.D. Dissertations/Master's Theses on Okinawa Collection
 Watkins Collection (Okinawan Papers Deposited by James T. Watkins, Stanford University Hoover Institution)
 Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, Texas
 The V. Alexis Johnson Diaries
 Manuscripts and Archives Division, Yale University Library, Yale, Connecticut
 The Henry Lewis Stimson Diaries
 Military History Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania
 Papers of Paul W. Caraway
 Papers of Jaines E. Lampert
 Papers of Matthew E. Ridgway
 Papers of William C. Westinoreland
 Ryukyu Papers (Prepared by Arnold G. Fisch, Jr.)
 Nahashi Shiryo Senta (Naha City Historical Association Archives), Naha City, Okinawa
 Eattle of Okinawa and Early Occupation Materials
 National Security Archive, Gelman Library, George Washington University, Washington, D.C.

U.S.-Japan Project Documents

Okinawa Ken Kobunshokan (Okinawa Prefectural Archives), Haebaru-cho, Okinawa

USCAR Documents

Okinawa Ken Toshokan (Okinawa Prefectural Library), Naha, Okinawa

Local Materials Collection

Uruma Shimpō (microfilm)

Ryūkyū Shimpō (microfilm)

Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey

Papers of John Foster Dulles

Papers of James V. Forrestal

Papers of George F. Kennan

Special Collections Library, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina

Papers of Robert L. Eichelberger

United States National Archives, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

Record Group 84, Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State

Record Group 107, Records of the Office of the Secretary of War

Record Group 165, Records of the War Department General and Special Staffs

Record Group 218, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Record Group 319, Records of the Army Staff

Record Group 331, Records of GHQ/SCAP

United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland

Papers of William J. Seabald

Oral Histories

Association for Diplomatic Studies, Foreign Affairs Oral History Program, Lauinger Library, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

Richard W. Boehm, June-September, 1994

David L. Osborn, November 15, 1989

Richard W. Petree, July 22, 1993

Ulrich A. Straus, December 1992–February 1993

Philip Trezise, May 17, 1989

Japan Country Collection (2 Volumes)

George C. Marshall Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Virginia

Dorothy Hessman, October 1, 1970

Carlton Savage, September 30, 1970

John Foster Dulles Oral History Project, Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey

John M. Allison, April 20, 1969

C. Stanton Babcock, July 23, 1964

W. Walton Butterworth, September 8, 1965

U. Alexis Johnson, May 28, 1966

George F. Kennan, 1967

Nobusuke Kishi, 1964
 Douglas MacArthur, II, December 18, 1966
 Katsuo Okazaki, October 2, 1964
 William J. Sebald, 1965
 Yoshida Shigeru, September 30, 1964
 Lyndon B. Johnson Oral History Collection, Lyndon B. Johnson Library and
 Museum, University of Texas, Austin, Texas
 Dean Rusk, January 2, 1970
 Oral History Research Office, Columbia University, New York City, New York
 The Reminiscences of Joseph W. Ballantine
 The Reminiscences of Hugh Borton
 The Reminiscences of Eugene H. Dooman
 The Reminiscences of Youel Harlan
 The Reminiscences of Douglas W. Overton
 Truman Library Oral History Program, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library,
 Independence, Missouri
 Lucius D. Eattle, June 23, 1971
 Niles W. Bond, December 28, 1973
 W. Walton Eutterworth, July 6, 1971
 U. Alexis Johnson, June 19, 1975
 Robert A. Lovett, July 7, 1971
 Livingston T. Merchant, May 27, 1975
 J. Graham Parsons, July 1, 1974
 Charles E. Saltzman, June 28, 1974
 Special Collections Division, Nimitz Library, United States Naval Academy,
 Annapolis, Maryland
 The Reminiscences of William J. Sebald (3 Volumes), 1977

Personal Interviews by Author/Correspondence with Author

Eiltichi Aralti (Family of), Fujisawa City, Japan, November 29, 1999
 Richard L. Armitage, Arlington, Virginia, June 23, 1998
 Niles W. Bond, Old Lyme, Connecticut, August 11, 1998, and September 26, 1998
 W. Walton Butterworth (Family of), Seattle, Washington, December 11, 1999;
 Greenwich, Connecticut, December 27, 1999
 William I. Cargo, Arlington, Virginia, February 5, 1998
 John P. Davies, Jr, Asheville, North Carolina, November 20, 1997
 Olcott H. Deming, Georgetown, Washington, D.C., February 1 and 8, 1998
 Rust M. Deming, Tokyo, July 29, 1997 and Washington, D.C., June 22, 1998
 George M. Esek, Georgetown, Washington, D.C., May 22, 2000
 Robert A. Fearey, Bethesda, Maryland, September 1, 1997 and February 8, 1998
 Richard B. Finn, Bethesda, Maryland, September 25, 1997, August 29, 1997,
 September 20, 1997, November 26, 1997, and June 16, 1998
 Edward O. Freimuth, Annandale, Virginia, September 19, 1997

Marshall Green, Washington, D.C., September 14, 1997, February 1, 1998, and February 8, 1998
 George F. Kennan, Princeton, New Jersey, September 5, 1997, September 15, 1997, and September 24, 1998
 Henry W. Lawrence, Tokyo, Japan, December 13, 1997
 Mrs. John W. Masland, West Lebanon, New Hampshire, September 15, 1998
 Mariko Terasaki Miller, Casper, Wyoming, September 11, 1997 and November 12, 1997
 Kiichi Miyazawa, Tokyo, Japan, October 4, 1999
 Sen Nishiyama, Tokyo, Japan, December 13, 1997
 Seisaku Ota, Ogikubo, Tokyo, Japan, June 10, 1997
 William T. Pendley, Montgomery, Alabama, September 16, 1996
 James K. Penfield, Seattle, Washington, December 10, 1999
 Edward B. Rice, Tiburon, California, June 12, 2000
 John S. Service, Oakland, California, October 16, 1998
 William N. Stokes, Eethesda, Maryland, March 22, 2000
 Ulrich A. Straus, Silver Spring, Maryland, September 12, 1996
 John M. Steeves, Hershey, Pennsylvania, June 13, 1998 and July 28, 1998
 Justin Williams, Sr., Venice, Florida, November 22, 1999 and July 7, 2000

Personal Papers (shared with author)

Niles W. Bond
 Robert A. Fearey
 Richard B. Finn
 Edward O. Freimuth
 Marshall Green
 Kayo Yasuharu, courtesy of Kayo Yasuaki
 Henry A. Lawrence
 Thomas H. Murfin
 Ulrich A. Straus
 Gerald Warner

Published Memoirs, Diaries, Personal Accounts, and Unpublished Private Papers

Acheson, Dean. *Morning and Noon: A Memoir*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1965.
 Acheson, Dean. *Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department*. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1969.
 Allison, John M. *Ambassador from the Prairie or Allison Wonderland*. Easton: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973.
 Ashida, Hitoshi (edited by Shindo Eiichi and Shiinokobe Motoharu). *Ashida Hitoshi Nikki* (The Diary of Ashida Hitoshi). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1986.
 Ball, W. Macmahon. *Japan: Enemy or Ally?* New York: The John Day Company, 1949.

- Bohlen, Charles E. *Witness to History*, 1929-1969. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1973.
- Eorton, Hugh. *American Presurrender Planning for Postwar Japan*. Occasional Papers of The East Asian Institute, Columbia University, New York, New York, 1967.
- Eorton, Hugh. "Preparation for the Occupation of Japan," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (February 1966), 203-212.
- Eorton, Hugh. *Spanning Japan's Modern Century: The Memoirs of Hugh Borton*. Unpublished manuscript (Published in Japanese by Asahi Shimbunsha, 1998 with the title *Sengo Nihon no Sekkeisha: Borton no Kaisorokzt*).
- Bowles, Chester. *Promises to Keep: My Years in Public Life, 1941-1969*. New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1971.
- Erdle; Omar N. *A General's Life: An Autobiography*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.
- Byrnes, James F. *All in One Lifetime*. New York: Harper and Erothers Publishers, 1958.
- Byrnes, James F. *Speaking Frankly*. New York: Harper and Erothers Publishers, 1947.
- Cargo, William I. and Margaret L. Cargo. *Wherever the Road Leads: A Memoir*. Private publisher, 1997 (copy received from Ambassador Cargo).
- Chiang Kai-shek. *Sho Kai Seki Hiroku 14—Nihon Kofuku* (Chiang Kai-shek's Secret Records Vol. 14—Japan's Surrender). Tokyo: Sankei Shimbunsha, 1977.
- Clark, Mark W. *From the Danube to the Yalu*. New York: Harper and Erothers, 1954.
- Clifford, Clark. *Counsel to the President: A Memoir*. New York: Random House, 1991.
- Davies, John P. Jr. *Dragon by the Tail: American, British, Japanese, and Russian Encounters with China and One Another*. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1972.
- Dewey, Thomas E. *Journey to the Far Pacific*. Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1952.
- Dulles, John Foster. "A Diplomat and His Faith," *The Christian Century*, March 19, 1952, 336-338.
- Else; George M. "Memoir: Some White House Recollections, 1942-1953," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 12, No. 3 (Summer 1988), 357-364.
- Emmerson, John K. *The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service*. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1978.
- Feare; Robert A. "My Year with Ambassador Joseph C. Grew," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1992), 99-136.
- Forrestal, James V. (edited by Walter Millis). *The Forrestal Diaries*. New York: Viking Press, 1951.
- Green, Marshall. *Pacific Encounters: Recollections and Humor*. Eethesda: Dacor Press. 1997.

- Green, Marshall, John H. Holdridge, and William N. Stokes. *War and Peace With China: First-Hand Experiences in the Foreign Service of the United States*. Bethesda, Maryland: Dacor Press, 1994.
- Hull, Cordell. *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1948.
- Ikeda, Hayato. *Kinko Zaisei fu Senryoka Sannen no Omoide* (Balanced Finance and Memories of Three Years Under Occupation). Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 1999.
- Irie, Tsukemasa (edited by Irie Tametoshi). *Irie Tsukemasa Nikki* (The Diary of Irie Tsukemasa). Tokyo: Asahi Shiinbunsha, 1991.
- Jessup, Philip C. *The Birth of Nations*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.
- Johnson, U. Alexis. *The Right Hand of Power: The Memoirs of an American Diplomat*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1984.
- Kase, Toshikazu. *Journey to the Missouri*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950.
- Kennan, George F. *Memoirs, Volume 1: 1925-1950*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1967.
- Kennan, George F. *Memoirs, Volume 11: 1950-1963*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1972.
- King, Ernest J. *Fleet Admiral King: A Naval Record*. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1952.
- Krock, Arthur. *Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line*. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1968.
- Leah; William D. *I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman, Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time*. New York: Whittlesey House, 1950.
- MacArthur, Douglas. *Reminiscences*. New York: McGraw Books, 1964.
- Miyazawa, Kiichi. *Tokyo-Washington no Mitsudan* (Secret Talks Between Tokyo and Washington). Tokyo: Jitsugyo no Nihonsha, 1956.
- Murphy, Robert D. *Diplomat Among Warriors*. New York: Doubleday, 1964.
- Nakayoshi, Ryoko. *Okinawa Sokoku Fukki Undoki* (A Record of the Okinawa Reversion Movement). Naha: Okinawa Taimususha, 1964.
- Nishimura Kumao, "Kowa Joyaku (The Peace Treaty)," in Asahi Shimbun, ed. *Kataritsugzt Showashi: Gekido no Hanseki* (Oral History of the Showa Period: Half-Century of Rapid Change), Vol. 6. Tokyo: Asahi Shiinbunsha, 1977.
- Nishimura, Kumao, "Okinawa Kizoku no Kimaru Made—Motomeru ni Isoideatta Nihon no Seron (Until the Reversion of Okinawa is Decided—Public Opinion Demanded [the Return of the Islands] Too Quickly)," *Asahi Jaanaru* (Asahi Journal), Vol. 1, No. 15 (June 21, 1959), 19.
- Nishimura, Kumao. *San Fztranshisuko Heiwa Joyaku Nichibei Anpo Joyaku* (The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty). Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 1999.
- Nishimura, Kumao. "San Furanshisuko Heiwa Joyaku ni Tsuite (on the San Francisco Peace Treaty)," *Kasumigasekikai Kaiho* (Kasumigaseki Association Newsletter), May 1979, 24-28.

- Nishimura, Kumao. "San Furanshisuko no Omoide (Memories of San Francisco)," *Chuo Koron*, Vol. 72, No. 6 (May 1957), 74-80.
- Nishimura, Kumao. "Senryo Zenki no Tainichi Kowa Mondai—Muttsu no Dentatsu (The Problem of the Peace Treaty With Japan—Six Attempts at Communication)," *Fainansu* (Finance), Vol. 10, No.11 (February 1975), 77-83.
- Okazaki, Katsuo. *Sengo 20 Nen no Henreki* (Travels During Twenty Years of the Postwar). Tokyo: Chuo Koronshinsha, 1999.
- Okazaki, Katsuo. "Yoshida Naikaku no Shutsugen to Heiwa Joyaku Teiketsu no ButaiUra (Behind the Scenes of the Emergence of the Yoshida Cabinet and the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty)," *Gaiko Jiho* (Revue Diplomatique), April 1964.
- Ota, Masahide. *Okinawa no Ketsudan* (Okinawa's Decision). Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun, 2000.
- Passin, Herbert. *Encounter With Japan*. Tokyo: Kodansha International, Ltd., 1982.
- Radford, Arthur W. (edited by Stephen Jurika, Jr.). *From Pearl Harbor to Vietnam: The Memoirs of Admiral Arthur W. Radford*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1980.
- Reischauer, Edwin O. *My Life Between Japan and America*. Tokyo: John Weatherhill, Inc., 1986.
- Ridgway, Matthew E. *Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway*. New York: Harper and Erothers, 1956.
- Rusk, Dean. *As I Saw It: A Secretary of State's Memoirs*. London: I. E. Tauris and Co., 1991.
- Sebald, William J. *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation*. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1965.
- Senaga, Kamejiro. *Senaga Kamejiro Kaisorokzt* (The Memoirs of Senaga Kamejiro). Tokyo: Shinnihon Shuppansha, 1991.
- Shimoda, Takezo. *Sengo Nihon Gaiko no Shogen; Nihon wa Koshite Saisei Shita* (Testimony of Postwar Japanese Diplomacy: This is How Japan Was Reborn). Tokyo: Gyosei Mondai Kenkyujo, 1984.
- Shikiya, Koshin. *Renraku Jiko Biborokzt* (Daily Notes of Governor Shikiya Koshin). Unpublished notes in possession of author.
- Stettinius, Edward R. (edited by Campbell, Thomas M. and George C. Herring). *The Diaries of Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., 1943-1946*. New York: New Viewpoints, 1975.
- Stimson, Henry L. *On Active Service in Peace and War*. New York: Harper and Erothers, 1947.
- Terasaki, Gwen. *Bridge to the Sun*. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1973.
- Terasaki, Hidenari and Mariko Terasaki Miller. *Showa Tenno Dokuhakuroku: Terasaki Hidenari Goyogakari Nikki* (Personal Account of the Showa Emperor: The Diary of Terasaki Hidenari, Adviser to the Emperor). Tokyo: Bungei Shunjusha, 1991.
- Truman, Harry S. *Memoirs, Volume I: Year of Decisions*. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1955.

- Truman, Harry S. *Memoirs, Volume II: Years of Trial and Hope*. New York: Signet Eook edition, 1965.
- Truman, Harry S. *Mr. Citizen*. New York: Bernard Geis Associates, 1960.
- Welles, Sumner. *Seven Decisions that Shaped History*. New York: Harper and Erothers Publishers, 1950.
- Welles, Sumner. *The Time for Decision*. New York: Harper and Erothers Publishers, 1944.
- Whitney, Courtney. *MacArthur: His Rendezvous With History*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1956.
- Yoshida, Shigeru. *Kaiso Junen* (Recollections of Ten Years), 4 Volumes. Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1957.
- Yoshida, Shigeru. *Oiso Zuiso* (Random Thoughts from Oiso). Tokyo: Sekkasha, 1962.
- Yoshida, Shigeru. *The Yoshida Memoirs: The Story of Japan in Crisis*. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1973.

Documents and Reference Materials

- Bundy, Harvey H. and James G. Rogers. *The Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs: A Report with Recommendations Prepared for the Commission on Organization of Executive Branch of the Government*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949.
- Department of State. *Biographic Register of the Department of State* (for the years of 1945-1952). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1942, China*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1956.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. 1, General; The The United Nations*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945, Vol. 6, The British Commonwealth, The Far East*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1969.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. 1, General; The United Nations*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Vol. 8, The Far East*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. 1, General; The United Nations*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 19, Vol. 6, The Far East*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1972.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. 1, General; The United Nations Part 2*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976.

- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Vol. 6, The Far East and Australasia*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. 7, The Far East and Australasia Part 2*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. 6, East Asia and the Pacific*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Vol. 7, Korea*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Vol. 6 Asia and the Pacific (in two parts) Part 1*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1977.
- Department of State. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol. 14, China and Japan (in two parts) Part 2*. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985.
- Department of State. *Foreign Service Lists* (for the years 1945 to 1952). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
- Department of State. *The Department of State Bulletin* (for the years 1945 to 1952). Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office.
- Division of the Federal Register, National Archives. *United States Government Organization Manual* (for the years of 1945-1952). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Etzold, Thomas H. and John Lewis Gaddis, eds. *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978.
- Fuchigami, Fusataro. *This is Okinawa! A Straightforward Appeal to Leaders of America*. The Relief Association for Okinawa & Ogasawara, October 1957.
- Gaimusho, ed. *Shoki Tainichi Senryo Seisaku: Asakai Koichiro Hokokusho* (Early Occupation Policy for Japan: The Asakai Koichiro Reports). Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbunsha, 1979.
- Hata, Ikuhiko, ed. *Sekai Shokoku no Seido, Soshiki, Jinji 1840-1987* (The Personnel, Organizations, and Systems of Countries Around the World, 1840-1987). Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1988.
- Iokihe, Makoto, ed. *The Occupation of Japan: U.S. Planning Documents, 1942-1945*. Bethesda: Congressional Information Service, Inc., 1987.
- Iokihe, Makoto, ed. *The Occupation of Japan, Part 2: U.S. and Allied Policy, 1945-1952*. Bethesda: Congressional Information Service, Inc., 1989.
- Iokihe, Makoto, ed. *The Occupation of Japan, Part 3: Reform, Recovery and Peace, 1945-1952*. Bethesda: Congressional Information Service, Inc., 1991.
- Nakano, Yoshio, ed. *Sengo Shiryo: Okinawa* (Postwar Materials: Okinawa). Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1969.
- Nelson, Anna Kasten, ed. *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, 1947, Vol. 1*. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1983.
- Nelson, Anna Kasten, ed. *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, 1948, Vol. 2*. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1983.

- Nelson, Anna Kasten, ed. *The State Department Policy Planning Staff Papers, 1949, Vol. 3*. New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1983.
- Nihon Gaikoshi Jiten Hensan Iinkai, ed. *Nihon Gaikoshi Jiten* (Encyclopedia of Japanese Diplomatic History). Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1992.
- Okinawa Henkan 20 Shunen Kinen Gyoji Minkan Jikko Iinkai, ed. *Okinawa Henkan Kankei Shuyo Nenpyo Shiryoshu* (Documents and Chronology of Important Events Relating to the Reversion of Okinawa). Tokyo: Japan Foundation Center for Global Foundation, 1992.
- Otake, Hideo, ed. *Sengo Nihon Boei Mondai Shiryoshu* (Documents on the Problem of Postwar Japanese Defense), *Daiikkkan* (Vol. 1), *Higunjika Kara Saigunbi e* (From Demilitarization to Rearmament). Tokyo: Sanichi Shoho, 1991.
- Otake, Hideo, ed. *Sengo Nihon Boei Mondai Shiryoshu* (Documents on the Problem of Postwar Japanese Defense), *Dainikan* (Vol. 2), *Kowa to Saigunhi no Honkakuka* (The Peace Treaty and the Start of Full Rearmament). Tokyo: Sanichi Shoho, 1992.
- Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley Not-ter, 1939-1945*. Eethesda, Maryland: Congressional Information Service, Inc. 1985.
- Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman (1945-1952)*. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1961.
- Takemae, Eiji, ed. *GHQ Senryo shi* (History of the Non-Military Activities of the Occupation of Japan, 1945-1951). Tokyo: Nihon Tosho Senta, 1996.
- Yamagiwa Akira, Nakamura Masanori, Okada Ryonosuke, eds. *Shiryō Nihon Senryo 1 Tennosei* (Documents on the Japanese Occupation, Vol. 1: The Emperor System). Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1990.
- Yamamoto, Munetsugu, ed., *Kokztsai Joyakushu* (International Treaties). Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1995.

Official Histories

- Appelman, Roy E., et. al. *Okinawa: The Last Battle*. Washington, D.C.: United States Amŀ; Center of Military History, 1991.
- Cline, Ray S. *Washington Command Post: The Operations Division*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Amŀ; Office of the Chief of Military History, 1951.
- Colm, Peter W., et. al. *The Reversion of Okinawa: A Case Study in Intra-Agency Co-ordination (U)—Paper P-889*. Arlington: Institute for Defense Analyses, 1972.
- Condit, Doris M. *The History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Volume II: The Test of War, 1950-1953*. Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988.
- Condit, Kenneth W. *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume II, 1947-1949*. Wilmington: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1979.

- Fisch, Arnold G., Jr. *Military Government in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1950* (Army Historical Series). Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1988.
- Futrell, Robert F. *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953*, Rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: Officer of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1983.
- Gaimusho Hyakunenshi Hensan Iinkai, ed. *Gaimusho no Hyakunen* (100 Years of the Foreign Ministry), Vol. 2. Tokyo: Hara Shoho, 1969.
- Hewes, James E. Jr. *From Root to McNamara: Army Organization and Administration, 1900-1963*. Washington, D.C.: United States Army Center of Military History, 1975.
- Historical Office, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Organizational Development of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1942-1989*. Washington, D.C.: Historical Office, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1989.
- Hone, Thomas C. *Power and Change: The Administrative History of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1946-1986*. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, 1989.
- Kadena Air Base, 1945-1995: *Fifty Years of Heritage*. Kadena: Office of History, 18th Wing, Kadena Air Base, 1995.
- Okinawa Prefecture. *Okinawa: The 50 Years of the Postwar Era*. Naha: Okinawaken, 1995.
- Palmer, Michael A. *Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade*. Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, Naval Historical Center, 1988.
- Poole, Walter S. *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume IV, 1950-1952*. Wilmington: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1980.
- Rearden, Steven L. *The History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Volume I: The Formative Years, 1947-1950*. Washington, D.C. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Historical Office, 1984.
- Schnabel, James F. *The History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume I, 1945-1947*. Wilmington: Michael Glazier, Inc., 1979.
- Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery. *Organizational History of the National Security Council during the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations*. August 1960.
- Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. *The Political Reorientation of Japan, September 1947-September 1948*. 2 Volumes. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Press, 1949.
- Welfare Department, Okinawa Prefecture. *An Oral History of the Battle of Okinawa*. Naha: Prefectural Peace Memorial Museum, 1992.
- Who's Who in America: A Biographical Dictionary of Notable Living Men and Women* Chicago: A. N. Marquis Co. (1930-1953).

Newspapers, Journals, and Periodicals Cited or Consulted

America Kenkyu (America Review)
American Political Science Review
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
Asahi Jaanaru (Asahi Journal)
Asahi Shimbun (Asahi Newspaper)
Asian Survey
Asia-Pacific Review
Chuo Koron (The Central Review)
Christian Century
Christian Science Monitor
Collier's
Comparative Strategy
Diplomatic History
Economist
Fainansu (Finance)
Far Eastern Economic Review
Far Eastern Survey
Foreign Affairs
Gailzo Jiho (Revue Diplomatique)
Hiroshima Hogalzu (The Hiroshima University Law Review)
Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics
International Affairs
International Security
Japan Quarterly
Japanese Journal of American Studies
Journal of American-East Asian Relations
Journal of American History
Journal of Japanese Studies
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies
Kasumigasekikai Kaiho (Kasumigaseki Association Newsletter)
Keio Hogalzu (Legal Studies, Keio University)
Keizai Orai (Economic Comings and Goings)
Kobe Hogaku (Kobe Law)
Kobe University Law Review
Kokusaiho Gailzo Zasshi (Journal of International Law and Diplomacy)
Kokusai Seiji (International Relations)
Kwansei Gakuin Hogalzu (Kwansei Gakuin Law Review)
Life Magazine
Mainichi Shimbun (Mainichi Newspaper)
Misuzu
Nankai Nichinichi Shimbun (Nankai Nichinichi Newspaper)
National Geographic Magazine
Naval War College Review

New Republic
 Newsweek
 New York Times
 New York Times Magazine
 Pacific Affairs
 Pacific Historical Review
 Pacific Stars and Stripes
 Political Science Quarterly
 Rekishi Kenkyu (Historical Review)
 Rokkodai Ronshu (Kobe University Graduate School of Law Review)
 Ryudai Hogaku (Ryukyu University Law Review)
 Ryukyu Shimpo (Ryukyu Daily News)
 Saturday Evening Post
 Science and Society
 Scientific Monthly
 Sekai (The World)
 Shiso (Thought)
 Social Science Japan
 Taiyo (The Sun)
 Time Magazine
 Uruma Shimpo (Uruma Daily News, predecessor to Ryukyu Shimpo)
 U.S. News & World Report
 Virginia Quarterly Review
 Waseda Journal of Asian Studies
 World Politics
 World Report
 World Today
 Yomiuri Shimbun (Yomiuri Newspaper)

SECONDARY SOURCES

Books

- Aketagawa, Toru. *Nichibei Gyosei Kyotei no Seijishi: Nichibei Chii Kyotei Kenkyu Josetsu* (The Political History of the U.S.-Japan Administrative Agreement: Introductory Study of the U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement). Tokyo: Hosei Daigaku Shuppankyoku, 1999.
- Allison, Graham. *Essence of a Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971.
- Ambrose, Stephen E. *Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938* (3rd Edition). New York: Penguin, 1984.
- Ando Yoshio. *Showa Keizaishi e no Shogen* (Testimony to the Economic History of the Showa Period), Vol. 2. Tokyo: Xsahi Shimbunsha, 1966.
- Xoyanagi Keisuke. *Kaze no Otoko* (Man of the Wind: Shirasu Jiro). Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1997.

- Arasaki, Moriteru. *Sengo Okinawashi* (Postwar Okinawa History). Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1981.
- Barnet, Richard J. *The Alliance: America-Europe-Japan Makers of the Postwar World*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.
- Eattistini, Lawrence H. *Japan and America: From Earliest Times to the Present*. Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1953.
- Eeal, John Robinson. *John Foster Dulles, 1888-1959*. New York: Harper and Erothers Publishers, 1959.
- Binnendick, Johannes A. "The Dynamics of Okinawan Reversion, 1945-69," in Gregory Henderson, ed. *Public Diplomacy and Political Change—Four Case Studies: Okinawa, Peru, Czechoslovakia, Guinea*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973.
- Eix, Herbert P. *Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan*. New York: Harper Collins, 2000.
- Blumenson, Martin. *Mark Clark*. New York: Congdon and Weed, Inc., 1991.
- Borden, William S. *The Pacific Alliance: United States Foreign Economic Policy and Japanese Trade Recovery, 1947-1955*. Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984.
- Eorklund, Carl W. *Men of the Pentagon: From Forrestal to McNamara*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966.
- Euckle!; Roger. *Occupation Diplomacy: Britain, the United States, and Japan, 1945- 1952*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982.
- Buell, Thomas E. *The Quiet Warrior: A Biogmphy of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance*. Eoston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974.
- Calder, Kent E. *Crisis and Compensation: Public Policy and Political Stability in Japan, 1949-1986*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- Calder, Kent E. *Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, and America's Future in Asia*. New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1996.
- Camilleri, Joseph A. and Jim Falk, eds. *The End of Sovereignty?* Vermont: Edward Elgar, 1992.
- Chase, James. *Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1998.
- Chapman, J.W.M., R. Drifte, and I.T.M. Gow. *Japan's Quest for Comprehensive Security: Defense-Diplomacy-Dependence*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982.
- Chiang Kai-shek. *China's Destiny & Chinese Economic Theory*. New York: Roy Publishers, 1947.
- Cohen, Bernard C. *The Political Process and Foreign Policy: The Making of the Japanese Peace Settlement*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957.
- Cohen, Theodore. *Remaking Japan: The American Occupa- tion as New Deal*. New York: The Free Press, 1987.
- Cohen, Warren I. *Dean Rusk*. Totowa: Cooper Square Publishers, 1980.
- Cook, Haruko Taya and Theodore F. Cook. *Japan at War: An Oral History*. New York: The New Press. 1992.

- Council on Foreign Relations (John C. Campbell). *The United States in World Affairs, 1945-1947*. New York: Harper and Erothers, 1947.
- Curry, George. *James F. Bymes. The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Vol. 14*. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1965.
- Dallek, Robert. *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
- Destler, I.M., et. al. *Managing an Alliance: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1976.
- Dixon, Joe C. *The American Military and the Far East: Proceedings of the Ninth Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy*. Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1980.
- Donovan, Rohert J. *Nemesis: Truman and Johnson in the Coils of War in Asia*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984.
- Dowel; John W. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York: W.W. Norton, 1999.
- Dowel; John W. *Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988.
- Dowel; John W. *War and Peace: Selected Essays*. New York: New Press, 1993.
- Drifte, Reinhard. *The Secztrity Factor in Japan's Foreign Policy, 1945-1952*. Erighton: Saltire Press, 1983.
- Dulles, John Foster. *War or Peace*. New York: Macinillan, 1950.
- Emmerson, John. *Arms, Yen, and Power*. New York: Dunnellen Publishing, 1971.
- Feare!; Rohert A. *The Occztpation of Japan: Second Phase, 1948-1950*. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950.
- Feifer, George. *Tennozan: The Battle of Okinawa and the Atomic Bomb*. Eoston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1992.
- Friedman, Edward, and Mark Selden, ed. *America's Asia: Dissenting Essays on American-East Asian Relations*. New York: Random House, 1969.
- Fukunaga, Fumio. *Senryoka Chztdo Seiken no Keisei to Hokai: GHQ Minseikyoku to Nihon Shakaito* (The Rise and Fall of the Centrist Administration in the Occupation Period: The GHQ Government Section and the Japan Socialist Party). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1997.
- Funahashi, Yoichi. *Alliance Adrift*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999.
- Gabe, Masaaki. *Nichibei Kankei no Naka no Okinawa* (Okinawa in Japan-U.S. Relations). Tokyo: Sanichi Shoho, 1996.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Secztrity Policy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Gaddis, John Lewis. *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War; 1941-1947*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1972.

- Gallicchio, Marc S. *The Cold War Begins in Asia: American East Asian Policy and the Fall of the Japanese Empire*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
- Green, Michael J. and Patrick M. Cronin, eds. *The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999.
- Hagiwara, Toru. *Kowa to Nihon* (The Peace Settlement and Japan). Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1950.
- Halperin, Morton H. *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy*. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974.
- Hammond, Paul Y. *Organizing for Defense: The American Military Establishment in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961.
- Hara, Kimie. *Japanese-Soviet/Russian Relations Since 1945: A Difficult Peace*. London: Routledge, 1998.
- Hasegawa, Tsuyoshi. *The Northern Territories Dispute and Russo-Japanese Relations, Vol. 1: Between War and Peace, 1697-1985*. Berkeley: University of California, 1998.
- Hata, Ikuhiko. *Hirohito Tenno Itsutsu no Ketsudan* (The Five Decisions of Emperor Hirohito). Tokyo: Kodansha, 1984 (later revised several years after Hirohito's death as *Showa Tenno Itsutsu no Ketsudan* [The Five Decisions of the Showa Emperor]). Tokyo: Eungei Shunjusha, 1994.
- Hata, Ikuhiko. *Shiroku Saigunbi* (A Record of Japan's Rearmament). Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1976.
- Heller, Francis H. *The Truman White House: The Administration of the Presidency, 1945-1953*. Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1980.
- Higa, Mikio. *Politics and Parties in Postwar Okinawa*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia, 1963.
- Hilderbrand, Robert C. *Dumbarton Oaks: The Origins of the United Nations and the Search for Postwar Security*. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1990.
- Hiyane, Teruo. *Kindai Okinawa no Seishinshi* (History of Modern Okinawa's Psychology). Tokyo: Shakai Hyoronsha, 1996.
- Hogan, Michael J. *A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Holsti, K.J. *International Politics: A Framework For Analysis, 4th ed.* Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1983.
- Hosoya, Chihiro and Homma Nagayo, eds. *Nichibei Kankeishi Masatsu to Kyocho no 140 Nen* (Japan-U.S. Relations: 140 Years of Friction and Cooperation). Tokyo: Yuhikaku Sensho, 1991.
- Hosoya, Chihiro. *San Furanshisztko Kowa e no Michi* (The Road to the San Francisco Peace Treaty). Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1984.
- Igarashi, Takeshi. *Sengo Nichibei Kankei no Keisei: Kowa Anpo to Reisengo no Shiten ni Tatte* (The Formation of the Postwar Japan-U.S. Relationship: From the Perspective of the Peace Treaty; Security Relationship, and After the Cold War). Tokyo: Kodansha, 1995.

- Igarashi, Takeshi. *Tainichi Kowa to Reisen* (The Treaty of Peace with Japan and the Cold War). Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986.
- Immerman, Richard H., ed. *John Foster Dulles and the Diplomacy of the Cold War*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990.
- Inoki, Masamichi. *Hyoden Yoshida Shigeru* (Yoshida Shigeru: A Biography). Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1981.
- Iokihe, Makoto. *Beikokzt no Nihon Senryo Seisaku* (U.S. Occupation Policy for Japan). Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha, 1985.
- Iokihe, Makoto. *Nichibei Senso to Sengo Nihon* (The Japan-U.S. War and Postwar Japan). Osaka: Osaka Shoseki, 1989.
- Iokihe, Makoto. *Senryoki: Shizshotachi no Shin Nippon* (The Occupation Period: The Prime Ministers and the New Japan). Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1997.
- Irokawa, Daikichi. *The Age of Hirohito: In Search of Modern Japan*. New York: The Free Press, 1995.
- Iwanami Koza Nihonshi 23 *Gendai* 2 (Iwanami Lectures on Japanese History Vol. 23, Modern History 2). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977.
- James, D. Clayton. *The Years of MacArthur, Vol. 3: Triumph and Disaster; 1945-1964*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985.
- Johnson, Chalmers. *Okinawa: Cold War Island*. Cardiff: Japan Policy Research Institute, 1999.
- Jones, F. C., Hugh Borton, and B.R. Pearn. *Survey of International Relations: The Far East, 1942-1946*. London: Oxford University Press, 1955.
- Kayo, Yasuharu. *Okinawa Minseifu: Hitotsu no Jidai no Kiseki* (Okinawa Civil Administration: The Foundation of an Era). Tokyo: Kume Shoho, 1986.
- Kennan, George F. *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1951.
- Kerr, George. *Okinawa: The History of An Island People*. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1958.
- Kojima, Noboru. *Kowa Joyaku* (The Peace Treaty). Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1992.
- Kono Yasuko. *Okinawa Henkan o Meguru Seiji to Gaiko Nichibei Kankeishi no Bunmyaku* (Politics and Diplomacy Over the Reversion of Okinawa in the Context of the History of Japan-U.S. Relations). Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1994.
- Korb, Lawrence J. *The Joint Chiefs of Staff: The First Twenty-Five Years*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976.
- Lacey, Michael J., ed. *The Truman Presidency*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- LaFeber, Walter. *America, Russia, and the Cold War; 1945-1971*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1967.
- Langdon, F.C. *Japan's Foreign Policy* Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1973.
- Leckie, Robert. *Okinawa: The Last Battle of World War II*. New York: Penguin Books, 1995.
- Leffler, Mervyn P. *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.

- Leffler, Melvyn P. and David S. Painter. *Origins of the Cold War: An International History*. London: Routledge, 1994.
- Livingston, Jon, Joe Moore, and Felician Oldfather, ed. *Postwar Japan: 1945 to the Present*. New York: Pantheon Books, 1973.
- Louis, William Roger. *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- Macridis, Roy C., ed. *Foreign Policy in World Politics* (5th Edition). New York: Prentice & Hall, Inc., 1976.
- Masumi, Junnosuke (translated by Lonny E. Carlile). *Postwar Politics in Japan, 1945-1955*. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 1985.
- Masumi, Junnosuke. *Showa Tenno to Sono Jidai* (The Showa Emperor and His Era). Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1998.
- Matsuo, Takayoshi. *Kokusai Kokka e no Shuppatsu, Nihon no Rekishi 21* (Toward an International State: Japanese History Series, 21). Tokyo: Shueisha, 1993.
- McE, Ernest R. *American Cold War Strategy: Interpreting NSC 68*. Boston: Bedford Books, 1993.
- McCune, Shannon. *The Ryukyu Islands*. Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1975.
- McLellan, David S. *Dean Acheson: The State Department Years*. New York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1976.
- Messer, Robert L. *The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman, and the Origins of the Cold War*. Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1982.
- Mikuni, Ichiro, ed. *Showashi Tanbo* (A Journey Through the Showa Period), Vol. 6. Tokyo: Bancho Shobo, 1975.
- Minamura, Takeichi. *Sengo Nihon no Keisei to Hatten: Senryo to Kaikaku no Hikakz Kenkyu* (The Formation and Development of Postwar Japan: Comparative Studies of Occupation and Reform). Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Hyronsha, 1995.
- Miscamble, Wilson D. *George F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992.
- Miura, Yoichi. *Yoshida Shigeru to San Furanshisztko Kowa* (Yoshida Shigeru and the San Francisco Peace Treaty). Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten, 1996.
- Miyagi, Etsujiro. *Senryo 27 Nen Iseishatachi no Shogen* (27 Years of Occupation: The Testimony of the Rulers). Naha: Hirugisha, 1993.
- Miyagi, Etsujiro, ed. *Okinawa Senryo—Mirai e Mukete—Fukki 20 Shunen Kinen Shinpojium* (Commemorative Symposium on the 20th Anniversary of the Reversion of Okinawa). Naha: Hirugisha, 1993.
- Miyagi, Etsujiro. *Senryosha no Me* (In the Eyes of the Occupier). Naha: Naha Shuppansha, 1982.
- Miyazato, Seigen. *Amerika wa Naze, Okinawa o Nihon Kara Kirihanashitaka* (Why Did America Separate Okinawa From Japan?). Okinawa shi: Okinawa shi Kikakubu Heiwa Bunka Shinkoka, 1999.
- Miyazato, Seigen. *Amerika no Okinawa Seisakz* (American Policy for Okinawa). Naha: Niraisha, 1986.

- Miyazato, Seigen. *Amerika no Okinawa Tochi* (The American Administration of Okinawa). Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1966.
- Miyazato, Seigen. *Amerika no Taigai Seisaku Kettei Katei* (The Process of American Foreign Policy-Making). Tokyo: Sanichi Shoho, 1981.
- Miyazato, Seigen, ed. *Sengo Okinawa no Seiji to Ho, 1945-1972* (Postwar Okinawan Politics and Law, 1945-1972). Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1975.
- Morison, Samuel Eliot. *The Two-Ocean War: A Short History of the United States Navy in the Second World War*. New York: Galahad Eooks, 1963.
- Morris, M.D. *Okinawa: A Tiger By the Tail*. New York: Hawthorn Eooks, Inc., 1968.
- Mosley, Leonard. *Hirohito: Emperor of Japan*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1966.
- Mosley, Leonard. *Dulles: A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster Dztles and Their Family Network*. New York: The Dial Press, 1978.
- Murakawa, Ichiro. *Daresu to Yoshida Shigeru* (Dulles and Yoshida Shigeru). Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1991.
- Nakachi, Kiyoshi. *Ryukyu-U.S.-Japan Relations, 1945-1972: The Reversion Movement, Political, Economic, and Strategical Issues*. Quezon City: Hiyas Press, 1989.
- Nakano, Yoshio and Arasaki, Moriteru. *Okinawa 70 Nen Zengo* (Okinawa: Before and After 1970). Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1970.
- Neustadt, Richard E. *Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1976.
- Nishimura, Kumao. *Anzen Hosho Joyaku Ron* (The Security Treaty Debate). Tokyo: Jiji Shinsho, 1960.
- Nishimura, Kumao. *San Furanshisuko Heiwa Joyaku* (The San Francisco Peace Treaty). Tokyo: Kajima Heiwa Kenkyujo Shuppankai, 1971.
- Okinawa Jinminto Henshu Kanko Iinkai, ed. *Okinawa Jinminto no Rekishi* (A History of the Okinawa People's Party). Naha: Nihon Kyosanto Okinawaken Iinkai, 1985.
- Okinawa Sokoku Fukki Kyogikai, ed. *Okinawaken Sokoku Fztkki Undoshi* (A History of the Okinawa Prefecture Reversion Movement to the Fatherland). Naha: Okinawa Jiji Shuppansha, 1964.
- Okinawa Shakai Taishutoshi Hensan Iinkai, ed. *Okinawa Shakai Taishutoshi* (A History of the Okinawa Socialist Masses Party). Naha: Okinawa Shakai Taishuto, 1981.
- Osgood, Robert E. *The Weary and the Wary: U.S. and Japanese Security Policies in Transition*. Ealtimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972.
- Ota, Masahide, ed. *A Comprehensive Study on U.S. Military Government on Okinawa*. Nishihara-cho: University of the Ryukyus, 1987.
- Ota, Masahide. *Minukui Nihonjin* (The Ugly Japanese). Tokyo: Simul Shuppankai, 1995.
- Ota, Masahide. *Okinawa no Chosen* (Okinawa's Challenge). Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1990.

- Ota, Masahide. *Okinawa no Ketsudan* (Okinawa's Decision). Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 2000.
- Ota, Masahide. *Okinawa no Teio: Koto Benmukan* (Okinawa's Emperor: The High Commissioner). Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 1996.
- Pempel, T. J. *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977.
- Pogue, Forrest C. *George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945-1959*. New York: Penguin Books, 1987.
- Pratt, Julius W. *Cordell Hull (The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Vol. 13)*. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1964.
- Pruessen, Ronald W. *John Foster Dulles: The Road to Power*. New York: The Free Press, 1982.
- Rees, David. *The Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles*. New York: Praeger, 1985.
- Reischauer, Edwin O. *Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia*. New York, Alfred A. Knopf Press, 1968.
- Reischauer, Edwin O. *Transpacific Relations*. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle Co., 1968.
- Rosenau, James N., ed. *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy*. Toronto: Free Press, 1967.
- Ryukyu Daigaku Kokai Koza Iinkai, ed. *Okinawa no Sengo Shi* (Okinawa's Postwar History). Nishihara-cho: Ryukyu University, 1987.
- Ryukyu Ginko Chosabu, ed. *Sengo Okinawa Keizaishi* (Postwar Okinawa Economic History). Naha: Ryukyu Ginko, 1984.
- Sakamoto, Kazuya. *Nichibei Domei no Kizuna: Anpo Joyaku to Sogosei no Mosaku* (The Bonds of the Japan-U.S. Alliance: The Security Treaty and the Search for Mutuality). Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2000.
- Scalapino, Robert A. *American-Japanese Relations in a Changing Em*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, 1972.
- Scalapino, Robert and Masumi Junnosuke. *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.
- Scalapino, Robert A. *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
- Schaller, Michael. *Altered States: The United States and Japan Since the Occupation*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.
- Schaller, Michael. *Douglas MacArthur: The Far Eastern General*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Schaller, Michael. *The American Occupation of Japan: The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Schoenbaum, Thomas J. *Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson Years*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988.
- Schonberger, Howard E. *Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945-1952*. Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1989.
- Sebald, William J. and C. Nelson Spinks. *Japan: Prospects, Options, and Opportunities*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1967.

- Sherry, Michael S. *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941-1945*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
- Shiels, Frederick L. *America, Okinawa, and Japan: Case Studies for Foreign Policy Theory*. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980.
- Shibata, Shinichi. *Showaki no Koshitsu to Seiji Gaiko* (The Imperial Household and Political Diplomacy). Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1995.
- Shikiya Kosia Itoku Kensho Jigyo Kiseikai, ed. *Shifu Sikiya Koshin* (Teacher and Father Shikiya Koshin). Naha: Shikiya Koshin Sensei Itoku Kensho Jigyo Kiseikai, 1980.
- Shoemaker, Christopher C. *The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991.
- Smith, Perry McCoy. *The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1943-1945*. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970.
- Sneider, Richard L. *U.S.-Japanese Relations: An Historical Perspective*. New York: East Asian Institute, 1982.
- Snyder, Richard C., et. al. *Foreign Policy Decision Making: An Approach to the Study of International Politics*. New York: The Free Press, 1962.
- Sodei, Rinjiro and Takemae, Eiji, eds. *Sengo Nihon no Genten Senryoshi no Genzai* (The Origin of Postwar Japan: The Present State of Occupation History). Tokyo: Yushisha, 1992.
- Spector, Ronald H. *Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan*. New York: Vintage Books, 1985.
- Stuart, Graham H. *The Department of State: A History of Its Organization, Procedure, and Personnel*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1949.
- Summers, Harry G., Jr. *Korean War Almanac*. New York: Facts on File, 1988.
- Suzuki, Tadakatsu. *Nihon Gaikoshi, Vol. 26: Shusen Kara Kowa Made* (Japanese Diplomatic History: From the End of the War Until the Peace Treaty). Tokyo: Kajima Kenkyujo Shuppankai, 1973.
- Tamamori, Terunobu and John C. James. *A Minute Guide to Okinawa: Society and Economy*. Naha: Bank of the Ryukyus International Foundation, 1995.
- Tanaka, Akihiko. *Anzen Hoshō: Sengo 50 Nen no Mosaku* (Security: 50 Years of Searching in the Postwar). Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1997.
- Toyoshita, Narahiko. *Anpo Joyaku no Ronri—Sono Seisei to Tenkai* (The Logic of the Security Treaty—Its Birth and Development). Tokyo: Kashiwa Shohō, 1999.
- Toyoshita, Narahiko. *Anpo Joyaku no Seiritsu—Yoshida Gaiko to Tenno Gaiko* (The Formation of the Security Treaty—Yoshida's Diplomacy and the Emperor's Diplomacy). Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1996.
- Ulam, Adam E. *The Rivals: American and Russia Since World War II*. New York: The Viking Press, 1971.
- Ullman, Richard and Raymond Tanter, eds. *Theory and Policy in International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.
- Walker, Richard L. *E. R. Stettinius, Jr. (The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, Vol. 14)*. New York: Cooper Square Publishers, 1965.

- Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979.
- Ward, Robert E. and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987.
- Warner, Gordon. *The Okinawan Reversion Story: War, Peace, Occupation, Reversion 1945-1972*. Naha: The Executive Link, 1995.
- Watanabe, Akio. *The Okinawa Problem: A Chapter in U.S.-Japan Relations*. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1970.
- Watanabe, Xkio and Miyazato Seigen, eds. *San Francisco Kowa* (The San Francisco Peace Treaty). Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1986.
- Weiner, Michael, ed., *Japan's Minorities: The Illusion of Homogeneity*. London: Routledge, 1997.
- Weinstein, Franklin B., ed. *U.S.-Japan Relations and the Security of East Asia: The Next Decade*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1978.
- Weinstein, Martin E. *Japan's Postwar Defense Policy, 1947-1968*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1971.
- Welfield, John. *An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System: A Study in the Interaction of Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy*. London: The Athelone Press, 1988.
- Woods, Randall B. and Howard Jones. *Dawning of the Cold War: The United States' Quest for Order*. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1991.
- Yanagida, Kunio. Mariko. Tokyo: Shinchosha, 1980.
- Yoshitsu, Michael M. *Japan and the San Francisco Peace Settlement*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

Ph.D. Dissertations and M.A. Theses

- Amaltawa, Altira. "Nihon hondo no senryo to Oltinawa no senryo (The Occupation of the Japanese Mainland and the Occupation of Oltinawa)." *Yokhama Kokusai Keizai Hogaku*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1993), 37-65.
- Ashman, Harold Lowell. "A Review and Assessment of United States Policy in the Ryukyu Islands From 1945-1965." Unpublished M.A. thesis, Brigham Young Universiti!; 1966.
- Boyes, Jon Lippitt. "The Political Adviser (POLAD): The Role of the Diplomatic Adviser to Selected United States and North Atlantic Alliance Military Commanders." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Delaware, 1971.
- Eldridge, Robert D. "The Yoshida Doctrine and Pax Americana, 1945-1972: Geo-Economic Choices in a Geo-Political Setting." Unpublished M.A. thesis (in Japanese), Kobe Universiti!; 1996.
- Foltos, Lester J. "The Bulwark of Freedom: American Security Policy for East Asia, 1945-1952." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1980.
- Friedman, Hal Marc. "Creating an American Lake: United States Imperialism, Strategic Security, and the Pacific Basin, 1945-1947 (Cold War)," Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University, 1995.

- Ginoza, Tsuyoshi. "The International Legal Status of the Ryukyu Islands," Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1960.
- Guntharp, Walter A. "United States Foreign Policy and the Reversion of Okinawa to Japan." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The George Washington University, 1973.
- Heer, Paul J. "George F. Kennan and U.S. Foreign Policy in East Asia." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The George Washington University; 1995.
- Hewett, Robert Foster. "United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands, 1950-1960: A Historical Analysis and Appraisal of a Decade of Civil Administration of an Asian Area." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The American University; 1960.
- Kampf, Herbert A. "The United States and Okinawa: A Study in Dependency Relationship." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University; 1972.
- Liu, Xiaoyuan. "A Tentative Partnership: The United States and China Contemplate the Postwar Disposition of Japan and the Japanese Empire." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Iowa, 1990.
- Marcot, Neal Abel. "The Japanese Foreign Policymaking: A Case Study—Okinawa Reversion." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University; 1981.
- Martin, Richard Gordon. "The Okinawa Factor in U.S.-Japanese Post-World War II Relations." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia, 1982.
- McHale, William M. "American Policy for the Disposition of the Japanese Mandated Islands," Unpublished M.A. thesis, Hiroshima University; 1978.
- Nakamoto, Kazuhiko. "Democracy and Security in Conflict: America's Mission in the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1958." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Maryland at College Park, 1997.
- Sarantakes, Nick E. "Keystone: The American Occupation of Okinawa, and U.S.-Japanese Relations, 1945-1972." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California, 1996.
- Seigal, Albert. "United States Policy Toward Okinawa, 1945-1972: A Study in Organizational Interaction in Policy-Making." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, West Virginia University, 1978.
- Shoup, Lawrence H. "Shaping the National Interest: The Council on Foreign Relations, The Department of State, and the Origins of the Postwar World, 1939-1943." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University; 1974.
- Smith, Howard Frank. "The Possibility of the Ryukyu Islands Attaining a Condition of Self-Support Under a United States Trusteeship," Unpublished M.A. thesis, American University, 1952.
- Stires, Frederick Hand. "The Ryukyus: An American Dependency—An Analysis of the Military and Civil Administrations of the Ryukyu Islands, 1945-1958." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Georgetown University; 1960.
- Tull, James N. "The Ryukyu Islands, Japan's Oldest Colony and America's Newest: An Analysis of Policy and Propaganda." Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Chicago, (1953).

Articles, Essays, Papers, and Reports

- Amos, Paul S. "Oltinawa and the Liuchius," Department of State *Bulletin*, Vol. 12, No. 304 (April 22, 1945), 743-748.
- Ballantine, Joseph W. "The Future of the Ryukyus," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 31, No.4 (July 1953), 663-674.
- Barrett, George. "Report on Oltinawa: A Rampart We Built," *New York Times Magazine*, September 21, 1952, 9-11, 63, 65.
- Bell, Otis W. "Play Fair with Okinawans!" *Christian Century*, January 20, 1954.
- Bennet, Henry Stanley. "The Impact of Invasion and Occupation on the Civilians of Oltinawa," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 72 (February 1946), 262-275.
- Bess, Demaree. "Oltinawa—American Island," *Saturday Evening Post*, Vol. 226, No. 1 (July 11, 1953), 26-27; 86-88.
- Bogan, Eugene F. "Government of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 267 (January 1950), 164-174.
- Borton, Hugh. "United States Occupation Policies in Japan Since Surrender," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 62, No. 2 (June 1947), 250-257.
- Braibanti, Ralph J.D. "The Outlook for the Ryukyus," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 22, No. 7 (June 1953), 73-78.
- Braibanti, Ralph J.D. "The Role of Administration in the Occupation of Japan," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 267 (January 1950), 154-163.
- Braibanti, Ralph. "The Ryukyu Islands: Pawns of the Pacific," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 48, No. 4 (December 1954), 972-998.
- Burnham, Alexandec "Oltinawa, Harry Truman, and the Atomic Bomb," *The Virginia Quarterly Review*, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Summer 1995), 377-392.
- Chang, Hsia-hai. "The Treaty With Japan: A Chinese View," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (April 1948), 505-514.
- Connor, Sydney. "The Navy's Entry into Military Government," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 267 (January 1950), 8-18.
- Davidonis, A. C. "Some Problems of Military Government," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 38, No. 3 (June 1944), 460-474.
- Dingman, Rogec "Strategic Planning and the Policy Process: American Plans for War in East Asia, 1945-1950," *Naval War College Review*, Vol. 32 (November- December, 1979), 133-155.
- Dingman, Rogec "The U.S. Navy and the Cold War: The Japan Case," in Craig L. Symonds, ed. *New Aspects of Naval History: Selected Papers Presented at the Fourth Naval History Symposium*, United States Naval Academy, 25-26 October 1979. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1981, 291-312.
- Dooman, Eugene H., Hugh Borton, and Cabot Coville. "Formosa," Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 310 (June 3, 1945), 1018-1023.

- Dorrance, John C. "The Pacific Islands and U.S. Security Interests: A New Era Poses New Challenges," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 29, No. 7 (July 1989), 698-715.
- Dowel, John W. "A Rejoinder," *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 57 (May 1988), 202-209.
- Dulles, Foster Rhea and Gerald E. Ridinger. "The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 70, No. 1 (March 1955), 1-18.
- Dulles, John Foster. "Policy for Security and Peace," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 32 (April 1954), 353-364.
- Dulles, John Foster. "Security in the Pacific," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1952), 175-187.
- Eldridge, Robert D. "Joji F. Kenan, PPS to Okinawa: Beikoku no Okinawa Seisaku Kettei Katei, 1947-1949 (George F. Kennan, the Policy Planning Staff, and U.S. Policy-Making toward Okinawa)," *Kokusai Seiji* (International Relations), No. 120 (February 1999), 28-56.
- Eldridge, Robert D. "Showa Tenno to Okinawa (The Showa Emperor and Okinawa: The "Tenno Message" Reexamined)," *Chuo Koron* (The Central Review), Vol. 114, No. 3 (March 1999), 152-171.
- Eldridge, Robert D. "Okinawa and the Nago Heliport Problem in the U.S.-Japan Relationship," *Asia-Pacific Review*, Vol. 7, No. 1 (May 2000), 137-156.
- Eldridge, Robert D. "The Amami Reversion Movement: Its Origins, Meaning, and Impact," Paper presented at the Fourth Annual Asian Studies Conference, Japan, Sophia University, Tokyo, June 25, 2000.
- Eldridge, Robert D. "The Okinawa Prefectural Referendum: One Question, Several Answers," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 37, No. 10 (October 1997), 879-904.
- Eldridge, Robert D. and Ayako Kusunoki. "To Base or Not to Base? Yoshida Shigeru, the 1950 Ikeda Mission, and Post-Treaty Japanese Security Conception," *Kobe University Law Review*, No. 33 (1999), 97-126.
- Eldridge, Robert D. *Yomiuri* Newspaper 1999 First Place Award Article, "The San Francisco Peace Treaty and the Disposition of Okinawa: The Yoshida-Dulles 'Negotiations' Over the 'Residual Sovereignty' Formula (in Japanese)," *Yomiuri Research Institute* (Tokyo), *Collection of Award-winning Articles of 1999*, 6-33.
- Emerson, Rupert. "American Policy Toward Pacific Dependencies," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 20 (September 1947), 259-275.
- Figal, Gerald A. "Placed Names: A/historical A/effects at Okinawa's Cornerstone of Peace," *Columbia University East Asian Institute Report* (July 1996).
- Foltos, Lester J. "The New Pacific Barrier: America's Search for Security in the Pacific, 1945-1947," *Diplomatic History*, No. 13 (Summer 1989), 317-342.
- Ford, Clellan S. "Occupation Experiences on Okinawa," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 267 (January 1950), 175-182.
- Gabe, Masaaki. "Bei Tago Sanbo Honbu ni Okeru Okinawa Hoyu no Kento/Kettei Katei (The Process of Deciding on the Retention of Okinawa Within the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff), 1943-1946," *Hogaku Kenkyu* (Legal Studies), Vol. 69 No. 7 (July 1996), 73-107.

- Gabe, Masao. "Senryo Shoki no Okinawa ni Okeru Seigun Kankei (Civil Military Relations in Okinawa Under U.S. Occupation). *Nenpo Seijigaku* (The Annuals of the Japan Political Science Association), 1989. 47-73.
- Gilchrist, Huntington. "The Japanese Islands: Annexation or Trusteeship?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (July 1944), 635-642.
- Haring, Douglas G. "Amami Gunto: Forgotten Islands," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 21, No. 16 (November 19, 1952), 170-172.
- Hayward, Edwin J. "Co-ordination of Military and Civilian Affairs Planning," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 267 (January 1950), 19-27.
- Higa, Mikio. "Okinawa: Recent Political Developments," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 3, No. 9 (September 1963), 415-426.
- Higa, Mikio. "The Okinawan Reversion Movement (I)," *Ryudai Hogaku* (Ryudai Law Review), No. 17 (November 1975), 147-174.
- Higa, Mikio. "The Okinawan Reversion Movement (II)," *Ryudai Hogaku* (Ryudai Law Review), No. 18 (March 1976), 117-135.
- Higa, Mikio. "The Reversion Theme in Current Okinawan Politics," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (March 1967), 151-164.
- Hiraga, Kenta. "Okinawa Oyobi Okinawa Jumin no Chii (The Status of Okinawa and the Inhabitants of Okinawa)," *Kokusaiho Gaiko Zasshi* (The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy), Vol. 54, No. 6 (December 1955), 1-26.
- Hosoya, Chihiro. "Characteristics of the Foreign Policy Decision-Making in Japan," *World Politics*, Vol. 26 (April 1974), 353-369.
- Hosoya, Chihiro. "Japan's Response to U.S. Policy on the Japanese Peace Treaty: The Dulles-Yoshida Talks of January-February 1951," *Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics* (December 1981), 15-27.
- Hyneman, Charles S. "The Army's Civil Affairs Training Program," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (April 1944), 342-353.
- Igarashi, Takeshi. "American-Japanese Peace-Making and the Cold War, 1947-1951," *Amerika Kenkyu* (The American Review), Vol. 13 (March 1979), 166-187.
- Igarashi, Takeshi. "Peace-Making and Party Politics: The Formation of the Domestic Foreign-Policy System in Postwar Japan," *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Summer 1985), 323-356.
- Igarashi, Takeshi. "Tainichi Kowa no Teisho to Tainichi Senryo Seisaku no Tenkan (The Calls for a Peace Treaty with Japan and Changes in Occupation Policy for Japan)," *Shiso* (Thought), October 1976, 21-43.
- Iokihe, Makoto. "American Policy towards Japan's Unconditional Surrender," *The Japanese Journal of American Studies*, No. 1 (1981), 19-53.
- Iokihe, Makoto. "Kairo Sengen to Nihon no Ryodo (The Cairo Declaration and Japanese Territory)," *Hiroshima Hogaku* (The Hiroshima University Law Review), Vol. 4, Nos. 3-4 (March 1981), 85.
- Iokihe, Makoto. "United States Policy Toward East Asia," *The Japanese American Association for American Studies, The Japanese Journal of American Studies*, No. 1 (1981), 19-53.

- Johnstone, William C. "Trusteeship for Whom?" *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 12 (June 20, 1945), 156-159.
- Johnstone, William C. "Regionalism in the Pacific," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 13 (July 4, 1945), 169-171.
- Kajiura, Atsushi. "Hoppo Ryodo o Meguru Eeikoku no Seisaku—Daresu ni Yoru Tai- nichi Kowa Joyaku Keisei (U.S. Policy over the Northern Territories: The Formation of the Peace Treaty with Japan by Dulles)," *Kokusai Seiji* (International Relations), No. 85 (May 1987), 97-114.
- Kalischer, Peter. "Our Gibraltar in the Pacific," *Collier's*, October 11, 1952, 22-26.
- Karasik, Daniel D. "Okinawa: A Problem in Administration and Reconstruction," *Far Eastern Quarterly*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (May 1948), 254-267.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. and Nohuo Okawara. "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), 84-117.
- Kennan, George F. "Japanese Security and American Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 43, No. 1 (October 1964), 14-28.
- Kennan, George F. (X). "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (July 1947), 566-582.
- Keesing, Felix M. "The Former Japanese Mandated Islands," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 19 (September 26, 1945), 269-271.
- Kimball, Warren F. "'Merely a Facade'? Roosevelt and the South Pacific," *The Journal of American-East Asian Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Summer 1994), 103-126.
- Kuriyama, Masako. "Senryoki no 'Gaiko' ('Diplomacy' During the Occupation Period), Part 1," *Misuzu*, No. 251 (1981), 2-21.
- Kuriyama, Masako. "Senryoki no 'Gaiko' ('Diplomacy' During the Occupation Period), Part 2," *Misuzu*, No. 255 (1981), 24-49.
- Kusunoki, Ayako. "Senryoka Nihon no Anzen Hosho Koso: Gaimusho ni Okeru Yoshida Doctrine no Keisei Katei (Japanese Security Conceptions During the Occupation: The Foreign Ministry and the Formation of the 'Yoshida Doctrine'), 1945-1949," *Rokkodai Ronshu* (The Kobe University Graduate School of Law Review), Vol. 45, No. 3 (March 1999), 1-55.
- Kusunoki, Ayako. "Yoshida Dokutorin No Keisei: Yoshida Shigeru to Bureen Guruupu (The Formation of the Yoshida Doctrine: Yoshida Shigeru and His Brain Group)," *Kobe Hogakzt* (Kobe Law), Vol. 40, No. 3 (forthcoming).
- Lattimore, Eleanor. "Pacific Ocean or American Lake?" *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 22 (November 7, 1945), 313-315.
- Laves, Walter H. C. "The Reorganization of the Department of State," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 38, No. 2 (April 1944), 289-301.
- Livermore, Seward W. "American Naval-Base Policy in the Far East, 1850-1914," *The Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (June 1944), 113-135.
- Maki, John M. "Japan's Rearmament: Progress and Problems," *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 1955), 545-568.
- Maki, John M. "US Strategic Area or UN Trusteeship," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 16, No. 15 (August 13, 1947), 175-178.

- Mason, John Brown. "Lessons of Wartime Military Government Training," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 267 (January 1950), 183- 192.
- Mears, Helen. "Okinawa: Orphan of Conquest," *Nation*, Vol. 183 (November 3, 1956), 15-18.
- Mendel, Douglas H., Jr. "Revisionist Opinion in Post-Treaty Japan," *The American Political Science Review*, Volume 48, No. 3 (September 1954), pp. 766-774.
- Minor, Michael. "Decision Models and Japanese Foreign Policy Decision Making," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 25, No. 12 (December 1985), 1229-1241.
- Miyasato, Seigen. "Okinawa no Sengo (Okinawa's Postwar). *Rekishi Kenkyu* (Historical Research)," No 545 (September 1985), 14-33.
- Morgenthau, Hans J., "Another 'Great Debate': The National Interest of the United States," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 46, No. 4 (December 1952), 961-988.
- Murata, Koji. "The U.S.-Japan Alliance and the U.S.-Korean Alliance: Their Origins, Dilemmas, and Structures," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 14, 185-194.
- Nelson, Anna Kasten. "President Truman and the Evolution of the National Security Council," *Journal of American History*, Vol. 72, No. 2 (September 1985), 360-378.
- Newman, Marshall T., and Ransom L. Eng. "The Ryukyu People: A Cultural Appraisal," *Smithsonian Report for 1947*, 379-406.
- Nomura, Kichisaburo. "Kokudo Hozen no Tame Ni (Preserving the Country)," *Keizai Orai* (Economic Comings and Goings), September 1950, 30-31.
- Nomura, Kichisaburo. "Ryodo o Meguru Shoinondai (Problems Regarding Territorial Issues)," *Keizai Orai* (Economic Comings and Goings). June 1950, 36-42.
- Ogden, David A. D. "Keystone of the Pacific," *Army Information Digest*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (January 1954), 42-48.
- Okamoto, Koichi. "William J. Sebald: The United States Political Adviser for Japan," *Waseda Journal of American Studies*, Vol. 19 (1997), 15-39.
- "Okinawa and the Luchu Archipelago," *The World Today*, Vol. 3 (July 1947), 363-370.
- "Okinawa: Ease to Dominate Asia," *U.S. News & World Report*, Vol. 30 (June 22, 1951), 25-26.
- "Okinawa: Forgotten Island," *Time*, Vol. 54, No. 22 (November 28, 1949), 24-27.
- "Okinawa: Junkyard of the Pacific," *Life*, Vol. 27 (December 19, 1949), 19-23.
- "Okinawan Showcase," *The New Republic*, Vol. 137, No. 28 (December 30, 1957), 6.
- Omori, Shigeo. "The Okinawa Problem (2): Controversy Between Government and Opposition Parties," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. 15, No.1 (January-March 1968), 22-29.
- "On the Alert at Okinawa," *New York Times Magazine* (September 16, 1951), 10-11.
- Ota, Masahide. "War Memories Die Hard in Okinawa," *Japan Quarterly*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (January-March 1988), 9-16.

- Robertson, J. Michael. "Alfred Thayer Mahan and the Geopolitics of Asia," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 15, 1996, 353-366.
- Roosevelt, Franklin D. "Our Foreign Policy: A Democratic View," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 6, No. 4 (July 1928), 573-586.
- Schaller, Michael. "MacArthur's Japan: The View From Washington," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter 1986), 1-23.
- Schaller, Michael. "Securing the Great Crescent: Occupied Japan and the Origins of Containment in Southeast Asia," *Journal of American History*, Vol. 69 (September 1982), 392-414.
- Seidensticker, Edward G. "Japanese Views on Peace," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 20, No. 12 (June 13, 1951), 119-124.
- Shibayama, Futoshi. "Japan, An Ally of What Kind in the U.S.-Japanese Military Relations? The Negotiations Surrounding the Administrative Agreement to Implement the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, 1951-1952," *The Journal of Information and Policy Studies* (Aichi Gakuin University), Vol. 1 (March 1999), 1-24.
- Shibayama, Futoshi. "The U.S. Military and Presidential Decision to Rearm Japan Between September 1951 and August 1952," *The Journal of Information and Policy Studies* (Aichi Gakuin University), Vol. 2, No. 1 (December 1999), 35-57.
- Shindo, Eiichi. "Bunkatsu Sareta Ryodo—Okinawa, Chishima, Soshite Anpo (Separated Territories—Okinawa, Chishima, and the Security Treaty)," *Sekai* (The World), No. 401 (April 1979), 31-51, later translated as "Divided Territories and the Origin of the Cold War," *Tsukuba Hosei* (Tsukuba Law and Politics), No. 13 (1990), 244-273.
- Shindo, Eiichi. "'Tenno Messeiji' no Sairon: Sengo Gaiko Shiryo no Yomikata ('The Tenno Message' Revisited—Ways to Read Postwar Diplomatic Materials)," *Sekai* (The World), No. 407 (October 1979), 104-113.
- Slover, Robert H. "Military Goyerninen—Where Do We Stand Today?" *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 267 (January 1950), 193-200.
- Smith, Howard. "Economy of the Ryukyu Islands," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 20, No. 10 (May 1951), 102.
- Souers, Sidney W. "Policy Formulation for National Security," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (June 1949), 534-543.
- Steiner, Paul E. "Okinawa and its People—I, II," *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 64 (March 1949), 233-241; 306-312.
- Stoler, Mark A. "From Continentalism to Globalism: General Stanley D. Embick, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee, and the Military View of American National Policy During the Second World War," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 6 (Summer 1982), 301-321.
- Taira, Koji. "Ryukyu Islands Today: Political Economy of a U.S. Colony," *Science and Society*, Vol. 22 (Spring 1958), 113-118.
- Taoka, Ryoichi. "Okinawa Problems: Past, Present, and Future," *Kwansei Gakuin Hogaku* (Kwansei Gakuin Law Review), Nos. 4-5, (1968), 1-12.

- Taylor, Philip H. "The Administration of Occupied Japan," *The Annals of the American Academic of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 267 (January 1950), 140-153.
- "Tokyo's Secret Plans for Peace," *World Report*, Vol. 3, No. 24 (December 9, 1947, 18-19, 33-36.
- "The United States, Japan, and the Ryukyu Islands," *The World Today*, Vol. 8 (August 1952), 352-360.
- "The Okinawa Junk Heap," *Life*, Vol. 27 (December 19, 1949), 29-23.
- Trumbull, Robert. "Okinawa: 'Sometimes Painful' Lesson for Us," *New York Times Magazine*, April 7, 1957, 29, 60, 62-63.
- Umetsu, Hiroyuki. "Communist China's Entry into the Korean Hostilities and a U.S. Proposal for a Collective Security Arrangement in the Pacific Offshore Island Chain," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Summer 1996), 98-118.
- Veith, Ilza. "The Strategic Bonins," *Far Eastern Survey*, Vol. 14, No. 21 (October 24, 1945), 307-309.
- Wakabayashi, Chiyo. "Senryo Shoki Okinawa ni Okeru Beigunkichika to 'Jichi' (Base and 'Self-Government' in Okinawa Under U.S. Military Occupation), 1945-1946," *Kokusai Seiji* (International Relations), Vol. 120 (February 1999), 10-27.
- Wakabayashi, Chiyo. "Occupation and 'Self-Government' 1945-1946," *Social Science Japan*, No. 14 (November 1998), 17-18.
- Ward, Robert E. "Presurrender Planning for the Allied Occupation of Japan." A Paper for the Allied Occupation of Japan Conference of the Social Science Research Council, Maui, Hawaii, 1978.
- Watanabe, Akio. "Foreign Policy Making, Japanese Style," *International Affairs*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (January 1978), 75-88.
- "We Have Colonial Troubles Also (Editorial)," *Christian Century*, Vol. 73, No. 27 (July 4, 1956), 795.
- Weigert, Hans W. "U.S. Strategic Bases and Collective Security," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 35, No. 2 (January 1947), 250-262.
- Wurfel, David. "Okinawa: Irrendenta on the Pacific," *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 35, No. 4 (Winter 1962-1963), 353-374.